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Abstract1 
 
The goal of this dissertation is not only to bring two intellectual traditions into conversation 
with each other, but also to explore the resolution to their potential incompatibility in a 
multicultural and multilingual context. The protagonists of the current study are Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938) and Chinese Yogācārins, both known for their investigation of 
consciousness. Aside from their similar views of intentionality, there is a perceived 
incompatibility in their clarifications of the nature of reality: for Chinese Yogācārins, 
everything is empty of essence (svabhāva) whereas Husserl affirms the existence of essence 
and articulates phenomenology as the study of essence. From this conflicting view, there 
arises the problem of essence: If Husserl and Yogācārins derive incompatible standpoints 
regarding the nature of reality from their different views of essence, is it possible to make the 
claim that Yogācāra Buddhism belongs under the same umbrella as Husserl’s 
phenomenology? 
 
Drawing on previous research, this dissertation reveals and resolves the problem of essence. 
This resolution is imperative insofar as it secures the foundation for a comparative study of 
phenomenology and Yogācāra, which further deepens our understanding of what is involved 
when a philosophical comparison is made across a cultural and linguistic divide. Solving the 
problem of essence epitomizes how we can tackle disputes between two traditions in a 
multilingual and multicultural context. Instead of making an overarching claim, my 
dissertation argues that what Husserl means by essence differs from what Chinese 
Yogācārins mean by svabhāva. If Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins do not have a real dispute 
over essence, the problem of essence is eventually NOT a problem. Although the problem of 
essence is not an obstacle, it is also not irrelevant. Investigating the problem of essence brings 
to the forefront a number of important implications for a comparative study of philosophical 
traditions in a multicultural and multilingual context. This is the major contribution of my 
dissertation to the field.   
 
The relationship between phenomenology and Yogācāra is encapsulated in the Zen capping 
phrase, “our road is the same but we travel in different wheel tracks (同軌不同轍)” (ZS 210). 
This road-track-destination analogy, which inspires this dissertation’s title, further provides 
its organizing principle. The first part focuses on the road, on which both traditions present 
similar accounts of intentionality. The second part analyses their different articulations of 
essence, which demonstrates how their tracks start to diverge. The last part of the dissertation 
explores their destination, where they prescribe the path to liberation. On his journey, Husserl 
strives to cure the existential crisis in modern Europe. He therefore outlines the principle for 
liberation but does not provide the mechanics for realizing it. Different from the nascent 
version of soteriology in Husserl, Chinese Yogācārins put forward an elaborate system of 
religious training known as the Bodhisattvas’ path, which guides sentient beings in realizing 
awakening. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Keywords: Buddhist Phenomenology; Problem of Essence; Edmund Husserl; Chinese Yogācāra; Xuanzang; 
Descriptive-Explicative-Prescriptive; Self-Knowledge; Other Minds; Conceptualism; Objectivity; Authenticity; 
Transcendental Idealism; Emptiness; Contemplation; Ethics; Pure Land 
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Résumé2 
 
Le but de cette thèse est non seulement d’apporter deux traditions intellectuelles à la 
conversation, mais aussi d’explorer la solution de leur incompatibilité potentielle dans un 
contexte multiculturel et multilingue. Les protagonistes de cette étude sont Edmund Husserl 
(1859-1938) et les Yogācārins chinois, deux sont connus pour leurs recherches sur la 
conscience. Au lieu de leur conceptions similaires de l’intentionnalité au niveau 
épistémologique, il existe une incompatibilité perçue dans leurs clarifications de la nature de 
la réalité: pour les Yogācārins chinois, tout est vide de l’essence (svabhāva), alors que 
Husserl affirme l’existence d’essence et formule la phénoménologie comme une science de 
l’essence. De cette incompatibilité perçue, le problème de l’essence survient: si Husserl et les 
Yogācārins tirent des positions incompatibles sur la nature de la réalité de leurs conceptions 
différentes de l’essence, est-il possible de proposer que le Bouddhisme Yogācāra appartient 
au même parapluie que celui de la phénoménologie chez Husserl? 
 
Profitant des recherches suivantes, cette thèse révèle et résout le problème de l’essence. Cette 
solution est impérative, parce qu’elle assure la base d'une étude comparative de la 
phénoménologie et du Yogācāra. De plus, elle approfondit notre compréhension de ce qui est 
impliqué, quand une comparaison philosophique est faite à travers un clivage culturel et 
linguistique. Cette solution du problème de l’essence représente comment on pourrait 
résoudre un conflit entre deux traditions dans un contexte multilingue et multiculturel. Au 
lieu de faire une conclusion générale, ma thèse soutient que ce que Husserl veut dire par 
«essence» est diffèrent de ce que les Yogācārins chinois veulent dire par svabhāva. Si 
Husserl et les Yogācārins chinois n’ont pas de conflit sur l’essence, ce problème de l’essence 
se trouve finalement PAS un problème. Bien que le problème de l’essence ne soit pas un 
obstacle, il n’est pas non plus sans importance. L’étude du problème de l’essence présente un 
nombre d’implications importantes pour une étude comparative des traditions philosophiques 
dans un contexte multiculturel et multilingue. C’est la contribution majeure de ma thèse au 
terrain. 
 
La relation entre les deux est résumée par la Zen phrase, «notre route est la même mais nous 
voyageons sur des traces de roues différentes (同軌不同轍)» (ZS 210). Cette analogie de 
route-trace-destination, qui inspire le titre, fournit également le principe d’organisation de 
cette thèse. La première partie est centrée sur la route, sur laquelle les deux traditions ont 
présenté des comptes rendus similaires de l’intentionnalité. La deuxième partie analyse leurs 
différentes articulations d’essence, qui montrent comment leurs traces commencent à 
diverger. La dernière partie explore leur destination où ils prescrivent le chemin de la 
libération. Au cours de son voyage, Husserl s’efforce de remédier à la crise existentielle dans 
l'Europe moderne. Il expose donc le principe de la libération mais il ne fournit pas les 
mécanismes pour réaliser cette libération. Différentes de la version naissante de la 
sotériologie chez Husserl, les Yogācārins chinois ont mis en avant un système élaboré 
d’entraînement religieux, connu sous le nom de chemin des Bodhisattvas, qui guide tout le 
monde vers l’éveil. 
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A Note on Usage and Convention 
 
ROMANIZATION  
All non-English terms are italicized; these include terms in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, 
French, German, Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit. For the romanization of Chinese characters, I 
use the pinyin system rather than that of Wade-Giles. English paraphrasing of Chinese terms 
is usually followed by the italicized pinyin and characters in classical Chinese, for instance, 
body-function (tiyong 體⽤). Some Chinese terms are translations of Sanskrit concepts. In 
those cases, English translations of Chinese terms are followed by the italicized Chinese 
pinyin, the characters in classical Chinese, and the original Sanskrit word, for instance, 
condition (yuan 緣, pratyaya).  
 
NAMES 
Names of persons in this dissertation are written as a given person would write it himself or 
herself, or as it appears in their own publications. For monks and clerics, I directly refer to 
them by their dharma names, for example, Xuanzang (⽞奘 602-664).   
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Prologue: The Problem of Essence in Buddhist Phenomenology  
 
The goal of this dissertation is not only to bring two philosophical traditions into 
conversation with each other, but also to explore how their perceived incompatibilities might 
be resolved. The protagonists of the current study are Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and 
Chinese Yogācārins, both known for their investigations of consciousness. The similarities 
and dissimilarities between the two are encapsulated in the Zen capping phrase, “Our road is 
the same but we travel in different wheel tracks (同軌不同轍)” (ZS 210), which inspires the 
title of this dissertation.  
For Husserl, one enters the field of phenomenology whenever one initiates an 
investigation of the intentional characteristics of consciousness (Hua 19/5; Hua3/156).  
Consciousness is intentional, because it is always the consciousness of something for 
someone (Hua 3/181). Most scholars acknowledge that Husserl’s phenomenology shows 
great potential for doing comparative studies, insofar as it provides an approach to theories of 
the mind presented in non-Western traditions, including Yogācāra Buddhism (Kern 1992; 
Lusthaus 2003; Ni 2009, 2010; Arnold 2012; Coseru 2012; Garfield 2015).  
Commonly referred to as the School of Mind-only or Consciousness-only (weishi 唯識, 
vijñaptimātra), Yogācāra is one of the major Mahāyāna schools, dating back to the 300s CE. 
Within the Yogācāra tradition, this dissertation focuses on its development in China, 
especially the teachings articulated by Xuanzang (⽞奘 602-664) and his disciples Kuiji (窺
基 632-682), Huizhao (慧沼 650-714), and Zhizhou (智周 668-723). In their doctrine of 
Consciousness-only, Chinese Yogācārins characterize consciousness through its intentional 
feature of causing mental acts to know objective phenomena (T31N1585, P1a29).3   
                                                        
3 The causal relationship as well as its association with intentionality in the Yogācāra framework will be 
elaborated upon in the first section of Chapter 4.  
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The Yogācāra characterization of consciousness permits, at least in principle, the 
possibility of comparative studies between Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism and Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Indeed, considering the way in which Yogācāra philosophy explores the 
intentional feature of consciousness, comparative scholars propose to read this philosophy as 
a phenomenology in the Buddhist sense, namely, as a Buddhist phenomenology. Many 
philosophers, Ni Liangkang in China, Iso Kern in Europe, and Dan Lusthaus in North 
America, have embarked on such research projects (Ni 2009, 2010; Kern 1992; Lusthaus 
2003). However, in their fruitful studies of the similar views on the intentional feature of 
consciousness and production of knowledge preserved in phenomenology and Yogācāra 
literature, these scholars have not yet examined the theoretical foundations that support these 
respective doctrines of intentionality. They have not brought to light basic concepts, such as 
essence (svabhāva in Buddhism and wesen in phenomenology), which inform both theories. 
As a result, they have left unresolved the perceived incompatibility of Yogācāra and 
Husserlian views of “essence”, namely, that which defines what a thing really is.4  
In Husserl’s phenomenology, essence is a crucial and complex notion, the meaning of 
which is made even more complicated by the tendency of English translators to render 
several different terms used by Husserl – wesen, eidos and essenz – as simply “essence” (Hua 
3/12-13). Husserl devises phenomenology as a science of essence (Hua 3/4). In his own 
words, “this phenomenology … has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable 
and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived 
and treated as real facts” (Hua 19/2). Although essence is fundamental to Husserl’s 
                                                        
4 For our purposes here, it is important to introduce readers to the rich nuance of this term, “essence”. In 
contemporary philosophy, scholars employ the notion of essence to capture the necessary attributes or properties 
that cannot be lacked by an object (Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Correia 2007; Cowling 2013; Denby 2014; 
Wildman 2013; Zalta 2006). For a preliminary review of this discussion on essence and essential properties, see 
Philip Atkins and Teresa Robertson (2016). What Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins mean by essence can be 
demarcated from the contemporary characterization of essence; this will be detailed in Chapter 7. Due to the 
intellectual history in the East and West, it is rather difficult to offer one fixed definition of this concept. 
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phenomenology, this concept seems to have escaped the attention of contemporary 
phenomenologists and philosophers of mind who engage themselves in the study of Husserl 
(De Warren 2006). 
Essence is equally crucial for understanding the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness. The 
English term “essence” has been frequently employed by Buddhist scholars to translate the 
Sanskrit word svabhāva.5 Etymologically, svabhāva derives from sva-, which means “self” or 
“own”, and -bhāva, the literal meaning of which is “coming into existence”. As such, 
svabhāva indicates an existence that comes into being on its own, self-determining, and 
invariant across time and space. Considering how svabhāva describes the sui generis, 
intrinsic nature of the existence of sentient and non-sentient beings, it has been frequently 
translated as “essence” in English language scholarship of Buddhist studies.6 The changing 
stances toward svabhāva almost encapsulate the development of Buddhist doctrinal 
philosophy in India, during which the Mahāyāna tradition arose as a critique of the Hīnayāna, 
or what we now call Theravāda Buddhism.7 Theravāda clerics negate the svabhāvic self-
existence of sentient beings like humans or animals (insofar as their self is made up of five 
aggregates and will dissolve eventually), but they affirm the svabhāvic self-existence of non-
                                                        
5 In Chapter 7, we will delve deeper into how the English term “essence” has been used to translate at least three 
different terms in the Chinese languages. This discussion will inform us how the nuance of this term “essence” 
is very different from that in contemporary studies of epistemology.   
6 The English translations of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā can epitomize this way of translating 
svabhāva. Let us take a look of three widely used translations accomplished by David Kalupahana (1986), by 
Jay Garfield (1995), and most recently by Mark Siderits and Katsura Shōryū (2013). Kalupahana translated 
svabhāva as substance which is further equated with essence (Kalupahana 1986, 15). Garfield directly used 
essence to translate svabhāva (Garfield 1995, 19). Siderits and Katsura first translated svabhāva as intrinsic 
nature that is later considered synonymous with essence (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 81).  
7 As to be further clarified in Chapter 6, the refutation of svabhāva has been articulated in different manners. 
The Mādhyamikas mainly take the metaphysical approach whereas the Yogācāra approach, due to its 
indebtedness to the Ābhidharmic tradtion, is mainly epistemological. Nevertheless, as I will argue, the 
epistemological account provided by Yogācārins paves the way for their metaphysical discussion of svabhāva. 
As for what kind of metaphysical position that can be inferred from the notion of svabhāva, scholars are 
debating with each other. Mark Siderits characterizes the svabhāvic viewpoint as an expression of metaphysical 
realism, which defines reality as self-determining through causality and, therefore, mind-independent in one’s 
experience (Siderits 1988, 321-324). Such a definition of metaphysical realism is also utilized by Husserlian 
scholars to describe naturalism (Zahavi 2010b). I am grateful to Garth Green’s suggestion that I need to clarify 
the relationship between dependence on causaility and dependence on the mind in the discussion of 
metaphysical realism. 
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sentient dharmas (T45N1861, P249a19). One argument provided by Theravāda clerics from 
an epistemological point of view is articulated in the following manner: external objects are 
directly given to the mind through affection and, if that is the case, the stimuli qua external 
objects must have an existence on their own, independent of sentient beings (Lin 2009, 121). 
As followers of the Mahāyāna tradition, Yogācārins refute the Theravāda view of reality. In 
their refutation, Yogācārins contend that the mind of a sentient being does not passively 
receive given objects but rather actively serves as the condition for the possibility of these 
objects to appear as phenomena. Therefore, every object depends on the mind for appearing 
as a phenomenon in a sentient being’s experience. If the perceiver qua the sentient being has 
no svabhāvic existence, neither does the perceived object. As such, everything in the cosmos 
is empty of such svabhāvic self-existence (T31N1585, P1b9). T.R.V. Murti compares this 
paradigm shift in Indian philosophy – from how things are given to the mind to how the mind 
actively serves as the condition of knowledge – to a “Copernican Revolution” in the Kantian 
sense (Murti 1955, 123).  
 “Essence” presents a problem for a comparative study of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism 
and Husserl’s phenomenology for a number of reasons; the crux being that while Husserl 
appears to affirm the existence of essence in consciousness (Hua 3/43), Chinese Yogācārins 
refute the concept of essence altogether. If Husserl and Yogācārins derive incompatible 
standpoints regarding the nature of reality from their different views of essence, is it possible 
to make the claim that Yogācāra Buddhism belongs under the same umbrella as Husserl’s 
phenomenology?  
Determining an answer to this question would be relatively simple if not for the fact that 
Husserl’s concept of “essence” undergoes a number of changes and transformations 
throughout different phases of his philosophical thinking. For instance, in Ideas Pertaining to 
a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, commonly referred to as 
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Ideas I, Husserl differentiates essence (essenz) from existence (existenz), and essence (eidos) 
from matters of fact, for the purpose of demarcating phenomenological ideality from factual 
reality. As he clarifies (Hua 3/11-12):  
The essence (eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an 
individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence.  
 
To the essential difference between the intuitions there corresponds the essential relationship between 
“existence” (here obviously in the sense of individual factual existent) and “essence”, between matters of 
fact and eidos.8  
 
Nonetheless, as Ideas I unfolds, Husserl does not stick to such distinctions. Instead of giving 
one fixed definition of the concept of essence, Husserl places on this notion a wide range of 
meanings. If that is the case, a closer investigation of this concept is required. In Chapters 5 
and 7, I trace three stages in the development of Husserl’s conception of essence. In stage 
one, namely, in his pre-transcendental writings, Husserl delineates essence from actually 
existent realities, therefore, defining essence, not as contingent, accidental matters of fact but 
rather as the ideal union of both the form and matter of a mental act (Hua 19/417-418). On 
the basis of this definition, Husserl continues to distinguish the intentional (intentionale) 
essence from the semantic (bedeutungsmäßig) essence. In stage two, after his transcendental 
turn, Husserl draws the line between post-epoché essence and pre-epoché essence. That being 
said, for naturalists, there exists a naturalistic essence,9 which is a general abstraction of 
existent facts (Hua 3/42), to be contrasted with the eidetic essence, which is an ideal union of 
noesis and noema (Hua 3/184). In the last stage, when Husserl expands his phenomenological 
                                                        
8 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 9-11). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Das Wesen (Eidos) ist ein neuartiger Gegenstand. So wie das Gegebene der individuellen oder erfahrenden 
Anschauung ein individueller Gegenstand ist, so das Gegebene der Wesensanschauung ein reines Wesen. 
Den Wesen-unterschieden der Anschauungen korrespondieren die Wesensbeziehungen zwischen 
‚Existenz‘ (hier offenbar im Sinne von individuell Da-seiendem) und ‚Essenz‘ zwischen Tatsche und Eidos“. 
9 I use the term “materialistic” and “naturalistic” to describe a reductionist view that reduces perceived objects 
into mere matters of fact. What is “materialistic” differs from that which is “material”. For Husserl, the material 
essence is another way of expressing the essence of the matter of the intending act, which Husserl later refers to 
as the noematic essence (Hua 3/22). Likewise, “naturalistic” is used to describe a quality that differs from what 
is “natural”. The former characterizes how someone with a natural attitude perceives various objects to be 
existing on their own, an existence that is is self-determining and thus independent from the mind, whereas the 
latter entails what is empirically real. 
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investigation from individual consciousness to collective consciousness, he further 
accentuates the genetic nature of the essence for each person as a twofold a priori of its being 
in the world and being with others (Hua 1/101; Hua 6/5, 255).  
This preliminary presentation indicates why it is a challenge to determine what Husserl 
precisely means by “essence”. For now, it remains unclear whether the Husserlian essence 
entails the sense of “coming into being on its own”, namely, the sense of svabhāva. If that 
would be the case, Yogācāra Buddhists would refute the Husserlian notion of essence, as well 
as his phenomenology. Therefore, the first question we shall address is, what exactly do 
Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins mean when they use the term “essence”?  
The question at stake is further compounded by the multilingual context. Both Chinese 
Yogācārins and Husserl have appropriated terms from other languages (Sanskrit/Greek) to 
explain their philosophical standpoints and translated those terms into their native tongues 
(Chinese/German). These multiple terms of disparate origins continue to be translated into 
English as the singular concept of “essence”. In order to reach a common ground from which 
a comparative project can begin, this complicated term and its Chinese, Sanskrit, German, 
and Greek homeomorphic equivalents must be scrutinized within the perspective of their own 
traditions. Stemming from such a wide range of challenges, there arises what I call the 
Problem of Essence.10  
Though never coining the term problem of essence, many comparative scholars have 
discerned how the notion of “essence” can present issues to the interpretation of Buddhist 
conceptions of consciousness, as well as to a comparative project of Buddhism and Western 
philosophy. These scholars, however, have gradually refrained from inquiring into whether 
consciousness and other beings have a svabhāvic essence, namely, an intrinsic nature of 
                                                        
10 A preliminary analysis of the problem of essence has been done by the author in the paper, “Buddhist 
Phenomenology and the Problem of Essence” (Li 2016). 
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coming into existence on their own, by which scholars can focus on the discussion of how the 
intentional structure of consciousness contributes to the acquisition of knowledge. This 
tendency can be generally observed in the studies of Yogācāra and philosophy of mind 
(including Husserl’s early writings). For instance, when comparing Dharmakīrti’s theory of 
the mind (c. 500s -600s) with modern philosophy, Dan Arnold remarks how this Indian 
Yogācāra master is vulnerable to his own critique of physicalism (Arnold 2012, 47).11 This 
remark reveals Arnold’s awareness of the problem of essence. As detailed by Arnold, 
Dharmakīrti seems to formulate ambivalent views when implicitly perceiving reality as 
existing on its own, but explicitly refuting such realism with his critique of svabhāva (Arnold 
2012, 47). Given this potential ambivalence, Arnold avows that “Dharmakīrti’s philosophical 
project may in the end share precisely the presuppositions that most significantly and 
problematically characterize physicalism” (Arnold 2012, 47). Conjecturing that Dharmakīrti 
would actually be a svabhāvist, Arnold refrains from further examination of the problem of 
essence. Christian Coseru categorizes Dharmakīrti’s ambivalent stance toward svabhāva as 
one of the many “discontinuities” or “inconsistencies” in the philosophical writings 
composed by Indian Buddhist clerics (Coseru 2013, 39). Upon elaborating how Śāntarakṣita 
and Kamalaśīla’s conceptions of reality also create tensions with their negation of svabhāva, 
Coseru suggests that one should ask “whether such inconsistencies reflect an attempt to 
reveal the inherently contradictory nature of the subjective domain when confronted with the 
objective order of logical truths”, rather than strive to resolve these inconsistencies (Coseru 
2013, 41).   
In the comparative scholarship on Husserl’s phenomenology and Chinese Yogācāra, 
discussions of the problem of essence have been suspended in a similar fashion. For instance, 
                                                        
11 By physicalism, Arnold means a “strictly metaphysical view, namely that all that exists is physical in nature”, 
which undergirds modern philosophy of mind (Arnold 2012, 246). The way in which physicalism defines reality 
as metaphysically mind-independent and sui generis is in conformity with the Buddhist notion of svabhāva. 
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Iso Kern does not inquire into the Yogācāra critique of svabhāva or the Husserlian notion of 
essence, a limitation of which Kern is fully aware (Kern 1992, 268).12 Inspired by Kern, Ni 
Liangkang examines similarities and dissimilarities between Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Chinese Yogācāra. He immediately discovers a divergence between the two (Ni 2010, 85-86):  
With the assertion that “internal consciousness exists, and the external world inexists”, the acceptable 
conclusion of consciousness and world for phenomenology, Yogacara goes a step further, asserting that 
grasping at internal consciousness as real is still [part of the]“incorrect tenets”. So both “attachment to self” 
and “attachment to things” are seen as “attachments to heterodoxy” which should be refuted. According to a 
text, the Buddha said, “all things have no objects, no arising, and no passing away, are originally quiescent, 
and are in cessation.” Phenomenology diverges from Yogacara, when it insists that all objects dissolve into 
consciousnesses, and that the objectivity dissolves into subjectivity, inasmuch as it treats consciousness as 
the only real existence, and ascribes the transcendental objectivity (as the achievement of reflection) to 
subjectivity, the radical basis of knowledge. 
 
This passage can be viewed as Ni’s expression of the problem of essence insofar as he 
discerns the tension between the Buddhist critique of svabhāva as epitomized in the Buddha’s 
teaching of all things having no self-existence, and Husserl’s essentialist view of 
consciousness (“consciousness as the only real existence”). Subsequently, Ni explains to the 
reader how he shall center his comparative study on the analysis of the intentional structure, 
not the existential nature, of consciousness. Similar to Ni, Dan Lusthaus advocates reading 
“Yogācārin’s treatment of vijñapti-mātra (Consciousness-only) as an epistemic caution, not 
an ontological pronouncement” (Lusthaus 2003, 6). Understood as such, the idea of being 
empty of svabhāva, or, in short, the idea of emptiness (kongxing 空性), does not entail any 
ontological commitment but rather indicates an epistemic conditionality “in which distinct 
entities involved in the conditional process do not need to be isolated and identified” 
(Lusthaus 2003, 462).  
Drawing on previous research, this dissertation not only reveals the problem of essence, 
                                                        
12 Kern is fully aware of the fact that he has neglected many key elements of the Yogācāra theory of the mind, 
especially those that are related to metaphysics and soteriology (Kern 1992, 268). Nonetheless, he hopes his 
research could inspire later scholars to continue working on comparing Yogācāra and phenomenology. In 
Kern’s terms, “my making a link between phenomenology and the thinking of Vijñānavāda merely intended to 
let occidental phenomenologists guess that Vijñānavāda may be for them a treasure house to be explored and 
tapped” (Kern 1992, 268). 
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but also attempts to resolve it. From my vantage point, this resolution is imperative insofar as 
it secures the foundation of a comparative study of phenomenology and Yogācāra, further 
deepening our understanding of what is involved when a philosophical comparison is made 
across a cultural and linguistic divide. Resolving the problem of essence epitomizes how we 
can tackle disputes between two traditions in a multicultural and multilingual context. When 
one English concept has been evoked by scholars from different cultural and intellectual 
traditions to translate a wide range of ideas from non-English languages, these scholars may 
encounter scenarios in which they endorse incompatible understandings of this concept. If 
that is the case, it becomes necessary to examine nuances of the concept in question for the 
purpose of abating misunderstanding and advancing mutual understanding. The problem of 
essence coined in this dissertation thereby serves as an exemplar of such potential 
incompatibility.  
Instead of making an overarching claim, my dissertation argues that what Husserl means 
by essence differs from what Chinese Yogācārins mean by svabhāva. If Husserl and Chinese 
Yogācārins do not have a real dispute over essence, the problem of essence is eventually 
NOT a problem. Although the problem of essence is not an obstacle, it is also not irrelevant. 
Investigating the problem of essence brings to the forefront a number of important 
implications for a comparative study of philosophical traditions in a multicultural, 
multilingual context. This is the major contribution of my dissertation to the field. Three 
aspects of my argument can be further elaborated:   
(1) In defining phenomenology as a science of essence, Husserl means “essence” in the 
phenomenological sense, not in the naturalistic, materialistic sense. While the 
naturalistic essence entails the svabhāvic existence, the phenomenological essence, 
also known as eidos, is not associated with any self-determining, immutable quality. 
As such, eidos is universal but not sui generis (Hua 3/4), perceptible but not factual 
(Hua 1/417; Hua 3/5), ideal but not transcendent to intersubjectively accessible reality 
(Hua 10/93-94; Hua 6/212; Hua 19/745). It defines what it is like to appear in pure 
consciousness, further tantamount to the a priori that undergirds the structure of 
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intentionality (Hua 18/240; Hua 19/609; Hua 1/83).13  
 
(2) Both Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins are critical of an essence in the naturalistic, 
svabhāvic sense. In their refutation of svabhāva (zixing ⾃性) and in their articulation 
of “emptiness” (kongxing 空性), Chinese Yogācārins have provided a very affirmative 
characterization of being and existence (T31N1585, P39b14-19).14 Such an 
affirmative articulation allows Chinese Yogācārins to advocate a worldview that is 
similar to Husserl’s definition of transcendental idealism. Thereby, what looks like an 
incompatibility in their attitudes towards essence, reveals, in fact, their similar 
viewpoints regarding how things actually are. 
 
(3) Since Husserl’s conception of eidos does not contradict the Yogācāra notion of 
svabhāva, the problem of essence can be resolved. This resolution secures the 
foundation of the current comparative project and serves to advance our philosophical 
understanding of both intellectual traditions. On the one hand, Husserl’s 
phenomenology entails a two-level study of the human mind: it first describes 
intentionality (Hua 3/156) and then explains an idealist worldview (Hua 3/148).15 On 
the other hand, Yogācāra Buddhism provides a three-level study of consciousness: at 
the descriptive level, it portrays the intentional structure of eight different types of 
consciousness (T31N1585, P1a14); at the explicative level, it expounds an idealist 
worldview through the interpretation of emptiness (T31N1585, P1a13); at the 
prescriptive level, it preaches a practice-oriented Buddhist ethics (T31N1585, 
P48b11).  
 
To illustrate the difference between and the interdependence of the views of Husserl and 
Chinese Yogācārins, I borrow the following verse from the Zen capping phrases, “our road is 
the same but we travel in different wheel tracks (同軌不同轍)” (ZS 210). This road-track-
destination analogy not only inspires the title, but also provides the organizing principle of 
this dissertation. In this analogy, the road symbolizes the descriptive level at which these two 
schools of thought articulate their theories of knowledge and describe what is commonly 
referred to as the intentional structure of mental acts. The different wheel tracks represent the 
explicative level at which the two parties elucidate the nature of reality and subsequently 
                                                        
13 Since intentionality amounts to a structure in which the subjective act of perceiving and the objective 
phenomenon to be perceived mutually constitute each other, it has already implied an understandable sense of 
this very object. Thus, when saying that essence consists in intentionality, Husserl has already assumed essence 
in an ideal sense (Ricoeur 1967, 108). As such, essence entails not only the ideal sense per se but also the 
structure that generates this sense, commonly known as intentionality: this we will detail in Chapter 5.   
14 To demarcate the Buddhist essence from the Husserlian one, the dissertation will continue to use the Sanskrit 
term svabhāva. 
15 Or, in Husserl’s terms, it is both the “descriptive doctrine of essence (deskriptive Wesenslehre)” (Hua 3/156)   
and the “eidetic clarification (Wesenklärung)” of the possibility of such a descriptive doctrine (Hua 3/148)”. 
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demonstrate seemingly opposite appraisals of essence. The destination of the journey 
represents the last prescriptive level. On his journey, Husserl strives to cure the existential 
crisis in modern Europe. Therefore, he outlines principles for each individual to liberate 
themselves from such a crisis and for each community to renew its culture. However, Husserl 
does not prescribe the mechanics for realizing liberation and renewing communal life. 
Different from the nascent version of soteriology preserved in Husserl’s writings, Chinese 
Yogācārins establish an elaborate system of religious training that guides sentient beings in 
following the Bodhisattvas’ path towards awakening. This soteriology at the prescriptive 
level eventually makes Yogācāra Buddhism more than a Buddhist version of 
phenomenology. Inspired by Husserl, later phenomenologists, inter alia, Edith Stein (1891-
1942) and Michel Henry (1922-2002), continue to explore the prescriptive level in their 
respective articulations of ethics and phenomenological theology.  
Just as the road, the tracks, and the destination are integral parts of one’s travel as a 
whole, so are the three levels interrelated. It is important to keep in mind that the three 
categories of “descriptive”, “explicative”, and “prescriptive” are neither mutually exclusive 
nor jointly exhaustive. Indeed, any philosophical theorization entails a process of 
generalizing facts and data. This dissertation is no exception. These three categories cannot 
exhaust every aspect of phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism, nor encompass every 
single concept formulated by Husserl or Chinese Yogācārins; rather, together, they serve as a 
skillful means, namely, as an attempt to help readers access these two schools of thought. 
Acknowledging its own limitations, the dissertation cherishes the hope of motivating scholars 
to continue the investigation and to deepen the understanding of these two intellectual 
traditions, the same way that previous studies have inspired the current research project.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Our road is the same 
but we travel in different wheel tracks.  
同軌不同轍 
Zen Sand 
 
If, by entering foreign language-worlds, we overcome the 
prejudices and limitations of our previous experience of 
the world, this does not mean that we leave and negate 
our own world. Like travellers we return home with new 
experiences. Even if we emigrate and never return, we 
still can never wholly forget. Even if, as people who 
know about history, we are fundamentally aware that all 
human thought about the world is historically 
conditioned, and thus are aware that our own thought is 
conditioned too, we still have not assumed an 
unconditional standpoint.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer,  
Truth and Method 
 
 
In the prologue, we have brought to light the three-level (descriptive-explicative-prescriptive) 
framework and the road-track-destination analogy. This chapter explains why this framework 
is an appropriate tool for doing a comparative analysis. To do so, I first address the general 
methodological question to explore how comparative studies of philosophy can promote and 
contribute to the exchanges of views in a multicultural and multilingual society. I put forward 
the “both-and” approach that can maintain the distinctiveness of each tradition while making 
explicit their middle ground and manifesting their interconnectedness. Employing the both-
and approach, I continue to offer a historical overview of the development of Yogācāra 
Buddhism and Husserl’s phenomenology, respectively. I contend that the structure of one 
Yogācāra text, known as the Chengweishilun (成唯識論, Treatise on the Perfection of 
Consciousness-only), provides a paradigm for studying Yogācāra Buddhism which can also 
be adapted and applied to Husserl’s phenomenology. Stemming from this paradigm, there 
arises the three-level (descriptive-explicative-prescriptive) framework.  
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1.1 Comparative Philosophy and Multiculturalism  
In the first section, we enquire into how philosophers can conduct comparative studies of 
ideas to promote cross-cultural communications. Turning to the scholarship, we find two 
widely-adopted approaches, which I refer to as synthetic and juxtapositional, respectively, in 
this dissertation. After examining each approach, I elaborate on their limits. Thereafter, I 
introduce a third approach that can serve as an alternative for comparative studies.  
Philosophers propose the synthetic approach to assimilating various traditions into a new 
architectonic as a way of overcoming the divide among said traditions. What epitomizes this 
synthetic approach is Max Müller’s (1823-1900) project of universal religion, dating back to 
the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1893, Müller expressed a yearning for this 
universal religion in the Parliament of Religions in Chicago: “What can be more disturbing 
and distressing than to see the divisions in our own religion, and likewise the divisions in the 
eternal and universal religion of mankind?” (Müller 2002, 350). Here, universal religion 
arose as the solution to this disturbing and distressing situation. As envisaged by Müller, 
“above and beneath and behind all religions there is one eternal, one universal religion, a 
religion to which every man, whether black, or white, or yellow, or red, belongs or may 
belong” (Müller 2002, 350). Nonetheless, Müller acknowledged only eight religions as 
legitimate ones throughout human history, which are, “Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianity, 
Mosaism, Zoroastrianism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism, Daoism” (Müller 2002, 346). 
The ways in which Müller over-generalized religious traditions for the purpose of 
discovering the one eternal, universal truth, have been thoroughly scrutinized and criticized.   
To refrain from assuming the existence of a higher truth and also to preserve the 
distinctiveness of each tradition, most comparative scholars, especially those who work on 
phenomenology and Yogācāra philosophy, turn to the juxtapositional approach. As such, they 
shun “a third privileged system, or an objective vantage point external to both of them” 
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(Lusthaus 2003, vi). Some scholars focus on conscious activities and mental states at the 
descriptive level (Arnold 2012; Coseru 2012; Varela et. al. 1991; Kern 1992), while others 
highlight idealist worldviews at the explicative level (Ni 2010; Garfield 2015). Through the 
juxtapositional approach, scholars propose to understand Yogācāra Buddhism as a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology. As Dan Lusthaus suggests, Buddhist phenomenology is a 
“philosophical translation of Yogācāra into the idiom of phenomenology”, which fulfils the 
purpose of expressing the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness in phenomenological terms, 
and subsequently attempts to bridge the gaps between Buddhologists and phenomenologists 
(Lusthaus 2003).  
The juxtapositional approach emerges as a critique of and a reflection on the previously 
predominant synthetic approach. For a long time, comparative scholars have pondered how to 
go beyond the limit of juxtaposition and how to bridge the gaps between various 
philosophical traditions. This is the concern addressed by Bo Mou, “how they could learn 
from each other and jointly and constructively contribute to a common philosophical 
enterprise have become pressing in philosophical circles” (Mou 2003, xv). Similarly, 
Lusthaus avows that “this is only a starting effort. Hopefully, others will carry this type of 
project further, and explore the possibilities opened here in greater depth and detail” 
(Lusthaus 2003, vii). One option to carry this type of project further is known as “fusion or 
confluence philosophy”, the proponent of which is Mark Siderits (Siderits 2003, 2014). The 
proposal of fusion philosophy soon animates another scholarly debate. 
Envisioning fusion philosophy as the future of comparative philosophy or 
comparativism, Siderits speaks of fusion philosophers as those “who see problem-solving as 
central to philosophy, and who also believe that the counterpoising of distinct traditions can 
yield useful results in this endeavor” (Siderits 2003, 1). The intent of fusion philosophy is 
“not to point to similarities and differences, but instead to try to solve a philosophical 
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problem” (Siderits 2016, 129). According to Siderits, unlike traditionally-defined 
comparative philosophy, which juxtaposes various schools of thought as separate entities, 
fusion philosophy positions itself as an attempt to break the boundary of cultures to resolve 
one specific problem (Siderits 2015, 78-80). Critics of fusion philosophy have expressed 
concerns not only about the “generalization and vagueness that glosses over significant 
differences”, but also about the way of extracting ideas from the cultural-philosophical 
context, with which they are embedded (Levine 2016; 2017; Nylan and Verhoeven 2016).16 
Indeed, prima facie, fusion philosophy seems to beget a return to what Lusthaus terms “a 
third privileged system” or the type of universalism envisioned by Max Müller. This can be 
seen in Siderits’s claim (Siderits 2015, 79):  
The objection was that individual elements of a philosophical tradition—specific theories, concepts, or 
arguments—cannot be lifted out of their cultural context. But why not? Surely the idea is not that cultures 
are the bearers of intellectual property rights. It must rather have something to do with a kind of meaning 
holism that would make the basic semantic unit not the word or the sentence but the totality of what is said 
in the culture. And this seems prima facie implausible. We do, after all, believe that kimchi continues to be 
kimchi when it goes in a taco. Why suppose we couldn’t do the equivalent in cross-cultural philosophizing, 
for instance putting the Nyāya concept of inherence to new work in the current debate between 
endurantists and perdurantists? Nothing in the notion of a culture as developed so far would seem to give 
us grounds for ruling this out. What would be needed, it seems, is something along the lines of the Whorf-
Sapir hypothesis, some way of supporting the claim that certain concepts cannot be expressed or fully 
grasped outside the cultural context in which they are at home. And while the notion that distinct 
conceptual schemes might somehow be incommensurable continues to have popular appeal, there are good 
Davidsonian reasons to question its coherence.  
 
Siderits’s claim about extractability, that is, philosophical thinking can be lifted out of its 
specific cultural context, triggers the controversy of fusion philosophy. Putting aside the 
question of feasibility, what does Siderits mean by this claim? If Siderits conceives of this 
“lifting out” as a method for philosophers to extract ideas out of their context so as to 
constitute an a-cultural, higher sphere of meaning outside cultures, then his fusion philosophy 
closely approaches that of Max Müller’s universal religion. Another way to interpret “lifting-
out” is as a method that enables people in one culture to go beyond their original worldview, 
                                                        
16 Levine extends his critique to Mou Bo’s constructive engagement model (Mou 2010), insofar as Levine 
rejects the over-generalization of philosophical traditions implied in Mou’s pronouncement of  “constructive 
engagement of distinct approaches toward world Philosophy” (Levine 2016).  
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to recognize their own stereotypes, and to secure a middle ground for dialogue with people 
from another culture. Following this interpretation, fusion philosophy does not resume the 
synthetic approach proposed by Max Müller; instead, it opens up a new perspective for 
comparative scholars. If this is the case, confluence philosophy, instead of becoming the 
future of comparative philosophy, remains one of the many possible models of doing 
comparative studies.  
Therefore, I find it reasonable to keep the name “comparative philosophy” while 
expanding the connotation of this term for the field. The idea that comparative philosophy 
can help different cultures in constituting a middle ground as the shared space of meaning is 
best encapsulated in the following description proposed by the German hermeneutic 
phenomenologist, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) (Gadamer 1998, 464):  
If, by entering foreign language-worlds, we overcome the prejudices and limitations of our previous 
experience of the world, this does not mean that we leave and negate our own world. Like travellers we 
return home with new experiences. Even if we emigrate and never return, we still can never wholly forget. 
Even if, as people who know about history, we are fundamentally aware that all human thought about the 
world is historically conditioned, and thus are aware that our own thought is conditioned too, we still have 
not assumed an unconditional standpoint. 
 
Comparative philosophy, due to its role in cross-cultural exchange, positions itself in and 
finds a way to contribute to a multilingual and multicultural society. Multiculturalism, as 
defined by Charles Taylor, serves as a model for guiding people in one cultural tradition to 
recognize, respect, and appreciate a different tradition. As such, a multicultural society will 
not empower people to isolate themselves from others, in the way that first-class citizens 
would demarcate themselves from second-class ones (Taylor 1992, 27). Nor will it foster a 
homogenous culture, for which the distinctiveness of each culture “has been ignored, glossed 
over, assimilated to a dominant or majority identity” (Taylor 1992, 38). As pinpointed by 
Taylor, although the tendency of homogenizing cultures arises as a reflection on social 
hierarchy, being homogenous is just as biased as being hierarchical, insofar as the 
homogenous narrative “not only suppressed but also failed to appreciate other cultures” 
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(Taylor 1992, 42). Scrutinizing these two models of constructing societies, Taylor proposes a 
third way of perceiving multiculturalism as that which can preserve the distinctiveness of 
each culture without losing the universal value of equal respect (Taylor 1992, 61). People in 
this kind of multicultural society can communicate about cultural differences and learn to 
appreciate dissimilar viewpoints, though they may be unable to convince others of adopting 
their own values (Taylor 1992, 72).  
Throughout history, comparative philosophers have been forerunners of cross-cultural 
exchanges. Their research likewise embodies and epitomizes how thinkers from a wide range 
of cultural and intellectual traditions initiate conversations to examine perceived 
incompatibilities and enhance mutual understanding. Comparative philosophers do not 
believe that each tradition exists as a closed system unable to communicate with others, and 
therefore they do not shun possible tensions. Nor do they close their eyes to 
incommensurability between cultures in an effort to fuse all philosophical traditions into a 
third, higher, culture-neutral sphere. Indeed, as remarked by Taylor, a person who is 
difference-blind is just as biased as someone who is close-minded (Taylor 1992, 44). 
Recognizing and respecting diversity, comparative philosophers can secure a middle ground 
as a shared space of understanding between two philosophical traditions so that people from 
two cultures can discover and tackle potential incompatibilities. As Jiang Tao specifies, such 
a middle ground allows for the possibility of “treat[ing] the theories involved as they are 
within their own contexts first and then examine the very presuppositions behind the 
formulations when they are brought into a new context of a face-to-face dialogical setting” 
(Jiang 2006, 6). That being said, to philosophize does not entail a process of composing 
monologues in an armchair, but rather indicates a chance to participate in dialogues in a 
multicultural society.  
Keeping this possibility in mind, this dissertation embarks on an adventure to 
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simultaneously expand the juxtapositional approach and eschew the synthetic one. The 
current study refers to this expanded approach as the “both-and” approach, considering how 
it enables the dissertation both to indicate how one tradition can be related to the other, and to 
solve the problem of essence so as to secure the foundation of the current comparative 
project. The name “both-and” is inspired by the traveller analogy articulated by Gadamer, 
“the reader who studies a foreign language and literature retains the possibility of free 
movement back to himself, and thus is at once both here and there” (Gadamer 1998, 458). In 
Buddhist terms, both-and epitomizes the idea of the middle way that negates dualities for the 
purpose of disclosing interdependence.  
To maintain their distinctiveness, make explicit their middle ground, and manifest their 
interconnectedness, this dissertation positions Husserl’s phenomenology and Yogācāra 
Buddhism in their concrete contexts. For ideas are cultivated, though not necessarily 
produced, by their intellectual climate. After stripping away the broader context, scholars can 
easily overlook the different “wheel tracks” left by Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins in their 
respective journeys. In virtue of this oversight, they can fail to discern the problem of essence 
in comparative studies of the two schools of thought, further risking overgeneralizing 
Buddhism and phenomenology as manifestations of a higher entity, be it a scientific study of 
the mind or a nihilistic philosophy of life. While eschewing a return to the nineteenth-century 
style of synthetic approach, this dissertation continues to deepen the philosophical 
understanding of the ultimate nature of consciousness as well as the mind-world relationship. 
Consequently, the current study makes the following original contributions to comparative 
scholarship:  
• Regarding methodology, this dissertation initiates the both-and approach to conduct 
comparative studies of two schools of thought, which can be considered as a 
development of the juxtapositional approach and an alternative to the synthetic 
approach.  
 
• Through this approach, the project explores ways in which comparative scholars can 
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promote constructive cross-cultural dialogues in a multilingual society, further 
contributing to multiculturalism.  
 
1.2 Yogācāra Buddhism in China  
Employing the both-and approach, I intend to explore a framework that can be extracted from 
and then applied to both Yogācāra Buddhism and phenomenology. This framework will 
guide us in clarifying how phenomenology can be related to Yogācāra Buddhism, although 
Yogācāra is much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology. In fulfilling this purpose, 
I find it necessary to outline the intellectual history of Yogācāra and phenomenology, 
respectively. Upon completing an overview of the way in which ideas are developed in each 
system, we can proceed to discover a paradigm in their philosophical thinking. The current 
section centres on the philosophical system preserved and presented in Yogācāra literature. I 
contend that the structure of one Yogācāra text, known as the Chengweishilun (成唯識論, 
Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness-only), provides a framework for studying 
Yogācāra Buddhism which can also be adapted and applied to Husserl’s phenomenology. 
In 659 CE, the Chinese monk Xuanzang (⽞奘 602-664) composed the Chengweishilun 
(成唯識論, henceforth referred to as CWSL), in which he detailed the Yogācāra teaching of 
consciousness.17 This text, together with its commentaries written by Xuanzang’s disciples, 
Kuiji (窺基 632-682), Huizhao (慧沼 650-714), and Zhizhou (智周 668-723), became 
foundational for Yogācāra Buddhism in East Asia. At the time of CWSL’s composition, the 
                                                        
17 For a long time, scholars have assumed that CWSL was composed by Dharmapāla in India and translated by 
Xuanzang in China. This interpretation was based, in part, on the Taishō Tripiṭaka’s version of CWSL, which 
began by stating that “Xuanzang received the order from the emperor to translate [the text] 
(xuanzangfengzhaoyi, ⽞奘奉詔譯)” (T31N1585, P1a6). Kuiji explains, however, that when Xuanzang decided 
to write a treatise on the doctrine of Consciousness-only, he foregrounded Dharmapāla’s interpretation of 
Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā (weishisanshisong, 唯識三⼗頌) against the backdrop of doctrinal debates between 
Dharmapāla and other Indian Yogācāra clerics (T43N1830, P229b17). Kuiji’s account of the origin of the text 
suggests that CWSL was originally written by Xuanzang under the influence of Dharmapāla and other Indian 
Yogācārins. This misinterpretation has since been corrected in the English and French translations of CWSL 
composed by Wei Tat (1973), Francis Cook (1999), and Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1928). 
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newly established Tang Empire (618-907 CE) had recently reunited China, putting an end to 
over three hundred years of war and heralding the advent of a new era of prosperity. 
Following China’s reunification, Buddhism flourished throughout the entire empire. Clerics 
began to formulate their own doctrines and lineages, and engaged one another in debates over 
core Buddhist concepts, such as emptiness and compassion.  
Growing up in this vibrant monastic environment, the young monk Xuanzang was drawn 
to the Yogācāra doctrine of “Consciousness-only” (weishi 唯識, vijñaptimātra). Yogācārins 
were known for using the investigation of consciousness to argue for the wisdom of 
emptiness and altruistic compassion. Up until the 600s CE, the Yogācāra teaching of 
consciousness had mainly been preached by two groups: the Dilun group (dilunpai 地論派), 
led by Bodhiruci (菩提流⽀) who arrived in China in 508 CE;  and the Shelun group 
(shelunpai 攝論派) led by Paramārtha (真諦 499-569).18 Both groups were named after the 
Buddhist texts they revered, the Shidijinglun (⼗地經論, Daśabhūmikasūtraśāstra) and the 
Shedachenglun (攝⼤乘論, Mahāyānasaṃgraha). Due to their different interpretations of 
Yogācāra philosophy, Dilun and Shelun clerics debated with one another over the names of 
various types of consciousness, the proper understanding of Consciousness-only, and the 
definitions of emptiness and Buddha nature (Fu 2006, 21). Considering how the Dilun group 
and the Shelun group represented early development of Yogācāra Buddhism in China, I refer 
to both groups as early Yogācāra, in this dissertation, to distinguish their teachings from that 
of Xuanzang and his disciples. 
After visiting and studying with most early Yogācāra clerics at that time, Xuanzang 
                                                        
18 According to Lü Cheng,  Dilun and Shelun were referred to as teachings (shishuo 師說) or groups (pai 派), 
rather than schools (zong 宗). This is primarily because Dilun and Shelun did not possess a temple-complex as 
their monastic base, and did not form their own dharma-lineages (Lü 1979, 159). 
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found it impossible to reconcile the two groups (Tang 2000, 149).19 He attributed their 
differences to the fact that the complete teaching of consciousness had not yet been 
transmitted to China from India. Eventually, Xuanzang decided to travel to India to study 
Buddhism. He hoped to use his knowledge of Buddhism to liberate more sentient beings from 
suffering (T51N2087, P868b7-9). Motivated by this conviction, Xuanzang embarked on his 
journey to India in 629 CE (T50N2053, P222c4-5).  
It was an arduous journey. Xuanzang marched through the Gobi Desert, crossed the 
Pamir Mountains, and arrived at the Nālandā Temple in Northern India in 633 CE. There, he 
became a protégé of Śīlabhadra (戒賢 529-645), the dharma heir of the Indian Yogācāra 
master Dharmapāla (護法 530-561) (T51N2087, P914c7). With great diligence, Xuanzang 
mastered the Yogācāra teaching of the mind. When Xuanzang returned to China in 645 CE, 
he received an official welcome from the Chinese Emperor, Li Shimin (李世民 598-649). 
Informed about Xuanzang’s influence outside his empire, the emperor decided to patronize 
Xuanzang’s project of translating Indian Buddhist texts into Chinese (T51N2087, 868b16).  
When Xuanzang translated Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit to Chinese, he faced two 
obstacles: first, there were huge grammatical differences between the Chinese and Sanskrit 
languages; second, the Chinese had their own indigenous intellectual traditions distinct from 
those of India. For clerics like Xuanzang who were proficient in both languages and familiar 
with both intellectual contexts, their translations of Buddhist texts involved more than the 
passive reception of ideas written in a foreign language. Indeed, they exercised their agency, 
harnessing all the intellectual, philosophical, and philological resources to incoprate their 
own understanding of the Buddhist teaching in their Chinese translation. Consequently, these 
translations represented an active comprehension of concepts in the local context.  
                                                        
19 Interestingly, as Tang Yongtong noted, during his study, Xuanzang did not visit any clerics of the 
Madhyamaka schools (Tang 2000, 149).  
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Undoubtedly, early Yogācārins did not welcome Xuanzang’s new translations.20 In 
defense of his master, Kuiji composed extensive commentaries on Xuanzang’s texts and 
debated with the supporters of previous translations. This led Kuiji to found the “Dharma-
Image School of Consciousness-only” (faxiangweishizong法相唯識宗), also known as the 
Faxiang School. This School marked the official, institutional establishment of later 
Yogācāra, insofar as it possessed its own dharma lineage, revered text, and location in the 
Ci’en Temple (慈恩寺). The lineage between early and later Yogācāra can be depicted in the 
following manner:  
Early Yogācāra: Asaṅga — Vasubandhu — Sthiramati — Paramārtha; Bodhiruci  
Later Yogācāra; Dignāga — Dharmapāla — Śīlabhadra — Xuanzang — Kuiji — Huizhao — Zhizhou 
 
After the Great Persecution (840-846 CE) of non-indigenous traditions during the late-Tang 
Dynasty period (836-906), Yogācāra, as well as most Buddhist schools, gradually declined in 
China.21 Most of the writings composed by Xuanzang and Kuiji were preserved in Korea and 
Japan, where they continue to be studied by clerics and Buddhist scholars today (Yamasaki 
1985; Yokoyama 1986, 1996; Fukihara 1989; Nagao 1991; Takasaki 1992; Suguro 2009; 
Bauer 2010). Towards the end of the 1800s, these Yogācāra treatises were brought back to 
China through the joint effort of a Chinese lay Buddhist, Yang Wenhui (楊⽂會 1837-1911) 
and his Japanese friend, Nanjō Bunyū (南條⽂雄 1849- 1927). Renewed study of these texts 
marked the revival of Yogācāra Buddhism in early modern China. Most intellectuals found 
the Yogācāra study of consciousness to be as profound as Western science and philosophy. 
Generations of Buddhist scholars and scholar monks, represented by Ouyang Jian (歐陽漸
                                                        
20 What exemplifies this early-later controversy is the Nadi Incident (那提事件), documented later by Daoxuan 
(道宣 596-667) in the Expanded Chronicles of Great Masters (續⾼僧傳) (T50N2060, P459a10). According to 
Daoxuan, Nadi was a prominent master, the disciple of Nāgājuna, who travelled to China from India in the hope 
of transmitting dharma. However, Nadi was forced to leave China due to his dispute with Xuanzang. Modern 
Chinese scholars cast doubt on the authenticity of this story, and conjecture that the so-called Nadi Incident was 
fabricated by Xuanzang’s antagonists to defame later Yogācārins (Xiong 1958; Zhang 1964).  
21 For studies on the revival of Yogācāra, please consult Holmes Welch (1968).  
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1871-1943), Lü Cheng (呂澄 1896-1989), Xiong Shili (熊⼗⼒ 1885-1968), Liang Shuming 
(梁漱溟 1893-1988), Taixu (太虛 1890-1946), and Yinshun (印順 1906-2005), dedicated 
themselves to the study of the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness (Ouyang 2015; Lü 1991; 
Xiong 1990; Liang 1920; Taixu 2005; Yinshun 2009). Subsequently, the Yogācāra revival 
not only brought forward the modern reform of Buddhism, but also shaped the development 
of modern Confucianism (Welch 1968; Makeham et al. 2014).  
In the wake of this revival, contemporary scholars continue to use Western philosophical 
categories to interpret Yogācāra concepts (Lin 1991; Lusthaus 2006; Jiang 2006; Keng 2009; 
Teng 2011; Yao 2014).22 Dan Lusthaus presents an epistemological reading of CWSL, 
interpreting the Yogācāra doctrine of consciousness as an epistemic inquiry of the human 
mind (Lusthaus 2006, 6). Scrutinizing Lusthaus’s reading of Yogācāra, Lawrence Lau 
identifies the limits of the epistemic approach. For Lau, Yogācāra epistemic inquiries are 
secondary to the goal of resolving the existential crisis facing all sentient beings (Lau 2007, 
255). He maintains that Yogācāra Buddhism should be understood as a two-dimensional 
project: the epistemological investigation of the cause of ignorance (zhishilun 知識論) and 
the existential-ontological explanation of the cure for suffering (cunyoulun 存有論) (Lau 
2007, 255). Recently, more philosophers come to recognize that the philosophical doctrines 
articulated by Buddhists are inherently preceptive and didactic. Considering the crucial roles 
of ethical practices and moral actions, Lai Shen-chon initiates his project of Buddhist 
                                                        
22 Drawing on Indo-Tibetan resources, scholars have explored various aspects of the treatises composed by or 
attributed to Vasubandhu (c. 300s-400s), Asanga (c. 300s-400s), Dignāga (c. 480-540), Dharmakirti (c. 500s-
600s), Sthiramati (c. 475-555), and Tsong kha pa (1357-1419). Some of them work on logic and theories of 
knowledge (Arnold 2005; Coseru 2012; Davidson 1985; Flanagan 2011; Ganeri 2012; Garfield 2002; 2015; 
Gold 2015; Hayes 1989; Tzohar 2017; Yao 2005), and some discuss the metaphysical positions endorsed by 
Yogācārins (Chatterjee 1962; Willis 1979; Griffiths 1986; Hopkins 2002; Kochumuttom 1982; Schmithausen 
2005). For a long time, scholars questioned the authenticity of Chinese Buddhism, including Chinese Yogācāra. 
Many of them regarded Chinese Buddhism as an inauthentic sinicization of Indian Buddhism (Ch’en 1973, 5; 
Zürcher 2007, 4). While not engaging with this issue of authenticity, I support Lin Chenkuo’s view that Chinese 
scholarship on Yogācāra has been rudimentary, and resources in East Asian languages will contribute to 
contemporary studies on Yogācāra (Lin 1999, 231-247).  
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hermeneutics (fojiaoquanshixue 佛教詮釋學), which conceives of Buddhism as a system of 
epistemology (zhishilun 知識論), ontology (cunyoulun 存有論), and practice (shijianlun 實
踐論)  (Lai 2009, 62).  
In determining how CWSL should be interpreted, it is helpful to consider its structure. 
CWSL consists of two halves: the first half preserves the Yogācāra critique of their rivals 
inside and outside the Buddhist tradition; the second half presents the articulation of the 
doctrine of Consciousness-only. The latter half is further divided into three parts. In the first 
part, Xuanzang describes the intentional structure and epistemic functions of eight different 
types of consciousness and their mental factors (T31N1585, P7b26). On the basis of this 
description, in the second part, Xuanzang puts forward the three-nature (sanxing 三性) theory 
to expound the ultimate nature of reality and elucidate the correct understanding of 
Consciousness-only and emptiness (T31N1585, P39a2-4). In the last part, Xuanzang 
prescribes rules and precepts for followers to “gradually enter Consciousness-only” 
(jianciwuruweishi 漸次悟⼊唯識) (T31N1585, P48b11), which becomes the Yogācāra 
articulation of the Bodhisattvas’ path towards awakening. 
Modelled on the structure of CWSL, a framework can be proposed to study Yogācāra 
Buddhism. In defining the three levels, the current project eschews terms such as 
epistemological, ontological/metaphysical, or ethical, partly because terms from Western 
philosophy have their distinct nuances that do not always match that in the writings of 
Xuanzang and Kuiji,23 partly also because philosophers are still debating how to demarcate 
one category from another. Thereby, the following chapters replace the “epistemic-
metaphysic-ethic” trio with the “descriptive-explicative-prescriptive” tripartite. Positioned in 
                                                        
23 Many Buddhist scholars doubt whether we can directly transport these western philosophical terms into 
Buddhism because conceptions such as “ontology” or “metaphysics”, usually entail the sui generis, immutable, 
substantial existence that can contradict Buddha’s teaching of emptiness (Xia 2002, 133-139; Fu 2002, 15-27). 
Besides, in Husserlian scholarship, terms like “ontological” or “metaphysical” also becomes problematic, 
because Husserlians are still debating Husserl’s attitude toward metaphysics. 
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the “descriptive-explicative-prescriptive” framework, Yogācāra Buddhism can be understood 
as a three-level study of consciousness through which Yogācārins first describe the activities 
of consciousness and depict the knowledge of selfhood and of other minds; they then explain 
the ultimate nature of reality and expound the truth of emptiness; eventually, they prescribe 
rules for actions that lead to awakening. As previously mentioned, these three categories are 
neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive, but rather serve as the skillful, provisional 
means, through which one can access Yogācāra philosophy.  
Therefore, in the study of the doctrine of consciousness provided by Chinese Yogācārins, 
this dissertation makes original contributions in at least three ways:  
• It makes a case for Chinese Yogācāra as a creative development of the Buddhist 
tradition from India.  
 
• It proposes the three-level framework in an attempt to grasp the Yogācāra teaching of 
consciousness.   
 
• With these three levels, this research fills lacunas in English language Yogācāra studies 
by expanding the epistemological inquiry from self-knowledge to that of other minds, 
by clarifying the Yogācāra brand of idealism, and by expounding the Yogācāra proposal 
for community building and social construction. 
 
1.3 Transcendental Phenomenology in Modern Europe  
Thus far, we have reviewed the development of ideas in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism and 
justified how the three-level framework can be derived from the foundational Yogācāra text, 
the Chengweishilun. In the current section, we outline the way in which Husserl developed 
his philosophical thinking. As such, we enquire into whether the three-level framework can 
also be inferred from and therefore applied to the study of phenomenology.  
In 1935, Husserl delivered the lecture “Die Krisis des Europäischen Menschentums und 
die Philosophie (The Crisis of European Humanity and the Philosophy)” before the Vienna 
Cultural Society (Hua 6/314). Upon expressing his concern for the existential crisis in 
Europe, Husserl explained how transcendental phenomenology could serve as the tool for 
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liberating Europeans from this crisis (Hua 6/315). By then, it had been over thirty years since 
Husserl completed his doctorate at the University of Vienna in 1883. Born in Prossnitz, a city 
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Husserl was an assiduous student, who dedicated his youth 
to the exploration of knowledge (Zahavi 2003, 1). Inspired by Franz Brentano (1838-1919), 
who taught psychology at the University of Vienna, Husserl was fascinated by the study of 
intentionality, a term used by Brentano to pinpoint how consciousness is always directed 
toward its objects (Brentano 1995, 68; Hua 12/69). Brentano defines intentionality as follows 
(Brentano 1995, 68):  
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly 
unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within 
itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement 
something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.  
 
A similar view can be found in Husserl’s early writings, Philosophy of Arithmetic, in which 
Husserl wrote (Hua 12/69):  
There is a second main type of relations, which is thereby characterized by the fact that here the relational 
phenomenon is a psychical one. A unified psychical act directs itself upon a plurality of contents, then, 
with regard to it, the contents are combined or are related to each other… For example, any arbitrary act of 
representation, judgment, or feeling, and will that is directed upon a plurality of contents will do. 
 
Between 1900 and 1901, Husserl published his thoughts in the two-volume monograph 
Logische Untersuchungen (Logical Investigations). At the end of this monograph, Husserl 
speculated whether an alternative approach to empirical studies of the human mind could be 
found which stressed the ideal nature of consciousness so that “all this does not depend on 
the empirical contingencies of the course of consciousness” (Hua 19/704). This speculation 
signalled Husserl’s departure from the Brentanian psychology and his subsequent shift 
towards transcendental philosophy, which explored the condition for the possibility of 
knowledge. 
Husserl’s transcendental turn was marked by the release of Ideen zu einer reinen 
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch (Ideas Pertaining to a 
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Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book, henceforth Ideas 
I). In Ideas I, Husserl characterized phenomenology in the transcendental sense as the 
“descriptive eidetic doctrine of pure mental processes” (Hua 3/156). Articulated as such, 
phenomenology was both descriptive, since it observed phenomena in pure consciousness, 
and explicative, because it clarified the condition for the possibility of various phenomena to 
appear. Transcendental phenomenology was later formulated as Husserl’s remedy for the 
existential crisis that prevailed in Europe at the time, a crisis stemming from what Husserl 
termed “naturalism” in the Vienna Lectures in 1935 (Hua 6/318). He argued that, armed with 
naturalism, scientists segregated human consciousness from the rest of the world, further 
stripping away meaning from human life and transforming the world into an existential 
wasteland. After the First World War, Husserl began to reflect on the so-called prosperity of 
positive science through his critique of naturalism (Hua 6/4).24 This critique, in its allusion to 
the broader intellectual climate of Weimar Germany (Gordon 2003, 5), eventually inspired 
Husserl to expand his phenomenology from an investigation of knowledge to an inquiry into 
a meaningful existence for modern humans.  
Acknowledging how Husserl has shifted his focus from epistemology to existential 
issues, scholars have put forward their own frameworks to capture these different moments in 
his writings, such as that of the “descriptive and transcendental” (Ricoeur 1967), the 
“empirical and transcendental” (Carr 1999), the “epistemological and metaphysical” (Moran 
2005), the “logical and ontological” (Smith 2007), the “static and genetic” (Welton 2003), the 
“descriptive and generative” (Steinbock 1995), and “intentionality on the surface and 
subjective ideality deep down” (Ni 2010). That being said, through his life, Husserl gradually 
placed more weight upon metaphysical and transcendental issues, than descriptive, epistemic, 
                                                        
24 Three years after the publication of Ideas I, Husserl accepted a tenured position at Freiburg University. 
Towards the end of the Weimar Republic, he was suspended from teaching. He died in Freiburg in 1938, shortly 
after Nazi Germany annexed Austria. 
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empirical ones. 
Drawing on current Husserlian scholarship, I borrow the terms “beschreibende” and 
“erklärende” from Husserl’s Vienna lectures to define his phenomenological project. As 
remarked by Husserl later in Crisis, the purpose of phenomenology is to renew the schema of 
“descriptive and explanatory (beschreibende und erklärende)” in natural science (Hua 
6/224).25 To highlight the contrast with natural science, I translate this schema envisaged by 
Husserl as that of the “descriptive and explicative”. For Husserl, phenomenology is first and 
foremost a “descriptive science” that examines the essential structure of intentionality in pure 
consciousness (Hua 3/156). Phenomenology as a descriptive doctrine of consciousness 
emerges as the major theme in Husserl’s early writings and continues to be an integral part of 
his later writings. It is on the basis of this descriptive phenomenology that Husserl moves 
onto another level to inquire into the ultimate nature of phenomena in the domain of pure 
consciousness (Hua 6/229). The shift from describing how objects are given to the mind to 
exploring how the mind serves as the condition for the possibility of the appearance of 
phenomena marks Husserl’s transcendental turn in his articulation of phenomenology. The 
descriptive-explicative schema is an attempt to incorporate the categories proposed by 
                                                        
25 The descriptive-explicative schema envisaged by Husserl is demarcated from that in empirical science, 
insofar as explication does not entail any general abstraction of the descriptions but rather finds its basis in 
them. As Husserl detailed later in Crisis, “In no way, not even in the schema of description vs. explanation, can 
a science of souls be modeled on natural science or seek methodical counsel from it. It can only model itself on 
its own subject matter, as soon as it has achieved clarity on this subject matter's own essence. There remains 
only the formal and most general notion that one must not operate with empty word-concepts, must not move in 
the sphere of vagueness, but must derive everything from clarity, from actually self-giving intuition, or, what is 
the same thing, from self-evidence—in this case from the original life-world experience of, or from what is 
essentially proper to, the psychic and nothing else. This results in, as it does everywhere, an applicable and 
indispensable sense of description and of descriptive science and also, at a higher level, of ‘explanation’ and 
explanatory science. Explanation, as a higher-level accomplishment, signifies in this case nothing but a method 
which surpasses the descriptive realm, a realm which is realizable through actually experiencing intuition. This 
surpassing occurs on the basis of the ‘descriptive’ knowledge, and, as a scientific method, it occurs through a 
procedure of insight which ultimately verifies itself by means of the descriptive data. In this formal and general 
sense there is in all sciences the necessary fundamental level of description and the elevated level of 
explanation. But this must be taken only as a formal parallel and must find its meaning-fulfillment in each 
science through its own essential sources; and the concept of ultimate verification must not be falsified in 
advance by assuming, as in physics that certain propositions in the specifically physical (that is, the 
mathematically idealized) sphere are the ultimately verifying propositions.” (Hua 6/226-227) 
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Husserlian scholars, enabling this dissertation to read Husserl’s phenomenology as a two-
level approach to consciousness. 
The two-level approach can be related to that in Yogācāra Buddhism, insofar as both 
Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins have pinpointed the intentional feature of consciousness to 
describe our knowledge of the self and of other minds, subsequently using this description to 
explain the nature of reality. Although the Yogācāra view of the mind can be related to that in 
Husserl, they are not completely identical. At the descriptive level, Chinese Yogācārins 
extend their study to extreme mental states, such as pre-death experience, and associate 
mental acts with their moral consequences. Further, at the explicative level, Chinese 
Yogācārins and Husserl put forward different stances as to the concept of essence.  
Having identified the descriptive and explicative levels in both Yogācāra Buddhism and 
Husserl’s phenomenology, it remains to be seen whether and how Husserl developes the 
prescriptive level of consciousness in his phenomenology. The Husserlian scholar Hanne 
Jacobs once addressed the question in a similar fashion, “how could what I have learned as a 
phenomenologist change the way in which I engage in practical projects, value certain things, 
and commit myself theoretically”? (Jacobs 2013, 363) As previously mentioned, the term 
“prescriptive” is used to capture normative values for ritualized actions that lead to liberation, 
in Yogācāra Buddhism. Defining “prescriptive” in this manner, I maintain that the 
prescriptive level remains rather nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology. That being said, 
although Husserl provides an account of soteriology in his appeal to liberating people from 
the existential crisis in modern Europe, he only outlines basic principles for moral actions; he 
does not prescribe the mechanics of such a soteriology. Therefore, phenomenology in the 
Husserlian sense is teleological, probably even soteriological, but not prescriptive in an 
explicit way. Different from the nascent soteriology in Husserl’s phenomenology, Chinese 
Yogācārins, who also endorse a worldview that can be interpreted as transcendental idealism 
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in the Husserlian sense, articulate concrete mechanics for individual contemplative rituals, 
community building, and the construction of an ideal society, which further makes Yogācāra 
Buddhism much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology. Compared in this manner, 
one tradition becomes the mirror of the other.  
The nascent soteriology in Husserl’s philosophical thinking has been acknowledged by 
several scholars who consider Husserl’s later works foundational to “phenomenological 
theology” (Hart 1986; Zahavi 2017). Indeed, drawing on Husserl’s writings, 
phenomenologists, inter alia, Edith Stein (1891-1942), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), and Michel Henry (1922-2002), have developed more 
systematic forms of phenomenological theology. As such, Husserl has been recognized as the 
founder of the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg 1982, xxviii). Currently, 
phenomenology, in its widest sense, has become a distinct discipline in contemporary 
philosophy that furnishes scholars with an approach to the structure of consciousness 
(Spiegelberg 1982, 5). Phenomenology continues to flourish and has been incorporated into 
the studies of religion, psychology, and cognitive science.   
Therefore, in the study of Husserl’s phenomenology, this dissertation makes original 
contributions in at least three ways:  
• It develops the two-level framework in an attempt to understand Husserl’s articulation 
of phenomenology.  
 
• It proposes a way of understanding Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a correlative 
dualism, which contributes to the current discussion in the scholarship. 
 
• It explores the way in which Husserl’s articulation of phenomenology possesses a 
nascent account of soteriology, which allows later scholars to develop theories at the 
prescriptive level.  
 
1.4 Chapter Outline  
Thus far, we have made a case for the three-level framework through demonstrating how it is 
modelled on seminal works in Yogācāra and phenomenology, so that it can be applied to 
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these two intellectual traditions. Such a framework epitomizes the both-and approach, which 
aims at maintaining the distinctiveness of each tradition while making explicit their middle 
ground and manifesting their interconnectedness. These three levels can further be compared 
to the road, the tracks, and the destination. The road-track-destination analogy not only 
inspires the title of this dissertation but also provides its organizing principle.  
Part One examines the descriptive level of Husserl’s phenomenology and Chinese 
Yogācāra Buddhism. After elaborating on the meaning of “descriptive”, this part focusses on 
the salient feature of consciousness, known as intentionality. As I will argue, their 
characterizations of consciousness are compatible, though not identical. To unpack the rich 
concept of intentionality proposed by Husserl, Chapter 2 pinpoints four phases in his 
philosophical thinking through which he defines intentionality first as directedness, next as 
the noesis-noema correlate, subsequently as the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema, and finally as 
the tripartite structure of the collective acts of intending, the collective intended phenomena, 
and the collective we. In this process, Husserl gradually divorces himself from psychologism 
and naturalism to promote transcendental phenomenology, further expanding his scope from 
individual consciousness to collective consciousness. Husserl’s view of intentionality can be 
related to that in Yogācāra Buddhism. Chapter 3 explores how Chinese Yogācārins express 
their view of intentionality first in their translation of vijñāna and vijñapti, and then in their 
depiction of the fourfold structure of mental acts. With the help of intentionality, Chinese 
Yogācārins continue to outline our knowledge of the self and other minds. While Husserl’s 
notion of intentionality can be related to that in Yogācāra Buddhism, the two are not 
completely identical. The way in which their views of consciousness are compatible but not 
identical inspires us to explore how phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism can contribute 
to non-conceptualism in Chapter 4.  
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Part Two proceeds to the explicative level of Husserl’s phenomenology and Chinese 
Yogācāra Buddhism where they enquire into the ultimate nature of reality, based on their 
theories of intentionality. This part begins with a clarification of the meaning of 
“explicative”. In their explication of what and how things actually are, Husserl affirms the 
existence of essence and articulates phenomenology as the science of essence (Hua 3/4), 
whereas Chinese Yogācārins argue that everything in the cosmos – be it the self of sentient 
beings or other objects qua dharmas – is empty of essence (svabhāva) (T31N1585, P1a23-
24). At least on the surface, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins endorse different, or even 
disparate, stances towards essence. This is where we are presented with the divergence of 
their paths and the difference of their wheel tracks. As I will argue, the problem of essence 
does not jeopardize the current project, although it is not completely irrelevant. In Chapter 5, 
I begin by investigating whether or not Husserl’s conception of essence entails any svabhāvic 
quality. I argue that, because Husserl keeps enriching and expanding the notion of essence in 
different phases of his philosophical thinking, his conception of essence is not svabhāvic. In 
Chapter 6, I examine whether the Yogācāra articulation of three natures is compatible with 
transcendental idealism. I contend that it is compatible as the negation of svabhāva is not an 
affirmation of nihilism; rather the negation of svabhāva affirms the interdependence of 
ideality and reality, which can be further interpreted as a form of transcendental idealism. 
Having clarified that what Husserl means by essence is different from what Chinese 
Yogācārins mean by svabhāva, I demonstrate that the problem of essence does not undermine 
the current comparative project; however, this does not mean that it is irrelevant. 
Investigating the problem of essence brings to the foreground a number of important 
implications for a comparative study of philosophical traditions in a cross-cultural, 
multilingual context. These implications are examined in Chapter 7.  
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Part Three enquires into the prescriptive level of Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Yogācāra Buddhism, in which they translate their philosophical insights into actions. Upon 
elucidating the meaning of “prescriptive”, I argue that on their respective journeys, Husserl 
arrests his study at transcendental idealism and, thus, leaves a rather nascent account of the 
prescriptive level of phenomenology, whereas Chinese Yogācārins put forward an elaborate, 
systematic theory of religious practice, known as the Bodhisattvas’ path towards the wisdom 
of emptiness and compassion. Chapter 8 addresses the question of the possibility of agency. 
As I argue in this chapter, Xuanzang and Kuiji propose a distinct way of interpreting 
causality that affirms the existence of agency without violating the universal influence of 
karma (T31N1585, P43b27-c26). Chapter 9 answers the question, if all sentient beings have 
agency, then what is the point of sorting them into five different families (gotra)? This 
chapter will try to comprehend Xuanzang and Kuiji’s promotion of the five-gotra theory as 
their way of accentuating Bodhisattvas’ compassion (T43N1831, P610c2-4). Chapter 10 
explores how Husserl provides a nascent account of soteriology through outlining basic 
principles for contemplation, moral action, and social construction, but does not the 
mechanics of such a soteriology. The soteriology at the prescriptive level eventually makes 
Yogācāra Buddhism much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology. 
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Part One: The Same Road – Theories of Intentionality at the Descriptive Level of 
Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology and Chinese Yogācāra Philosophy   
 
Bedeutungen, die nur von entfernten, verschwommenen,  
uneigentlichen Anschauungen  
– wenn überhaupt von irgendwelchen –  
belebt sind, können uns nicht genug tun.  
Wir wollen auf die „Sachen selbst“ zurückgehen. 
[Meanings inspired only by remote, confused, inauthentic intuitions  
– if by any intuitions at all – are not enough.  
we must go back to the “things themselves”.]  
(Hua 19/6) 
 
智緣彼空之時。顯此真如故  
[When someone has the wisdom of perceiving something  
that is [ultimately] empty,  
this wisdom manifests things as they really are.] 
 (T43N1830, P546a8)   
 
 
The first part of this dissertation examines the descriptive accounts of consciousness 
presented by Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins, focusing in particular on their articulations of 
the intentionality of consciousness. In our daily lives, most of us take the activity of 
consciousness for granted. As I open my eyes in the morning, I am immediately aware of my 
surroundings –the rain splattering against my window, the tree rustling in front of my 
apartment, my cat stretching and sleeping on the sofa, etc. Even while I am asleep, my mind 
perceives and experiences a plethora of objects, some real – such as the cold breeze from my 
open window – and others imagined – like the unicorn that licked my hand. Though we rarely 
stop to think about how all of this can happen, many thinkers throughout history have been 
intrigued by the way in which a wide range of mental acts target their objects, thinkers 
including the two protagonists of this dissertation: Edmund Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins.  
Prior to analyzing the notion of intentionality, it will be helpful to elaborate on the 
meaning of “descriptive”. It has been explained in the introductory chapter that the concept of 
“descriptive” is used to characterize depictions of how an intentional act is directed towards 
its intended object. The descriptive examination further accomplishes the following tasks:  
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1. A descriptive study of consciousness outlines the intentionality of mental acts in 
one’s experience. 
 
2. Intentionality opens a way for examining mental acts from three perspectives: the 
first-person perspective (subjective experience), the second-person perspective 
(intersubjective experience), and the third-person perspective (objective experience). 
 
3. Intentionality provides one with a tool to conduct an exhaustive examination of 
mental acts at all levels.  
 
4. An exhaustive examination enables one to describe the connections between mental 
acts, that is, how a compounded act can be founded on the simplest acts of 
presenting.  
 
5. The connection of mental acts allows for a depiction of the production of knowledge 
as well as the justification of knowledge. 
 
6. A study of consciousness at the descriptive level goes beyond mere matters of fact so 
that it serves as the methodological foundation for an explanation of the ultimate 
nature of reality, that is, whether various objects come to exist on their own or they 
mutually constitute their existence in our experience with the subjective mind.  
 
 
At the descriptive level, both Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins conduct an exhaustive 
examination of the intentionality of mental acts, through which they are able to depict the 
production of knowledge. As I will argue, their characterizations of consciousness are 
compatible, though not identical. They are compatible in that their respective accounts of 
intentionality are consistent with one another. Furthermore, they both employ their 
descriptions of consciousness to investigate the origin of knowledge. While Husserl’s view of 
intentionality can be related to that in Yogācāra Buddhism, I contend that the Yogācāra 
account of mind is not identical to Husserl’s at the descriptive level, insofar as Chinese 
Yogācārins extend their investigations to extreme mental states, such as the pre-death 
experience, and they connect mental acts with their moral consequences.  
I utilize the term “descriptive” to replace the more widely used notion of 
“epistemological”, partly because the term “descriptive” is more in line with the terminology 
used by Husserl to define his phenomenological approach, partly also because the Western 
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notion of knowledge cannot be directly imposed upon Yogācāra Buddhism. For Husserl (Hua 
19/2; Hua 3/139): 
We are concerned with discussions of a most general sort which cover the wider sphere of an objective 
theory of knowledge and, closely linked with this last, the pure phenomenology of experiences of 
thinking and knowing. This phenomenology, like the most inclusive pure phenomenology of 
experiences in general, has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in 
the pure generality of their essence, not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as 
experiences of humans or animals in the phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. This 
phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential concepts and 
their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition, 
and the connections which have their roots purely in such essences.26  
As for phenomenology, it is concerned to be a descriptive eidetic doctrine of transcendentally pure 
mental processes as viewed in the phenomenological attitude; and like any other descriptive, non-
substructing and non-idealizing discipline, it has its inherent legitimacy.27  
Husserl thinks that being descriptive is required in order to observe how we perceive the 
world as we do, and to deduce what lies beyond empirical perception. In this way, being 
“descriptive” characterizes a science not only on par with, but also more rigorous than any 
other empirical sciences, which gives Husserl’s whole phenomenological approach 
legitimacy. In the meantime, the term “epistemology” is concerned with how we arrive at the 
knowledge of an object, and subordinates the question of how our mind perceives objects to 
the question of knowledge acquisition. If that is the case, then the term “epistemological” 
leads us too far ahead of where Yogācāra philosophy insists that we begin; that is, 
understanding of the activity of consciousness itself. Yogācārins, thus, subordinate the 
question of knowledge to the question of consciousness itself, placing a greater emphasis on 
                                                        
26 The English translation is based on J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 166). The original German version is as 
follows 
„Es handelt sich dabei… um Erörterungen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphäre einer objektiven 
Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammenhängt, einer reinen Phänomenologie der Denk- und 
Erkenntniserlebnisse gehören. Diese, wie die sie umspannende reinen Phänomenologie der Erlebnisse 
überhaupt, hat es ausschließlich mit den in der Intuition erfassbaren und analysierbaren Erlebnissen in reiner 
Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als 
Erlebnissen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. 
Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfassten Wesen und rein in den Wesen gründenden Zusammenhänge bringt 
sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck.“  
27 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 167). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Was die Phänomenologie anbelangt, so will sie eine deskriptive Wesenslehre der transzendental reinen 
Erlebnisse in der Phänomenologischen Einstellung sein, und wie jede deskriptive, nicht substruierende und nicht 
idealisierende Disziplin hat sie ihr Recht in sich.“ 
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the importance of achieving a descriptive understanding of consciousness than an epistemic 
understanding of consciousness. 
If we have laid out the horizon for our comparative study at the descriptive level, we can 
continue to survey Husserl’s notion of intentionality in Chapter 2. I track how Husserl keeps 
enriching the notion of intentionality in four phases of his philosophical thinking. Throughout 
these phases, Husserl gradually departs from Brentanian psychologism to develop his 
transcendental phenomenology, and expands his phenomenological investigation from that of 
the individual mind to that of collective consciousness. As a result, intentionality entails how 
consciousness is not only directed towards objects but also points back to the egos – 
consciousness is the consciousness of something for someone. Husserl’s notion of 
intentionality can be related to that in Yogācāra Buddhism, insofar as Chinese Yogācārins 
also define consciousness through the intentional relation of intending acts, the intended 
objects, and the underlying egos. In Chapter 3, we investigate the Yogācāra view of 
consciousnesses and their mental factors, through which we present how Chinese Yogācārins 
depict the origin of self-knowledge and the knowledge of other minds. Although the 
Yogācāra conception of intentionality can be related to that in Husserl, the two are not 
identical. Their similar but not identical view of intentionality prompts us to question the 
underlying assumptions held by a conceptualist view of experience and knowledge. After 
scrutinizing what counts as the content of a mental act and what it is meant to be conceptual, 
we explore whether and how these two intellectual traditions can make a contribution to non-
conceptualism in Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 2: Intentionality in Husserl’s Phenomenology  
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The current chapter examines Husserl’s concept of intentionality at the descriptive level of 
his phenomenology. In contemporary philosophy, intentionality is commonly understood as 
the feature of directedness or aboutness (Arnold 2012; Anscombe 1965; Dennett 1987; 
Dretske 1980; Searle 1982). To be more specific, it describes how a mental act is always 
directed towards and, therefore, about an object. Intentionality is important in contemporary 
philosophy of mind, because it indicates how every mental act has a structure: in every 
mental act, there are two inseparable and interdependent constituents, namely, the act of 
perceiving, imagining, judging, feeling, etc., and the targeted object to be perceived, 
imagined, judged, felt, etc.   
The concept of intentionality is fundamental to Husserl’s phenomenology. In his own 
terms, intentionality stands “at the starting point of the beginning of phenomenology” (Hua 
3/172). Throughout his life, Husserl keeps developing and enriching the concept of 
intentionality.28 To facilitate our understanding of this rich concept, as well as its function in 
Husserl’s phenomenological project, I differentiate four phases in Husserl’s philosophical 
thinking:  
1. In his early writings, intentionality is articulated as the feature of directedness (Hua 
19/379). At that time, the function of intentionality is mainly twofold. First, it helps 
                                                        
28 Among Husserlian scholars, intentionality has been construed and interpreted in different manners, further 
resulting in debates between the East Coast school and the West Coast school. These two camps are named after 
their respective geographical locations in North America, or more precisely, the locations of their university 
affiliations (Zahavi 2003, 58-59; 2017, 83-94). Drawing on Husserl’s early writings such as the Logical 
Investigations, members of the West Coast school speak of intentionality as a three-place relation (between the 
subjective act, the content of the act, and the object) (Dreyfus 1982, 2; Smith 1982, 195; McIntyre1982, 221). 
They further interpret noema as the generalization of meaning (Føllesdal 1982, 78). Their interpretations have 
been scrutinized by the East Coast school. Most members of the East Coast school argue that the intended object 
does not represent itself via noema but discloses itself as noema. In John Drummond’s terms, “the appearance, 
therefore, unambiguously reinterpreted, is the object precisely as it appears under present conditions, i.e. the 
psycho-physically conditioned noema” (Drummond 1990, 146). Contextualizing Husserl in the post-Cartesian 
history of philosophy, the East Coast school stresses the way in which intentionality enables Husserl to close the 
rift between the mind and the world, to direct us to an object, and thus to break our “egocentric predicament” 
(the realm of subjective consciousness for individuals) (Sokolowski 2000, 9). Considering how intentionality 
becomes the driving force that unveils the external world to us, Dan Zahavi characterizes the East Coast 
school’s interpretations of intentionality as an object theory (also known as a dyadic theory) in contrast to the 
mediator theory (also known as a triadic theory) (Zahavi 2017, 85). The debate between these two schools could 
be easily resolved, if not for the fact that Husserl keeps developing his concept of intentionality, as well as his 
notion of essence, in different phases of his philosophical thinking. Instead of participating in the on-going 
debate, I propose to outline the development of Husserl’s conception of intentionality as a way of elucidating 
the rich meaning of this core idea of phenomenology. 
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Husserl outline the pure principles of knowledge. Second, it is an integral part of his 
critique of psychologism. 
 
2. After his transcendental turn, intentionality is defined through the noesis-noema 
correlate (Hua 3/169).29 By then, intentionality performs the function of demarcating 
transcendental phenomenology from naturalism and undergirding Husserl’s viewpoint 
of knowledge. 
 
3. In his later writings, intentionality is described as the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema 
(Hua 1/87). The expanded notion of intentionality fulfills the function of providing a 
phenomenological theory of temporality and selfhood. 
 
4. In the last phase, intentionality is formulated as the tripartite structure of the collective 
we, the collective acts of intending, and the collectively intended phenomena (Hua 
6/189). The collective account of intentionality demonstrates how phenomenology 
entails no solipsism, and how phenomenology at its descriptive level is an analysis of 
experience from the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives. 
Furthermore, intentionality assists Husserl in unraveling the existential crisis triggered 
by naturalism in modern Europe.  
 
Through analyzing the trajectory of Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality, I contend that 
intentionality describes how mental acts allow objects to appear as phenomena for 
individuals. Consciousness is intentional, because it is always the consciousness of something 
for someone. The examination in the current chapter is admittedly far from exhaustive, yet it 
is sufficiently persuasive to set down here as it demonstrates how Husserl departs from 
Brentanian psychologism to initiate his transcendental phenomenology, and gradually 
expands his phenomenological investigation from that of the individual mind to that of 
collective consciousness. This discussion of intentionality sketches out the entire architecture 
of the rest of this dissertation, because it clarifies the tasks of phenomenology defined by 
Husserl and allows for a parallel discussion of consciousness presented by Chinese 
Yogācārins.    
2.1 Phase One: Intentionality as Directedness  
                                                        
29 In Ideas I, Husserl refers to the relation of noesis and noema as either the “noetic-noematic structure” (Hua 
3/193), or as “the correlation between noesis and noema” (Hua 3/190, 191).  
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In the first phase of his philosophical thinking, Husserl speaks of intentionality as 
directedness. As suggested by this term, directedness indicates a two-place relation between 
that which directs itself towards and that which can be directed upon. In his reformulation of 
directedness, Husserl introduces two concepts to account for the diversity of mental acts and 
their objects: quality, which refers to the general character of a mental act, and matter, which 
refers to the content of the act (Hua 19/412). Quality and matter are two heterogeneous, yet 
inseparable, constituents of an intentional act. As Husserl details in the Fifth Investigation 
(Hua 19/411):  
We now turn from the distinction between the acts in which we “live” and the acts which proceed “on the 
side” to another extremely important, seemingly plain distinction lying in a quite different direction. This 
is the distinction between the general character which stamps an act as merely presentative, judgemental, 
emotional, desirative etc., and its “content” which stamps it as presenting this, as judging that etc. etc.30 
 
For instance, Cindy’s recollection of her cat sleeping on the sofa is different from her 
perception of the cat sleeping on the sofa. Even though the contents (of the act) remain the 
same, i.e., the cat sleeping on the sofa, the quality (of the act) – recollecting vs perceiving – 
bespeaks their difference. Likewise, two acts of the same quality and different matter are also 
distinct from one another. For instance, Cindy’s recollection of her last family reunion is not 
the same as her recollection of the breakfast she ate this morning.  
Husserl’s conception of intentionality enables him to outline principles for knowing an 
object. To this end, Husserl puts forward three principles of knowledge: founding, 
fulfillment, and identification (Hua 19/572). For Husserl, knowledge of an intentional object 
is acquired and justified when various mental acts present this object as it is (Hua 19/572).  
                                                        
30 The English translation is based on that of J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 119). The original German version is 
as follows:  
„In ganz anderer Richtung als der zuletzt behandelte Unterschied zwischen Akten, in denen wir leben, und 
Akten, die nebenherlaufen, liegt ein höchst wichtiger und zunächst ganz selbstverständlicher Unterschied, 
nämlich der Unterschied zwischen dem allgemeinen Charakter des Aktes, der ihn je nachdem als bloß 
vorstellenden, oder als urteilenden, fühlenden, begehrenden usw. kennzeichnet, und seinem ,Inhalt’, der ihn als 
Vorstellung dieses Vorgestellten, als Urteil dieses Geurteilten usw. kennzeichnet.” 
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Through the principle of founding, Husserl explains how intentional acts build on one 
another. Husserl starts his explanation of this principle with a discussion of sensuous 
perception – an act of perceiving in which the content appears to the ego as the perceived 
object (Hua 19/508). For instance, when Cindy perceives the tree in the foyer of the Birks 
building, she sees it straightforwardly as right in front of her eyes. Husserl refers to this way 
of “seeing an object” as the narrow and popular meaning of seeing, and this way of 
“perceiving” as the narrow and popular meaning of perception (Hua 19/646). However, the 
tree is not all that Cindy perceives when she looks at the tree. The tree is part of the foyer. 
When Cindy perceives the tree, she also perceives it as part of the entire foyer. Although the 
content of her perception of “the tree in the foyer” is still straightforwardly presented, Husserl 
identifies something new about this act of perceiving: the act aims at the overall state of 
affairs qua “the tree in the foyer”, in which “the tree” and “the foyer” are both sensed objects 
presented through individual acts of perceiving whereas the prepositional term “in” 
corresponds not to any particular object but to the relation between the tree and the foyer 
(Hua 19/652). At this point, Husserl finds it necessary to expand the meaning of “seeing” and 
“perceiving” to capture this straightforward presentation of the state of affairs. He coins the 
term “categorial intuition” to describe a mental act that takes as its content a state of affairs 
(Hua 19/653). To describe how the act of perceiving a whole state of affairs is built on 
several simple acts of perceiving each specific object, Husserl introduces the concept of 
“founding”. In his terms, “these manifold part-acts are … summed up in one total act whose 
total achievement lies in the unity of its intentional reference” (Hua 19/403). “Seeing” the 
state of affairs in categorial intuition does not mean seeing with the eyes but rather entails 
grasping the state of affairs “in one stroke (in einem Schlage)” (Hua 19/646). As such, 
categorial intuition becomes an intuitive act in a supersensuous sense that founds itself on a 
wide range of sensuous intuitions (Hua 19/654). 
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The process of founding does not stop at categorial intuition. Husserl moves on to the 
idea of universal intuition, which describes how higher levels of abstraction can continue to 
compound on one another. He writes: “for we become aware of the identity of the universal 
through the repeated performance of such acts upon a basis of several individual intuitions, 
and we plainly do so in an overreaching act of identification which brings all single acts of 
abstraction into one synthesis” (Hua 19/669). The object of universal intuition, qua an “idea”, 
can be seen in the sense that an idea can be grasped straightforwardly, analogous to the way 
in which a tree is seen with the eyes (Hua 19/670). Further founded on the act of universal 
intuition, there arise even more abstract acts of conceptual thinking, such as symbolizing, 
signifying, and expressing. The principle of founding, thus, explains why not all mental acts 
have the same quality.   
While founding is mainly concerned with the quality of mental acts, the principles of 
fulfilment and identification are about matter. A founded act is indeed more abstract 
regarding its quality, yet this act does not provide knowledge unless its content is fulfilled by 
certain matter. For instance, Cindy can think about the tree in the foyer of the Birks building, 
but it does not mean she has knowledge about that tree. The thought, or in Husserl’s terms, 
the “meaning-intention”, is empty unless its content is fulfilled by perpetual matter. When 
Cindy walks into the Birks building and sees the tree, her perception of the tree confirms her 
abstract thought, and the thought generates knowledge, in the sense that the content of the 
thought is fulfilled by the matters in perception. Yet, if Cindy does not see a tree but instead 
sees something else in its place, her abstract thought of the tree remains empty and 
meaningless so that it offers no knowledge about the tree in the Birks building. This example 
illustrates that knowledge of the tree can only be acquired when the content of a mental act is 
fulfilled; in other words, when what is intended meets what is presented.  
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Husserl formulates the principle of fulfilment to explain how knowledge arises from a 
synthesis, namely, a coherent combination of the quality and the content of a mental act 
through which an object itself is presented to consciousness (Hua 19/691): the abstract act of 
thinking can obtain its meaning when the content of a thought, or a meaning-intention, is 
fulfilled by intuition; categorial intuition can be seen and grasped in one stroke when its 
content is fulfilled by sensuous intuition; sensuous intuition can be perceived when its 
content is presented. As such, while the principle of founding allows one to exercise the 
power of reason to engage in abstract thinking, the principle of fulfilling brings reason back 
to the starting point of intuition in which an object itself is presented. Once what is intended 
becomes identical with what is presented, knowledge becomes true. The principle of 
identification is hereby for justifying whether the knowledge is true or not (Hua 19/566).  
Husserl is confident that these principles allow for a more nuanced view of knowledge 
than is possible under psychologism, a term utilized by Husserl to brand Franz Brentano’s 
study of knowledge.31 As detailed by Husserl in the “Appendix to the Sixth Investigation”, 
upon formulating intentionality as directedness to external objects, namely, as directedness to 
                                                        
31 Brentano defines psychology as the study of “properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within 
ourselves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others” (Brentano 
1995, 4). This doctrine of psychology starts with the crucial distinction between inner and outer perception, also 
translated as internal and external perception. Brentano elaborates on how inner perception presents one with 
mental phenomena whereas outer perception presents one with physical phenomena (Brentano 1995, 91). 
Among the two types of phenomena, only mental phenomena in inner perception have “intentional inexistence” 
because physical phenomena need the mediation of inner perception to become part of one’s self-consciousness 
(Brentano 1995, 85-91). As such, Brentano ipso facto formulates inner perception as mental act that mediates, 
namely, synthesizes and conceptualizes outer perception. The rules of synthesizing and conceptualizing become 
psychological laws that ensure the evidence and incorrigibility of inner perception (Brentano 1995, 91; 20).  
 
It must be noted that Brentano refutes the label “psychologism” insofar as he believes Husserl misunderstood 
him. As remarked by Brentano, “Understood in this sense, I am not only not now an advocate of psychologism, 
but I have always very firmly rejected and opposed such absurd subjectivism. But then I hear it replied that I am 
nevertheless an advocate of psychologism and that I do away with the unity of truth for all, since this, it is said, 
exists only because there is something outside of the mind corresponding to the true judgement, something 
which is one and the same for everyone who judges. In the case of negative judgements and those which 
indicate that something is possible or impossible, past or future, this something could not be a thing, however. 
Consequently, since I do not admit that there are certain non-things, such as non-being, possibility, 
impossibility, pastness, futureness, and the like, in addition to things, this is where I do away with the unity of 
truth for all. I reply that even if the elimination of the general validity of knowledge were a consequence of such 
a denial, it still would not do to call me down for being an advocate of psychologism, because I myself do not 
draw this conclusion” (Brentano 1995, 238). 
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objects that transcend consciousness, Brentano presupposes the real existence of these objects 
(Hua 19/745). According to Husserl, Brentano further interprets knowledge as the product of 
psychological laws acquired through the presentation in inner perception of the directly given 
external objects in outer perception (Hua 19/746). In his scrutiny of Brentano’s viewpoint, 
Husserl finds the distinction between inner and outer ineffective, insofar as both physical and 
psychic objects need to be transformed into the ideal content of a mental act (Hua 19/744). 
As Husserl clarifies (Hua 19/744): 
 Having regard to the fact that all sorts of experiences (including the experiences of outer intuition, whose 
objects are therefore called outer appearances) can be made objects of reflective inner intuition, we call all 
experiences in an ego’s experiential unity “phenomena”. Phenomenology is accordingly the theory of 
experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real or intentional, given in experiences, and 
evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of “pure 
phenomena”, the phenomena of a “pure consciousness” or of a “pure ego”: it does not build on the ground, 
given by transcendent apperception, of physical and animal and so of psycho-physical nature, it makes no 
empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements which relate to objects transcending consciousness: it 
establishes no truths concerning natural realities, whether physical and psychic – no psychological truths, 
therefore, in the historical sense – and borrows no such truths as assumed premises. It rather takes all 
apperceptions and judgmental assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely immanent 
intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences 
they are in themselves; it subjects them to a purely immanent, purely descriptive examination into essence. 
The examination of essence is also pure in a second sense, in the sense of Ideation; it is an a priori 
examination in the true sense.32   
 
From Husserl’s vantage point, our knowledge goes beyond the realm of factual reality by 
virtue of intentionality. If that is the case, anything whose nature is “psycho-physical” cannot 
provide the universal and necessary conditions for the possibilities of knowledge and science 
                                                        
32 The English translation is based on that of J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 343). The original German version is 
as follows:  
„Mit Rücksicht darauf, daß auch jederlei Erlebnisse (darunter auch die Erlebnisse äußeren Anschauens, deren 
Gegenstände dann ihererseits äußere Erscheinungen heißen) zu Gegenständen reflektiver, innerer 
Anschauungen werden können, heißen dann alle Erlebnisse in der Erlebniseinheit eines Ich ‚Phänomene‘: 
Phänomenologie besagt demgemäß die Lehre von den Erlebnisse überhaupt, und, darin beschlossen, auch von 
allen in Erlebnissen evident ausweisbaren, nicht nur reellen, sondern auch intentionalen Gegebenheiten. Die 
reine Phänomenologie ist dann die Wesenslehre von den ‚reinen Phänomenen‘, denn des ‚reinen 
Bewusstseins‘ eines ‚reinen Ich‘ – das ist, sie stellt sich nicht auf den durch transzendente Apperzeption 
gegebenen Boden der physischen und animalischen, also psychophysischen Natur, sie vollzieht keinerlei 
Erfahrungssetzung und Urteilssetzung, die sich auf bewusstseinstranszendente Gegenstände beziehen; sie stellt 
also keinerlei Wahrheiten über physische und psychische Naturwirklichkeiten (also keinerlei psychologische im 
historischen Sinne) fest und nimmt keine als Prämissen, als Lehnsätze. Vielmehr nimmt sie alle über die 
Gegebenheiten adäquater, rein immanenter Intuition (also über den reinen Erlebnisstrom) hinausmeinenden, 
Apperzeptionen und Urteilssetzungen rein als die Erlebnisse, die sie in sich selbst sind, und unterzieht sie einer 
rein immanenten, rein ‚deskriptiven‘ Wesenerforschung. Ihre Wesenerforschung ist dabei eine reine noch in 
einem zweiten Sinne, in dem der ‚Ideation‘; sie ist im echten Sinne apriorische Forschung.“ 
 45  
 
in general (Hua 18/236; Hua 19/744). Our knowledge is not secured by psychological laws of 
such passive presenting through which one can examine, scrutinize, and reflect on what is 
known (Hua 18/240). Nor is our knowledge attested to by laws that govern physically real 
objects (Gegenstände) (Hua 19/744). Quite to the contrary, the a priori laws of knowledge 
pertain to the realm of ideality and consist in the principles of founding, fulfilling, and 
identifying (Hua 19/698).33 In Husserl’s presentation, phenomenology differs from 
Brentano’s psychology in that phenomenology explores these a priori laws through a 
thorough investigation of the phenomena, or in Husserl’s terms, “all experiences in an ego’s 
experiential unity”. The manifested phenomenon is pure, not only because it is devoid of 
factuality, but also because it demonstrates the interdependence of that which intends and that 
which is intended.  
As to be seen shortly, Husserl’s pronouncement that pure phenomenology “does not 
build on the ground” and “it makes no empirical assertions, it propounds no judgements 
which relate to objects transcending consciousness”, ushers in his notion of epoché. His 
definition of matter as ideal, not factually real, heralds his promotion of transcendental 
idealism. His inquiry into the a priori conditions eventually prompts him to establish 
phenomenology as the “theory of essence (Wesenslehre)” in Ideas I.  
2.2 Phase Two: Intentionality as the Noesis-Noema Correlate  
Following his reflection on psychologism, Husserl begins to rearticulate intentionality so that 
mental acts are not limited to those about factually existent objects. In virtue of intentionality, 
consciousness and knowledge go beyond “all wont and all divisions into spheres of reality” 
(Hua 19/705). In the first phase, Husserl does not explicitly express the alternative to 
                                                        
33 Here, I mainly draw on Husserl’s writings in the “Prolegomena” of Logical Investigations and the “Appendix 
to the Sixth investigation”, insofar as Husserl expounded in the foreword to the Second German Edition of 
Logical Investigations that if one wants to eschew misunderstanding of his philosophy and to truly understand 
his critique of psychologism, it would be good to read this “Appendix” right after the “Prolegomena” (Hua 
18/xvii). For a further analysis of the “Appendix to the Sixth investigation”, see Nicolas de Warren (2003, 147-
166). 
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psychologism, although he keeps contrasting the ideal with the real. It is only at the 
beginning of the second phase of his philosophical thinking that he brings this alternative to 
light, the alternative known as transcendental phenomenology. Different from psychology or 
any other natural science, phenomenology is a science of essence (eidos), not that of matters 
of fact (Hua 3/10). Further, as a transcendental philosophy, phenomenology shifts the focus 
from how real objects are given to the mind to how the mind serves as the condition for the 
possibility of the appearance of these objects. In light of this shift, Husserl renews his 
terminology, defining intentionality as the noesis-noema correlate in Ideas I. He refers to the 
noesis-noema correlate as the “all-inclusive phenomenological structure” of consciousness 
(Hua 3/169).  
The noetic-noematic structure is expressed through Husserl’s widely-known formula, 
“consciousness is the consciousness of” (Hua 3/177;182). In this formula, the italicized of can 
be considered as Husserl’s accentuation of the twofold relationship between the act of our 
consciousness that makes us “conscious of”, and the phenomenon for us being “conscious 
of”. While noesis describes which kind of act has been emitted by consciousness to seize 
upon a phenomenon (Hua 3/176), noema reveals the phenomenon as the object appears in the 
mind (Hua 3/182). To understand how the noetic-noematic structure becomes Husserl’s new 
expression of intentionality in the second phase of his philosophical thinking, it is helpful to 
explore the function of this structure in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology; that is, how 
the noetic-noematic structure underpins transcendental phenomenology and how it undergirds 
Husserl’s view of knowledge.  
Noesis and noema are integral parts of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. What 
demarcates a transcendental, pure phenomenology from natural sciences is the distinct 
attitude adopted by phenomenologists. The term “attitude” is used by Husserl to capture “a 
habitually fixed style of willing life” (Hua 6/326). As such, different attitudes bespeak 
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dissimilar habitual styles of perceiving and living. While the phenomenological attitude 
describes the habitual lifestyle and worldview of phenomenologists, the natural attitude is 
embraced by naturalists who are the main antagonists of phenomenology. As to be seen in 
Chapter 5, the natural and phenomenological attitudes pertain to both the descriptive and the 
explicative levels, further cultivating one to describe knowledge and to explain the nature of 
reality in different manners.  
The first type of attitude is termed “natural attitude”. A person with a natural attitude is 
someone who is conditioned to perpetuate assumptions about the “factually existent actuality 
(Wirklichkeit)” of various objects in the world (Hua 3/53). A natural attitude is commonly 
embraced by naturalists, inter alia, psychologists and physicists. Those who have this attitude 
reduce the objects around them to factually existent realities independent of their 
consciousness; objects exist prior to the perception of them. According to Husserl, followers 
of Brentanian psychologism can be described as naturalists, for they maintain that objects are 
given directly to the mind through inner perception and, thus, become part of one’s first 
consciousness. As the first cause of knowledge, these objects must have pre-existed on their 
own. In Husserl’s terms, “no doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the natural world 
alters in any respect of the general positing which characterizes the natural attitude” (Hua 
3/53).34 Whenever one can put aside these assumptions and go through a radical alteration, 
his or her attitude can change from a natural one to a phenomenological one, the latter of 
which, unlike the former, is pure and devoid of any assumptions. The phenomenological 
attitude provides access to the domain of pure consciousness and is the point of origin for 
phenomenological inquiry (Hua 3/53).  
                                                        
34 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 53). In his translation, Kersten made it more 
explicit that the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude is the positing of the “factually existent 
actuality” of various objects in the world. In his German writing, Husserl only used the term “actuality 
(Wirklichkeit)” without clarifying the feature of this actuality being factually existent. The German version of 
the quoted passage is as follows, „Alle Bezweiflung und Verwerfung von Gegebenheiten der natürlichen Welt 
ändert nichts an der Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellung“.  
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Husserl coins the term epoché to describe how a person can radically switch from the 
natural attitude to the phenomenological one, and suspend all assumptions about the material, 
factual existence of objects (Hua 3/60). Husserl gives the following example (Hua 3/183-
184): 
 Let us suppose that in a garden we regard with pleasure a blossoming apple tree, the fresh greenness of the 
lawn, etc. It is obvious that the perception and the accompanying liking are not, at the same time, what is 
perceived and liked. In the natural attitude, the apple tree is for us something existing in the transcendent 
realm of spatial actuality, and the perception, as well as the liking, is for us a psychic state belonging to 
real people. Between the one and the other real things, between the real person or the real perception, and 
the real apple tree, there exist real relations… Let us now go to the <transcendental> phenomenological 
attitude. The transcendent world receives its “parenthesis”, we exercise the epoché in relation to 
<positing> its actual being. We now ask what, of essential necessity, is to be discovered in the complex of 
noetic process pertaining to perception and in the valuation of liking. With the whole physical and psychic 
world, the actual existence of the real relation between perceiving and the perceived is excluded; and 
nonetheless, a relation between perceiving and perceived (as well as between liking and liked) remains left 
over, a relation which becomes given essentially in “pure immanence”, namely, purely on the ground of 
the phenomenologically reduced mental processes of perceiving and liking precisely as they fit into the 
transcendental stream of mental process… Even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental 
process is a perceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden” etc., and, likewise, the reduced liking 
is a liking of this same thing. The tree has not lost the least nuance of all these moments, qualities, 
characteristics with which it was appearing in this perception, <with which> it <was appearing as> 
“lovely”, “attractive” and so forth “in” this liking.35 
 
As indicated in the example, epoché entails a two-step reduction: phenomenological 
reduction qua bracketing, and transcendental reduction qua seeing the essence (Hua 3/60). 
Once enacting epoché, a person first suspends and excludes all assumptions about the 
                                                        
35 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 214-216). The original German version is as 
follows 
„Angenommen, wir blicken mit Wohlgefallen in einen Garten auf einen blühenden Apfelbaum, auf das 
jugendfrische Grün des Rasens usw. Offenbar ist die Wahrnehmung und das begleitende Wohlgefallen nicht das 
zugleich Wahrgenommene und Gefällige. In der natürlichen Einstellung ist uns der Apfelbaum ein Daseiendes 
in der transzendenten Raumwirklichkeit, und die Wahrnehmung, sowie das Wohlgefallen ein uns, den realen 
Menschen zugehöriger psychischer Zustand. Zwischen dem einen und anderen Realen, dem realen Menschen, 
bzw. der realen Wahrnehmung, und dem realen Apfelbaum bestehen reale Verhältnisse…Nun gehen wir in die 
phänomenologische Eistellung über. Die transzendente Welt erhält ihre ‚Klammer‘, wir üben in Beziehung auf 
ihr Wirklichsein epoché. Wir fragen nun, was im Komplex noetischer Erlebnisse der Wahrnehmung und 
gefallenden Wertung wesensmäßig vorzufinden ist. Mit der ganzen physischen und psychischen Welt ist das 
wirkliche Bestehen des realen Verhältnisses zwischen Wahrnehmung und Wahrgenommenem ausgeschaltet; 
und doch ist offenbar ein Verhältnis zwischen Wahrnehmung und Wahrgenommenem (wie ebenso zwischen 
Gefallen und Gefallendem) übrig geblieben, ein Verhältnis, das zur Wesensgegebenheit in ‚reiner 
Immanenz‘ kommt, nämlich rein auf Grund des phänomenologisch reduzierten Wahrnehmungs- und 
Gefallenserlebnisses, so wie es sich dem transzendentalen Erlebnisstrom einordnet…Auch das 
phänomenologisch reduzierte Wahrnehmungserlebnis ist Wahrnehmung von ‚diesem blühenden Apfelbaum, in 
diesem Garten usw.‘, und ebenso das reduzierte Wohlgefallen Wohlgefallen an diesem selben. Der Baum hat 
von all den Momenten, Qualitäten, Charakteren, mit welchen er in dieser Wahrnehmung erscheinender, 
‚in‘ diesem Gefallen ,schöner‘, ‚reizender‘ u.dgl. war, nicht die leiseste Nuance eingebüßt.“ 
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factually existent actuality (Hua 3/57), subsequently returning to the domain of pure 
consciousness to grasp the essential conditions for the possibility of objects to appear as 
phenomena that manifest themselves through intentionality (Hua 3/60). These essential 
conditions become transcendental ones. Those that can appear as phenomena in pure 
consciousness are not limited to factually real objects, but are inclusive of the ideal ones. As 
such, an object is not passively given to the mind through affection but rather relies on the 
activities of the mind to appear as a phenomenon. “Seeing” the essence, as mentioned in the 
previous section, does not entail seeing in a literal sense, i.e., “seeing with the eyes”, but 
rather implies figuratively how one grasps in one stroke any state of affairs, universal 
idealized object, or a priori self-evident laws of knowledge. Since the phenomenological 
attitude cultivates one in describing mental activities in the domain of pure consciousness and 
explaining the nature of reality in a distinct manner, epoché as a change of attitude becomes 
crucial to Husserl’s study of consciousness not only at the descriptive level, but also at the 
explicative one. In Husserl’s terms (Hua 3/179):  
 In its pure eidetic attitude “excluding” every sort of transcendence, on its own peculiar basis of pure 
consciousness, phenomenology necessarily arrives at this entire complex of transcendental problems in the 
specific sense, and on that account deserves the name of transcendental phenomenology.36 
 
That being said, epoché animates the phenomenological attitude, through which one enters 
the transcendental realm of pure consciousness, and becomes able to grasp how the universal 
and necessary conditionality unfolds itself through the noetic-noematic structure at all levels 
of founding and constituting.  
By nature, the noesis-noema correlate is characterized by ideality, rather than factuality 
and actuality. Husserl expresses this ideality in the following manner: “what is given at any 
                                                        
36 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 209). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„In ihrer rein eidetischen, jederlei Transzendenzen ‚ausschaltenden‘ Einstellung kommt die Phänomenologie auf 
ihrem eigenen Boden reinen Bewusstseins notwendig zu diesem ganzen Komplex der im spezifischen Sinne 
transzendentalen Probleme und daher verdient sie den Namen transzendentaler Phänomenologie.“ 
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particular time is usually surrounded by a halo of undetermined determinability 
(Unbestimmter Bestimmbarkeit)” (Hua 3/130). What is given is undetermined, insofar as this 
noesis-noema correlation of several mental acts remains a possibility, not reality. 
Nevertheless, what is given at each time is also determinable, insofar as nothing can be 
experienced without the noetic-noematic structure. As such, Husserl is able to highlight how 
the mind does not passively receive a given object but rather actively serves as the condition 
for the possibility, or, undetermined determinability of a phenomenon.  
To facilitate our understanding of how these attitudes influence the noesis-noema 
correlation, let us consider the following example. When Cindy receives roasted chestnuts 
from her colleague, Amanda, she is delighted. Were Cindy to be in possession of a natural 
attitude, her view of the chestnuts would be different from her view when she adopts a 
phenomenological attitude. Naturalist-Cindy considers the chestnuts as the fruits growing on 
chestnut trees, and as that which have their own material existence and spatial actuality. Her 
delight comes from her psychological state; her feelings are contingent on having received 
the chestnuts. After epoché, phenomenologist-Cindy turns her focus from whether these 
chestnuts are real to the way in which they appear to her. She suspends all her previous 
presuppositions about the factual existence of the chestnuts and she “retreats” to her pure 
consciousness. Stemming from epoché, Cindy develops a phenomenological attitude – her 
consciousness is the consciousness of the chestnut. As Husserl remarks, the perceived 
chestnut “has not lost the least nuance of all these moments, qualities, characteristics with 
which it was appearing in this perception, <with which> it <was appearing as> lovely, 
attractive, and so forth in this liking” (Hua 3/184). The perceived chestnuts then appear as the 
noematic content of her noetic act of perceiving. Founded on the perception, there arises the 
feeling of delight. As such the noesis-noema correlation depicts the pure ego’s mental “gaze” 
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at a phenomenon in the domain of pure consciousness (Hua 3/182). As detailed by Husserl 
(Hua 3/182): 
 Corresponding in every case to the multiplicity of Data pertaining to the really inherent noetic content, 
there is a multiplicity of Data, demonstrable in actual pure intuition, in a correlative “noematic content” or, 
in short, in the “noema” – terms which we shall continue to use from now on. Perception, for example, has 
its noema, most basically its perceptual sense, i.e. the perceived as perceived. Similarly, the current case of 
remembering has its remembered as remembered, just as its <remembered>, precisely as it is “meant”, 
“intended to” in <the remembering>; again, the judging has the judged as judged, liking has the liked as 
liked, and so forth.37 
 
Articulated in this manner, “the fundamental correlation between noesis and noema” 
indicates the universal, all-inclusive structure of pure consciousness (Hua 3/ 189). This 
structure is how Husserl encourages one to explain the widest sphere of intentionality (Hua 
3/189). The term “correlation”, as that between noesis and noema, stresses how mental acts 
are not directed to any real objects exterior to the mind, but rather are correlated with ideal 
phenomena in pure consciousness.   
Aside from supporting Husserl’s articulation of transcendental phenomenology, the 
noetic-noematic structure likewise facilitates Husserl’s depiction of the origin of knowledge 
and the connection of intentional mental acts at all levels. As expressed by Husserl, the 
universal noetic-noematic structure of pure consciousness characterizes the acts in “the 
higher spheres of consciousness in which a number of noeses are built up on one another in 
the unity of a concrete mental process and in which, accordingly, the noematic correlates are 
likewise founded” (Hua 3/193). Returning to the previous example of chestnuts: upon feeling 
happy after receiving the chestnuts, Cindy can continue to make a judgment that the chestnuts 
are auspicious. In any phenomenological inquiry, as Husserl contends, one needs to 
differentiate judgment-noesis from judgment-noema (Hua 3/195). The noesis of this 
                                                        
37 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 214). The original German version is as 
follows: „Überall entspricht den mannigfaltigen Daten des reellen, noetischen Gehaltes eine Mannigfaltigkeit in 
wirklich reiner Intuition aufweisbarer Daten in einem korrelativen ‚noematischen Gehalt‘, oder kurzweg im 
‚‘noema‘ – Termini, die wir von nun ab beständig gebrauchen werden. Die Wahrnehmung z.B. hat ihr Noema, 
zu unterst ihren Wahrnehmungssinn, d.h. das Wahrgenommenen als solches. Ebenso hat die jeweilige 
Erinnerung ihr Erinnertes als solches eben als das ihre, genau wie es in ihr ‚Gemeintes‘, ‚Bewusstes‘ ist; wieder 
das Urteilen das Geurteilte als solches, das Gefallen das Gefallende als solches usw.“ 
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judgment of the chestnuts is founded on previous acts of perceiving and feeling, further 
defining the act of judging as such. Understood in a noetic sense, judging is just “as any 
judging whatever, with an eidetic universality determined purely by the form” (Hua 3/197). 
The correlated noema of this specific judgment becomes “the whole which is formed out of 
them” (Hua 3/195), namely, the state of affairs about the chestnuts. All these acts can further 
give rise to abstract thinking. Cindy can talk about chestnuts even when she does not have 
them in hand. As Husserl remarks, “everything is connected by eidetic relations, thus 
especially noesis and noema” (Hua 3/194). Considering the way in which more abstract acts 
of thinking can be founded and constituted, curious readers might immediately question the 
objectivity of noema. Husserl is positive that there pertains to every noema an objective core 
(Gegenstandskerne), a core “in the mode belonging to its fullness” (Hua 3/273). As Husserl 
details (Hua 3/271):  
 With this, obviously, a quite fixed content in each noema is delimited. Each consciousness has its What and 
each means “its” objective something; it is evident that, in the case of each consciousness, we must, 
essentially speaking, be able to make such a noematic description of <“its” objective something>, 
“precisely as it is meant;” we acquire by explication and conceptual comprehension a closed set of formal 
or material, materially determined or undetermined (emptily meant) “predicates” and these in their 
modified signification determine that “content” of the object-core of the noema which is spoken of.38 
 
Nevertheless, how and why can the object always appear as the same noema first after 
epoché and then after continuous founding? The issue of objectivity will be addressed in 
Chapter 5.  
2.3 Phase Three: Intentionality as the Ego-Cogito-Cogitatum Schema  
When using the noetic-noematic structure to trace the production of knowledge and the 
connection of intentional acts at all levels, Husserl keeps in mind the question of how these 
                                                        
38 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 312-313). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Offenbar ist hiermit ein ganz fester Gehalt in jedem Noema abgegrenzt. Jedes Bewusstsein hat sein Was und 
jedes vermeint ‚sein‘ Gegenständliches; es ist evident, dass wir bei jedem Bewusstsein eine solche noematische 
Beschreibung desselben, ‚genau so, wie es vermeintes ist‘, prinzipiell gesprochen, müssen vollziehen können; 
wir gewinnen durch Explikation und begriffliche Fassung einen geschlossenen Inbegriff von formalen oder 
materialen, sachhaltig bestimmten oder auch ‚unbestimmten (leer vermeinten) ,Prädikaten‘, und diese in ihrer 
modifizierten Bedeutung bestimmen den ‚Inhalt‘ des in Rede stehenden Gegenstandskernes des Noema.“  
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acts remain as a unity in one’s consciousness. In Husserl’s terms, “intentionality is what 
characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at the same time, justifies 
designating the whole stream of mental processes as the stream of consciousness and as the 
unity of one consciousness” (Hua 3/168). In the third phase of his philosophical thinking, 
Husserl turns to the intentionality of inner time consciousness, through which he examines 
temporality as well as selfhood. As questioned by Husserl, if temporality is not what 
Brentano refers to as the succession and association of inner perceptions, how do these 
intentional acts of the past, present, and future coalesce with one another? In his answer to 
this question, the schema of ego-cogito-cogitatum gradually transpires as Husserl’s new 
definition of intentionality, which expands the noesis-noema binary. The ego-cogito-
cogitatum schema fulfils the function of providing a phenomenological theory of temporality 
and selfhood. 
To understand the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema, it will be of help to go through 
Husserl’s investigation of inner time. Adopting his phenomenological approach, he conducts 
epoché, suspending convictions about the natural time that can be tracked through watches, 
clocks, calendars, or any other chronometers (Hua 10/7). Through this shift of attitude, 
Husserl embarks on the examination of a distinct set of mental acts that make the entire 
temporal experience coalesce in his focus on what he calls the inner time. To avoid any 
possible interference of spatial intentionality, Husserl selects melody, the exemplar of 
temporal objects that does not occupy any material space (Hua 10/7). He details how inner 
time unfolds as a “two-dimensional infinite series” (Hua 10/10), the vertical dimension 
inherent to the consciousness of each now-point in the current moment (T2-T1’-T0’), and the 
horizontal dimension in the continuum of consciousness of all now-points (T0-T1-T2-T3) 
that exist throughout each phase of one’s life:
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T:  The Line of Now-points 
T’: Previous now-points  
TT’: Inner Time as a “two-dimensional infinite  
        series” 
The vertical dimension of consciousness depicted in T2-T1’-T0’ describes an individual’s 
experience in a singular moment. This description helps Husserl answer the question of why 
we never hear one single tone after another, but rather a consistent melody, when listening to 
a song. According to Husserl, our impression of tone 1 does not vanish, but sediments itself 
in our consciousness. The past is preserved in an absent way. This act of preserving the 
immediately passed impression is defined by Husserl as “retention”, which brings in a unique 
kind of temporal intentionality (Hua 10/31). As unique as such, the noetic act of retending is 
founded on the simple presenting of tone 1. The noematic content of this retending remains 
the same as that in the primal impression, namely, the content being that which appears as 
tone 1. Retention of tone 1 (T1’) co-exists with our primal impression of tone 2 (T2). 
Likewise, we have another unique intentionality that captures the immediate future, an 
intentionality coined by Husserl as “protention” (Hua 10/53). If impression co-exists with 
retention and protention, a temporal horizon soon opens up between T2-T1’-T0’, extending 
not only to the immediate past but also to the upcoming future (Hua 10/29; 44). Founded on 
the acts of retending, impressing, and protending, there arises the act of perceiving as the act 
of whole qua T2-T1’-T0’, which synthesizes the past tone 1, the present tone 2, and the 
upcoming tone 3. Those which are absent in this current moment, namely, the immediate past 
and the near future, do not vanish. Rather, they persist as the backdrop for the present now-
perception on the temporal horizon. It is in virtue of this horizon that we do not hear one 
individual tone after another when listening to a melody. To the contrary, each tone is heard, 
upon this horizon, as an integrated part of the melody as-a-whole.  
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This is also true of our experience of distant past and future, which unfolds throughout 
our lives as a continuous horizon. This horizon is depicted as the horizontal dimension in the 
continuum of consciousness of all the now-points (T0-T1-T2-T3). When this perception 
flows away into the past, this retention-impression-protention becomes afloat in our 
consciousness. By floating, Husserl has in mind the aforementioned quality of “undetermined 
determinability”, in comparison to the determined retention-impression-protention in our 
current now-perception, namely, the perception right here right now (Hua 10/85). The 
undetermined yet determinable previous retention-impression-protention will not be 
determined again until it is reproduced in our recollection. Sometimes, it is easy to determine 
this possibility and reproduce previous retention-impression-protentions, when we summon 
our previous perceptions from time to time. Yet, it is also commonplace that previous 
memories can escape us. The same can be said for anticipation. We can anticipate what will 
happen in the future after being conditioned by our previous experience, although we will 
never actually know what the future will be until it takes place. The new model of 
recollection-perception-anticipation, thus, extends its arms to our entire temporal experience, 
ensuring the experiential coalescence.39 
As shown by the previous diagram, a temporal horizon unfolds not only in virtue of 
retention-impression-protention in the vertical dimension, but also through recollection-
perception-anticipation in the horizontal dimension. If what happens in the past does not 
vanish but sediments, these past experiences need to have a place to reside. Husserl thus 
discerns “the absolute flow” as the temporal ground for the flowing-away past and the 
forthcoming future (Hua 10/75). As such, consciousness flows as a continuum that coalesces 
                                                        
39 As recent research demonstrates, some traumatic experiences have the power of not only giving us the 
continual feeling of being unsettled but also breaking the coalescence of our entire experience. When this 
coalescence can no longer be sustained, patients will suffer from a wide range of mental illnesses, such as 
PTSD, depression, and hallucination. For researches in this regard, see the studies of solitary confinement 
(Guenther 2013) and of the sense of foreshortened future (Ratcliffe et. al. 2014). 
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the present with its past and future. The absolute ego of each individual is, therefore, 
unravelled through this time-constituting flow (Hua 10/75). Moment by moment, stemming 
from this flow, there arises a noetic act that constitutes its noematic content (Hua 10/73). The 
interaction of the absolute flow of consciousness, the constituting acts, and the constituted 
phenomena continues to be refined by Husserl as the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema in 
Cartesian Meditations (Hua 1/ 87). In light of the schema, consciousness is not just the 
consciousness of something, but also the consciousness for someone. Through expanding the 
noesis-noema structure, Husserl describes how temporality does not consist in the succession 
of inner perceptions as presented in psychologism, but rather entails the coalescence of one’s 
entire experience underpinned by the intentional structure of ego-cogito-cogitatum.  
It seems that Husserl foregrounds the idea of a pure ego as the absolute flow of 
consciousness that constantly gives rise to the cogito qua the subject act of intending and the 
cogitatum qua the intended phenomenon, against the background phenomenological theory 
of temporality. However, Husserl’s view of the emergence of, or in his terms “genesis” of, 
intentional acts is much more complicated. The ego as the underlying flow of consciousness, 
inseparable from the constituting act and the constituted phenomenon, does not transform 
into a closed system or an outstanding pole, but rather mutually constitutes itself with the 
subjective act of cogito and the objective phenomenon qua cogitatum. To understand the 
view of mutual constitution, it is important to introduce Husserl’s distinction between two 
types of genesis of the experience of inner time: the passive and the active. As to be seen 
shortly, passive and active geneses summarize two different ways for intentional acts to arise, 
found, and fulfil themselves.  
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Passivity characterizes the experience of a wide range of sensations and intuitions in 
which the subjective act and the objective phenomenon are constituted primordially in every 
phase of experience.40 In Husserl’s terms (Hua 1/112):  
In any case, anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives 
something beforehand; and when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive 
generation. The “ready-made” object that confronts us in life as an existent merely physical thing is given, 
with the originality of the “it itself”, in the synthesis of a passive experience. As such a thing it is given 
beforehand to “spiritual” activities, which begin with active grasping.  
 
While these are making their synthetic products, the passive synthesis that supplies all their material still 
goes on. The physical thing given beforehand in passive intuition continues to appear in a unitary intuition; 
and no matter how much the thing may be modified therein by the activity of explication, of grasping parts 
and features, it continues to be given beforehand during and in this activity.41  
 
In the previous analysis of inner time consciousness, passivity penetrates the constitution of 
impression, retention, and protention on the same horizon: through sensuous impression, an 
object is passively constituted; on the basis of the previous impression, retention is founded 
whose content remains the previously constituted object; further built up on retention, 
impression, and protention, a horizon opens in the current moment. Now, when an ego 
actively conducts the intentional act of perceiving the current moment, this active act of 
perceiving has already presupposed the primordial constitution of a horizon in virtue of 
passive genesis.  
In contrast, activity characterizes the use of human reason, which is able to operatively 
conduct intentional acts from categorial intuition to conceptualizing (Hua 1/111). While 
activity attributes to the ego a privileged position and elevates the ego to the center of one’s 
                                                        
40 The conception of passivity has been developed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For a closer investigation of 
passivity in phenomenology, please see Don Beith, The Birth of Sense: Generative Passivity in Merleau-Ponty’s 
Philosophy (2017). 
41 The English translation is based on Dorion Cairns’s edition (1960, 78-79). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Jedenfalls aber setzt jeder Bau der Aktivität notwendig als unterste Stufe voraus eine vorgebende Passivität, 
und dem nachgehend stoßen wir auf die Konstitution durch passive Genesis. Was uns im Leben sozusagen fertig 
entgegentritt als daseiendes bloßes Ding, das ist in der Ursprünglichkeit des es selbst in der Synthesis passiver 
Erfahrung gegeben. Als das ist es vorgegeben den mit dem aktiven Erfassen einsetzenden geistigen Aktivitäten. 
Während diese ihre synthetischen Leistungen vollziehen, ist die ihnen alle Materie beistellende passive 
Synthesis immer weiter im Gang. Das in passiver Anschauung vorgegebene Ding erscheint weiter in 
einheitlicher Anschauung, und wieviel dabei auch <durch> die Aktivität der Explikation, des Einzelerfassens 
nach Teilen und Merkmalen modifiziert sein mag, es ist auch während und in dieser Aktivität stehende 
Vorgegebenheit.“ 
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experience, passivity pinpoints the limit of reason, insofar as the active exercise of reason 
presupposes a primordial constitution of worldly objects in one’s experience. What 
primordially constitutes these worldly objects amounts to an intentional act of perceiving the 
entire world throughout every phase of time, a holistic perception to which a person may not 
even have access. Husserl refers to this holistic perception that generates passively as 
apperception. In Husserl’s terms (Hua 1/113):  
There, however, we soon encounter eidetic law governing a passive forming of perpetually new syntheses 
(a forming that, in part, lies prior to all activity and, in part, tales in all activity itself); we encounter a 
passive genesis of the manifold apperceptions, as products that persist in a habituality relating specifically 
to them. When these habitual apperceptions become actually operative, the already given objects formed 
for the central ego appear, affect him, and motivate activities. Thanks to the aforesaid passive synthesis 
(into which the performances of active synthesis also enter), the ego always has an environment of 
“objects”.42  
 
From Husserl’s delineation, it can be inferred that apperception, as a holistic perception of all 
the worldly objects throughout time, is passively constituted prior to any perception actively 
conducted by the pure ego. The holistic perception constitutes the primordial life-experience 
for the ego, although the ego might not always have access to the passively constituted 
objects in apperception. Our previous example of recollection and anticipation illustrates this 
limit of reason – we can try very hard to recollect and, still, the memory seems to escape us, 
yet since we do not lose our memory, there is always the possibility that it will come back to 
us in the future. The undetermined determinability of intentional acts, like recollection, thus, 
alludes to the interplay between passive and active geneses of experience. In the wake of the 
idea of genesis, “to intend” becomes synonymous with “to constitute”.  If that is the case, the 
threefold ego-cogito-cogitatum schema neither presents the underlying ego as a passive 
receiver of given objects, nor depicts the ego as an active producer of experience, but rather 
                                                        
42 The English translation is based on Dorion Cairns’s edition (1960, 79). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Da aber stoßen wir bald auf Wesensgesetzmäßigkeiten einer passiven, teils aller Aktivität voranliegenden, teils 
alle Aktivität selbst wieder umgreifenden Bildung von immer neuen Synthesen, auf eine passive Genesis der 
mannigfaltigen Apperzeptionen als in einer eigenen Habitualität verharrender Gebilde, die für das zentrale Ich 
geformte Vorgegebenheiten scheinen, wenn sie aktuell werden, affizieren und zu Tätigkeiten motivieren. Das 
Ich hat immerzu dank dieser passiven Synthesis (in die also auch die Leistungen der aktiven eingehen) eine 
Umgebung von Gegenständen.“ 
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portrays how intending acts, intended phenomena, and the underlying ego mutually constitute 
the identity of one another.   
2.4 Phase Four: Intentionality of Collective Consciousness 
Towards the end of his investigation of individual consciousness, Husserl clarifies the mutual 
constitution of subject and object in consciousness, further highlighting the foundational role 
of the underlying pure ego. In doing so, he finds himself cornered by the problem of other 
minds – if the pure ego is an absolute flow of consciousness, can it perceive or be perceived 
by other minds? To explore how the ego of one person is not a closed system but rather 
interdependent with others, Husserl elaborates on his notion of apperception, further 
expanding intentionality from that of the I to that of the we. As a result, intentionality goes 
beyond the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema, bringing together the collective we, the collective 
act of intending, and the intended life-world. The function of the notion of collective 
intentionality is also twofold: not only does it demonstrate that phenomenology entail no 
solipsism, but it also reveals how phenomenology, at its descriptive level, is an analysis of 
experience from the first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives.  
Husserl addresses the problem of other minds at the beginning of the Fifth Meditation of 
Cartesian Meditations (Hua 1/121):  
 As the point of departure for our new meditations, let us take what may seem to be a grave objection. The 
objection concerns nothing less than the claim of transcendental phenomenology to be itself transcendental 
philosophy and therefore its claim that, in the form of a constitutional problematic and theory moving 
within the limits of the transcendentally reduced ego, it can solve the transcendental problems pertaining to 
the Objective world… But what about other egos, who surely are not a mere intending and intended in me, 
merely synthetic unities of possible verification in me, but according to their sense, precisely others?43 
 
                                                        
43 The English translation is based on Dorion Cairns’s edition (1960, 89). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Knüpfen wir unsere neuen Meditationen an einen, wie es scheinen möchte, schwerwiegenden Einwand. Nichts 
Geringeres betrifft er als den Anspruch der transzendentalen Phänomenologie, schon Transzendentalphilosophie 
zu sein, also in Form einer im Rahmen des transzendental reduzierten ego sich bewegenden konstitutiven 
Problematik und Theorie die transzendentalen Probleme der objektiven Welt lösen zu können…Aber wie steht 
es dann mit anderen ego’s, die doch nicht bloße Vorstellung und Vorgestelltes in mir sind, synthetische 
Einheiten möglicher Bewährung in mir, sondern sinngemäß eben Andere.“ 
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Psychologists respond to the question of how it is possible to have knowledge of other minds 
without negating their alterity by asserting that we have no direct knowledge of the 
consciousness of others; that is, we can only infer them indirectly and analogically. This 
response is put forward by Brentano, who states: “In addition to the direct perception of our 
own mental phenomena we have an indirect knowledge of the mental phenomena of others. 
The phenomena of inner life usually express themselves, so to speak, i.e. they cause 
externally perceivable changes” (Brentano 1995, 28). We can infer what others have in mind 
through how they express themselves to us, either verbally in “mutually intelligible 
communication” (Brentano 1995, 28), or non-verbally through “behavior and voluntary 
action” (Brentano 1995, 29). Brentano’s approach to the problem of other minds remains 
popular in modern philosophy of mind (Ryle 1949; Ayer 1956; Malcolm 1962; Goldman 
1970).44 
Husserl finds problematic the way in which psychologists, like Brentano, presume others 
to be pre-given and foreign to us, a presumption that contradicts the idealism intrinsic to 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. If everything depends on the mind to appear as a 
phenomenon, why cannot we have direct knowledge of other minds without negating their 
alterity? This question prompts Husserl to inquire into alternative means of resolving the 
problem of other minds.  
                                                        
44 The aforementioned philosophers represent the investigation of other minds from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
when the problem of other minds was prevalent in the field of philosophy. They represent the linguistic and 
behaviorist approaches to other minds, respectively. Contemporary philosophy of mind provides two models to 
account for the way in which we access other minds: the theory-theory (TT) and the simulation theory (ST). The 
former argues that we infer other minds from a framework qua a commonsense theory whereas the latter 
contends that we use our own mind as a screen on which to project those of others (Goldman 2006, 8-17). 
Nonetheless, both models tend to prioritize the first-person perspective of experience. The question 
phenomenologists like Dan Zahavi intend to address is, why do we have to go through “a circuit through self” to 
understand others? (Zahavi 2008, 519). A circuit, as such, entails a self-other rift as a result of which I can only 
interact with other minds through a causal relation with the first cause being either a universal common theory 
or my own mind. Drawing on the theory of empathy articulated by phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and 
Edith Stein, Dan Zahavi argues that we do have direct access to other minds through the second-person and 
third-person perspectives. 
 61 
 
 
Husserl approaches the problem of other minds by drawing a parallel between our bodily 
experience and our collective perception. Both experiences are characterized by the part-
whole relation, and both allude to the role of apperception, namely, the holistic perception 
generated from passive synthesis (Hua 1/139). Let us first turn to our bodily experience. 
Suppose that I am standing in front of the Notre-Dame Basilica. I, thus, conduct epoché and 
withdraw from the natural attitude that propels me to square-meters. Rather, I envisage the 
space as the phenomenon that appears in my consciousness as such. My body always 
occupies a locus that limits what can appear in my perception. For instance, when I stand 
“here” facing the forefront of the Basilica, its backside remains invisible. As a movable 
being, I can move my body, changing my position from the “here” qua facing-the-front to the 
“there” qua facing-the-back, to make the invisible “there” visible in my perception. As such, 
my body, similar to the now-moment in time, opens up a horizon on which the visible “here” 
co-appears with the invisible “there”. Even though the Basilica cannot present all its aspects 
to me from one given locus, or in Husserl’s terms, the Basilica cannot really appresent itself 
to me, I turn my body consecutively from one side to another to perceive the Basilica as-a-
whole (Hua 1/138). Thereby, my active perception of each aspect of the Basilica presupposes 
a primordial, passive constitution of the Basilica-as-a whole in my experience. Such a passive 
constitution that entails the holistic perception is referred to as apperception (Hua 1/141):  
 Apperception is not inference, not a thinking act. Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, 
and consciously grasp, objects given beforehand – for example, the already-given everyday world – every 
apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith points back to a primal 
instituting, in which an object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time…The manner in 
which apperceptions arise, and consequently in themselves, by their sense and sense-horizon, point back to 
their genesis, varies greatly. There are different levels of apperception, corresponding to different layers of 
objective sense. Ultimately, we always get back to the radical differentiation of apperceptions into those 
that, according to their genesis, belong purely to the primordial sphere and those that present themselves 
with the sense alter ego and upon this sense, have built a new one – thanks to a genesis at a higher level.45 
                                                        
45 The English translation is based on Dorion Cairns’s edition (1960, 111). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Apperzeption ist kein Schluss, kein Denkakt. Jede Apperzeption, in der wir vorgegebene Gegenstände, etwa 
die vorgegebene Alltagswelt mit einem Blick auffassen und gewahrend erfassen, ohne weiteres ihren Sinn mit 
seinen Horizonten verstehen, weist intentional auf eine Urstiftung zurück, in der sich ein Gegenstand ähnlichen 
Sinnes erstmalig konstituiert hatte… Doch ist die Art, wie Apperzeptionen entspringen und in weiterer Folge in 
sich, durch ihren Sinn und Sinneshorizont, auf ihre Genesis intentional zurückweisen, eine sehr verschiedene. 
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As previously mentioned in section 3, those that are absent for now do not vanish but, rather, 
appear in a specific way for us, together with those that are present. The appresentation of an 
object as-a-whole alludes to the primordial constitution of the object in apperception, which 
exists as the direct, immediate perception in the holistic sense, as that of the entire horizon, be 
it present or absent. Every perception that has been enacted and, therefore, determined by the 
subject in one specific moment and locus presupposes the role of apperception to which one 
might not always have access in each specific moment. Articulated as such, apperception for 
Husserl is marked by its indeterminacy and passivity, further serving as the ground for any 
active, determined perception.  
Just like how the invisible sides of the Basilica serve as parts of my perceptual 
background, so too are other egos with whom we share the same perceptual field. Other 
minds are constituted primordially in the collective experience, the same way the invisible 
parts of the Basilica are constituted in one’s experience (Hua 6/258-259): 
 Just as every ego-subject has an original perceptual field within a horizon that can be opened up through 
free activity, which leads to ever new perceptual fields, repeatedly preindicated through a combination of 
the determinate and the indeterminate: so every ego-subject has his horizon of empathy (Einfüllung), that 
of his cosubjects, which can be opened up through direct and indirect commerce with the chain of others, 
who are all others for one another, for whom there can be still others, etc. But this means that each has an 
oriented world in such a way that he has a nucleus of relatively original data; and this is the nucleus of a 
horizon, “horizon” being here a title for a complicated intentionality which, in spite of its indeterminacy, is 
covalid and anticipated. But this means at the same time that within the vitally flowing intentionality in 
which the life of an ego-subject consists, every other ego is already intentionally implied in advance by 
way of empathy and the empathy-horizon. Within the universal epoché which actually understands itself, it 
becomes evident that there is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential 
nature.46  
                                                        
Den Stufenbildungen der gegenständlichen Sinne entsprechen die der Apperzeptionen. Letztlich kommen wir 
immer zurück auf die radikale Unterscheidung der Apperzeptionen in solche, die ihrer Genesis nach rein der 
primordinalen Sphäre zugehören, und solche, die mit dem Sinn alter ego auftreten und auf diesem Sinn dank 
einer höherstufigen Genesis neuen Sinn aufgestuft haben.“  
46 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 255). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Wie jedes Ichsubjekt ein originales Wahrnehmungsfeld hat, in einem freitätig zu eröffnenden Horizont, der zu 
immer neuen, immer wieder bestimmt-unbestimmt vorgezeichneten Wahrnehmungsfeldern führt, so hat ein 
jedes seinen Einfühlungshorizont, den seiner Mitsubjektivität, zu eröffnen durch direkten und indirekten 
Verkehr, mit der Verkettung der Anderen, je für einander Andere, die immer wieder Andere haben können usw. 
Das sagt aber, jeder hat orientierte Welt so, dass er einen Kern relativ originaler Gegebenheiten hat, und zwar 
als Kern eines Horizontes, der ein Titel für eine komplizierte und bei aller Unbestimmtheit doch mitgeltende 
und antizipierende Intentionalität ist. Das sagt aber zugleich, dass in der lebendig strömenden Intentionalität, in 
der das Leben eines Ichsubjektes besteht, in der Weise der Einfühlung und des Einfühlungshorizontes jedes 
 63 
 
 
 
Husserl coins the concept of life-world (Lebenswelt) to describe this primordially constituted 
world of collective experience in which we live with others. As Husserl describes, “the 
constitution of the world essentially involves a harmony of the monads (egos)” (Hua 1/138), 
and “each of us has his life-world, meant as the world for all” (Hua 6/257). Other egos 
manifest themselves in my apperception of the life-world, thus “being constituted 
appresentatively” in my consciousness (Hua 1/143). To put it differently, I can perceive other 
egos as the invisible “you” with whom I collaborate to constitute our shared primordial life-
world. Without them, I would never be able to have an experience of the world and of 
myself. For this reason, Husserl detailed in the Vienna lectures in 1935 (Hua 6/314-315):  
Personal life is, when I and We live collectively upon a community-horizon, and to be precise, in 
communities of a variety of simple or highly categorized forms, like family, nation, supernation. The word 
life here does not have a physiological sense; it means a life that works towards a purpose and 
accomplishes spiritual products: in the widest sense, creating culture in the unity of historicity.47  
 
This collective horizon as the horizon of empathy becomes a shared space for the genesis of a 
meaningful life for each individual in that community, consequently becoming fundamental 
to the life of each individual. As such, a shared collective horizon known as 
Gemeinschaftshorizont is the ground for the realm of language, much broader than that which 
can be put in speeches, expressions, or voluntary actions. Abstract symbolic signs used in 
verbal or non-verbal communications need concrete experience to fulfill their meanings. 
When we can communicate and understand others, we have already presupposed the 
background experience, or to be more precise, the collective consciousness throughout 
history. 
                                                        
andere Ich im voraus schon intentional impliziert ist. In der wirklich sich selbst verstehenden universalen 
Epoché zeigt es sich, dass es für die Seelen in ihrer Eigenwesentlichkeit überhaupt keine Trennung des 
Außereinander gibt.“ 
47 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 270). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Personales Leben ist, als Ich und Wir vergemeinschaftet in einem Gemeinschaftshorizont leben. Und zwar in 
Gemeinschaften verschiedener einfacher oder aufgestufter Gestalten, wie Familie, Nation, Übernation. Das 
Wort Leben hat hier nicht physiologischen Sinn, es bedeutet zwecktätiges, geistige Geblide leistendes Leben: in 
weitesten Sinn kulturschaffend in der Einheit einer Geschichtlichkeit.“  
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Drawing on his discussion of appresentation and apperception, Husserl expands the 
articulation of intentionality from that which characterizes my consciousness to that which 
defines the consciousness of mankind (Hua 6/258). As Husserl writes in the early 1920s in 
the Kaizo articles, a collective life is constituted by a community full of individuals, namely, 
by the collective-we (Hua 27/44).48 Upon extending the scope from individual life to a 
collective one, Husserl subsequently expands the schema of ego-cogito-cogitatum into the 
tripartition of the egos or the we, the collective acts of intending, and the intended collective 
phenomena. 
Aside from proving phenomenology is an idealist philosophy devoid of solipsism, the 
conception of collective intentionality also enables phenomenologists to examine experiences 
from different perspectives. As demonstrated in the passages above, Husserl employs the 
term “einfühlung”, commonly translated in English as empathy, to encapsulate our 
experience of other minds (Hua 4/169; Hua 6/259). Husserl’s notion of empathy indicates the 
mutual non-exclusivity and inseparability of the self and others. As such, the essence of a 
human becomes a twofold a priori, namely, “consciousness of oneself as being in the world” 
(Hua 6/255), and “self-consciousness and consciousness of others are inseparable” (Hua 
3/256). Empathy in the Husserlian sense has been interpreted by contemporary Husserlian 
scholars as a perception of other minds from the second-person perspective (Moran 2001; 
Zahavi 2005; Crowell 2016). For a long time, phenomenology has been characterized as a 
study of experience from the first-person perspective. Aside from the first-person standpoint, 
Husserl also describes the third-person perspective of experience. Let us revisit the previous 
example of our perception of body. When I turn myself from the front to the back of the 
Basilica, I treat myself and my body as one – “I” am my body. Such an articulation 
                                                        
48 The Kaizo articles were penned by Husserl to introduce phenomenology to readers in Japan. As a historically 
conditioned human himself, Husserl reflected the popular Euro-centrism in this series of articles ((Hua 27). I am 
grateful to Philip Buckley for reminding me of not only being mindful but also being explicit about the 
ideological aspect of the Kaizo articles.  
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demonstrates the first-person experience of body. Then, after walking to the backside of the 
Basilica, I start to recollect my previous experience when I stood at the front. Upon 
recollection, my body reveals itself as a foreign object, which allows me to experience my 
body through the third-person perspective as an “it”. The way in which I can objectify my 
own body further indicates that alterity is a crucial dimension of my experience. As seen in 
the previous excerpt, through apperception, we acquire the sense of “alter-ego” (Hua 1/142), 
namely, the ego perceived from the third-person perspective. Unlike the first-person 
standpoint, which indicates a lived experience of that of me, and the third-person perspective, 
which objectifies the perceived phenomenon as a foreign it, the second-person standpoint 
appears in a collective setting which differs from that of me but is not fully objectified to be 
an it. The second-person standpoint encapsulates intersubjectivity, also known as the I-You 
relationship (Gomez 1996; Reddy 1996; Gallagher 2001). One exemplar of this I-You 
relationship is friendship – our friends, though different from ourselves, are still one of us, 
not one of them. Considering how the second-person standpoint has been articulated as 
irreducible to that of the first-person or third-person, Husserlian scholars argue for 
interpreting Husserl’s way of describing alterity as a second-person phenomenology of mind 
(Moran 2001; Zahavi 2005; Crowell 2016).  
Even though the Kaizo articles are one of the few places in which Husserl addresses 
ethical issues, he does not explicitly connect the discussion on ethics with the account of 
perception of other egos or empathy. In Crowell’s terms, Husserl’s account of other minds 
“does not explicitly link this normative moment to the constitutive role of second-person 
phenomenology” (Crowell 2016). Nevertheless, later phenomenologists, represented by Edith 
Stein and Emmanuel Levinas, continued to develop the normative level of Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology and proposed their own articulation of phenomenological 
ethics. In the next chapter, we will explore how Chinese Yogācārins resolve the issue of other 
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minds in a similar way but for a different purpose. Unlike Husserl’s phenomenology, the 
Yogācāra account of other minds serves to justify their ethical theory, known as the 
Bodhisattvas’ path, according to which Buddhists shall perform the altruistic moral deeds 
exemplified by the ten perfect actions (shengxing 勝⾏, pāramitā). Now, let us turn to the 
Yogācāra school of Buddhism and introduce readers to their description of intentional 
consciousness.  
 
Chapter 3: Intentionality in Later Chinese Yogācāra 
 
Thus far, we have clarified Husserl’s investigation of consciousness at the descriptive level 
with a focus on his rich notion of intentionality in the preceding chapter. Now we can 
proceed to see how the Husserlian concept of intentionality can be related to Yogācāra 
Buddhism. Yogācārins are known for their doctrine of vijñaptimātra, commonly translated in 
English as that of Mind-only or Consciousness-only. Due to the historical development of the 
Yogācāra school, it is impossible to speak of the Yogācāra description of consciousness in 
the singular. There are clear differences between the early and later Yogācārins’ 
interpretations of consciousness, as well as differences between Chinese Yogācāra and Indian 
Yogācāra.49 The interpretation explored in this chapter is that of the later Chinese 
                                                        
49 The distinction between early and later Yogācāra was first explicated by Kuiji as that between the “Ancient 
Preaching (古說) and “Current Text (今⽂)” (T45N1861, P247a15-16). In early Republican China, Lü Cheng 
(呂澂 1896-1989),  coined the terms “Ancient Learning (guxue 古學)” and the “Current Learning (今學)”. In 
1924, Lü Cheng elaborated further on the distinction in this way: for early Yogācāra, Consciousness-only means 
that “both the grasping subjects (i.e. the seeing parts, jianfen, ⾒分, darśanabhāga,) and the objects being 
grasped (i.e. the image parts, xiangfen, 相分, nimittabhāga) have consciousness as their nature and both are 
falsely posited (古學所⾔唯識，無論能取所取皆是識性，皆是虛妄分別)” (Lü 1968, 75). For later 
Yogācāra, however, Consciousness-only means that “grasping subjects and grasped objects can have different 
natures but they are still not apart from consciousness(皆為所緣可別有性，但不離識故名唯識)” (Lü 1986, 
76). Prior to Lü Cheng, the difference between early and later Yogācāra was long considered to be due to a 
dissimilar way of translating Yogācāra texts. For this, please see Mei Guangxi 梅光羲, “On the Distinctions 
between the Old and the New Translations of the Dharma-image School (相宗新舊兩譯不同論)”(2003).  
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Yogācārins, which has been preserved in the texts composed by Xuanzang (⽞奘 602-664 
CE), Kuiji (窺基 632-682 CE), and their disciples.   
Since Chinese Yogācārins have not directly utilized the concept of intentionality, how 
shall we understand their conception of consciousness? Here, I find it helpful to start with 
their translation of Sanskrit terms. Through paraphrasing both vijñāna and vijñapti as the 
Chinese word consciousness (shi 識), Chinese Yogācārins insert their understanding of the 
intentional feature of consciousness into their translations, which becomes more explicitly 
expressed through their presentation of the fourfold intentional structure of mental acts. In 
this manner, Chinese Yogācārins define consciousness as the way in which an intending act 
is always mutually constituted with an intended phenomenon and the underlying ego, a 
definition that highlights the interdependence of ego, act, and phenomenon, and is therefore 
compatible with Husserl’s formulation of intentionality. Furthermore, with the help of 
intentionality, Chinese Yogācārins are able to portray knowledge of the self and of other 
minds, a portrait that can likewise be related to that in Husserl. While the Husserlian account 
of intentionality can advance our understanding of Yogācāra Buddhism, they are not 
completely identical, partly because Yogācārins are interested in several extreme mental 
states, such as the pre-death mental state or the mental state at the beginning of each rebirth, 
partly also because Yogācārins associate all mental acts with their moral consequences. 
Thereby, the analysis in this chapter allows me to argue that Chinese Yogācārins have 
characterized consciousness through its intentional feature at the descriptive level, which can 
be related to, but is not identical with, that in Husserl’s phenomenology.  
In what follows, I start with the Yogācāra definition of consciousness and their 
conception of intentionality in section 1. Here, I examine how later Yogācārins in China 
express their view of intentionality implicitly in their translation of Sanskrit terms and 
explicitly in the presentation of the fourfold structure of mental acts. Then, I continue to 
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introduce the eight types of consciousness, which represent eight different cognitive faculties 
in the Yogācāra system, in section 2. The Yogācāra view of consciousness and their 
articulation of intentionality lay the ground for Xuanzang and his disciples to enquire into 
knowledge of the self and of other minds, which will be detailed in sections 3 and 4. To end 
this chapter, I introduce the Yogācāra theory of mental factors in section 5. Our analysis in 
the current chapter prepares us for exploring the Yogācāra elaboration on the ultimate nature 
of reality encapsulated in the notions of svabhāva (essence) and śūnyatā (emptiness) in 
Chapter 6.  
3.1 Intentionality in Translation and Elaboration 
In his articulation of consciousness, Husserl enters into discourse with a long philosophical 
tradition that stretches back through time all the way to the ancient Greeks. His choice of 
terminology, including terms such as empirical, transcendental, a priori, essence, conditions, 
etc., is reflective of the tradition that he draws from. Likewise, Chinese Yogācārins adopt a 
set of terminology that reflects their own intellectual background. In order to comprehend 
Chinese Yogācārins’ description of consciousness, it is therefore important to understand the 
intellectual context that informs their specific terminology.  
Chinese clerics speak of consciousness as “shi 識”, a term that is utilized to translate two 
different, yet related, Sanskrit terms, vijñāna and vijñapti.50 Both Sanskrit terms derive from 
the root √jñā, which means “to know”. The prefix vi- is used to indicate “apart”, “separate”, 
or “divided”. The literal meaning of vijñāna is knowing distinctly. This is the term Indian 
                                                        
50 In his dissertation, The Vijñaptimātratā Buddhism of the Chinese monk Kʻuei-chi (A.D. 632-682), Alan 
Sponberg also elucidated the distinction between vijñāna and vijñapti (1979). As per Sponberg, “The nominal 
forms of this verb, both vijñāna and vijñapti, retain the reference to an activity: they express the action specified 
by the verb, in somewhat the same manner as the -ing forms in English (e.g., walking, swimming, etc. as in: 
‘Running is good for you’). They do not express a state of being: hence the inappropriateness of 
‘consciousness’, the most commonly encountered equivalent for vijñāna” (Sponberg 1979, 43). However, 
Sponberg did not elaborate on the reason why both Xuanzang and Kuiji used one Chinese term to translate 
vijñāna and vijñapti, given their explicitly different nuances. In Sponberg’s terms, “Why Hsüan-tsang (aka, 
Xuanzang) and K’uei-chi (aka. Kuiji) retained Shih 識 for vijñapti thus remains a conundrum” (Sponberg 1979, 
50). As such, it is the original contribution of the current dissertation to clarify the unique way of translation.    
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Buddhists use to coin all types of consciousness, for instance, the eye consciousness referred 
to as cakṣuvijñāna. From the root vi+√jñā, one can make a causative verb, vijñapayati (to 
make/cause to know distinctly), of which the past passive participle becomes vijñapti. When 
Xuanzang and Kuiji refer to their doctrine as that of “Consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra)”, 
they have in mind the term vijñapti (T43N1831, P608c24).51 The meaning of these two terms, 
namely, vijñāna and vijñapti, can be understood as follows:  
Vijñāna (one-place relation) – knowing distinctly  
Vijñapti (two-place relation) – causing A to know B distinctly 
 
That being said, vijñāna indicates a sense of knowing distinctly, in which one does not have 
to know something specific but just knows in general. In contrast, vijñapti entails a sense of 
aboutness or directedness, insofar as its literal meaning, “causing A (act) to know B 
(phenomenon) distinctly”, implies a two-place relation between a subjective act of knowing 
and an objective phenomenon to be known. As such, vijñapti can be related to the notion of 
intentionality (as that in early Husserl). The meanings of the two terms are evidently 
different, although they derive from the same root.  
Considering the evident difference between the two Sanskrit terms, scholars of Yogācāra 
Buddhism have struggled to understand why Xuanzang used the Chinese term shi (識, 
consciousness) to translate both vijñāna and vijñapti. As remarked by Alan Sponberg, “why 
Hsüan-tsang (aka Xuanzang) and K’uei-chi (aka Kuiji) retained Shih 識 for vijñapti thus 
remains a conundrum” (Sponberg 1979, 50). Recently, Buddhologists have argued that it was 
inaccurate for Xuanzang to render vijñapti as consciousness (Zhou 2004, 2007). Upon 
comparing Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of Yogācāra literature with the original Sanskrit 
texts and versions in the Tibetan language, these Buddhologists have proposed to translate 
                                                        
51 Kuiji wrote, “梵云, 毘若底(丁爾反識也)、摩咀刺多(唯也)、悉提(成也)、奢薩呾羅(論也)，應云識唯成
論。” (T43N1831, P608c24), which means “In Sanskrit, vijñapti (referring to consciousness), mātratā (meaning 
only), siddhi (i.e. perfection), śastrā (namely, commentary), therefore the name of the treatise shall be 
‘Commentary on the Perfection of Consciousness-only’”. 
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vijñapti as “distinct representation (biaobie 表別)” (Huo 1994; Han 1999). According to 
these scholars, the term “distinct representation” can better demonstrate the two-place 
relation (between a subjective act of knowing and the objective phenomenon) encapsulated in 
the concept of vijñapti (Zhou 2004). While critics have provided counterarguments (Huo 
1980; Wu 2006; Cao 2014), their focus remains on whether Xuanzang’s translation is 
accurate, that is, whether his translation properly reveals the original meaning of these terms 
in Sanskrit. Therefore, regardless of their disputes, both the Buddhologists and their critics 
share the assumption that there is only one appropriate understanding of the text, and 
translation should be conducted in conformity with this understanding. 
There are two major problems with this claim: (1) it does not take into account how 
grammatical differences between the Chinese and Sanskrit languages can condition the 
translation of terms from one language to the other; and (2) it ignores other intellectual 
traditions that informed the thinking of Chinese Yogācārins, privileging the Indian Buddhist 
tradition over indigenous Chinese philosophical traditions. I maintain that discrepancies 
between Sanskrit and Chinese Buddhist texts deserve more attention from scholars, not 
because they reflect defects of translation, but because they indicate unique understandings 
specific to individual language systems. The Chinese language, unlike Sanskrit, does not 
conjugate verbs and nouns. Clerics, like Xuanzang and Kuiji, who mastered both Sanskrit 
and Chinese, had a clear idea of the meaning of the term in its original and translated 
languages. Translation is self-reflexive – it suggests not merely a passive reception of ideas 
from foreign languages but also an active comprehension of concepts in the local context. As 
I will demonstrate below, upon translating both vijñāna and vijñapti as consciousness, 
Chinese Yogācārins managed to introduce traditional Chinese philosophical concepts of ti 
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(體) and yong (⽤),52 to unpack the dialectical relation of these two Sanskrit terms, further 
proposing an indigenous articulation of what we know today as intentionality, in the Chinese 
context. As such, what looks like a simplified, inaccurate translation is in fact the first step 
towards a complicated, innovative account of consciousness. 
The creative understanding of consciousness can be tracked down first through the 
different terms Xuanzang and Kuiji utilize to characterize vijñāna and vijñapti. Aside from 
translating them both as shi (識, consciousness), Xuanzang and Kuiji also refer to vijñāna as 
liao (了, knowing), and vijñapti as liaobie (了别, causing to know distinctly).53 As unpacked 
in Kuiji’s commentaries (T43N1830, P238c29; T43N1830, P238c29):  
了，是諸識之通名也。 
Knowing is the common name for all consciousnesses. 
 
釋題⽬者, 梵云，毘若底(丁爾反識也)、摩咀刺多(唯也)、悉提(成也)、奢薩呾羅(論也)，應云識唯成
論。順此唐⾔，成唯識論…識，謂能了… 了，謂了別。 
Here, I explain the title of the treatise, which, in Sanskrit, is vijñapti (referring to consciousness)-mātratā 
(meaning only)-siddhi (i.e. perfection)-śastrā (namely, commentary). Therefore, the name of the treatise 
shall really be Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśastrā. Nevertheless, following how we habitually articulate ideas in 
the Chinese language, we reverse the order and refer to it as the Perfection of Consciousness-only 
Commentary… By consciousness, we mean that which can know... Knowing means “causing to know 
distinctly”. 
 
Upon defining vijñāna as liao (了, knowing), and vijñapti as liaobie (了别, causing to know 
distinctly), Kuiji continues to evoke the classic body-function (tiyong 體⽤)54 pair to 
elaborate on the dialectical relationship between vijñāna and vijñapti. Chinese intellectuals 
                                                        
52 Recently, Charles Muller initiated the study of the Ti-Yong binary (essence-function) in Korean and Chinese 
Buddhism (1995, 1999). In a recent paper, Muller noticed Kuiji’s application of this binary in his writings on 
Yogācāra (2016). Nevertheless, Muller did not elaborate on ways in which the Ti-Yong binary facilitated 
Kuiji’s articulation of the concept of consciousness. That is the lacuna the current section tries to fill.   
53 The way in which Xuanzang used vijñapti to explain vijñāna has also been discerned by most Yogācāra 
scholars (Nagasawa 1953, 163; Yeh 1981, 182; Suguro 1985, 127). As Suguro remarked, Yogācārins place the 
stress on the way in which objects are represented to the subjects in the process of knowing, rather than that 
which can know (Suguro 1985, 127). 
54 Ti has also been translated differently in the English language Buddhist scholarship, sometimes as 
“substance” (Wagner 2003) or “structure” (Wang 2012), sometimes as “absolute reality” (Grosnick 1989) or 
“essence” (Muller 1995, 1999). Nonetheless, considering how essence is also used to translate svabhāva, I 
follow the original meaning of this Chinese character and translate Ti as body. In Chapter 7, I will elaborate how 
Ti is related to the notion of Yin as the origin that generates and breeds various actually existent realities. As 
such, Ti is also characterized by feminineness in contrast to the Yong, which is supposed to be the Yang and the 
masculinity.    
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have formulated the body-function binary to epitomize what is currently known as dialectical 
logic and did so even prior to the arrival of Buddhism in China. As dialectical as such, the 
body serves as the ground and origin for the function, while the function manifests and 
represents the body. Although the body and its function seem to be separate on the surface, 
they complement each other at their core. Upon applying the body-function pair to explain 
the definition of consciousness, Kuiji indicates the complementarity between vijñāna and 
vijñapti. As described in his commentaries (T43N1831, P609b3; T43N1830, P240c16-18):  
了，謂了別。詮辨作⽤，是識義也。了別於境，是識⽤故。 
Knowing means causing to know distinctly. It is the meaning of consciousness to discern and differentiate. 
It is the function of consciousnesses to cause [an act] to know an object distinctly. 
 
論：識，謂了別。述⽈：釋識名義。今舉⾏相，顯識⾃體。⼼、意、識，了名之差別。故以了別，
釋識之義。  
CWSL: By consciousness, we mean that which “causes [an act] to know distinctly (liaobie 了別)”.   
 Kuiji: This verse explains the definition of consciousness. Now, master Xuanzang uses the act of knowing 
to unveil the body of the consciousness per se. Xin (⼼, i.e. the eighth consciousness ālayavijñāna), Yi (意, 
i.e. the seventh consciousness manas), and Shi (識, i.e. the first six consciousnesses), the difference in their 
names suggests that they are different types of knowing. [Considering how the function of causing to know 
distinctly can delineate one consciousness from another], CWSL therefore uses liaobie to clarify the 
meaning of consciousness.  
 
These two passages suggest that vijñāna and vijñapti are paraphrased as shi (識, 
consciousness) for the purpose of highlighting their complementarity: vijñāna as the body of 
consciousness gives rise to vijñapti as the function of causing to know distinctly; the function 
unveils (xian 顯) the underlying body, further demarcating one type of consciousness from 
another.  
If this interpretation is tenable, then it will help us answer one question regarding how 
causality in the Yogācāra framework can be related to intentionality in the Husserlian sense. 
As previously mentioned, vijñapti derives from the past passive participle of the causative 
verb vijñapayati (to make/cause to know distinctly). Every causative verb naturally alludes to 
two “doers”. For instance, in vijñapti (causing to know distinctly), there are two “doers” – a 
doer that causes and a doer that knows. In our previous analysis of vijñapti as a two-place 
relation, we have explained that the mental act is the second doer which knows. If that is the 
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case, what serves as the first doer that causes the act of knowing? Following our 
interpretation of vijñāna as the body and vijñapti as the function, it can be inferred that 
Chinese Yogācārins attribute the cause of vijñapti to vijñāna.  
Thereby, when Xuanzang and Kuiji translate vijñāna and vijñapti as shi (識, 
consciousness), they insert their distinct understanding in the translation that further indicates 
how causality can be related to Husserl’s notion of intentionality: on the one hand, vijñāna as 
the body (ti 體) of consciousness continually manifests itself through vijñapti as the function 
(yong ⽤) of causing a subjective act to know an objective phenomenon moment by moment; 
and on the other hand, this manifestation finds its ground in the underlying flow of 
someone’s consciousness. Perceived as such, shi (識) or consciousness becomes the fluid 
dynamic of the underlying flow that gives rise to the acts of knowing and the phenomena to 
be known. To put it in the Husserlian language, consciousness unfolds through the interaction 
of its three constitutents, namely, the underlying process of knowing, the act of knowing, and 
the phenomenon to be known. If we follow later Husserl, who defines intentionality as a 
mutual constitution of ego, act, and phenomena, it is fair to characterize the Yogācāra view of 
consciousness as their expression of what we currently call intentionality.  
The idea of intentionality is more explicitly expressed by Chinese Yogācārins in their 
articulation of the structure of consciousness. The interaction of ego, act, and phenomena is 
in conformity with the threefold structure articulated by Dignāga (c. 500sCE), one of the 
founders of later Yogācāra in India. As related by Xuanzang and Kuiji, in the threefold 
structure (sanfen 三分), the underlying flow is referred to as self-awareness (zizheng ⾃證, 
svasaṃvitti), the act of knowing as the seeing part (jianfen ⾒分, darśanabhāga), and the 
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phenomena as the image part (xiangfen 相分, nimittabhāga).55 Xuanzang explains this 
threefold structure in the following manner (T31N1585, P10b6-7):  
達無離識所緣境者，則說，相分是所緣；⾒分名⾏相；相⾒所依⾃體名事，即⾃證分，此若無
者，應不⾃憶⼼⼼所法。 
For those who contend that no perceived objects are consciousness-independent, they contend that the seen 
image turns out to be that which is intended and perceived (所緣); the seeing part [namely, the act of 
intending] becomes the act of knowing; the underlying body of the consciousness is called the event, 
namely, zizhengfen (自證分, the part of self-awareness), without which one will not be able to preserve 
[previous] consciousness and the accompanied mental factors.  
  
Dignāga’s formulation of the threefold structure encapsulates the complementary relationship 
between vijñāna (as we see in the conception of underlying self-awareness) and vijñapti (as 
we see in the act-image binary). To expound how the body of consciousness qua vijñāna 
gives rise to its function of vijñapti, Chinese Yogācārins put forward the concept of 
transformation (bian 變, pariṇāma), a term that deserves a deeper investigation in the next 
section (T31N1585, P7b25). Nevertheless, Xuanzang addresses the question posed by 
Dharmapāla, the eminent disciple of Dignāga. This question concerns whether the underlying 
self-awareness is reflexively aware of itself (T31N1585, P10b22). Dharmapāla argues for the 
existence of this reflexive awareness, which becomes the fourth part of consciousness, known 
as the “awareness of self-awareness” (zhengzizhengfen 證⾃證分) (T31N1585, P10b18). This 
fourfold structure (sifen 四分) of consciousness, namely, the awareness of self-awareness, 
self-awareness, the seeing part, and the image part, is that which Xuanzang and his disciples 
promoted. 
The fourfold structure represents Xuanzang and his disciples’ understanding of 
intentionality. For these Chinese Yogācārins, consciousness is not only the vijñapti through 
which a mental act qua the seeing part is caused to arise and is directed towards its targeted 
phenomenon qua the image part, but also points back to underlying vijñāna through the 
                                                        
55 In this dissertation, I speak of image interchangeably with appearance, manifestation, or what Husserl terms 
phenomenon. 
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reflexive self-awareness. As such, intentionality in later Chinese Yogācāra describes how 
consciousness is the consciousness of something for someone, a description that can be 
related to and compatible with that in Husserl.   
More importantly, the fourfold structure alludes to Xuanzang and Kuiji’s objection to the 
structure of consciousness formulated by early Yogācārins and Theravādins. Early 
Yogācārins center their study of consciousness either on vijñāna as the one-place knowing or 
vijñapti as the two-place relation between the image part and the seeing part. They, thus, 
depict intentionality as the one-place relation or the two-place relation (T31N1831, 
P609b5).56 Meanwhile, among the Theravādins, followers of the Sarvāstivāda School (說⼀
切有部) formulate their distinct threefold intentional structure of consciousness as that 
between an intending act, the intended image, and the external object (T31N1585, P10b204). 
Drawing on this structure, Sarvāstivādins suggest that knowledge is acquired through direct 
representation of external objects. As the cause of knowledge, external objects must have an 
existence on their own, independent of consciousness and other factors. The Sarvāstivāda 
approach to knowledge is commonly known as epistemological realism in modern Western 
philosophy, which contrasts with the idealist position endorsed by later Yogācārins, like 
                                                        
56 In CWSL, Xuanzang enumerates four depictions of transformation provided by the Yogācārins throughout 
history. Kuiji details these four depictions in the following manner (T43n1831, P609b5): “此⾔唯者。安惠⼀
分唯。難陀⼆分唯。陳那三分唯。於中有實有假⼆說。護法四分唯” By ‘only’ [as in Consciousness-only], 
Sthiramati means onefold-only, Nanda means twofold-only, Dignāga means threefold-only. Regarding 
threefold-only, there is a distinction between the real and the fictitious. Dharmapāla formulates [consciousness-
only as] fourfold-only. Among the four depictions, the first two accounts were inaugurated by early Yogācārins 
in India, the latter by later Yogācārins. Kuiji characterizes Sthiramati’s definition of consciousness as that of 
“onefold (yifen ⼀分)” (T43N1830, P320c20). Sthiramati defines consciousness as zizheng (⾃證 svasaṃvitti), 
namely, self-consciousness. Drawing on the previous discussion of vijñāna and vijñapti, we can find that 
Sthiramati’s definition of consciousness accentuates the basic meaning of vijñāna as the one-place knowing. 
Kuiji categorizes the second demarcation of consciousness as that of the twofold relationship (erfen ⼆分) 
between the act of perceiving and the image to be perceived, which was promoted by Indian Yogācāra master 
Nanda (T43N1830, P320c21). From the definition of consciousness as the twofold structure, it can be 
interpreted that Nanda highlights the basic meaning of vijñapti, especially the act-object interaction. I want to 
thank Jiang Tao for reminding me of introducing readers to the diversity of Yogācāra philosophy. Nevertheless, 
I decide not to include these four characterizations of the structure of consciousness in the main text, insofar as I 
understand that for readers who are new to Yogācāra philosophy, it might be easier to familiarize themselves 
with Xuanzang’s view first and then contextualize later Yogācārins’ view with the fplethora of Yogācāra 
definitions of consciousness. 
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Xuanzang and Kuiji. As indicated by the fourfold structure, due to the interplay between the 
underlying self-awareness, the seeing part and the image part, nothing in one’s consciousness 
can be viewed as sui generis, self-determining, and svabhāvic.  
3.2 Intentionality of Eight Types of Consciousness  
Based on their distinct functions of knowing an object, Xuanzang and Kuiji outline eight 
different types of consciousness which can be further sorted into three groups: xin (⼼, citta, 
namely, the eighth consciousness), yi (意, manas, namely, the seventh consciousness), and 
shi (識, namely, the first six consciousnesses).57 The eight consciousnesses not only represent 
eight different types of cognitive faculties but also associate themselves with affective mental 
states known as the mental factors, which we will visit in the last section of this chapter.  
Among the eight consciousnesses, the function of the first six is the most explicit and 
easy to be observed in everyday life. The first five consciousnesses (yanshi 眼識, ershi ⽿識, 
bishi ⿐識, sheshi ⾆識, shenshi ⾝識) pertain to the five senses (seeing, hearing, smelling, 
tasting, and touching). According to CWSL, these consciousnesses are defined by their 
functions of sensing (T31N1585, P37a25).58 To synthesize and conceptualize the manifold 
sensations provided by these five consciousnesses, one needs the sixth consciousness (yishi
意識, manovijñāna). The sixth consciousness is not continuously present nor functioning, in 
that there are several circumstances in which the flow of the sixth consciousness can be 
interrupted. For instance, when someone becomes extremely exhausted and falls into deep 
sleep, this person will lose his or her consciousness entirely (T31N1585, P38a23). Likewise, 
                                                        
57 Yogācārins prior to Xuanzang, among them Paramārtha (499-569CE), usually interchangeably use citta and 
vijñāna, thus not differentiating the two (T31N1587, P63c17). By fixing the title for these consciousnesses, later 
Yogācārins intend to renew the meaning of Consciousness-only. I will clarify the distinction between early 
Yogācāra and later Yogācāra in the subsequent Chapter 6. 
58 Xuanzang wrote, “由五轉識，⾏相麤動，所籍眾緣，時多不俱。故起時少，不起時多。” (T31N1585, 
P37a25). 
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one has no consciousness in the comatose state, as exemplified by the pre-death experience 
(T31N1585, P38a28).59 
Unlike the first six consciousnesses that are easily observed in everyday experience, the 
seventh consciousness, known as mona (末那, manas), and the eighth consciousness, laiye 
(賴耶, ālaya), exist in a more profound (shen 深) and subtle (xi 細) way (T31N1585, P14c5). 
Since their activities are too profound to be discerned in everyday life, Xuanzang provides 
evidence respectively, which can be interpreted as the transcendental argument for the 
existence of the seventh and the eighth consciousness.  
In his proof of the existence of mona, Xuanzang contends that without it, five facts 
would be impossible: ignorance could not sustain from one life to another (T31N1585, 
P25a1); the sixth consciousness could not arise continuously after interruptions (T31N1585, 
P25b5); one could not have a continuous flow of consciousness from the past to the present 
and to the future in this round of life (T31N1585, P25b16); one could not purify ignorance in 
a gradual process (T31N1585, P25b23-28); and attachments to the self could not arise in the 
first place (T31N1585, P25c10).  
In his proof of the existence of laiye, Xuanzang argues that without it, ten facts could not 
be possible: the acts of all consciousnesses would not be able to influence the future states of 
mind or be influenced by the previous mental states (T31N1585, P15b20); consciousness 
would not be able to shape one’s karmic action (T31N1585, P16a16); the endless circle of 
death and rebirth would not be sustainable (T31N1585, P16b3); sentient beings could not 
maintain their current bodily form (T31N1585, P16b16); sentient beings could not hold 
vitality and heat in their current bodily form (T31N1585, P16c6); consciousness could not 
exist in the moments prior to death or post-birth (T31N1585, P16c23); it would be impossible 
                                                        
59 Xuanzang wrote, “謂，有極重睡眠、悶絕，令前六識，皆不現⾏。疲極等緣，所引⾝位違前六識，故
名極重睡眠。此睡眠時，雖無彼體，⽽由彼似彼，故假說彼名。⾵熱等緣，所引⾝位亦違六識，故名極
重悶絕。或此俱是觸處少分，除斯五位意識恒起。正死⽣時，亦無意識。” (T31N1585, P38a23-28). 
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to explain dependent origination (T31N1585, P17a24); the regeneration of life forms would 
not be possible (T31N1585, P17b11); consciousness would not continue to flow for those 
who live in deep meditation (T31N1585, P17c15); and consciousness would not be polluted 
by or purified from mental defilement (T31N1585, P17c25). 
All of these eight types of consciousness, be it the obvious one or the subtle one, are 
intentional, in that they can transform (bian 變, pariṇāma) to give rise to the fourfold 
structure of the seeing part, the image part, the underlying self-awareness, and the awareness 
of the self-awareness, moment by moment. To further understand the idea of transformation, 
it will be of help to borrow the Husserlian notion of genesis. In his study of the origin of 
mental acts, Husserl introduces two types of genesis, namely, the passive and the active. 
While the active genesis demonstrates the power of reason, which enables a pure ego to 
found a more abstract intentional act on simple acts of presenting, the passive genesis 
exposes the limit of reason insofar as the active use of reason presupposes a primordial 
constitution of worldly objects in one’s experience. Relating to Husserl’s distinction between 
passivity and activity, I contend that the transformation of the subtle consciousnesses, 
namely, of the seventh and the eighth, is characterized by passivity, in contrast to the actively 
transforming first six consciousnesses. Thereby, the question for the subtle consciousnesses is 
not whether they can intend or not, but rather how they intend differently than the others.  
Given that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses passively transform themselves, 
sentient beings do not always have access to and therefore are not always actively aware of 
their constitution of the primordial self and the world. Nevertheless, any active 
transformation of the first sixth consciousnesses presupposes such a primordial constitution 
of the world and the unified self-identity. Considering its salient feature of being profound 
and subtle, contemporary scholars refer to the eighth consciousness as the subliminal 
consciousness (Jiang 2016, 48), the ultimate unconsciousness (Ni 2010, 90), or the 
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unconscious mental flow (Waldron 2003, xi), which cannot be perceived through intuition 
but can only be known through deduction. As remarked by Ni Liangkang, both the Sanskrit 
term ālaya and its Chinese translation cangshi (藏識, storehouse consciousness), indicate 
how the eighth consciousness seems to be hidden and, thus, seems to escape from everyday 
perception (Ni 2010, 87). Though inspired by their insight and indebted to their research, I 
believe that the notion of “subliminal” or “unconscious” requires further clarification. The 
way in which the eighth consciousness appears to be subliminal or unconscious bespeaks 
passivity, not the non-existence of its transformation. As to be seen shortly, how the eighth 
consciousness primordially constitutes these objects amounts to an intentional act of 
perceiving the entire cosmos throughout every phase of time: a holistic perception to which a 
person may not even have access. The passivity of the eighth consciousness differs from that 
of the seventh consciousness. To help our understanding of such a distinction, we will 
investigate how the passive transformation of the eighth consciousness gives rise to the 
passive and active conceptions of selfhood. 
3.3 Intentionality, Selfhood, and Self-Attachments60  
Thus far we have depicted the intentional structure, the eight types of consciousness, and the 
transformation of consciousness in Chinese Yogācāra literature. Now, we can continue to 
apply the fourfold intentional structure to each one of the eight consciousnesses to account 
for our experience of the self. The current analysis will help us understand how the 
conception of intentionality facilitates Yogācārins’ presentation of selfhood, which can again 
be related to Husserl’s investigation of ego.  
                                                        
60 For recent scholarship on the study of the Buddhist conceptions of self-knowledge and self-consciousness 
presented in Indian Yogācāra doctrines and texts, please see Dan Arnold (2012), Christian Coseru (2012), Jay 
Garfield (2015), Evan Thompson (2016), and Zhihua Yao (2012). To expand their analysis, I link the 
epistemological inquiries of self-knowledge with the existential question of attachments and suffering addressed 
by Yogācārins.  
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As previously mentioned, the transformation of the eighth consciousness, laiye (賴耶, 
ālaya), is characterized by passivity – when laiye transforms itself to give rise to the 
intending act and intended image, the entire cosmos throughout time primordially constitutes 
itself in the experience of a sentient being. In Xuanzang’s own words (T31N1585, P10a11-
19):  
此識⾏相、所緣云何？謂不可知執受、處、了。了，謂了別。即是⾏相。識以了別，為⾏相故。
處，謂處所，即器世間，是諸有情，所依處故。執受有⼆，謂諸種⼦、及有根⾝。諸種⼦者，謂
諸相名分別習氣。有根⾝者，謂諸⾊根及根依處。此⼆皆是識所執受。攝，為⾃體同安危故。執
受及處，俱是所緣。阿賴耶識，因緣⼒故，⾃體⽣時，內變為種及有根⾝；外變為器。即以所
變，為⾃所緣。 
 What is the act of knowing and what is to be perceived by this consciousness? We say they are the 
obscurely constituted ones (upātta), the place, and the knowing. By knowing, we mean [the function of] 
causing to know distinctly. It is also the mental act. This is so, because, for consciousness, its act is to 
cause to know distinctly. By place, we mean a residing place, namely, the material cosmos, insofar as the 
material cosmos is the residing place for all sentient beings. There are two types of constituted ones, 
namely, one type of seeds and corporeal bodies. This type of seeds is perfumed by conceptual 
differentiations of images and names. Corporeal bodies or bodily forms are five sense organs and the entire 
sensory apparatus. Seeds and corporeal bodies are both the constituted ones, so they are interrelated. Seeds, 
corporeal bodies, and the material cosmos, the three are those to be perceived. When causes and conditions 
are fulfilled, laiye will transform itself. In this process, it will give rise to the image parts of the seeds and 
corporeal bodies internally, and to the image parts of the material cosmos externally. To put it differently, 
these transformed image parts are those to be perceived. 
 
The first two sentences of Xuanzang’s description of laiye’s function of knowing as the 
obscure constitution can be considered as the Yogācāra view of passivity. In this sense, 
laiye’s function of knowing is close to what Husserl refers to as apperceiving, a holistic 
perception of everything in the cosmos that each sentient being might not always have access 
to but still requires for active perceptions. What are passively, primordially constituted by 
laiye are the material cosmos, the corporeal body, and the seeds, in one’s experience. If laiye 
transforms itself throughout endless time, the primordial constitution of the cosmos in one’s 
experience also extends to every phase of cosmic time, regardless of saṃsāra. The 
primordially constituted corporeal body lays the ground for a more generically passive 
constitution of selfhood.  
Now, how shall one understand the meaning of seeds that are transformed by laiye? I 
contend that seed is a figurative way of expressing the notion of possibility. To be more 
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specific, it describes how the transformation of laiye, though passive and sometimes 
inaccessible to the first six consciousnesses, paves the way for the passive and active 
transformation of other consciousnesses; that is, the transformation of laiye plants the seeds 
for the operation of other consciousnesses throughout endless time so that consciousness can 
motivate actions. In return, actions serve as the cause of karma, which can nourish seeds and 
cultivate the transformation of consciousnesses.61 Given how seeds can be nourished and 
cultivated in different ways, the eighth consciousness then stores the possibilities of either 
polluting the mind with ignorance or purifying such ignorance.  
Although the transformation of the seventh consciousness, mona (末那, manas), is also 
marked by passivity, it is slightly more generative than the eighth consciousness. In 
Xuanzang’s terms (T31N1585, P19b8-9; P22a8-10): 
是識，聖教別名，末那。恒審思量，勝餘識故。 
The name of this consciousness, as preached by the noble teaching, is mona. This is because it constantly 
conceptualizes, stronger than other consciousness.   
 
應知此意，但緣藏識⾒分，⾮餘。彼無始來，⼀類相續，似常⼀故。恒與諸法，為所依故，此唯
執彼，為⾃內我。 
One should know that this consciousness only takes the seeing part of the storehouse consciousness as that 
to be perceived, not anything else. [The seeing part of the storehouse consciousness,] throughout 
beginningless time, continues to function as such, as if it were sui generis, self-determining, and 
immutable. Since the storehouse consciousness always serves as the ground for other consciousnesses, 
mona tends to perceive it as a self-in-itself.     
 
The seventh consciousness passively constitutes the primordial self on the basis of laiye’s 
transformation. As described by Xuanzang, mona takes laiye’s act of apperceiving as its 
intended object (所緣). Through its transformation, mona passively constitutes the primordial 
self as a habitual sense of selfhood prior to a full-fledged category of ego or self (wo 我, 
ātman). The constitution of this habitual selfhood elevates the ego to the center as if it were 
an absolute self-in-itself (zineiwo ⾃內我) in one’s experience throughout endless time. 
                                                        
61 As will be clarified in Chapter 8, there are two types of seeds, the innate ones (benyou 本有) and the newly 
perfumed ones (xinxun 新熏). Here, Xuanzang was referring to the latter type, which demonstrates the way in 
which mental acts and embodied actions can cultivate and condition one’s way of perceiving and living. As 
such, the perfumed seeds entail a habitual attitude to be perceived and understood by the eighth consciousness.  
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Considering this distinct transformation, Xuanzang categorizes mona’s act of intending as 
conceptualizing (siliang 思量) in a passive sense. It is passive since mona constitutes a 
selfhood in a habitual way. Yet, it is conceptual since it generates a svabhāvic concept of the 
self as a self-in-itself independent of and irrelevant to others. As will be seen in the last 
chapter, due to its passivity, it becomes more difficult and time-consuming for sentient beings 
to rehabitualize themselves and remove the misperception of mona.  
On the basis of the passive transformation of the eighth and seventh consciousnesses, the 
first six consciousnesses can operatively and actively transform themselves to give rise to a 
wide range of intentional acts (T31N1585, P26b4-7).  
了境為性相者，雙顯六識⾃性⾏相。識以了境，為⾃性故。即復⽤彼，為⾏相故。由斯兼釋，所
⽴別名。能了別境，名為識故。 
 [Then, the treatise elaborates] that which takes “knowing objects” as its nature and function. This 
demonstrates the nature and function of the first six consciousnesses. For these six ones, it is their nature to 
perceive objects. This is also their function. As such, they establish their names as those which can 
transform to cause to know objects distinctly.  
 
One exemplar that can be used to unpack the distinct roles of these eight types of 
consciousness is knowledge of the self. Let us direct our attention to the experience of our 
own body. Now, imagine that I am playing with my cat. I throw the treat, move my body, and 
follow the cat. By “I”, I am de facto referring to my body as the subject of these actions of 
throwing, moving, and following. Suddenly, I feel pain from my fingers. I look down, 
realizing that my cat scratched me earlier when playing with me. In my recollection, I 
perceive my body as if it were a foreign object.  
In the Yogācāra framework provided by Xuanzang and Kuiji, our experience of our 
subjective and objective body presupposes the passive transformation of the eighth 
consciousness, laiye. Without this incessant passive transformation at the most profound 
level, I would never be able to return to my previous bodily experience of the moment I got 
scratched by my cat, once this very moment had passed away. In its passive transformation, 
the eighth consciousness, laiye, constitutes the act of apperceiving, as well as the 
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primordially apperceived corporeal body. The way in which I use my body without even 
paying any attention to my actions alludes to the apperceiving of the eighth consciousness, 
laiye, especially how it passively constitutes the corporeal body, without the mediation of 
conceptual thinking. In virtue of laiye, I do not think when I move around; I just move 
naturally.  
Only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are capable of conceptual thinking. When the 
eighth consciousness apperceives, mona takes laiye’s act of apperceiving as the target and 
constitutes a primordial self as a habitual sense of self-in-itself (T31N1585, P22a13). As 
such, mona passively constitutes the first type of a sui generis, immutable self-identify. Upon 
the rise of this misperception, sentient beings become conditioned to the egocentric view of 
life even prior to their formation of a full-fledged category of “ego” – I am the author of my 
life, and my “self”, thus, must remain the immutable center of my life story. The 
misconception of mona gives birth to our belief in an unchangeable self-identity, which 
continues to nurture our “embodied self-attachments (jushenwozhi 俱⾝我執, 
sahajātmagrāha)” (T31N1585, P2a10).  
The transformation of the seventh consciousness, mona, is based on the apperceiving act, 
namely, the seeing part of laiye. In comparison, the transformations of the other six 
consciousnesses presuppose the image part of laiye. As such, while mona constitutes the 
subjective sense of body in a passive way of which sentient beings are not usually aware, the 
first six consciousnesses operatively constitute the objective sense of body. Consider now this 
objective body. Suddenly, I find myself being scratched: I see the wound and feel pain. The 
wound on my index finger and the pain as an unpleasant feeling, all these phenomena pertain 
to the image part passively transformed from the eighth consciousness, laiye. Upon 
synthesizing all these phenomena, the sixth consciousness formulates a more abstract 
representation of this corporeal body. Due to this capacity of conceptualizing, this 
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consciousness is inclined to consider the abstract representation of our objective body again 
as the manifestation of a sui generis, immutable self. This misconception contributes to our 
embodied attachments to the self in the objective sense, together with that in the subjective 
sense derived from the seventh consciousness.   
On the basis of these embodied self-attachments, the sixth consciousness further enables 
us to put forward categories to differentiate our “self” from others. We can distinguish 
ourselves from others by using categories, such as height, weight, social class, or taste in 
fashion. These differentiations lead to our “discriminative self-attachments (fenbiewozhi 分別
我執, vikalpitātmagrāha)” (T31N1585, P2a21). These two types of self-attachments, namely 
the embodied and the discriminative, strengthen the conviction that our self-identity is sui 
generis and unchangeable, further rendering us unable to recognize our interdependence with 
others in our life story.  
From this analysis of the functions of these eight types of consciousness, we can infer the 
real reason for self-attachments. What causes our attachments is not the transformation of 
consciousness per se but the false way of intending and perceiving. By force of these 
misconceptions, we are left with the impression that our self-identity is already an 
accomplished reality. We, thus, ignore the fact that, throughout our entire life, our “self” is an 
on-going process of creation through the joint effort of subject-object interaction, or in Evan 
Thompson’s terms, it is a process of self-enacting (Thompson 2015, xxxi). For Yogācārins, 
ego-centrism is not only an epistemic issue but also an existential one. The moment we 
become ignorant of who we really are, the ego-centric worldview holds us captive, driving us 
to spare no effort to maintain our current state of life. However, these efforts always become 
futile, as we are eventually trapped in frustration and suffering. Now that I have clarified our 
experience of the self, we can turn to the experience of other minds.   
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3.4 Intentionality, Other Minds, and Dharma-Attachments62  
Not very different from Husserl, Yogācārins are confronted with an insidious solipsism in 
their depiction of consciousness. Therefore, they strive to demonstrate that, by 
Consciousness-only, they do not mean “my-Consciousness-only”. Yet, different from 
Husserl, the concern for other minds in the Yogācāra context is closely related to the 
Buddhist notion of altruistic compassion for others, which is also the salient feature of the 
Bodhisattvas (the ones who postpone their own awakening to help others). As such, this 
context differs from that which nourishes the modern discussion of our knowledge of others. 
Through resolving the problem of other minds, Chinese Yogācārins provide a theory that is 
similar to the modern conception of intersubjectivity, which further shows how the Yogācāra 
study of consciousness exhausts all three perspectives of experience, namely, the first-person, 
second-person, and third-person. As such, their notion of consciousness and its intentional 
structure serve the purpose of demonstrating how Yogācāra Buddhism is not solipsistic, is 
not a reaffirmation of the svabhāvic view of the self.   
In CWSL, Xuanzang addresses the problem of other minds in his clarification of the 
notion of Consciousness-only as follows (T31n1585, P39c10): 
外⾊實無，可⾮內識境。他⼼實有，寧⾮⾃所緣？ 
External form does not really exist, and it is not the object of internal consciousness. Other minds really 
exist. Are they not the objects intended and perceived (所緣) by one’s own mind?  
 
In understanding this problem, it will be of help to return to the doctrinal debates between 
Yogācārins and their antagonists. As previously presented in the two articulations of the 
threefold structure of consciousness, adversaries of Yogācārins endorse the view that the real 
                                                        
62 For recent scholarship on the discussion of other minds in Indian Yogācāra Buddhism, see Roy Tzohar 
(2016), and Matthew MacKenzie (2017). In his book, Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern 
Psychology on the Subliminal Mind, Jiang Tao also inquired into the problem of other minds articulated by 
Xuanzang in CWSL (2006). He contends that the intimate ālambana alludes to the existence of collective 
consciousness. Drawing on his findings, I plan to delve deeper into this problem of other minds in Chinese 
Yogācāra and fill the existing lacuna. An expanded investigation of the problem of other minds in Chinese 
Yogācāra will be published soon in Dao: Journal of Comparative Philosophy (Li 2019) 
 86 
 
 
existence of objects in one’s perception is mind-independent (lishishiyoufa 離識實有法), a 
view that is commonly known as epistemological realism in Western philosophy (T31N1585, 
P10b204). For them, external objects are directly given to the mind through affection, and if 
that is the case, the stimuli qua external objects must exist independently of the mind (Lin 
2009, 121). In their critique of this view, Yogācārins argue that the mind does not passively 
receive given objects but actively serves as the condition for the possibility of these objects to 
appear as phenomena. As such, everything depends on the mind, which further consists of 
eight different types of consciousness, to appear in one’s experience. This viewpoint is 
currently known as epistemological idealism in Western philosophy. As detailed by 
Xuanzang, for “those who realize that nothing in perception is mind-independent 
(dawulishisuoyuanjingzhe 達無離識所緣境者)”, they will know that each of the eight types 
of consciousness transforms (bian 變) itself to give rise to four distinct and interdependent 
parts simultaneously: the intending act qua the seeing part, the intended phenomenon qua the 
image part, the underlying self-awareness, and the reflexive awareness of this self-awareness 
(T31N1585, P10b6-7). Upon elucidating this fourfold structure of consciousness, Xuanzang 
ipso facto highlights how objects are no longer given passively to the mind. Quite to the 
contrary, subjective acts, objective phenomena, and self-awareness mutually constitute one 
another in one’s experience. Nevertheless, this epistemological idealism soon encounters the 
problem of other minds. As mentioned in the excerpt, external forms, namely, external 
objects, do not have real existence, because without consciousness, nothing can appear as 
phenomena in perception. Other minds, just as one’s own mind, should have real existence. If 
that is the case, can they be perceived? If they can, then these other minds shall have no real 
existence, just like external objects. Yet, if other minds can be perceived and still have real 
existence, then this fact indicates that there remains one type of objects in one’s perception 
qua other minds that have mind-independent existence, an indication that violates the 
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Yogācāra doctrine of Consciousness-only. Yet, if other minds cannot be perceived, this 
unknowability likewise breaks the doctrine of Consciousness-only, insofar as there is one 
type of objects qua other minds that do not appear as phenomena in one’s experience. Having 
said this, if one wants to resolve these issues, one needs to find a solution which fulfills three 
conditions:  
C1 other minds have real existence;  
C2 they can be perceived;  
C3 other minds are not mind-independent, but still rely on our minds to appear as    
phenomena for us.  
 
In this regard, early and later Yogācārins provide two different resolutions. Early Yogācārins, 
in a nutshell, resolve this problem of other minds by erasing the alterity of others and, 
therefore, merging others with the self. They argue that the self-other dichotomization is 
nothing but a mental fabrication (T43N1834, P1007b13). Once we dispel this delusion, we 
can directly perceive other minds by turning our own minds into theirs, further experiencing 
what others have gone through in their life (T43N1834, P1007b13). As such, when we 
perceive others, we use our minds to emulate theirs to make their minds appear as 
phenomena for us. As perceived phenomena, other minds are no longer independent of the 
minds of our own. 
However, when we use our minds to imitate those of others, what exactly is being 
perceived here? Upon turning ourselves into others, the perceived object becomes the event 
experienced by other minds, rather than other minds per se. For instance, Cindy is looking at 
her cat. Seeing her, I try to put myself in her shoes, so as to imagine what she is going 
through and imitate how she would perceive the cat. Through imagination, what is perceived 
by me turns out to be the cat, not the mind of Cindy. That being said, upon dissolving the line 
between the self and the other, one still cannot perceive other minds but can only perceive 
what others have in mind, namely, the phenomenon that appears in the minds of others. As 
remarked by Kuiji, “other minds per se, we do not really perceive them” (T43N1834, 
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P1007b14).63 If that is the case, the resolution provided by early Yogācārins succeeds in 
resolving C2 and C3, yet fails in proving C1.  
A deeper issue concerning the early Yogācārins’ resolution is, again, an insidious 
solipsism, insofar as it implies that we can never go beyond our own consciousness to know 
other minds. Yet, is our consciousness nothing but a closure, or, borrowing Charles Taylor’s 
terminology, nothing but a buffered self?  If that is the case, what looks like a negation of 
self-other duality on the surface seems to lead to a re-affirmation of the absolute self-in-itself 
at the core of early Yogācāra’s proposal.  
Later Yogācārins, represented by Xuanzang, subsequently explore an alternative that can 
fulfill the three conditions; that is, an alternative that can (1) affirm the real existence of other 
minds while not cancelling their alterity; (2) prove the possibility of directly perceiving other 
minds as they really are; and (3) reinforce the notion of mind-dependence. As to be seen 
shortly, the resolution promoted by later Yogācārins shifts the focus from whether other 
minds can be known to how other minds can be perceived.  
Xuanzang elaborates on this alternative through a mirror analogy (T31N1585, P39c11-
14), 
誰說他⼼⾮⾃識境？但不說，彼是親所緣。謂識⽣時，無實作⽤，⾮如⼿等，親執外物，⽇等舒
光，親照外境。但如鏡等，似外境現，名了他⼼。⾮親能了。親所了者，謂⾃所變。 
Who says that other minds cannot be the object for consciousness [to perceive]? It is just that we do not 
view other minds as qinsuoyuan (親所緣, intimate ālambana).64 This is because when [perceiving other 
minds,] consciousness arises and it does not have the real function. Thus, [for this consciousness,] it is not 
like the hand which can hold intimately external objects, not like the sun which can illuminate the external 
world intimately. Rather, it resembles the mirror through which the external world seems to manifest. This 
is how we know other minds, a knowing not in an intimate manner. Those that we can intimately perceive 
are transformed from the same consciousness.  
                                                        
63 The original Chinese verse is as follows, “他本質⼼。實不緣著。” 
64 This Chinese term, “親所緣緣”, has been translated into English in several ways. For instance, Louis de la 
Vallée Poussin translates “親所緣緣” as “immediate ālambanapratyaya” (La Vallée Poussin 1928, 430). 
Lusthaus further lists several alternatives, such as “intimate” or “familially related” (Lusthaus 2003, 300). I find 
the term “intimate” appropriate, not just because it indicates the affiliation of the perceived phenomenon to the 
consciousness, but also due to the different nuance of the term “immediate” or “direct” in modern philosophy. I 
use “direct” to translate a different term, xianliang (现量, direct knowing/measuring). We will detail this 
conception of direct knowing in Chapter 4. To give a quick preview, I will use the following example:  
cognition of our five senses falls in the category of direct knowing. Yet, according to Chinese Yogācārins, the 
perceived phenomenon of the first five senses can still be remote. Thus, to eschew ambivalence, I opt for 
“intimate”, not “immediate”. 
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I contend that this mirror analogy reflects the way in which Chinese Yogācārins depict our 
experience of other minds as a direct perception through the second-person perspective.65 As 
such, we do not experience other minds by turning ourselves into them; rather, we have direct 
experience of others, whereby the minds of others are revealed as interdependent with us 
through an “I-You relationship”. Mirroring, thus, entails what is currently known as the 
notion of intersubjectivity. Upon disclosing this self-other interdependence in a collective 
setting, we resolve, or to be more precise, dissolve the problem of other minds.  
To unpack my argument, let us start with the distinction between two types of ālambana. 
The concept of ālambana has been articulated by Yogācārins to describe that which can 
appear in our mind and then be perceived and intended by us (T31N1624, P888b12-13). In 
their critique of epistemological realism, Yogācārins, championed by Dignāga, contend that 
every object (jing 境) needs to depend on consciousness first to appear as a phenomenon, or 
in Yogācāra terms, as the image (xiang 相), and then to be cognized.66 In this manner, 
Yogācārins differentiate the object (jing 境) to be perceived from the phenomenon/image 
(xiang 相) that appears as the object in one’s mind. Considering their refutation of 
epistemological realism, Xuanzang and Kuiji depict the perception of consciousnesses as 
“having no real function” (T43N1830, P493c27-494a1). 
                                                        
65 Existing scholarship offers two options. Dan Lusthaus proposes an epistemological reading in which he 
describes our perception of other minds as projection (Lusthaus 2003, 503). Drawing on the mirror analogy, 
Lusthaus argues that our consciousness is a cognitive closure (a mind in-itself) which can project, and thus be 
affected by those who exist outside the closure, among them, other minds (Lusthaus 2003, 492; 503). Due to 
this affection, Lusthaus pinpoints a dialectic relation between self and others that exist independently yet 
influence one other interdependently (Lusthaus 2003, 503). Lusthaus contrasts his reading with the metaphysical 
one offered by Louis de la Vallée Poussin who construes such perception as a reproduction: just as how the 
image of the entire material world is generated by our consciousness, so is that of other minds which our own 
mind can reproduce (La Vallée Poussin 1928, 430). Lusthaus’s reading was scrutinized and criticized by 
Lambert Schmithausen (2005). According to Schmithausen, Lusthaus’s interpretation of Yogācāra entails an 
epistemological realism that contradicts the idealistic stance endorsed by Yogācārins (Schmithausen 2005). 
Drawing on the recent discussion in philosophy of mind, I propose an alternative reading that can open a new 
perspective. 
66 For an in-depth study on the ontological status of objects of cognition, please see Lin Chen-kuo (2009). 
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As related in the mirror analogy, other minds pertain to the phenomena that can be 
perceived remotely (shusuoyuan 疏所緣), not to those which can be perceived intimately 
(qinsuoyuan 親所緣) (T31N1585, P39c11). The notions of intimate and remote ālambana are 
formulated by Xuanzang and Kuiji to describe two ways for an object to appear in the mind. 
The definition articulated in CWSL is as follows (T31N1585, P40c15-21): 67  
三所緣緣。謂若有法，是帶⼰相，⼼或相應所慮、所託。此體有⼆，⼀親、⼆疏。若與能緣，體
不相離，是⾒分等，內所慮託，應知彼，是親所緣緣。若與能緣，體雖相離，為質能起內所慮
託，應知彼，是疏所緣緣。 
 
The third [out of the four conditions] is the condition of that which can be perceived. Its definition is as 
such: an existing dharma/object appears as its own image [in the mind] which can be perceived, further 
becoming dependent on consciousnesses and their mental factors. Ālambana has two types, the intimate 
and the remote. If the perceived phenomenon is not apart from the consciousness which aims at it [i.e. the 
phenomenon], is perceived by the seeing part, and gives dependence to this seeing part, this phenomenon 
is the intimate ālambana. If the perceived phenomenon is apart from the consciousness, yet this 
phenomenon is an archetype that can produce, inside the consciousness, an image part on which the seeing 
part depends and perceives, this phenomenon is the remote ālambana.  
 
As elaborated by Kuiji, when a phenomenon is not apart from a consciousness and is 
cognized by it, this phenomenon is originated from this very consciousness (T43N1830, 
P501a9-11).68 In contrast, when a phenomenon is apart from a consciousness yet is still being 
cognized by that consciousness, this phenomenon does not stem from the same consciousness 
but from something else, such as another mind (T43N1830, P501a15-17).69 To put it 
differently, when consciousness perceives its remote ālambana, this consciousness cannot 
                                                        
67 In his Contexts and Dialogue: Yogācāra Buddhism and Modern Psychology on the Subliminal mind, Jiang 
Tao contends that intimate ālambanapratyaya (or what he refers to as close ālambanapratyaya) alludes to the 
personal aspect of our experience in contrast to the collective aspect revealed by remote ālambanapratyaya 
(Jiang 2006, 73-75). Although I applaud Jiang’s stress on the collectivity, I believe that his argument can be 
further developed if we can identify what this collectivity is and how it is related to personal experience. I thus 
find it necessary to explicate the sharing characteristics of all the remote ālambanapratyaya. In this manner, we 
could specify that by personal, we ipso facto refer to the first-personal perspective of our experience whereas by 
collective, we mean the second-personal perspective. More importantly, aside from describing how collectivity 
is an indispensable aspect of our consciousness, we also need to account for, as Yogācārins advocate, the way in 
which such collectivity raises an open possibility for us to form and remove attachments.  
68 Kuiji further clarifies two types of intimate ālambana. The first is the type of phenomenon that originates 
from the same consciousness. As Kuiji writes, “唯是⾒分，內所慮託。此有⼆種：⼀是有為，即識所變，
名內所慮。” The second type is more subtle, insofar as it is suchness per se, “真如體不離識，名所慮託。” 
(T43N1830, P501a9-11). 
69 In parallel with his elucidation of intimate ālambana, Kuiji also differentiates two types of remote ālambana: 
those that originate from other minds and those that arise from a different consciousness in one’s own mind. As 
Kuiji states, “所緣緣與能緣⼼，相離法是。謂即他識所變，及⾃⾝中別識所變，杖為質者是。” 
(T43N1830, P501a15-17). 
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complete this perception alone but must depend on other archetypes (zhangwaizhi 仗外質) 
(T31N1585, P41a4).  
All of the eight consciousnesses have their respective intimately perceived phenomena, 
due to their distinct epistemic functions (T31N1585, P40c19). For these consciousnesses, 
whenever they perceive an object, this object appears as the image part, and this image is 
transformed by the same consciousnesses. All of these eight consciousnesses likewise have 
their remote ālambana, insofar as one consciousness alone cannot complete its perception but 
must depend on others. As Kuiji details, the first five consciousnesses are coarse (cu 粗), 
blunt (dun 鈍), and weak (lie 劣), so their perception in the current moment must rely on the 
eighth consciousness (T43N1830, 501c17-18). So it is the seventh consciousness mona that 
depends on the eighth consciousness, laiye (ālayavijñāna), to complete its current perception 
(T43N1830, 501c8-9). Even the eighth consciousness needs to depend on other minds to 
fulfill its function (T43N1830, 501b17).  
From Kuiji’s interpretation, it is possible to draw a parallel between the remote 
ālambana for the first five consciousnesses, and other minds for one’s laiye. I contend that 
this parallel alludes to a part-whole relation. In each moment when an object appears as a 
phenomenon, the first five consciousnesses can perceive one specific aspect of this 
phenomenon on their own. Nevertheless, this perception of one aspect presupposes and is 
always contextualized in laiye’s holistic perception of the entire cosmos. As remarked by 
Louis de la Vallée Poussin (1928, 446):  
Note that the eight consciousnesses (with their mental factors, eight kalāpas) are apart from one another. 
Eye-consciousness does not directly perceive blue, part of the image of the material cosmos that is 
developed by ālayavijñāna (which makes part of the image part of ālayavijñāna): the blue is the archetype 
that, in quality of fundamental condition (adhipatipratyaya), conditions an image of blue that is the seeing 
part of the eye-consciousness.70  
                                                        
70 The original text is written in French : « Noter que les huit vijñānas (avec leur Caittas, huit kalāpas) sont à 
part les uns des autres.  Le vijñāna de l’œil ne connaît pas directement le bleu, partie du monde-réceptacle, qui 
est un développement de l’ālayavijñana (qui fait partie du nimittabhāga de l’ālayavijñana) : le bleu est 
l’archétype qui, en qualité d’adhipatipratyaya, conditionne une image bleue qui est le nimittabhāga du vijñāna 
de l’œil ».  
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This being said, if the eye-consciousness could directly perceive blue, then this direct 
perception would suggest epistemological realism, which is scrutinized and refuted by 
Yogācārins. That is why, for Yogācārins like Xuanzang and Kuiji, when the eye-
consciousness starts to perceive and blue appears as the phenomenon or the image part for the 
eye-consciousness, this image of the blue is integrated and contextualized in a larger whole, 
namely, the image of the entire material cosmos developed and transformed by the eighth 
consciousness, laiye. As such, the image of the material cosmos becomes the remote 
ālambana for the eye consciousness, which serves as the backdrop for the eye-
consciousness’s perception of blue. In Kuiji’s terms, the perception of the first five 
consciousnesses in the current moment must rely on that of the eighth consciousness 
(T43N1830, 501c17-18). Any specific part is contextualized in the whole.   
Just like the image of blue is an integral part of the image of the entire cosmos, one’s 
mind is a crucial unit among the minds of all sentient beings. The depiction of other minds as 
remote ālambana subsequently alludes to a collective consciousness as a shared collective 
context co-constituted by one’s own mind and those of others throughout various stages of 
the existence of the cosmic history. Just as the image of the entire material cosmos serves as 
the backdrop for the eye-consciousness’s perception of blue, so too do the minds of others 
constitute the collective context of one’s own experience. Each individual sentient being 
perceives other minds through the collective context.  
Subsequently, Xuanzang and Kuiji shift the question at stake from whether other minds 
can be perceived to how they can be perceived. It is not that we cannot perceive other minds. 
It is just that we cannot perceive other minds through the first-person perspective as we do to 
our own minds; and that we do not perceive other minds through the third-person perspective, 
since that would make an other mind into a mind-independent material object. These 
impossibilities, however, do not confine us to a solipsistic account of consciousness and does 
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not a fortiori cancel other ways of perceiving. We perceive the minds of others in a 
distinctive manner: as the backdrop of the greater collective context. That is, we view others 
as our friends and partners, namely, as the you with whom we co-constitute the collective 
consciousness of the we. Other minds are then perceived through the second-person 
perspective. In resolving the problem of other minds, Xuanzang and his disciples do not 
cancel alterity. Nor do they surmise that our own minds can exhaust everything in the 
cosmos. Refuting this solipsism, they turn to highlight the importance of community and 
collectivity, as a reminder of how the mind of the self and those of others are interdependent.  
This approach to other minds, I suggest, is what Xuanzang intends to capture through the 
mirror analogy. Just as the image in the mirror is never homogeneous with the object 
revealed through reflection, so too does our perception of other minds never cancel the 
alterity of others. Between the sui generis and the homogeneous, there stands the 
interdependence of the self and the other. If the reader will allow, I would like to borrow the 
analogy provided by the Huayan school of Buddhism in which the I-you relation is compared 
to that of the gems in Indra’s net, neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous, but revealing one 
another through reflecting. What constitutes the identity of the gem is the reflection of others, 
and vice versa. Subsequently, the negation of a svabhāvic, solipsist self does not lead to 
nihilism but rather reveals self-other interdependence. That is why Xuanzang compares our 
perception of other minds as “seeing the world through the mirror” (T31N1585, P39c14).  
As such, our experience of other minds discloses how otherness is indispensable to our 
own experience. As Charles Taylor once remarked in a different context, “we define our 
identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant 
others want to see in us” (Taylor 1985, 33). Even though Buddhists would consider dialogue 
as one of the many ways of disclosing and revealing otherness, the underlying idea is an 
affinity: otherness constitutes a crucial dimension of our experiences. As a Buddhist would 
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say, we do not exist as a svabhāvic self but live in the cosmos with others, interdependently. 
Collaborating with others, we become able to build communities and constitute shared spaces 
of meaning. In this way, other minds do have real existence. They can be perceived by us 
through the second-person perspective and they are not independent of our own minds. 
Fulfilling C1, C2, and C3, Xuanzang and his disciples promote this alternative solution to the 
problem of other minds, which further reveals the importance of collectivity. 
Nonetheless, if otherness is so indispensable to us, why are we always prone to 
distinguish others from ourselves, or even polarize them from us? As we will see soon, 
stemming from the second-person experience of other minds, there arises the open possibility 
of treating others as our friends and our foes.  
As Xuanzang and Kuiji expound, the reason why we are prone to treat others as our foes 
and competitors comes from wrong ways of perceiving. Let us recall our previous analysis of 
self-attachments. We have embodied self-attachments not because consciousness transforms 
itself, but rather because we perceive this transformation in a wrong manner. The seventh 
consciousness mona and the sixth consciousness misconceive the eighth consciousness laiye 
as the sui generis, immutable ego. The sixth consciousness further produces categories to 
differentiate others, thus nourishing discriminative self-attachments. As a matter of fact, these 
misconceptions not only give rise to self-attachments but also generate dharma-attachments.   
Misperception plays the same role in the experience of other minds. When the eighth 
consciousness, laiye, perceives others through the second-person perspective, mona aims at 
laiye’s act of apperceiving and is prone to misperceive this act as a manifestation of 
svabhāvic self-identity. This misperception, as previously mentioned, propels us to prioritize 
the first-person perspective of experience and proceeds to cultivate our egocentric worldview. 
Gradually, mona nourishes our embodied self-attachments (T31N1585, P2a10). 
Simultaneously, mona treats those outside our own minds, including other minds, as 
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irrelevant and inaccessible to us, namely, as other sui generis entities. Viewing other minds 
as such, we steadily develop “embodied dharma-attachments (jushenfazhi 俱⾝法執, 
sahajadharmagrāha)” (T31N1585, P6c27). 
Meanwhile, the sixth consciousness objectifies the images parts (i.e., the image of the 
body and the image of the material cosmos) transformed by the eighth consciousness, laiye. 
In this way, we start to obtain the third-person perspective of experience. When forming an 
objective representation of these image parts, the sixth consciousness becomes prone to 
misrepresent the image of the body of a sentient being as a manifestation of a sui generis, 
immutable self. Upon this misrepresentation, we tend to develop an embodied self-
attachment in the objective sense. Equally, the sixth consciousness is inclined to form false 
representations of various things in the material cosmos, including that of other minds, as sui 
generis and immutable entities. Consequently, we consider other minds as independent of 
and irrelevant to our own minds. Such an attitude equally contributes to embodied dharma-
attachments to other minds.  
Based on these embodied attachments, the sixth consciousness is capable of formulating 
various criteria and categories to strengthen the self-other polarization. As a result, our 
rudimentary attitude of polarizing the self from the other matures into stereotypical beliefs 
that underpin our egocentric worldview. These stereotypes demonstrate the “discriminative 
self-attachments (fenbiewozhi 分別我執, vikalpitātmagrāha)” on the one hand and the 
“discriminative dharma-attachments (fenbiefazhi 分別法執, vikalpitadharmagrāha)” on the 
other (T31N1585, P2a21; P7a06). Through the joint force of these self-attachments and 
dharma-attachments, we develop our egocentric life story in which others are pushed to the 
fringes.   
From this argumentation, we can infer that what results in a wide range of attachments is 
not the transformation of consciousness per se but rather the wrong way of perceiving. The 
 96 
 
 
transformation of consciousness is neutral by nature and, thereby, furnishes us with an open 
possibility. We can misperceive the function of consciousness in such a way that we falsely 
view our “self” and other things in the cosmos (including other minds) as svabhāvic entities. 
Nonetheless, we can also follow the transformation of consciousness to realize self-other 
interdependence. What is referred to as an open possibility and its two ways of actualization 
have been encapsulated in the Yogācāra account of three-nature; this I will detail in Chapter 
6. Eventually, what determines this open possibility, is the subject. If the subject wants to 
liberate itself from suffering, it needs to change its ways of perceiving, both habitually and 
conceptually. Chapter 8 will further discuss what this change entails. 
In our investigation of selfhood and other minds, we have already had a preliminary view 
of the Yogācāra conception of Consciousness-only; that is, everything depends on 
consciousness to appear as a phenomenon for each subject. The way in which Xuanzang and 
Kuiji make their investigation of consciousness subservient and subordinate to the goal of 
awakening the wisdom of emptiness and compassion, complicates Husserl’s description of 
intentionality. To clarify this view, I now introduce readers to the concept of xinsuo (⼼所, 
caitasika), the mental factors that accompany and support the cognitive function of 
consciousnesses.  
3.5 Intentionality of Mental Factors 
While the eight types of consciousness are capable of discerning and knowing objects 
distinctly, the mental factors represent other mental states, such as feeling, attending, willing, 
or mental affliction, which accompany the function of consciousnesses. In the Yogācāra 
context, there are, in total, fifty-one mental factors. In the current section, I will give a brief 
description of mental factors and their functions, further exploring how the Yogācāra portrait 
of consciousnesses is compatible with, can be related to, but remain not completely identical 
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to that in Husserl. In Chapter 8, we will revisit these mental factors and expand our analysis 
to demonstrate how mental factors are capable of fusing the rift between knowing and doing.  
In CWSL, Xuanzang introduces mental factors in this manner (T31N1585, P26c15-18):  
恒依⼼起，與⼼相應。繫屬於⼼，故名⼼所。如屬我物，⽴我所名。⼼於所緣，唯取總相。⼼所
於彼，亦取別相。助成⼼事，得⼼所名。如畫師，資作模填彩。 
[The mental factors] always arise together with the mind [namely, consciousnesses] and, thus, they are 
associated with the mind. Since they are affilicated with the mind, they are called mental factors, just like 
how a property belongs to me is named for its affiliation to me. The mind cognizes the general image of 
the perceived phenomenon. The mental factors cognize the distinct aspects of the image of the same 
perceived phenomenon. Due to their role in facilitating the perception of the mind, they are known as the 
mental factors. [When someone is perceiving,] this sentient being is like a painter [whose mind] outlines 
the image [of the perceived phenomenon and whose mental factors] furnish the image with colours.  
 
Articulated as such, the mental factors possess three salient features: first, they perpetually 
depend on consciousness to arise; second, they always accompany consciousnesses; third, 
they likewise have a fourfold intentional structure (T31N1585, P26c15-16). As Xuanzang 
documents, the mental factors are supposed to assist consciousnesses with their functions 
(T31N1585, P26c17). To illustrate this interplay, Kuiji compares the mental factors to the 
servants of the king qua the consciousness (T43N1830, P320c16). The king-servant metaphor 
alludes to the way in which mental factors find their ground and basis in the consciousness. 
Borrowing Husserlian terminology, we can conceive of these mental factors as the compound 
acts that are founded on the acts of perceiving, and target at the same object.  
Let us take the mental factor of regret (hui 悔), for instance. Regret is one of the mental 
factors that accompanies the function of the sixth consciousness. When the sixth 
consciousness begins to recollect previous misconduct, regret will arise on the basis of this 
act of recollecting (T31N1585, P35c1). Likewise, when the seventh consciousness mona 
falsely perceives the subjective act transformed from the eighth consciousness laiye as the 
immutable ego, wrong views (xiejian 邪⾒) will accompany mona, which further nourishes 
various types of attachments (zhi 执).  
Considering this articulation of mental factors in the framework provided by Xuanzang, I 
contend that an epistemic aspect is intrinsic to these mental factors. As I will unpack further 
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in the last part of this dissertation, even faith (xin 信) is categorized as a mental factor that 
arises from our knowledge of perceiving things as they really are. Faith, further, serves as the 
ground for the mental factor of perseverance (qin 勤), which drives us to diligently engage in 
altruistic actions. In the Yogācāra framework, both faith and perseverance are demarcated for 
their cognitive and normative characteristics.  
Thus far, we have detailed how the Yogācāra conception of the mind, including the eight 
consciousnesses and their mental factors, can be related to that in Husserl, not only because 
they have both pinpointed the salient feature of intentionality as the mutual constitution 
between the ego, intending act, and intended phenomenon in their respective ways, but also 
because they have depicted how the function of consciousness is animated by both the 
passive and active geneses. Furthermore, Chinese Yogācārins and Husserl employ their 
formulation of intentionality to depict the ego not as a closed system, but rather as 
interdependent with other objects, including other minds.  
Although the Yogācāra view of consciousness can be related to that in Husserl, the two 
are not completely identical for at least two reasons. Above all, Yogācārins, like Xuanzang 
and Kuiji, investigate several extreme mental states that Husserl did not fully tackle, despite 
expressing his intention to do so in Crisis, among them being the “problems of birth and 
death” and “the problem of unconsciousness”, such as “dreamless sleep, loss of 
consciousness and whatever else of the same or similar nature” (Hua 6/102). In the context of 
CWSL, we have inquired into these extreme states when exploring the way in which the first 
six consciousnesses can stop functioning from time to time. According to Yogācārins, even 
when we are attacked by sunstroke and pass out, consciousness does not break itself 
(T31N1585, P38a26). In virtue of the seventh consciousness mona and the eighth 
consciousness laiye, we are able to maintain our memories after waking up from a coma. 
Yogācārins, likewise, argue that we do not lose our consciousness during a pre-death 
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experience, insofar as the eighth consciousness, laiye, functions throughout endless time and 
preserves the previously cultivated seeds for the future. This continuity of consciousness 
makes it possible for the iron chain of karma to influence every stage of existence from this 
round of life to that of the next. Thus, Yogācārins utilize the continuous flow of 
consciousness to explain their cosmological view of death and rebirth, a view encapsulated in 
the notion of saṃsāra.  
In the second place, Yogācārins provide a detailed description of the way in which each 
consciousness is paired with its respective set of mental factors, in contrast to which Husserl 
does not articulate a fixed association of mental states with cognitive faculties. As 
documented in CWSL, there are five omnipresent mental factors that assist the function of all 
eight types of consciousness; they are contacting (chu 觸), attending (zuoyi 作意), feeling 
(shou 受), thinking (xiang 想), and purposing (si 思). These factors indicate how we direct 
our attention to an object, discern it from others, generate feelings towards it, designate a title 
to refer to it, and eventually, purposefully carry out verbal or non-verbal actions relating to it. 
To illustrate the interplay between consciousness and its mental factors, Xuanzang articulates 
the painter analogy. As the subject or agent, each one of us is the painter of our own 
worldview. In the process of painting, the eight types of consciousness enable us to depict the 
outlines of our mental images on the basis of which various mental factors fill these images 
with colours (T31N1585, P26c18). Thus, it is in virtue of both consciousness and its mental 
factors that we live a rich and colourful life, sometimes with suffering and attachment, and 
sometimes with awakening and compassion.  
To highlight this distinction, Yogācārins ascribe moral qualities to consciousness and 
their mental factors. Such an association of mental acts with moral consequences alludes to 
how mental factors can motivate moral actions, further facilitating a transition from the 
descriptive account of consciousness to the prescriptive one. There are four types of moral 
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qualities: good (shan 善), evil (e 惡), neutral with ignorance/pollution (youfuwuji 有覆無記), 
and neutral without ignorance/pollution (wufuwuji 無覆無記) (T31N1585, P12a20). For 
instance, the moral quality of the eighth consciousness, laiye, is neutral without pollution 
(T31N1585, P12a27-29). That being said, laiye, which passively constitutes one’s experience 
throughout endless time, is destined to be neither good nor evil, neither polluted nor 
unpolluted by misperception. Mona, the seventh consciousness, is neutral with pollution 
when it misperceives laiye as the sui generis, immutable self-entity (T31N1585, P23c7). The 
first six consciousnesses have all four types of qualities (T31N1585, P26b11). As will be 
elaborated in the last part of this dissertation, the moral qualities of consciousness and its 
mental factors are crucial to Buddhist cosmology of karma and saṃsāra on the one hand, and 
moral actions on the other. While ethics remains rudimentary in Husserl’s articulation of 
phenomenology, Yogācārins perceive ethics as an integral part of the Bodhisattvas’ path, 
namely, a path towards the realization of emptiness and compassion at the prescriptive level 
of their doctrine of consciousness. We will elaborate on this in Chapter 8.  
 
Chapter 4: Intentionality and Non-conceptualism 
 
In the previous two chapters, we have clarified how Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins depict 
the intentional feature of consciousness. For both, consciousness is intentional, because it is 
always the consciousness of something for someone. With the help of intentionality, Husserl 
and Chinese Yogācārins are able to examine mental acts at all levels: from the simplest act of 
presenting to the more compounded act of conceptualizing. In this process, they expand the 
scope of consciousness from that of the first-person perspective to the second-person and 
third-person ones. Since they highlight how an abstract thought (or a meaning-intention, in 
Husserl’s terms) produced by conceptual thinking not only presupposes the passively-
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functioned intuition, but also needs to go back to non-conceptual intuition to fulfil the 
meaning, they are both confident that their approach to consciousness allows for the 
possibility of seeing things as they present themselves in intuitions. It is Husserl’s 
pronouncement that, through phenomenology, “we must go back to things themselves” to 
perceive them as they are (Hua 19/10). For Yogācārins, it is imperative to correct 
misperceptions and attain the “wisdom of perceiving something that is [ultimately] empty”, 
which further manifests things as they really are (T43N1830, P546a8). Given that both 
Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins prioritize the role of non-conceptual intuition over 
conceptual thinking, I contend that they can contribute to the ongoing debate over non-
conceptualism in their distinct ways, which further encourages us to rethink our definition of 
what counts as a “concept” and what counts as the “content” of a mental act.  
Non-conceptualism, in its very literal sense, entails a doctrine that argues for the 
existence and significance of non-conceptual content of mental acts in someone’s experience. 
This doctrine is important for the philosophical study of knowledge, for the general 
understanding of experience, and for comparative studies of philosophy and religion, in 
respective manners. For the study of knowledge, non-conceptualism highlights how intuitions 
and sensations provide a zone where the mind and the world, the organism and its 
environment, come into contact and interact with one another in the first place, an interaction 
that has largely been overlooked by conceptualism. For the general understanding of 
experience, non-conceptualism contests the popular view that we cannot experience 
something unless we can form a concept to capture it, represent it, and express it. If 
experience is sustained not by conceptualization but rather by intuition, then sentient beings, 
such as animals, who do not have a full-fledged capacity to reason and conceptualize, can 
still have a coherent experience. By acknowledging the cognitive faculty of other sentient 
beings, non-conceptualism motivates us to reflect on an anthropocentric view of experience 
 102 
 
 
and knowledge. For comparative studies of philosophy and religion, non-conceptualism is 
closely related to the question of unmediated experience, an experience in which people 
transcend dualistic thinking, conceptuality, and mundane reality to realize ultimate reality 
right away (Komarovski 2012, 88). Considering how several philosophical and religious 
traditions across time and space have affirmed and acknowledged the existence of such 
unmediated experience, non-conceptualism has a special appeal to comparative scholars 
(Gunther 2003, 2).  
In what follows, we first clarify what it means to be a “concept” and what counts as the 
“content” of a mental act in section 1. Through this examination, we scrutinize and diagnose 
all the presumptions that have been inserted in these notions. After broadening the meaning 
of “content” and narrowing the meaning of “concept”, we explore whether it is possible to 
entertain and examine the content of mental acts that are non-conceptual and intentional. 
Subsequently, in sections 2 and 3, we explore whether and how Husserl and Chinese 
Yogācārins can contribute to non-conceptualism.   
4.1 What is Non-Conceptualism?   
The debate over non-conceptualism concerns whether non-conceptual content, such as 
intuition, exists in one’s experience and can serve as a source of justification for knowledge. 
Those who affirm the existence and the justificatory role of non-conceptual content are 
known as non-conceptualists, whose antagonists are conceptualists. This debate in modern 
epistemology can be traced back to Immanuel Kant (Sellars 1968; McDowell 1994; Hanna 
2005; Ginsborg 2008). In his Critique of Pure Reason,  Kant opens up a discussion on the 
principles for knowing an object, upon acknowledging both intuitions and concepts as the 
sources of knowledge (KrV A51/B75). To understand the debate, it is of importance to 
examine what philosophers mean when they utilize the notions of “content” and “concept”.  
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Earlier in Chapter 2, we introduced how Husserl used the notion of content in 
formulating the doctrine of intentionality in different phases of his philosophical thinking. 
We can track down at least two different senses of this concept called “content”. In his early 
writings, Husserl defines it as the “interpretative sense of objective reference” (Hua 19/416). 
After his transcendental turn, Husserl revises the definition in that he realizes content cannot 
be reduced to the interpretative sense. He thereby speaks of content as the noema, namely, as 
the idealized presentation of an intended object (Hua 3/186). Therefore, in Husserl’s writings, 
content can mean either the interpretative sense or the ideal presentation of an object.  
In contemporary studies of philosophy, it remains popular to equate the content of 
mental acts with the “interpretative sense of objective reference”. Not very different from 
early Husserl, Christopher Peacocke defines content as the that-clause, which refers to 
various objects in the world (Peacocke 1983). For instance, the content of Cindy’s perception 
or feeling is expressed through the proposition – Cindy perceives that a tree is in the foyer; 
Cindy feels that she is happy to receive the chestnuts. Aside from understanding content as 
the interpretative sense, several scholars define content as the presentation or representation 
of an object (Cussins 1990; Crane 1992; Bermúdez 2007). 
The view that each mental act has its content can also be traced back to Kant when he 
proclaims that “thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” 
(KrV A51/B75). Nevertheless, Kant does not define what he means by content. Neither has 
he given a clear definition of concepts. We can, however, find that Kant uses the notion of 
“concept” in at least three ways: 
1. Concepts are abstract ideas. This is the definition of concepts in the pure sense, 
namely, concept as the form of understanding (KrV A50/B74);  
 
2. Concepts are synonymous with representations that contribute to the content of 
consciousness in general, including understanding. According to Kant, a concept is 
“one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successfully intuited, and 
then reproduced, into one representation” (KrV A103).  
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3. Concepts entail the spontaneous mental faculty of understanding, or what we today 
call the capacity of conceptualizing. Kant states that “our cognition arises from two 
fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations 
(the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by 
means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts)” (KrV A50/B74).  
 
It is not hard to see how these three senses conveyed by Kant set the paradigm for 
contemporary discussion of concepts. Among the three, the second sense of concepts has 
become prevalent in contemporary studies of philosophy (Harman 1987; Carruthers 2000; 
Fodor 2003; Margolis & Laurence 2014). For instance, Michael Tye contends that a concept 
is a “mental representation of a sort that can occur in thought”, which differs from the 
linguistic term we use in our everyday language (namely, not as concepts in the first sense 
listed above) (Tye 2005, 222).  Since concepts are representations that unify the sense data 
given through intuitions, concepts function to mediate between the subject and object, further 
enabling a person to relate to a represented object (Tye 2000, 17). Considering how concepts 
possess references that allow someone to relate to an object, concepts can be used to 
determine a semantic value – someone cannot have knowledge of something, unless this 
person can formulate a concept to express it. Aside from understanding concepts as mental 
representations, several philosophers also endorse the last sense of concepts as the mental 
faculty of conceptualizing (Dummett 1993; Bennett & Hacker 2008; Millikan 2000; Kenny 
2010). For them, concepts entail the capacities of forming a representation, making reference 
to an object, and providing principles for justifying knowledge of this object, capacities that 
cannot be reduced to representations per se.  
Thus far, I have clarified two senses of “content” as the interpretative sense and mental 
representation, and three senses of “concept” as the abstract idea, the mental representation, 
and the capacity of conceptualizing. There is a clear overlap between the two categories, 
since content and concept can both mean representation. However, if concept is the same as 
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content, it is not only tautological to talk about conceptual content (since concept is content), 
but also futile to entertain any possible existence of non-conceptual content.  
For this reason, I maintain that it is necessary to expand the definition of the term 
“content” and narrow the meaning of “concept”. Here I draw upon Husserl’s definition of 
“content” as that which an intentional act is about. As such, content can be either abstractly 
representational or concretely phenomenal. Mutatis mutandis, I narrow the meaning of 
“concept”. By concept, I do not mean mental representation in general, but rather the capacity 
of producing abstract categories, which is referred to by Husserl as “meaning-intentions”.  
If “content” means what an intentional act is about and “concept” means the capacity of 
producing abstract categories, it becomes possible for us to entertain and examine non-
conceptual content. We speak of non-conceptual content as that which does not involve 
abstract names and categories but rather presents an object immediately. Meanwhile, we 
conceive of conceptual content as that which is not only abstract and categorial but also 
enables someone to inferentially and intermediately relate to an object. 
The way in which we acknowledge the existence of non-conceptual content guides us in 
rethinking what non-conceptuality really entails. For a long time, non-conceptual content has 
been described as that which goes beyond subject-object distinction (Sellars 1968; Evans 
1982; Crane 1992). Since there is no subject-object duality, non-conceptual content is not 
about an object but becomes one with the object. As such, by saying that non-conceptual 
content is unmediated, scholars generally mean that this type of content is not 
representational nor intentional. Under this assumption, two stances towards non-
conceptuality have been proposed. One group of philosophers contend that we cannot 
consciously be aware of non-conceptual content because it is not part of our explicit 
experience (Sellars 1968; Katz 1978). As described by Gareth Evens, non-conceptual content 
remains subconscious, which is “not ipso facto perceptual experiences”, yet can become a 
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state of a conscious subject through serving as the input of thinking (Evans 1982, 157-158). 
In this manner, non-conceptuality exists only in a subconscious way. Others argue that non-
conceptual content can still be part of our explicit experience, insofar as it contributes to a 
unique type of experience qua a mystical and ineffable experience, producing knowledge 
through a direct realization of ultimate reality (Forman 1990; Griffins 1990; Rothberg 1990). 
As such, non-conceptuality becomes an attribute of mysticism.  
The reason why philosophers are prompted to choose between subconsciousness and 
mysticism is that they assume non-conceptual content to be non-intentional.71 Such an 
assumption per se alludes to a conceptualist view of experience – people cannot experience 
something unless they can form a concept to capture it, represent it, and express it. In line 
with this thought, if the content of a mental act is unmediated, non-conceptual, and thus non-
representational, this mental act has no intentionality, cannot bring about knowledge through 
representation, and cannot become part of our explicit experience, unless it is ineffable and 
mystical.  
Indeed, when we perceive intentionality as a static form of what is directing and what is 
directed, or of what is representing and what is represented, then intentionality does entail a 
polarity between subject and object. The static view of intentionality as synonymous with 
subject-object polarity was held by naturalists in Husserl’s era. However, if intentionality 
characterizes a dynamic process of mutual constitution brought about through the joint effort 
of the subject and the object, then it alludes to interdependence and correlationality, rather 
than pure polarity. As pinpointed by Victor Hori, “Katz and his opponents both agree in 
dividing the spectrum of consciousness into those with cognitive content and those without, 
into those that are mediated (not pure) and those that are unmediated (pure)” yet they never 
                                                        
71 There is a similar discussion of whether pure consciousness exists between Steven Katz and Robert Forman 
(Kamarvoski 2012). 
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consider possibilities outside the polarities (Hori 2002, 282). As to be seen shortly, non-
conceptuality is devoid of conceptual thinking, but it is not without intentionality.  
In their articulation of intentionality, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins explore how non-
conceptual content can be immediate and intentional, although intentionality does not 
necessarily entail a polarity between subject and object. Through the phenomenological 
discussion of “genesis” and the Yogācāra articulation of “transformation”, Husserl and 
Xuanzang stress how the non-conceptual act of intending, such as intuition and sensation, is 
neither polarized from nor merged with the intended phenomenon. If the act of intuiting were 
polarized with its content qua the intuited phenomenon, then this act would become 
representational and transform into conceptual thinking. Likewise, if the act of intuiting were 
merged with its content, then the content would assimilate into the act as in a mystical 
experience. Quite to the contrary, the non-conceptual act of intending and its content qua the 
intended phenomenon mutually constitute each other with the underlying ego. Such mutual 
constitution bespeaks the interdependence, not polarity nor unity, of the act and its 
phenomenon. To stress such interdependence, Husserl eventually characterizes intentionality 
as mutual constitution, rather than directedness. Similarly, the interdependence of the 
intending act qua the seeing part, the intended phenomenon qua the image part, and the 
underlying self-awareness is foregrounded in the Yogācāra articulation of the fourfold 
intentional structure of consciousness. In virtue of this conception of intentionality, we ipso 
facto broaden the meaning of non-conceptual content as that which does not involve abstract 
names and categories but can still present an object immediately as the intended 
phenomenon.  
In short, non-conceptual content is immediate and intentional. Here, with the intending 
act, the intended phenomenon, and the underlying ego(s), their distinctness is not cancelled, 
and they do not merge into a higher unity. Rather, through their mutual constitution, things 
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present themselves as they actually are to us. Such presented phenomena in non-conceptual 
content further lay the ground for the active use of reason as in conceptual thinking. As will 
be further detailed in Chapters 5 and 6, the mutual constitution gives rise to an open 
possibility – either a person can misperceive interdependence as a dichotomization and form 
attachments, or a person can return to non-conceptual content to see things as they actually 
are. To fulfil their meaning, concepts need to go back to non-conceptual content. Knowledge, 
thus, is produced when what is meant becomes what is presented. As described by Robert 
Hanna, non-conceptual content is “representationally significant (i.e. meaningful in the 
‘semantic’ sense of describing or referring to states-of-affairs, properties, or individuals of 
some sort)”, despite not involving conceptual thinking (Hanna 2005, 248). Our expanded 
view of non-conceptual content indicates a stronger version of non-conceptualism – we 
cannot have knowledge of something unless we can experience the thing itself directly in 
intuition and sensation. Now that we have redefined the notions of content, concept, and 
conceptual content, we can continue to explore whether and how Husserl and Chinese 
Yogācārins can contribute to non-conceptualism.  
4.2 Husserl’s Contribution to Non-Conceptualism  
In this section, I explore how Husserl’s view of intentionality can contribute to the ongoing 
discussion of non-conceptualism.72 Husserl acknowledges the existence of non-conceptual 
                                                        
72 Recently, there has been a discussion in the Husserlian scholarship on reading Husserl’s phenomenology as a 
doctrine of epistemology-only. This reading is championed by Walter Hopp who managed to integrate Husserl’s 
conception of intentionality into the heated discussion on non-conceptualism. In his writing, Hopp focuses on 
what we call in this dissertation the descriptive level of Husserl’s phenomenology. No one could deny Hopp’s 
contribution of rediscovering Husserl and reincorporating his architectonic of consciousness into this discussion 
among philosophers of mind. Upon utilizing Husserl’s theory of intentionality to justify non-conceptualism, 
Hopp makes a plea for suspending the explicative level at which Husserl puts forward transcendental idealism. 
Hopp accounts for his approach in the following manner: “the more closely one adheres to Husserl’s own 
conception of the subject matter and methods of phenomenology… which became increasingly bound up with 
his distinctive brand of transcendental idealism, the less philosophical work will strike one as genuinely 
phenomenological” (Hopp 2011, 3). Through this statement, Hopp depicts genuine phenomenology as that 
which should be separated from transcendental idealism. In his new book, Husserl’s Legacy: Phenomenology, 
Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy, Dan Zahavi poses the following questions concerning this 
reading of Husserl: “What is ultimately at stake in his phenomenological analyses? Are Husserl’s 
phenomenological analyses primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness, and if so, must they 
then be classified as psychological contributions of some sort? If Husserl is engaged in a transcendental 
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content in experience through expanding the meaning of intuition. He attributes intentionality 
to all mental acts so that even intuition and sensation have intended phenomena as their 
content. He further puts forward the ideas of categorial intuition and universal intuition for 
the purpose of affirming the constitutive function of intuition. As such, Husserl makes the 
move to expand the notion of non-conceptuality. To further explore how Husserl credits non-
conceptual content as the source of justification, I find it helpful to return to the three 
principles for knowing, namely, the principles of founding, fulfilling, and identification.  
Let us first examine the notion of “founding”. According to Husserl, our abstract 
thinking is founded on a set of simple presentational acts. In his terms (Hua 19/5),  
Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin in intuition: they must arise out of an 
ideational intuition founded on certain experiences, and must admit of indefinite reconfirmation, and of 
recognition of their self-identity, on the reperformance of such abstraction. Otherwise put: we can 
absolutely not rest content with “mere words”, i.e. with a merely symbolic understanding of words, such as 
we first have when we reflect on the sense of the laws for “concepts”, “judgments”, “truth” etc. (together 
with their manifold specifications) which are set up in pure logic. Meanings inspired only by remote, 
confused, inauthentic intuitions – if by any intuitions at all – are not enough: we must go back to the 
“things themselves”.73 
 
                                                        
philosophical project, is phenomenological transcendental philosophy then distinctive in some way, and what 
kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Is Husserlian phenomenology primarily descriptive in 
character, is it supposed to capture how matters seem to us, or is it also supposed to capture how things are?” 
(Zahavi 2017, 5). He continues to argue that “Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, not a 
phenomenalist, nor an internalist, not a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues”, and “on a more positive 
note, I will argue, that a proper grasp of Husserl’s transcendental idealism will reveal how fundamental a role he 
ascribed to embodiment and intersubjectivity” (Zahavi 2017, 6). Our analysis of Husserl’s phenomenology in 
Chapter 2 supports Zahavi’s viewpoint. Consider the concept of intentionality. As previously examined, 
intentionality indicates the mutual constitution of the subjective act of perceiving and the object to be perceived. 
A relation as such entails not only an epistemic account of perception but also a viewpoint regarding the 
metaphysical status of objects that appear as phenomena in our consciousness. As we will see in the next 
section, Husserl’s non-conceptualism is foregrounded by, and thus cannot be detached from, his transcendental 
idealism.  
73 The English translation is based on that of J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 168). The original German version is 
as follows:  
„Die logischen Begriffe als geltende Denkeinheiten müssen ihren Ursprung in der Anschauung haben; sie 
müssen durch ideirende Abstraktion auf Grund gewisser Erlebnisse erwachsen und im Neuvollzuge dieser 
Abstraktion immer wieder neu zu bewähren, in ihrer Identität mit sich selbst zu erfassen sein. Anders 
ausgedrückt: Wir wollen uns schlechterdings nicht mit ‚bloßen Worten‘, das ist mit einem bloß symbolischen 
Wortverständnis, zufrieden geben, wie wir es zunächst in unseren Reflexionen über den Sinn der in der reinen 
Logik aufgestellten Gesetze über ‚Begriffe‘, ‚Urteil‘, ‚Wahrheiten‘ usw. mit ihren mannigfachen 
Besonderungen haben. Bedeutungen, die nur von entfernten, verschwommenen, uneigentlichen Anschauungen – 
wenn überhaupt von irgendwelchen – belebt sind, können uns nicht genug tun. Wir wollen auf die ‚Sachen 
selbst‘ zurückgehen.‘   
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Recall the previous examples of the tree in the foyer seen by Cindy, and the roasted chestnuts 
received by her. When Cindy is looking at the tree, its colour, shape, texture, and smell are 
presented to her directly through sensation. Founded on these simple acts of presenting, the 
act of perceiving arises as the integral perception of the tree as a whole. Then, the tree is also 
the tree in the foyer. Founded on the perception of the tree and the foyer, the act of perceiving 
the state of affairs presents directly “the tree in the foyer” to Cindy. Such an act of 
perceiving, also known as categorial intuition in Husserl’s early writings, expands the notion 
of intuition as the sensuous one. Categorial intuition is non-conceptual insofar as it is 
directly, immediately given tout d’emblée. Nonetheless, since it is a categorial type of 
intuition, it enables Cindy to perceive not only an object like a tree, but also a state of affairs, 
such as “the tree in the foyer”. Then, on the basis of various acts of perceiving, Cindy is able 
to formulate abstract concepts. In the other example where Cindy’s colleague gave her 
roasted chestnuts, her feeling of delight is the act founded on her act of perceiving. Although 
the noematic content of feeling and perceiving remains the same chestnuts, the act of feeling 
arises from the act of perceiving. Feeling further leads to Cindy’s act of judging that 
chestnuts are auspicious. These two examples indicate how more complex acts, such as 
conceptualizing or categorizing, can continue to constitute themselves consecutively on the 
simple acts of presenting in sensation.  
Husserl evokes the ladder analogy to account for the way in which we can formulate 
more abstract concepts on the basis of categorial intuition (Hua 19/691). Through several 
rounds of founding, it seems that a ladder gradually takes shape from the simple act of 
presenting to the compound act of judging. The ladder analogy hitherto reflects how non-
conceptual mental acts, such as presenting and categorial intuiting, serve as the ground and 
foundation for all upper-level mental acts. To perceive an object, we need to start with 
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intuitions, not with concepts. As such, we go back to things themselves and see them as they 
actually are.  
Furthermore, the ladder is not a one-way street, but a two-way channel. On the one hand, 
more abstract and complex acts can rise one after another on the foundations, and, on the 
other hand, these upper-level mental acts need to return to non-conceptual contents to fulfill 
their meaning. In figurative terms, Husserl discerns that “fulfilment is carried out in a chain 
of acts which take us down a whole ladder of ‘foundations’” (Hua 19/691). That which 
determines fulfilment likewise comes from non-conceptual contents. In our introduction to 
Husserl’s investigation of inner time consciousness, we encountered a special case where we 
try to recollect the past but the previous memory just will not reveal itself to us. This 
incapacity to recall does not indicate our inability to carry out the act of recollecting but 
implies how the noematic content of this act remains missing. For even higher-level acts, 
such as naming, they likewise need to have their content fulfilled. Otherwise, the meaning of 
these acts becomes empty. For instance, we can formulate the concept “iPhone 50”. Yet, the 
concept will remain empty until the content of this naming is furnished and its meaning is 
fulfilled, specifically, when this product appears on the market. We can have various mental 
acts but not all of them are full of meaning. What determines the meaningfulness of these acts 
is non-conceptual content. For Husserl, we only have knowledge of an object when the 
content of an intending act of that object is fulfilled, that is, when what is intended meets 
what is presented.  
While several founded acts come to take shape, the issue of justification arises. There are 
times when Cindy believes she runs into her friend, Jen. Yet, upon a closer look, she realizes 
that this person is not Jen but a total stranger. Perception can make mistakes and reasoning 
can become fallacious. In Husserl’s account of intentionality, he proposes a way of justifying 
through the notion of “identification”. As previously mentioned, the principle of 
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identification shows that what is intended becomes identical with what is presented. Only 
when this principle is fulfilled, can knowledge of one object be justified. In understanding 
Husserl’s view, it will be helpful to return to the issue of fallacy. Husserl documents a similar 
example in which he mistook a waxwork figure for a real person (Hua19/443):  
 Wandering about in the Panopticum Waxworks we meet on the stairs a charming lady whom we do not 
know and who seems to know us, and who is, in fact, the well-known joke of the place; we have for a 
moment been deceived by a waxwork figure. As long as we are deceived, we have a perception that is so 
good as any other: we see a lady and not a waxwork figure. When we recognize that we are deceived, it is 
just the opposite, we only see a waxwork figure that represents a lady. Obviously, such talk of representing 
does not mean that the waxwork figure is modelled on a lady as in the same waxworks, there are figure-
models of Napoleon, of Bismarck etc. The perception of the wax-figure is not the base of our awareness of 
the same figure as representing the lady. Rather, the lady, appears together with the waxwork figure: the 
two perceptual interpretations, that is, two appearances of a thing, interpenetrate, coinciding as it were in 
part in their perceptual content. And they interpenetrate in conflicting fashion, so that our observation 
wanders from one to another of the apparent objects each barring the other from existence.74 
 
In this experience of being deceived and making a fallacious judgment, Husserl pinpoints two 
mental acts that are at play, perceiving and believing (Hua 19/443). He first saw a waxwork 
figure that had its colour and shape. This perception constituted a ground, on the basis of 
which the act of believing arose and propelled him to assume that he saw a lady (Hua 
19/443). More often than not, upon a closer look, he would realize he had made a mistake 
and recognize that it was a wax figure rather than a real lady. Through examination, Husserl 
notes that he was not able to confirm his belief, because the noematic content of perceiving 
(namely, the wax figure) is in conflict with and, thus, is not identical to the noematic content 
of believing (namely, a lady). Husserl describes this conflict as the way in which the content 
of the act of perceiving fails to be identical with the content of the act of believing (Hua 
                                                        
74 The English translation is based on that of J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 137-138). The original German 
version is as follows: „Im Panoptikum lustwandelnd, begegnen wir auf der Treppe einer liebenswürdig 
winkenden, fremden Dame – der bekannte Panoptikumscherz. Es ist eine Puppe, die uns einen Augenblick 
täuschte. Solange wir in der Täuschung befangen sind, haben wir eine Wahrnehmung, so gut wie irgendeine 
andere. Wir sehen eine Dame, nicht eine Puppe. Haben wir den Trug erkannt, so verhält es sich umgekehrt, nun 
sehen wir eine Puppe, die eine Dame vorstellt. Natürlich heißt diese Rede vom Vorstellen nicht, daß die Puppe 
als Bild einer Dame fungiere, also in der Art, wie etwa im selben Panoptikum Wachspuppen „von“ Napoleon, 
„von“ Bismarck als Abbilder fungieren. Die Wahrnehmung des Puppendinges ist also nicht Unterlage eines 
Abbildungsbewußsteins; vielmehr erscheint bloß in eins mit der Puppe zugleich die Dame: zwei perzeptive 
Auffassungen, bzw. zwei Dingerscheinungen durchdringen sich, nach einem gewissen Erscheinungsgehalt sich 
sozusagen deckend. Und sie durchdringen sich in der Weise des Widerstreites, wobei der aufmerkende Blick 
bald dem einen bald dem anderen der erscheinenden, aber sich im Sein aufhebenden Objekte zuwenden kann.“ 
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19/444). From the issue of deception, I infer that, for Husserl, what determines our 
justification is, again, the non-conceptual content given through sensation and intuition. 
Through non-conceptual content, we are able to go back to things themselves, which 
furnishes us with the source of justification.  
In the first two phases of his study of consciousness, Husserl focuses more on the active 
use of reason and he does not explicitly address the question of genesis, namely, how various 
intentional acts arise. In the next two phases, genesis becomes central in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. As previously mentioned, Husserl differentiates two types of genesis, 
passive and active. The active use of reason always presupposes the passive synthesis of non-
conceptual content in intuition, sensation, and impression. As such, while it is true that we 
can only communicate with one another through concept and language, the possibility of 
communication presupposes a primordially constituted life-world. In the collective 
consciousness of the we, such a life-world in which an individual person’s life experience is 
embedded pertains to the non-conceptual content of the collective intending act. On the 
horizon of the primordially constituted life-world, each individual person can actively 
exercise reason to conceptualize and think. At this point, individuals are presented with two 
options. Either they embrace the natural attitude, further prioritizing conceptuality and 
misperceiving things in the world. Or they adopt the phenomenological attitude to have an 
intuition of the essence and go back to things themselves. As we will see in the next chapter, 
reflection on naturalism gradually motivates Husserl to put forward his version of 
transcendental idealism as a study of essence. The examination of consciousness at the 
descriptive level, therefore, provides a methodological approach for Husserl to inquire into 
the ultimate nature of reality. Thus far, we have explained how Husserl can contribute to non-
conceptualism. Not only does he argue for the role of non-conceptual content furnished by 
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intuition as the origin of knowledge and as the source of justification, but he also discovers 
how conceptuality always presupposes and needs the existence of non-conceptual content.  
4.3 Chinese Yogācārins’ Contribution to Non-Conceptualism  
Not very different from Husserl, Yogācārins likewise expand the meaning of non-
conceptuality.75 The move is signaled by Chinese Yogācārins when they impose the fourfold 
intentional structure on all consciousnesses and their mental factors, and when they highlight 
the existence of the eighth consciousness that passively functions to serve as the ground for 
conceptual thinking. To further explore their stance on non-conceptuality, let us turn to their 
doctrine of measuring (liang量, pramāṇa). 
The Yogācāra doctrine of measuring constitutes an integral part of Buddhist logic and 
epistemology (yinming因明, Hetuvidyā), which brings to light the straight principles (zhengli
正理, Nyāya) for knowing things as they actually are (T44N1840, P91c25-26).76 As 
previously mentioned, knowledge of seeing things as they truly are amounts to the wisdom of 
emptiness (T43N1830, P546a8). It is, therefore, fair to state that the Yogācāra investigation 
                                                        
75 We are likewise presented with a reading of Yogācāra philosophy as a non-conceptualist epistemology. 
Exponents of this reading highlight how phenomenal consciousness serves as the foundation of knowledge in 
the Yogācāra framework. In his appeal for naturalizing Buddhist epistemology, Coseru proclaims, “Buddhist 
epistemologist’s reliance on a version of empiricism and on certain widely shared canons of positive 
argumentation, seems to disqualify, at least in principle, any appeal to religious authority” (Coseru 2012, 57). In 
a recent paper, Bernard Faure reflects on this movement of naturalizing/demythologizing Buddhism, be it 
Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, or Yogācāra, and downplaying the devotional aspect of Buddhist traditions (Faure 
2017, 122). As Faure remarks, “in its Western context, Buddhism, with its alleged emphasis on consciousness, 
is often paired with phenomenology. Thus, when many philosophers (including Varela) argue for a 
naturalization of consciousness and phenomenology, it would seem just as natural to want to naturalize 
Buddhism. But this is not just a philosophical project, a mere matter of agreement or disagreement; it implies 
the destruction of real aspects of Buddhism” (Faure 2017, 124). Indeed, in the current secular age, it is 
obligatory for scholars to remain value neutral. Consequently, the Buddhist discussion of faith, soteriology, or 
religious practice shall be eschewed. Nonetheless, as Faure nicely puts, “what if consciousness was the problem, 
not the solution? Perhaps ordinary consciousness is precisely what Buddhism was trying to bracket” (Faure 
2017, 124). In the case of Yogācāra, the investigation of consciousness paves the way for them to account for 
how each individual is furnished with an open possibility between awakening and suffering. As such, to become 
awake from ignorance, a person not only needs to grasp true knowledge but also has to engage in religious 
training to habitualize this knowledge. This is how the Yogācāra epistemic inquiries are subservient to the 
religious goal of awakening the wisdom and compassion. This goal has to be kept in mind in our comparative 
study. Otherwise, as Faure comments, “when we focus exclusively on scholastic discourses like Abhidharma, 
we may be barking up the wrong tree” (Faure 2017, 125).  
76 Kuiji wrote, “正理者，諸法本真之體義。”  
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of knowledge is subservient to the goal of realizing the wisdom of emptiness and 
compassion.  
The literal meaning of this Chinese term liang (量) or pramāṇa in Sanskrit is measuring. 
Kuiji elaborates on the analogy of measuring in the following manner – whenever tailors use 
a tape to measure the cloth, they need three things: first, a tool that is capable of measuring, 
e.g. the tape; second, an object to be measured like the silk-cloth; and third, the result of 
measurement, e.g. the length of the cloth (T44N1840, P140b12-13).77  Measuring is 
analogical to our way of knowing. As previously mentioned, later Yogācārins, like 
Xuanzang, support the fourfold structure of consciousness, namely, the seeing part qua the 
act of intending, the image part qua the intended phenomenon, the underlying flow of self-
awareness, as well as the reflexive awareness of this underlying flow. In this fourfold 
structure, the seeing part undertakes the role of knowing, parallel to the tool of measuring; the 
image part is the object to be measured, similar to the cloth; and the underlying self-
awareness can be compared to the result of a measurement. The underlying self-awareness 
can also measure itself, the result of which is the reflexive awareness of self-awareness.  
Yogācārins further outline three types of measuring, in order to capture three modes of 
knowing as the three sources of knowledge. They are direct perception (xianliang 現量, 
pratyakṣapramāṇa), inference (biliang ⽐量, anumānapramāṇa), and erroneous knowledge 
(feiliang ⾮量).  
The first type is referred to as xianliang (現量), the literal meaning in Chinese being 
directly measuring or measuring what is presented before the eyes right here right now. 
Direct perception does not entail any nominal differentiation or conceptual differentiation78 
(T44N1840, P139a26). Modern Yogācāra scholar Lü Cheng (呂澂 1896-1989) interprets “the 
                                                        
77 Kuiji wrote, “如尺秤等，為能量；絹布等，為所量；記數之智，為量果。”  
78 Kuiji wrote, “離此名⾔分別。” 
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nominal (mingyan 名⾔)” as “the conceptual (gainiande 概念的)” (Lü 2007, 254). Therefore, 
the salient feature of this direct perception is how it is devoid of conceptualization and 
dichotomization. Among all types of consciousness, there are several that can directly 
measure their objects, among them, the first five senses, the sixth consciousness, and the 
eighth consciousness, laiye (T44N1840, P139b13; T43N1830, P320b16). This being said, the 
seeing parts of these consciousnesses can directly perceive their objective phenomena. 
Besides, in the fourfold structure of each consciousness, the underlying flow of self-
awareness and the reflexive awareness are also capable of directly perceiving.  
Given that direct perception is “apart from differentiation” and several consciousnesses 
that can directly perceive are still characterized by the fourfold structure in which the four 
parts are differentiated, can direct perception accommodate the fourfold structure? From 
Chinese Yogācārins’ commentary, it can be inferred that they are confronted with a similar 
set of questions, especially due to the fact that Buddhists from other schools do consider 
direct perception to be devoid of any intentional structure. Kuiji’s disciple, Huizhao, provides 
the following elaboration of “being separate from differentiation (lifenbie 離分別)” 
(T44N1840, P139a24-b11):  
論：離名種等，所有分別。 述⽈：此所離也。謂，有於前⾊等境上，雖無映障，若有名種等，諸
⾨分別，亦⾮現量。故須離此名⾔分別，種類分別，等取諸⾨分別。故理⾨論云：遠離⼀切種
類、名⾔、假⽴，無異諸⾨分別。⾔種類者，即勝論師⼤有同異，及數論師所⽴三德等。名⾔，
即⽬短為⾧等，皆⾮稱實，名為假⽴...故須離此所有分別，⽅為現量。若⼀往唯⾔無⼆或三所有分
別，有太寬失。 
 
The Nyāyapraveśa said, direct perception is separate from all differentiations, such as those of names and 
categories.  
Huizhao: This verse clarifies what counts as “being separate [from differentiation]”, by which we mean 
that when [intending] a wide range of objects, such as the form, though there is no illusion or hallucination, 
the [intentional] act is still not directly perceiving if the [intentional] content entails differentiation, such as 
those of names and categories. Thereby, direct perception shall be devoid of these differentiations. By 
categories, we mean those such as the Vaiśeṣika concepts of generality and particularity, or the Samkhya 
theory of three guṇas. By names, we mean those like “seeing the short but perceiving as long”; that is, 
names that are designated yet unable to correspond with what is really presented… Thereby, only when an 
intending act is separate from all differentiations, can it can be referred to as direct perception. If we 
conceive of direct perception as that without any two or three different parts, then the definition becomes 
too broad to be true.  
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In this passage, Huizhao describes how direct perception does not reject the intentional 
correlation between the seeing and the image parts. What it negates are abstract concepts, 
namely, concepts in the very first sense listed in section 1 and exemplified by categories and 
empty names. As such, direct perception is intentional and immediate. This is how Chinese 
Yogācārins implicitly provide an account of non-conceptual content as that which presents an 
objective image directly to the mind without any mediation or inference by abstract concepts. 
If direct perception does not involve conceptual thinking, it can be categorized as, in modern 
terms, non-conceptual content. It is a direct knowledge of that which appears in front of us. 
The first five senses generate sensations of various aspects of a phenomenon on the basis of 
which the sixth consciousness processes these sensations to give rise to a synthesized image. 
The perception of the sixth consciousness, in this case, resembles what Husserl refers to as a 
categorial intuition, which founds itself on simple acts of presenting in sensations. Indeed, the 
sixth consciousness can function without the five senses but such knowing is no longer direct 
measuring. The eighth consciousness, laiye, passively constitutes the image of the object as-
a-whole, similar to what Husserl calls apperception. Then, whenever consciousnesses or 
mental factors begin their function, we are self-aware of such. This self-awareness is also 
direct perception. From how the first five consciousnesses and laiye are characterized by their 
capacity to directly perceive, it can be inferred that Chinese Yogācārins acknowledge the 
existence of non-conceptual content in consciousness.  
When the sixth consciousness works without the data delivered from the five senses, it is 
exercising its capacity of producing a general idea (gongxiang 共相) of various distinct 
phenomena. Knowledge of general ideas gives rise to biliang (⽐量) or inference. For 
instance, biliang is always exercised during our study of analytic geometry, in the case of 
which we can analyze spatial relations through the Cartesian coordinate system. Inferring is 
premised on reasoning, which enables us to acquire knowledge first through comparing direct 
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perceptions and then through abstracting a general image from these perceptions. Among the 
eight consciousnesses, the sixth consciousness is capable of both directly perceiving and 
reasoning. For instance, whenever we see smoke, we know there is fire; this is because “we 
have learnt from our previous experiences that when there is smoke, there is fire”79 
(T44N1840, P140a9). The way in which we infer fire from smoke entails the pure function of 
inferring. In this case, the inference is grounded in perception. Nonetheless, it is also quite 
often the case that inferring can set its premise on previous inferences. Kuiji illustrates this 
type of inference through the way in which we comprehend impermanence from the 
transformation of consciousness (T44N1840, P140a5). As detailed by Kuiji, we can never 
directly perceive the quality of impermanence but can only “infer its existence from various 
events [that arise and perish] through the course of our life experience”80 (T44N1840, 
P140a8). Articulated in this way, inference suggests the existence of conceptual content in 
consciousness.  
Aside from direct perception and indirect inference, Yogācārins discern a third type of 
knowing qua erroneous knowledge. Fallacies can stem from both inference and perception. 
As Kuiji explains, when someone sees smoke and infers fire, this person could be wrong, 
because smoke might turn out to be a mist rising over a waterfall (T44N1840, P141b22). This 
example illustrates the problem of fallacious inference. Erroneous perception is quite 
different. In our previous discussion, we encountered one exemplar of such erroneous 
perception, namely, that of mona. This seventh consciousness, mona, passively constitutes 
the primordial sense of selfhood, further misperceiving the seeing part of the eighth 
consciousness laiye as a permanent self-in-itself. The function of mona represents the 
erroneous type of direct perception, insofar as the direct perception of mona becomes 
                                                        
79 Kuiji wrote, “憶本先知，所有煙處，必定有⽕。” 
80 Kuiji wrote, “了無常等，從所作等，⽐量因⽣。” 
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conflated with the habitual concept of selfhood. As Lü Cheng unpacks, we can only infer the 
general idea of red from a concrete red object; however, it is never possible for us to directly 
perceive the concept of red (Lü 2007, 258).  
Having clarified three modes of knowing, let us inquire into the ground for knowledge. 
As we have deduced in Chapter 3, the eighth consciousness, laiye, transforms itself to give 
rise to the overall image of an object, whereas the first five consciousnesses perceive various 
aspects of this objective image. On the basis of the five senses, the sixth consciousness arises 
to integrate data from these senses and further to produce general concepts by comparing one 
objective image with another. Considering the way in which the sixth consciousness 
exercises its capacity of inferring on the basis of direct perception, we can argue that direct 
perception serves as the ground for indirect inference.  
It follows a fortiori that we always need to go back to direct perception at one specific 
moment to eliminate fallacy in our cognition and to justify our knowledge. Kuiji details this 
justification through the rope-snake analogy (T45N1861, P259a15-16): 
於繩起蛇覺，⾒繩了義無。證⾒彼分時，知如蛇智亂。 
Imagine that one misperceives the rope as a snake. Upon seeing the rope as it really is, this person knows 
the snake does not exist. Further realizing the seeing act of perceiving, this person comes to know how the 
misperception of the snake and the perception of the rope arise in the same manner [through the 
transformation of consciousness]. 
 
That being said, when walking in the dark, someone might mistake the rope on the road for a 
snake. The misperception could further elicit feelings of discomfort, fear, and worry. One 
might even scream out loud or faint, upon believing that s/he is seeing a poisonous snake. 
The fallacy emerges when the sixth consciousness, in the process of inferring, commits errors 
of false inference, which further provokes fear and anxiety that makes a person suffer. 
Articulated as such, a fallacy is not only an epistemic issue, but also an existential one. For 
Yogācārins, two factors make it possible to enlighten someone from misperception: first, 
various types of consciousness are self-aware of their functioning; second, previous 
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perceptions can be recollected in virtue of the incessant transformation of the eighth 
consciousness. Therefore, first by contrasting the perceived phenomenon qua the rope with 
the phenomenon in the belief qua the snake, one comes to recognize the fallacy. Furthermore, 
through recollecting, one will understand how the incessant transformation of the eighth 
consciousness gives rise to the possibility of seeing the rope as it really is and misperceiving 
the rope as a snake.  As such, Kuiji remarks that the misperception of the snake and the 
perception of the rope arise in the same manner, viz. through the transformation of 
consciousness. Non-conceptual content exemplified by the direct perception of the eighth 
consciousness laiye and of the self-awareness (zhengzizhengfen 證⾃證分) constitutes the 
ground for the justification of knowledge. The justified knowledge, namely, direct and 
correct cognition subsequently evolves into wisdom (zhi智).  
Hereby, for Yogācārins, direct perception serves as the origin of knowledge and as the 
source of justification. This is how Xuanzang and Kuiji can contribute to non-conceptualism. 
Subsequently, as demonstrated by Kuiji, this epistemological account soon paves the way for 
inquiries of metaphysics and ethics in the Yogācāra system. Let us return to the rope-snake 
analogy. After seeing the rope as it is, a sentient being will continue to learn that a 
phenomenon, either as a rope-phenomenon or as a snake-phenomenon, appears in the mind in 
virtue of the transformation of consciousness. Thus, things in the cosmos, instead of being sui 
generis, self-determining, and immutable, depend on consciousness to arise and perish in 
sentient beings’ experience. Once realizing this interdependence of the mind and world, and 
of the self and others, sentient beings come to acquire wisdom, namely, the direct and correct 
knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. It becomes obligatory for sentient beings to 
engage in systematic religious training if they intend to remove misperception and ignorance, 
to open their eyes to how things actually are, and therefore to realize wisdom (zhi智). As 
 121 
 
 
such, epistemic inquiries are subservient to the realization of emptiness and compassion in 
the Yogācāra framework.  
It is worth noticing that, for Chinese Yogācārins like Xuanzang and Kuiji, awakening 
from misperception and realizing the ultimate non-dualistic wisdom (wufenbiezhi 無分別智, 
nirvikalpakajñāna) does not yield a mystical experience. Xuanzang describes this wisdom as 
that which “has the seeing part but does not have the image part (⾒有相無) (T31N1585, 
P49c28). Xuanzang continues to explain that the non-dualistic wisdom does not have the 
image part in the sense that it allows the sentient being to see the image as mutually arising 
and self-interdependent (帶如相起不離), rather than to misperceive this image as svabhāvic 
and self-irrelevant (T31N1585, P50a1). From Xuanzang’s description, it can be inferred that 
awakening in a Buddhist sense is not a mystic experience that dissolves all distinctions, but 
rather, is a process of realizing ultimate reality through becoming one with the transformation 
of consciousness.  
In our previous analysis, we have explained how Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins 
contribute to non-conceptualism first by expanding the meaning of non-conceptuality and 
then by affirming the role of non-conceptual content as the origin of knowledge and as the 
source of justification. Through defining intentionality as the mutual constitution of intending 
act with its intended phenomenon and the underlying ego, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins 
contend that non-conceptual content of a mental act is both immediate and intentional. Their 
shared insight with respect to non-conceptuality is that they discern the mutual constitution 
and, thereby, interdependence of the subject and object, of the mind and world, and of the 
self and others; an insight that reveals their explanation of the ultimate nature of reality. 
Aside from these compatible views, Chinese Yogācārins do not provide an account of 
intentionality that is identical to that in Husserl’s phenomenology. As previously mentioned, 
Chinese Yogācārins enquire into mental states, such as pre-death experience and associate 
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mental states with their moral consequences. Upon applying intentionality to these extreme 
mental states and pairing intentionality with morality, Chinese Yogācārins proceed to argue 
that the acquisition of non-dualistic wisdom is a long process throughout countless rounds of 
rebirth. In this process, sentient beings conduct religious training and moral actions to 
eventually become one with the transformation of consciousness. While Husserls lays the 
foundation for the prescriptive level in his phenomenology, Chinese Yogācārins provide a 
more elaborative theory for moral actions and religious practice, which we will explore in the 
last part of this dissertation. If the shared insight of non-conceptuality reveals Husserl and 
Chinese Yogācārins’ explanation of the ultimate nature of reality, we can move on from the 
descriptive level to the explicative level.  
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Part Two: The Tracks Diverge – The Problem of Essence at the Explicative Level of 
Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology and Chinese Yogācāra Philosophy  
 
Wir folgen unserem allgemeinen Prinzip,  
dass jedes individuelle Vorkommnis sein Wesen hat,  
das in eidetischer Reinheit fassbar ist.  
[We follow our universal principle  
that every individual event has its essence,  
which can be seized upon in eidetic purity.]  
(Hua 3/60)  
 
世間聖教，說有我法。 
但由假⽴，⾮實有性。 
[The noble teachings in the world  
speak of the existent self and dharma,  
only as fictitiously real,  
not as ultimately real as svabhāva.] 
(T31N1585, P1a23-24) 
 
 
 
The preceding part examined the descriptions of the intentional character of consciousness 
provided by Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins. Through their descriptions, they have depicted 
how intentional consciousness is the consciousness of something  for someone. Employing 
the notion of intentionality, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins then outline the origin of 
knowledge. In their investigation of knowledge of the self and of other minds, both Husserl 
and Chinese Yogācārins are confident that, in virtue of intentionality at different levels of 
mental acts, we can go back to things themselves and perceive them as they actually are. 
Now, what is the ultimate nature of things that appear as they actually are in our mind? Are 
they mind-independent realities that come to existence on their own? Or are they nothing but 
mental productions? If the latter is true, would it make the mind another sui generis entity 
invariant across time and space?  
For both Husserl and Yogācārins, as their answers to these questions unfold, they move 
on from the descriptive level to the explicative level. Prior to our examination, it is necessary 
to clarify further the meaning of “explicative” – a notion that remains central to this part of 
the dissertation. We have briefly defined this concept in the introductory chapter: what is 
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“explicative” entails an elaboration of the ultimate nature of various things, including 
consciousness. The meaning of “explicative” can be further delineated in the following 
manner:  
1. An explicative study of consciousness is first and foremost a clarification of what and 
how things actually are; that is, an elucidation of the status of reality.  
 
2. This elucidation does not presuppose any modes of existence of reality but, rather, 
problematizes all our current assumptions and presumptions of existence and being 
for the purpose of revealing the mutual-dependence of things in the world.  
 
3. An elaboration of what and how things actually are prepares one for further enquires 
on death, rebirth, liberation, and agency.  
 
As previously mentioned in Part 1, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins strive to demonstrate 
how ideality and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, the mind and world, the self and others, 
mutually constitute each other at the descriptive level. Through their efforts to close the rift 
between these polarities, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins come to explain the ultimate nature 
of things through a worldview that can be termed transcendental idealism at the explicative 
level of their investigations of consciousness.  
I evoke the term “explicative” to replace the more widely used notion of “metaphysics”, 
partly because many scholars of Chinese Buddhism doubt whether we can directly transport 
these western philosophical terms into Buddhism, considering how conceptions such as 
“ontology” or “metaphysics” usually imply a substantial existence invariant in time and 
independent of others, which can contradict the Buddha’s teaching of emptiness (Xia 2002, 
133-139; Fu 2002, 15-27). I use the term also because the concept of metaphysics has a rich 
nuance in Western philosophy.81 Even inside Husserlian scholarship, scholars are still 
                                                        
81 In his book Husserl’s Legacy, Zahavi outlines the five different senses of the concept of “metaphysics” 
(Zahavi 2017, 66): 
1 Metaphysics is a speculatively constructed philosophical system dealing with the ‘highest’ and ‘ultimate’ 
questions concerning the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, etc. 
2 Metaphysics is an attempt to answer the perennial questions concerning the meaning of factual human life. 
3 Metaphysics is concerned with an answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. 
4 Metaphysics is a theoretical investigation of the fundamental building blocks, the basic ‘stuff’, of reality. 
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debating Husserl’s stance on metaphysics. Some have argued that phenomenology is not 
metaphysical but epistemological, because Husserl suspends metaphysical discussions for the 
purpose of making phenomenology the rigorous study of knowledge (Carr 1999, 134; Hopp 
2011, 3). Others, like Dan Zahavi, appeal to rethinking what Husserl means by metaphysics. 
As unpacked by Zahavi, Husserl proposes a metaphysics in a new sense: the new version can 
go beyond the traditional polarity of ideality and reality (Zahavi 2017, 206). Due to the 
ambiguities surrounding the term “metaphysics” in both Yogācāra Buddhism and Husserlian 
phenomenology, I instead use the term “explicative” to capture the “metaphysics in a new 
sense” envisioned by Husserl (Hua 7/188), and to characterize the Yogācāra theory of three 
natures. 
In his explication of what and how things actually are, Husserl contends that 
phenomenology centers on the ideation of a factually existent object, not factuality per se 
(Hua 3/6). To describe an object as “what it actually is” does not entail describing the 
object’s factual existence, but rather refers to the ideal a priori, namely, the essence of the 
object. He, thus, defines phenomenology as “a science of essence (wesenwissenschaft)” (Hua 
3/6), its major theme being the essence of consciousness (Hua 3/60). Conversely, through 
their investigation of consciousness, Yogācārins argue that everything in the cosmos – be it 
the self of sentient beings or other objects qua dharmas – are empty of essence (svabhāva) 
(T31N1585, P1a23-24). At least on the surface, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins endorse 
different, or even disparate stances towards essence. This is where we are presented with the 
divergence of their paths and the difference of their wheel tracks at the explicative level of 
their investigations.  
                                                        
5 Metaphysics is a fundamental reflection on and concern with the status and being of reality. Is reality mind-
dependent or not, and if yes, in what manner? 
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In the second part of this dissertation, I unveil and unravel the problem of essence. The 
first question I address is: what exactly does the term “essence” mean in the writings of 
Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins? At this point, translation adds another layer of complexity 
to the question, insofar as both Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins have never directly used the 
English term “essence”, yet the concept of essence has been evoked to translate a wide range 
of terms of disparate origins in phenomenology and in Chinese philosophy. Due to these 
factors, I maintain that a closer examination of the concept of essence’s rich nuances – an 
examination that includes how the term has been translated and applied in cross-cultural and 
multilingual contexts – is required. Such an examination will ultimately determine whether it 
is even possible to embark on a comparative project that groups phenomenology and 
Yogācāra under the same umbrella.  
Unlike the first part of this dissertation, which focuses on the convergence and 
compatibility of the two intellectual traditions, the second part targets their perceived 
divergences and differences. In this part, I argue that a comparative project is possible, 
because Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins do not use the term “essence” to refer to the same 
concept. Since they are not speaking of the same thing when the term appears in their 
writings, they do not, in fact, contradict one another. To support my argument, I begin by 
investigating whether or not Husserl’s conception of essence entails any svabhāvic quality in 
Chapter 5. I contend that, because Husserl keeps enriching and expanding the notion of 
essence in different phases of his philosophical thinking, the Husserlian essence is not 
svabhāvic. In Chapter 6, I examine whether the Yogācāra articulation of three natures is 
compatible with transcendental idealism. I suggest that it is compatible, since the negation of 
svabhāva is not an endorsement of nihilism; rather the negation of svabhāva affirms the 
interdependence of ideality and reality, which can be further interpreted as a form of 
transcendental idealism. Having clarified that what Husserl means by essence is different 
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from what Chinese Yogācārins mean by svabhāva, I demonstrate how the problem of essence 
does not undermine the current comparative project.  
Although the problem of essence is not an obstacle for the present study, this does not 
mean that it is irrelevant. Investigating this problem, rather, brings to the forefront a number 
of important implications for a comparative study of philosophical traditions in a 
multicultural and multilingual context. These implications are examined in Chapter 7. It is 
necessary to consider not only the linguistic and cultural heritage of the traditions being 
compared, but also the language and culture into which these traditions are translated. As the 
investigation into the problem of essence reveals, one English term can be summoned to 
translate several different notions from non-English languages. Accordingly, the nuance of 
the English term changes in a multicultural society.  
Eventually, as conveyed by the last sense of being “explicative”, the second part of this 
dissertation invites us to reconsider what “essence” really means and how it is used in a 
multilingual context, to rethink our assumptions about existence and non-existence, and 
thereafter to reflect on what notions we have internalized as norms and values that motivate 
our actions at the prescriptive level.  
 
Chapter 5: Essence in Husserl’s Phenomenology  
 
In this chapter, I enquire into how Husserl defines the concept of essence; that is, what 
defines an object as it actually is. With the help of the concept of essence, Husserl is able to 
reflect on how naturalism jeopardizes the worldview of modern Europeans. Regarding the 
question of what things actually are, naturalists in Husserl’s time provided the following 
answer: things in the world are nothing but factually existent realities that are pre-given and 
independent of the mind (Hua 3/53). As previously explained in Chapter 2, naturalists 
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interpret one’s knowledge of an object as that which one could acquire through directly given 
presentation of this very object. If this object can be represented to the mind and serve as the 
cause of knowledge, then it must have an existence on its own. Naturalists, be it physical 
naturalists or psychologists, construe essence as factuality, further reducing the mind and the 
world into contingent realities (Hua 3/8; 6/68). Husserl maintains that naturalism, in its 
negligence of the mutual constitution of the mind and its surroundings, can undermine the 
foundation of knowledge and ruin a meaningful life (Husserl 6/4; 18/68). As per Husserl, 
phenomenology explains why the ultimate nature of things is much more than factuality. 
Thereby, phenomenology becomes a science of essence that guides philosophers and 
scientists back to things themselves to see how and what they actually are (Hua 19/744; Hua 
3/3). In other words, an essence is not matters of fact (Hua 3/4), nor a “mystical metaphysical 
core”; rather, an essence is the ideation that is “accessible to the inquiring” (Hua 6/217). 
Considering the descriptions above, how shall one understand Husserl’s notion of 
essence and its contribution to the development of his philosophical thinking? As recently 
explained by Dan Zahavi, upon reformulating phenomenology as the science of essence, 
Husserl proposes a metaphysics in a new sense. This new metaphysics problematizes the 
presumed polarity of reality and ideality, of subjectivity and objectivity, and of the empirical 
and the transcendental for the purpose of revealing their interdependence and 
interconnectedness (Zahavi 2017, 206). In unpacking the new version of metaphysics as well 
as explaining the role of essence therein, the current chapter follows the outline of Chapter 2 
to trace Husserl’s conception of essence in four phases, through which it becomes clear why 
essence is crucial for transcendental phenomenology and transcendental idealism in every 
phase of Husserl’s philosophical thinking: 
1. In the first phase of Husserl’s philosophical thinking, essence (wesen) is the ideal 
union of the matter and quality of intending acts. Regarding the different modes of 
intending acts, essence (wesen) can be further differentiated into three categories: 
intentional, semantic, and epistemic. Furthermore, essence (wesen) is demarcated 
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from essentia (essenz): while essentia is ascribed to the matter of intuitive acts, 
essence is articulated to capture the unity of both the matter and form of all intending 
acts. The notion of essence allows Husserl to inquire into the authenticity of thinking 
and to problematize Brentanian psychologism.  
 
2. In the second phase, Husserl takes a transcendental turn and reformulates his notion of 
intentionality as the noesis-noema correlation. The pure essence qua eidos becomes 
an ideal union of noesis and noema that is encapsulated in the structure of 
intentionality. Unlike the naturalistic essence that is a sui generis, general abstraction 
of matters of fact, eidos indicates the mutual constitution of noesis and noema. The 
notion of eidos enables Husserl to articulate phenomenology as transcendental 
idealism, in contrast to the transcendental realism intrinsic to naturalism. 
 
3. In the last two phases of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, the pure essence (eidos) of 
each ego becomes a twofold a priori of being in the world and being with others. That 
being said, what defines a person as such consists in his or her interactions with things 
in the world and with others in a community. Defining essence in this manner, Husserl 
enriches his doctrine of transcendental idealism as a correlative dualism of the mind 
and world, of subjectivity and objectivity, and of the self and others. This new version 
of idealism is a reflection of and a remedy to the crisis of meaning in modern Europe.  
 
These three stages demonstrate the way in which Husserl refashions and revises the notion of 
essence in accordance with the development of his philosophical thinking. By pinpointing 
four characters of the Husserlian conception of essence (universality; constructability; 
ideality; objectivity), I argue for understanding essence as the ideal union of noesis and 
noema, which undergirds the structure of intentionality at different levels in pure 
consciousness. As to be seen shortly, Husserl’s conception of essence does not entail any 
svabhāvic quality. Through this analysis, I also explain how essence is transformed from a 
core concept in epistemology and pure logic to a notion in the renewed metaphysics called 
transcendental idealism, a transition that corresponds to Husserl’s reflection on the thriving 
naturalism in modern Europe.  
5.1 Essence in Early Husserl  
In his pre-transcendental period, Husserl perceives an essence (wesen) as that which defines 
objects in our experience as what they actually are. As the opposite of a factually existent 
reality, wesen in the first phase of Husserl’s philosophical thinking is the ideal union of the 
quality and content, or the form and matter, of intending acts at different levels (Hua 19/417). 
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That being said, wesen is encapsulated in, though not equated with, the intentional structure 
of mental acts. Just as intentionality penetrates mental acts at different levels, essence (wesen) 
also has many layers. With the help of the concept of essence (wesen), Husserl reflects on 
psychologism, explaining how knowledge is not governed by laws that are derived from 
physical or psychological matters of fact but is rather secured by the ideal principles of 
founding, fulfilling and identification.  
The concept of essence (wesen) enters the philosophical discussion of Logical 
Investigations, when Husserl explains how the content of a mental act is a new type of 
product, not merely a repetition of external objects. Husserl starts his explication with the 
simple intuitive act of presenting, gradually moving on to the abstract symbolic act of 
judging. To illustrate this point, he poses a question much like the following: how do Cindy 
and Sandy know that they are perceiving the same object, regardless of the fact that Cindy 
and Sandy are different individuals? According to Husserl, psychologists, such as Brentano, 
propose to attest this cognitive identity through inferring the sameness of the perceived object 
from “empirical contingencies of the course of consciousness” (Hua 19/704). Husserl regards 
this answer as untenable insofar as psychologism ignores the distinction between real and 
ideal (Hua 18/68). Indeed, when Cindy and Sandy are perceiving the same object or even 
when Cindy herself is perceiving the object from different perspectives, what are factually 
presented in the intentional acts are never perfectly alike, but rather share an ideal sameness 
based on the interpretative sense of the object (Hua 19/418). The ideation of the real object 
that is presented through the intentional structure of a mental act is the object’s essence 
(wesen). In Husserl’s terms, “in our essence, we really have the same presentation despite 
other phenomenological differences” (Hua 19/418). If a simple act of presenting can give rise 
to more compounded acts, the essence of these intentional acts can be further differentiated 
into two types.  
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In our previous investigation of intentionality, we depicted the way in which sensuous 
intuition serves as the ground for categorial intuition and then for more abstract meaning-
intention. To encompass this wide range of acts, Husserl differentiates two types of essence: 
one for intentional acts whose content is either presented or fulfilled, and the other for 
intentional acts whose content has yet to be fulfilled by intuitive matter. Husserl refers to 
them respectively as the intentional essence (intentionale wesen) and the semantic essence 
(bedeutungsmäßigen wesen)82 (Hua 19/417):  
Insofar as quality and matter now count for us (as will be shown later) as the wholly essential, and so 
never to be dispensed with, constituents of an act, it would be suitable to call the union of both, forming 
one part of the complete act, the act’s intentional essence. To pin down this term, and the conception of 
matter it goes with, we simultaneously introduce a second term. To the extent that we deal with acts, 
functioning in expressions in sense-giving fashion, or capable of so functioning – whether all acts are so 
capable must be considered later, we shall speak more specifically of the semantic essence of the act. The 
ideational abstraction of this essence yields a “meaning” in our ideal sense.83 
 
Husserl speaks of intentional essence as the “union of both [quality and matter]” of mental 
acts. For intuitive acts, either the sensuous or the categorial ones in which an object is 
presented directly, their intentional essence always entails a fullness of presentation. As put 
by Husserl himself, “the intuitive[…] has the character of being the fulfiller, and so also, in 
the most authentic sense, the giver of fullness” (Hua 19/583). Non-intuitive intentional acts, 
otherwise known as symbolic acts, have semantic essence. Symbolic acts come to acquire 
intentional essence only when their content is fulfilled by intuitive matters (Hua 19/603). To 
put it differently, “the fulfilling sense is interpreted as the intentional essence of the 
completely and adequately fulfilling act” (Hua 19/603). Considering how the content of 
                                                        
82 Kersten translates the two essences differently in Ideas I as “intuitive and cognitional essences” (Hua 3/196). 
83 The English translation is based on J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 122-123). The original German version is as 
follows 
„Sofern uns nun (wie wir hören werden) Qualität und Materie als die durchaus wesentlichen und daher nie zu 
entbehrenden Bestandstücke eines Aktes gelten müssen, würde es passend sein, die Einheit beider, die nur einen 
Teil des vollen Aktes ausmacht, als das intentionale Wesen des Aktes zu bezeichnen. Indem wir diesen 
Terminus und die ihm zugehörige Auffassung der Sachlage festzuhalten gedenken, führen wir zugleich einen 
zweiten Terminus ein. Soweit es sich nämlich um Akte handelt, die als bedeutungverleihende Akte bei 
Ausdrücken fungieren oder fungieren könnten – ob dies alle können, werden wir späterhin zu erforschen haben 
– soll spezieller von dem bedeutungsmäßigen Wesen des Aktes gesprochen werden. Seine ideierende 
Abstraktion ergibt die Bedeutung in unserem idealen Sinn.“  
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abstract symbolic acts is not always fully fulfilled, Husserl articulates the term “epistemic 
essence” (erkenntnismäßiges wesen) to encompass the ideal union of matter and form of all 
intentional acts regardless of the fullness of their content (Hua 19/604).  
As such, intentional, epistemic, and semantic essences capture different modes of mental 
acts. For instance, when Cindy is perceiving the tree in the foyer of the Birks building, her 
perception has an intentional essence insofar as the content of the mental act of perceiving is 
directly presented. Afterwards, Cindy goes back to her office in the basement and talks to her 
colleague, Shaun, about the tree she just saw. In the conversation, Cindy refers to the tree 
through formulating a concept of it. The content of her act of thinking is fulfilled by the 
matter of her previous perception. In this sense, her thought of the tree is meaningful and the 
act of thinking likewise has an intentional essence. Upon hearing Cindy’s description, Shaun 
is curious about the tree and starts to think about what the tree looks like. For Shaun, his act 
of thinking has only a semantic essence insofar as the content of his thought remains to be 
fulfilled. If Shaun goes upstairs to the foyer, his thought then acquires its meaning when the 
content is fulfilled by his perception of the tree. At that point, his act of thinking regains the 
intentional essence. Regardless of whether he goes upstairs to perceive the tree or not, 
Shaun’s act of thinking has an epistemic essence. Notably, Shaun’s perception of the tree is 
not exactly the same as that of Cindy – it is possible that Cindy is short-sighted and the 
appearance of the tree in her perception is less perfect than that in Shaun’s; it can also happen 
that it turns dark outside when Shaun walks upstairs, so he sees the tree in the shade while 
Cindy saw the tree in the light. Despite these phenomenological differences, Cindy and 
Shaun are perceiving the same tree due to the intentional essence. That is why essence 
(wesen) does not consist in factuality but rather in ideality.  
In addition to intentional, epistemic, and semantic essences, Husserl also borrows the 
scholastic term essentia (essenz) to describe the same matter held by two intuitive acts (Hua 
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19/609). As such, essentia becomes the ideation of matter, of that which is already presented 
in individual intuitions. It should be noted that, while Husserl ascribes essenz particularly to 
the matter of intuitive acts, wesen is articulated to capture the union of quality and content of 
all intending acts, including the intuitive and symbolic ones.  
The concept of essence (wesen) performs a twofold function in Husserl’s early writings 
on phenomenology: first, it assists him in explaining the authenticity of thinking; second, it 
allows him to elucidate the ideality of laws of thinking and knowledge, which marks a 
prelude to his version of transcendental idealism.  
To begin with, the authentic type of thinking leaves the real essence of intentional acts 
untouched (Hua 19/695). For instance, when Shaun is thinking about the tree in the foyer of 
the Birks building after his conversation with Cindy, his act of thinking is inauthentic insofar 
as the intentional essence is missing. Only when Shaun observes the tree, his thought 
becomes meaningful and his act of thinking becomes authentic.  
In Logical Investigations, Husserl provides a broader idea of “thinking”: if a mental act 
is founded upon others and has synthetic or categorial features, this mental act becomes that 
of thinking. Considering how categorial intuitions are founded on simple acts of sensuous 
intuiting and enable someone to “see” a state of affairs, these categorially intuitive acts 
become the intuitive acts of thinking (Hua 19/693). For instance, categorial intuitions allow 
Cindy to perceive the cat sleeping on the sofa. This whole state of affairs can further serve as 
the content of her abstract concepts. Due to the way in which a categorial intuition can 
always fulfill its content with intuitive matters, its intentional essence remains unshaped, 
which makes categorial intuitions the authentic type of thinking. As proclaimed by Husserl, 
“a ‘categorial intuition’, an intellectual insight, a case of thought in the highest sense, without 
any foundation of sense, is a piece of nonsense” (Hua 19/700). For Husserl, the act of 
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thinking becomes authentic when its content is fulfilled and its intentional essence is 
undistorted (Hua 19/693). 
For symbolic and semantic acts that sometimes lack an intentional essence, they run the 
risk of generating inauthentic thinking (Hua 19/702). If a symbolic act, such as the act of 
judging, does not have its content fulfilled, then this act has no real intentional essence and 
thereby yields an inauthentic type of thinking. As further unpacked by Husserl, “the concept 
of judging would then be pinned down by the element common to statement-intention and 
statement-fulfillment, i.e. by the intentional essence compounded of quality and intentional 
material” (Hua 19/703). Indeed, authenticity is no longer just about whether an object is 
straightforwardly given but rather consists in the unshaped intentional essence that appears 
when the content of intentional acts is fulfilled.  
Let us unpack this distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic types of thinking 
through the example of Cindy’s perceiving the state of affairs qua the cat on the sofa. Cindy’s 
perception of “the cat on the sofa” is a categorial intuition insofar as it is a perception of a 
state of affairs founded on several sensuous perceptions of the “cat” and the “sofa”. When 
Cindy sees her cat on the sofa, her eyes fall on the cat. On the periphery of her perception is 
the fuzzy background qua the sofa. Categorial intuitions could foreground the cat against the 
backdrop of the sofa, although they can never wipe that sofa off her perception for good. 
Abstracting or categorial forming, thus, is not widely free but delimited by its content. In 
Husserl’s terms, “great, however, as this freedom of categorial union and formation may be, 
it still has its law-governed limits” (Hua 19/695). As creative as such, categorial intuition is 
constrained by the intentional essence, namely, the ideal union of the quality and the fulfilled 
content. Symbolic thinking, however, is quite different. When Cindy is entertaining the 
concept of cat, she can relate to a theory of feline behaviors, easily removing irrelevant 
representations from her mind, such as the sofa or the window. Symbolic thinking becomes 
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the indirect way of forming, further remote to sensory manifolds and, thus, less delimited by 
sensations. Although this means that symbolic thinking becomes very powerful in creating 
linguistic expressions, symbols, and theories, it also risks creating empty concepts that can 
never fulfill their meaning and, consequently, never have the intentional essence for which 
“the objective possibility of its correlate is not guaranteed” (Hua 19/ 704). For instance, 
Cindy could formulate a statement, such as “some cats speak human language” by 
associating symbols such as “cats” and “human language”, although she never encounters 
any cat who can talk. In this case, Cindy’s statement does not have its meaning fulfilled. Such 
a statement exemplifies the way in which symbolic thinking lacks the intentional essence and 
becomes inauthentic. 
Considering how symbolic thinking requires categorial intuition to fulfill its meaning, 
Husserl remarks that “the a priori law of authentic thinking and authentic expression become 
norms for merely opinion-forming, inauthentic thought and expression” (Hua 19/707). The 
law of authentic thinking consists in the existence of an intentional essence, which 
demonstrates how the principles of founding (for the form of intentional acts), identifying 
(for the matter of the acts), and fulfilling (for the synthesis of the matter and form) work 
together to produce knowledge. As such, the law of thinking is not based on psychological, 
contingent realities but rather finds its ground in ideality. Husserl’s purpose for 
differentiating authentic thinking qua categorial intuition from the inauthentic one can now 
be seen: any instance of symbolic thinking finds its ground in and secures its objectivity by 
intuitive thinking, not vice versa.  
This is how objectivity is conveyed in Husserl’s early writings: it is characterized by the 
impossibility of reshaping the intentional essence. In sensory intuition, the content of the act 
is directly given without any modification, and the intentional essence is always presented. 
Founded on multiple simple acts of sensation, categorial intuition does not entail any 
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significant reshaping of the intentional essence, although it can rearrange presented matters in 
the state of affairs (Hua 19/700). Husserl further distances himself from Brentanian 
psychologism by making objectivity and authenticity of knowledge contingent on the essence 
of intentional acts, rather than on matters of fact. Different from psychologism, which entails 
epistemological realism, Husserl highlights the ideality of knowing and thinking. In his pre-
transcendental period, Husserl focusses more on his refutation of psychologism. He does not 
clarify the antidote to psychologism, although he implies it by contrasting the psychologically 
real with the purely ideal (Hua 19/704-705). After his transcendental turn, Husserl makes 
explicit this antidote qua transcendental idealism. Therefore, it is fair to say that Husserl’s 
reflection on psychologism gradually nourishes the mature form of essence and 
transcendental phenomenology. 
5.2 Essence after the Transcendental Turn  
After his transcendental turn, Husserl continues to conceive of essence as that which defines 
what and how things actually are, although essence becomes rearticulated as the ideal union 
of noesis and noema in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
the transcendental turn is marked by the release of his Ideas I in which Husserl expands his 
critique and employs the term “naturalism” to include both psychologism and physicalism.  
Ideas I begins with Husserl’s slogan that phenomenology is the “science of essence” 
(wesenwissenschaft), not the study of factually existent matters of fact, called naturalism 
(Hua 3/4). Opposing phenomenology with naturalism, Husserl continues to lay out a series of 
“contrasting pairs”: essence versus matters of fact, a priori versus contingent occurrence, 
irreal versus real, and transcendental versus empirical (Hua 3/4-5). As such, an essence is 
associated with several attributes, such as a priori, ideality, and transcendentality. To 
delineate the pure essence from any factuality, Husserl evokes the Greek term “eidos” in 
place of the German term “wesen” (Hua 3/6). He defines eidos in the following way: “the 
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essence (eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing 
intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence (wesen)” 
(Hua 3/11). Here, the term eidetic is utilized to describe that which is characterized by and 
related to eidos. Phenomenology as a science of essence (wesenwissenschaft) means that 
phenomenology is also an eidetic science (eidetische wissenschaft) (Hua 3/4).  
From Husserl’s definition, it can be inferred that he attempts to encapsulate what he 
earlier refers to as “intentional, semantic, and epistemic essences” all in the new concept of 
eidos. In Husserl’s terms, “intuition of an essence is consciousness of something, an object, a 
Something to which the intuitional regard is directed and which is ‘itself given’ in intuition” 
(Hua 3/12). Later when Husserl defines intentionality as the eidetic structure of noesis-
noema, he ipso facto formulates essence (eidos) as the ideal union of noesis and noema.  
With the shift towards a new terminology for essence as eidos in Ideas I, Husserl retains 
many elements of the “hierarchy of essences” that he developed in his characterization of 
wesen in Logical Investigations (Hua 3/26). Just as he attributed different modes of wesen to 
sensuous intuition and categorial intuition; so too does he identify different modes of eidos 
for individual intuition, universal intuition and conceptualization (Hua 3/11-13). Likewise, 
Husserl keeps his notion that essence (wesen) can be adequate and inadequate, depending on 
whether the content is presented perfectly or not, through his identification of adequate and 
inadequate eidos (Hua 3/10). Moreover, Husserl’s distinction between intentional essence 
(wesen) and semantic essence (wesen) is represented by his conceptualization of the self-
sufficient eidos whose content is fulfilled, and the non-self-sufficient eidos whose content 
cannot be fulfilled without referring back to intuitions (Hua 3/29). Husserl, further, calls non-
self-sufficient essence as an abstractum, self-sufficient essence as a concretum, and material 
essence of the concretum as an individuum (Hua 3/30). While in Ideas I the distinction 
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between the self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient essence is mainly epistemological, such a 
distinction becomes existential and metaphysical in the last two phases of Husserl’s thinking.  
Furthermore, since each mental act consists of its form and matter, there is also the 
formal essence concerning the character-quality of an act in contrast to the material essence 
that defines the content of the act (Hua 3/21). What Husserl means by material essence does 
appear rather similar to the notion of essentia (essenz) in Logical Investigations; however, in 
Ideas I, Husserl uses essenz in a different way, as the opposite of existenz in the sense of 
“individual factual existent” (Hua 3/12). As such, the replacement of wesen with eidos results 
in an overall renewal of Husserl’s terminology.  
Although it seems that Husserl opposes essence to existence through the contrast of 
essenz with existenz, this is not always the case. He suggests that notions like essence and 
existence can be understood in different ways depending on whether a person adopts a 
natural or a phenomenological attitude. To put it otherwise, essence and existence can be 
perceived either naturalistically or eidetically. In what follows, we will first examine these 
two types of essence and then clarify these two kinds of existence.  
In the eyes of naturalists, an essence becomes nothing but an abstract entity that one 
generalizes and extracts from various empirical, physical or psychological data. For 
naturalists, there is only factual reality and nothing more. The naturalist worldview 
presupposes that world is a pre-given factual reality; that is, there is “no doubt about or 
rejection of data belonging to the natural world” (Hua 3/53). This idea is reflected in the 
language of physicists, who speak of an object as an “individual object as such, a ‘This here’, 
an object never repeatable; as qualified ‘in itself’”, and psychologists, who perceive any 
knowable object as merely “something real individually” that exists as real actuality in our 
experience (Hua 3/13, 3/40). They, therefore, perceive essence in the following manner (Hua 
3/42):  
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 Ideas or essences, it is said, are thus “concepts” and concepts are “mental constructs,” “products of 
abstraction,” and as such, indeed play a large part in our thinking. “Essence”, “idea” or “Eidos”, these are 
but elegant “philosophical” names for “sober psychological facts”. They are dangerous because of their 
metaphysical suggestions.84 
 
Husserl finds this naturalistic worldview dangerous, because it presumes that reality and even 
essence itself are factual, independent from humans, and invariant across time and space. 
Naturalism never questions where our perception of reality comes from. That is why 
naturalists are deemed to be “naïve” (Hua 3/79). For Husserl, if we naively perceive the 
world as a mechanical system running on and self-determining through natural laws, we close 
our eyes to the concrete life-world in front of us and a fortiori lose our connection to the 
world. Subsequently, we reduce our life to an accumulation of matters of fact, which is 
ultimately irrelevant to us (Hua 19/706). When we degrade the mind and the world to the 
automatic generation of natural laws, we miss “the pure and the genuine” meaning of our 
consciousness and our life (Hua 19/706).  
“The pure and the genuine” unveils itself once we conduct epoché, which provides us 
with the insight of the pure eidetic essence called eidos (Hua 3/65). Eidos in the 
phenomenological sense, therefore, contributes to “a new sort of object” as “the datum of 
eidetic intuition”. In the phenomenological attitude, eidos likewise entails “that [which] is 
proper to an individual itself as its What” (Hua 3/14). Nevertheless, this “individual” is no 
longer tantamount to the What of any factually existent actuality, but rather refers to that 
which appears after epoché. That being said, eidos delineates what and how things actually 
are in pure consciousness, amounting to the ideal union of noesis and noema that undergirds 
the eidetic structure of intentionality for each mental act.  
                                                        
84 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 42). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Ideen oder Wesen sind also, heißt es, ,Begriffe‘ und Begriffe sind ‚psychische Gebilde‘, ‚Produkte der 
Abstraktion‘, und als solche spielen sie freilich in unserem Denken eine große Rolle. ‚Wesen‘, ‚Idee‘ oder 
‚Eidos‘, das sind nur vornehme ‚philosophischen‘ Namen für ‚nüchterne psychologische Fakta‘ Gefährliche 
Namen, um der metaphysischen Suggestionen willen.“  
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As previously mentioned, in Ideas I, Husserl’s notion of intentionality is expressed 
through the noesis-noema correlation. In this regard, the pure essence of noesis becomes that 
which underpins the form of an act, such as recollecting or judging or willing; and 
“consciousness is precisely consciousness of something. It is of its essence to bear in itself 
‘sense’” (Hua 3/177). In parallel, noematic essence is the objective core of the perceived 
phenomenon presented as such, namely, the sense as the objective core in the mode 
belonging to its fullness (Hua 3/274). As detailed by Husserl (Hua3/270), 
 If we then put ourselves into a living cogito, it has, according to its essence and in a pre-eminent sense a 
“direction” to something objective. In other words, there belongs to its noema “something objective” – in 
inverted commas – with a certain noematic composition which becomes explicated in a description of 
determinate delimitation, that is to say, in such a description which, as a description of the meant objective 
something, as it is meant, avoids all subjective expressions.85 
 
Having insight into the pure essence, amounts to “seeing” (again, not seeing with eyes but 
grasping immediately) the ideal correlate of noesis and noema at all levels of intentional acts 
from perceiving to judging (Hua 3/196). The clarity of these insights can vary. “To seize 
upon the most universal eidetic differences, like those between colour and sound and between 
perception and will, it is doubtless sufficient that the examples be given with a low degree of 
clarity” (Hua 3/130). Here, we shall notice Husserl’s stress on constitutive subjectivity in his 
articulation of the insight of essence (eidos) as that of the noesis-noema correlates; that is, an 
essence is not passively given in intuition; rather, the eidos as “that [which] is proper to an 
individual itself as its What” stems from the constitution of the eidetic noetic-noematic 
structure.   
Consider our previous example of Cindy’s perception of the cat on the sofa. Cindy can 
walk around the sofa to observe the gesture of her cat. Every locus she takes, she has 
                                                        
85 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 311-312). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Versetzen wir uns also in ein lebendiges cogito, so hat es seinem Wesen gemäß in ausgezeichnetem Sinne 
‚Richtung‘ auf eine Gegenständlichkeit, Mit anderen Worten zu seinem Noema gehört ein 
‚Gegenständlichkeit‘ – in Anführungszeichen – mit einem gewissen noematischen Bestand, der sich in einer 
Beschreibung bestimmter Umgrenzung entfaltet, nämlich in einer solchen, die als Beschreibung des ‚vermeinten 
Gegenständlichen, so wie es vermeint ist‘, alle ‚subjektiven‘ Ausdrücke vermeidet.“ 
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different sensory manifolds. Wherever she stands, her categorial intuition founded on these 
sensations will reach out to make her perception intelligible in such a way that the cat can 
always be foregrounded against the backdrop of her perceptual field. There arises what 
Husserl refers to as the eidos, which emerges from various appearances of the same cat. 
Albeit the appearance of the cat varies from one locus to another, it nevertheless reveals the 
same noematic object qua the cat (not merely as the matters of fact but also as the ideal 
phenomenon) through the same type of noetic acts of perceiving. In Husserl’s terms (Hua 
1/83),  
Thus, as consciousness of something, every consciousness has the essential property, not just of being 
somehow able to change into continually new modes of consciousness of the same object (which, 
throughout the unity of synthesis, is inherent in them as an identical objective sense), but of being able to 
do so, only in the manner of that horizon-intentionality. The object is, so to speak, a pole of identity, 
always meant expectantly as having a sense yet to be actualized; in every moment of consciousness it is an 
index, pointing to a noetic intentionality that pertains to it according to its sense, an intentionality that can 
be asked for and explicated.86 
 
Indeed, through epoché, we revert back to our pure consciousness, in which objects appear as 
our mental phenomena (Hua 3/188). When we perceive these phenomena, our intuition 
reaches out to the world and makes the world an intelligible field, which indicates how the 
mind actively serves as the condition for the appearance of objective phenomena. Every time 
we fix our eyes on an object, the intelligible field changes accordingly in order to make the 
intended phenomenon stand out. Through intuition, we start to build up intentionality 
between the intentional phenomenon, or the noema, and the intending, noetic act. Objectivity, 
as unpacked in section 1, is not mind-independent. Instead, objectivity in pure consciousness 
is always ensured by subjective acts. The intuitive, intelligible sense of objective phenomena 
                                                        
86 The English translation is based on Dorion Cairns’s edition (1960, 45-46). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„So gehört zu jedem Bewusstsein als Bewusstsein von etwas die Wesenseigenheit, nicht nur überhaupt in immer 
neue Bewusstseinsweisen übergehen zu können als Bewusstsein von demselben Gegenstand, der in der Einheit 
der Synthesis ihnen intentional einwohnt als identischer gegenständlicher Sinn; sondern es zu können, ja es nur 
zu können in der Weise jener Horizontintentionalität. Der Gegenstand ist sozusagen ein Identitätspol, stets mit 
einem vorgemeinten und zu verwirklichenden Sinn bewusst, in jedem Bewusstseinsmoment Index einer ihm 
sinngemäß zugehörigen noetischen Intentionalität, nach der gefragt, die expliziert werden kann.“ 
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becomes the ground for valid concepts, or meaning-intentions.87 In Husserl’s terms (Hua 
3/184),   
 The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as 
perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn 
up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense, the sense of this perception, something 
belonging necessarily to its essence cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real 
properties.88 
   
For every “undetermined determinable” act (Hua 3/130), pure eidetic essence is an ideal 
union of noesis and noema encapsulated in the eidetic structure of intentionality, and once 
determined, becomes the intelligible sense of the noesis-noema correlate.  
The refashioned concept of essence allows for the formulation of phenomenology as 
transcendental idealism at the explicative level.89 If naturalists and phenomenologists have 
their respective understandings of what things actually are and define essence in their own 
manners, how would they explain the existence of these things? After clarifying the two 
kinds of essence envisaged respectively by naturalists and phenomenologists, I propose to 
move on to the two types of existence/being depicted by Husserl. Just as Husserl implicitly 
                                                        
87 Husserl’s conception of intuition differs strongly from Kant’s. This also marks the divergence between 
Husserl’s pure phenomenology and Kant’s critical philosophy – for Kant, what is universal can only be grasped 
by concepts, not by intuitive acts, and concepts are already pre-made categories; mutatis mutandis, for Kant, 
objectivity is guaranteed by transcendental laws in understanding, not by that in intuition.  
88 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 216). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Der Baum schlechthin, das Ding in der Natur, ist nichts weniger als dieses Baumwahrgenommene als solches, 
das als Wahrnehmungssinn zur Wahrnehmung und unabtrennbar gehört. Der Baum schlechthin kann abbrennen, 
sich in seine chemischen Elemente auflösen usw. Der Sinn aber – Sinn dieser Wahrnehmung, ein notwendig zu 
ihrem Wesen Gehöriges – kann nicht abbrennen, er hat keine chemischen Elemente, keine Kräfte, keine realen 
Eigenschaften.“  
89 Existing scholarship offers three standard readings of this transcendental idealism articulated by Husserl: an 
epistemological reading from David Carr; a metaphysical reading from A.D. Smith; and a critical reading from 
Dan Zahavi. Per the epistemological reading, Carr construes Husserl’s transcendental idealism as 
metaphysically neutral rather than “part of the metaphysics of the subject” (Carr 1999, 133). Per the 
metaphysical reading propounded by A.D. Smith – one that is implicitly criticized by Carr as pushing “Kant and 
Husserl in the direction of metaphysical idealism” (Carr 1999, 137) – “If consciousness did not exist, nothing 
would” (Smith 2003, 179). Smith continues to explain that, for Husserl, “all objective physical objects remain 
immanent to consciousness” (Smith 2003, 182). Dan Zahavi initiates the third, critical reading. As per Zahavi, 
Husserl neither completely neutralizes metaphysical issues as we see in Carr’s epistemological reading nor 
absolutely bestows the metaphysical primacy on subjectivity as Smith contends (Zahavi 2010b, 75-78). Rather, 
Zahavi interprets Husserl’s idealism as an objection to metaphysical realism (Zahavi 2010b; 2017). Drawing on 
Zahavi’s demarcation of what Husserl’s transcendental idealism is not, I propose an affirmative account of what 
this idealism is. I will develop, in this section, a more affirmative definition of Husserl’s brand of transcendental 
idealism that can integrate the three aforementioned interpretations.   
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demarcates pure eidetic essence from naturalistic essence, he likewise differentiates existence 
in the transcendentally phenomenological sense from existence in the naturally real sense.  
Husserl speaks of natural existence as the “straightforwardly existing” (Husserl 1/21),90 
namely, the existence of factual, material reality in the actual spatial-temporal order, either as 
physical reality or the psychological one. Consider our example of perceiving the cat on the 
sofa. The natural existence of the cat is material and physical – she is made of flesh and fur. 
As a finite being, she will die within an anticipatable span of time. Given that natural 
existence is attributed to matters of fact, we come to find that in his writings, Husserl refers to 
what we term natural existence, as “existence de facto” (Hua 3/8; Hua 1/106).  
When we enact epoché, this natural existence will be bracketed or parenthesized. 
Thereafter, we suspend any presumption about this material existence and subsequently shift 
the focus back to our consciousness to observe the conditions for the possibility of 
phenomena. Stemming from this transcendental reflection, there unveils phenomenological 
existence of that which appears in pure consciousness (Hua 3/88): 
 Then the result is the correlate of our factual experience, called “the actual world”, as one special case 
among a multitude of possible worlds and surrounding worlds which, for their part, are nothing else but the 
correlates of essentially possible variants of the idea, “an experiencing consciousness” with more or less 
organized experience-concatenation (geordneten Erfahrungszusammenhängen). As a consequence, one 
must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness or as 
“existing in itself”.91 
 
As such, phenomenological existence is characterized by ideality. In Husserl’s terms, “one 
can say of a simple tree that it burns up, but a perceived tree ‘as such’ cannot burn up” (Hua 
6/248). While natural existence can vanish, that is, the cat could die and not remain part of 
                                                        
90 I use the term “naturalistic” to characterize the perception of someone in natural attitude. What is naturalistic 
differs from what is “natural”, insofar as the former describes an attitude whereas the latter entails what is 
empirically real. 
91 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 106). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Dann ergibt sich das Korrelat unserer faktischen Erfahrung, genannt ‚die wirkliche Welt‘, als Spezialfall 
mannigfaltiger möglicher Welten und Umwelten, die ihrerseits nichts anderes sind als Korrelate 
wesensmöglicher Abwandlungen der Idee ‚erfahrendes Bewusstsein‘ mit mehr oder minder geordneten 
Erfahrungszusammenhängen. Man darf sich also durch die Rede von der Transzendenz des Dinges gegenüber 
dem Bewusstsein oder von seinem ‚An-sich-sein‘ nicht täuschen lassen.“ 
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Cindy’s life, the phenomenological existence of the cat persists in Cindy’s recollection of the 
past and her expectation of the future.  
It would be inaccurate to describe phenomenological existence and natural existence as 
either irrelevant or identical to each other. As detailed by Husserl, phenomenological 
existence is inseparable from existence in the natural sense (Hua 3/8-9), 
 It is posited as something that is at this place, in this physical shape (or else is given in union with 
something organismal having this shape), whereas the same real something considered with respect to its 
own essence could just as well be at any other place and have any other shape, could also be changing 
though it is in fact unchanging… the sense of this contingency, which is called factualness, is limited in 
that it is correlative to a necessity which does not signify the mere de facto existence of an obtaining rule 
of coordination among spatiotemporal matters of fact but rather has the character of eidetic necessity and 
with this a relation to eidetic universality… An individual object is not merely an individual object as such, 
as a “This here”, an object never repeatable; as qualified in itself thus and so, it has its own specific 
character, its stock of essential predicables which must belong to it.92 
 
The cat prior to epoché remains the same as that which Cindy can perceive in her post-
epoché recollection. The relationship between these two types of existence is encapsulated in 
the notion of “correlate” (Hua 3/89): 
 As a consequence, one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending 
consciousness or as “existing in itself”. The genuine concept of the transcendence of something physical, 
which is the measure of the rationality of any statements about transcendence, can itself be derived only 
from the proper essential contents of perception or from those concatenations of definite kinds which we 
call demonstrative experience. The idea of such transcendence is therefore the eidetic correlate of the pure 
idea of this demonstrative experience.93  
 
                                                        
92 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 7). The original German version is as follows: 
„das an diesem Orte in dieser physischen Gestalt ist (bzw. mit Leiblichem dieser Gestalt in eins gegeben ist), wo 
doch dasselbe Reale, seinem eigenen Wesen nach betrachtet, an jedem beliebigen Ort, mit jeder beliebigen 
Gestalt ebensogut ein könnte, desgleichen sich ändern könnte, während es faktisch ungeändert ist, oder sich in 
anderer Weise ändern könnte, als wie es sich faktisch verändert…Aber der Sinn dieser Zufälligkeit, die da 
Tatsächlichkeit heißt, begrenzt sich darin, dass sie korrelativ bezogen ist auf eine Notwendigkeit, die nicht den 
bloßen faktischen Bestand einer geltenden Regel der Zusammenordnung räumlich-zeitlicher Tatsachen besagt, 
sondern den Charackter der Wesens-Notwendigkeit und damit Beziehung auf Wesens-Allgemeinheit hat…Ein 
individueller Gegenstand ist nicht bloß überhaupt ein individueller, ein Dies da!, ein einmaliger, er hat als ,in 
sich selbst‘ so und so beschffener seine Eigenart, seinen Bestand an wesentlichen Prädikabilien, die ihm 
zukommen müssen.“ 
93 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 106). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Man darf sich also durch die Rede von der Transzendenz des Dinges gegenüber dem Bewusstsein oder von 
seinem ‘An-sich-sein’ nicht täuschen lassen. Der echte Begriff der Transzendenz des Dinglichen, der das Maß 
aller vernünftigen Aussagen über Transzendenz ist, ist doch selbst nirgendwoher zu schöpfen, es sei denn aus 
dem eigenen Wesengehalte der Wahrnehmung, bzw. der bestimmt gearteten Zusammenhänge, die wir 
ausweisende Erfahrung nennen. Die Idee dieser Transzendenz ist also das eidetische Korrelat der reinen Idee 
dieser ausweisenden Erfahrung.“ 
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Indeed, phenomenological existence alludes to “the multitude of possible worlds and 
surrounding worlds” among which there is one special case qua the actual world of natural 
existence. Accordingly, the essence of these phenomenologically existent objects becomes an 
ideal one, not a real one, insofar as such an essence reveals a possibility. That is why Husserl 
contends that “natural being is a realm whose existential status is secondary”, because “it 
continually presupposes the realm of transcendental being” (Hua 1/60). Depicting natural 
existence as the correlate of phenomenological existence, Husserl indicates how one cannot 
be reduced to or exhausted by the other.  
Within a naturalist worldview, there is always the tendency to reduce phenomenological 
existence to natural existence, further demoting ideality to reality and degrading essence into 
factuality. When natural existence becomes naturalistic for someone of natural attitude, this 
person perceives the essence of these factually existent objects as the pre-given, sui generis 
reality invariant across time and space. That is why Husserl utilizes the term naïve to 
characterize the natural attitude (Hua 3/131; Hua 6/213). Contrarily, the phenomenological 
attitude encourages one to conduct epoché and open one’s eyes to how things actually are. 
Through the insight of essence, one comes to understand immediately that, without 
constitutive subjectivity, phenomenological existence is impossible. Indeed, it is not the case 
that various objects exist as pre-given reality and become represented to the mind through 
affection. Rather, the subjective mind actively serves as the condition for various things to 
appear as phenomena in our life experience. In figurative terms, subjectivity opens the door 
to “the multitude of possible worlds and surrounding worlds” (Hua 3/89). Furthermore, it is 
constitutive subjectivity that eventually determines the undetermined determinability of these 
possible worlds through the noesis-noema structure, moment by moment (Hua 6/279). 
Subjectivity, therefore, entails a living transcendental ideality, which is enacted throughout 
each phase of life. 
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From this stance on subjectivity, Husserl’s notion of transcendental idealism gradually 
develops. Subjectivity has its limits insofar as it cannot determine or exhaust the natural 
existence of a wide range of things in the world. The world exists as such, as that which is de 
facto, empirically real, and intersubjectively accessible. In Husserl’s terms, the realm of 
naturally existent matters of fact becomes the “correlate” of the phenomenological realm 
(Hua 3/88). Indeed, Husserl acknowledges an empirical form of realism (Hua 6/190-191):  
 In advance, there is the world, even pre-given and undoubted in ontic certainty and self-verification. Even 
though I have not [explicitly] “presupposed” it as a ground, it still has validity for me, the “I” of the cogito, 
through constant self-verification, together with everything that it is for me, in particular details sometimes 
objectively and legitimately so, sometimes not, and together with all sciences and arts, together with all 
social and personal configurations and institutions, insofar as it is just the world that is actual for me. There 
can be no stronger realism than this, if by this word nothing more is meant than: I am certain of being a 
human being who lives in this world, etc., and I doubt it not in the least.94 
 
While subjectivity has its limits, it is not passive but rather actively conditions and shapes the 
phenomenological existence of things in our experience. After epoché, subjectivity serves as 
the condition for the possibility of phenomena in one’s experience, further determining the 
undeterminable determinability of the noetic-noematic structure. In the process of 
determining, subjectivity conditions the appearance of phenomena, its noesis and its noema, 
subsequently shaping phenomenological existence. As such, subjectivity alludes to 
transcendental ideality. As clarified by Husserl (Hua 6/189): 
 This is what philosophical self-exposition in the epoché actually teaches us. It can show how the always 
singular “I”, in the original constituting life proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the 
primordial sphere; how it then, starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a constitutive 
accomplishment, through which an intentional modification of itself and of its primordiality achieves ontic 
validity (Seinsgeltung) under the title of “alien-perception”, perception of others, of another “I” who is for 
himself an “I” as I am… Thus, in me, “another I” achieves ontic validity as co-present with his own ways 
of being self-evidently verified.95 
                                                        
94 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 187). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Vorweg ist die Welt, die immerfort in Seinsgewissheit und Selbstbewährung vorgegebenen und zweifellose. 
Habe ich sie auch nicht als Boden ‚vorausgesetzt‘, so ist sie für mich, das Ich im cogito, doch aus ständiger 
Selbstbewährung in Geltung, mit allem, was sie für mich ist, im einzelnen bald objektiv rechtmäßig, bald nicht, 
auch mit allen Wissenschaften, Künsten, mit allen sozialen, personalen Gestalten und Institutionen, soweit es 
eben die Welt ist, die mir die wirkliche ist. Einen stärkeren Realismus kann es also nicht geben, wenn dieses 
Wort nicht mehr besagt als:, ich bin dessen gewiss, ein Mensch zu sein, der in dieser Welt lebt, usw., und ich 
zweifle daran nicht in mindesten‘.“ 
95 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 185). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Das lehrt wirklich die philosophische Selbstauslegung in der Epoché. Sie kann aufweisen, wie das immerfort 
einzige Ich in seinem originalen in ihm verlaufenden konstituierenden Leben eine erste Gegenstandssphäre, die 
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Therefore, transcendental idealism for Husserl is correlated with empirical realism. Affirming 
intersubjectively accessible reality, Husserl accentuates how subjectivity has the freedom of 
choice – either it can propel one to dwell back to the natural attitude or it can enact epoché 
and enable one to see things as they really are. While subjectivity in the first sense becomes 
envisioned as transcendentally real (which can be epitomized by Brentano’s psychologism, 
according to Husserl), the latter, in virtue of epoché, becomes transcendentally ideal. As 
such, transcendental idealism differs from transcendental realism, which treats reality as 
mind-independent. It is also not what Husserl refers to as speculative idealism for which 
“subjectivity … [has] the actual phenomenal world in intuitive validity” and, therefore, 
exhausts worldly reality (Hua 6/271).  
To repeat, transcendental idealism entails a correlative dualism. It is in this sense that 
transcendental phenomenology becomes a science of essence – an eidetic science that 
explores and explicates the ideal union of mutually constituted noesis and noema. What 
defines things as they are hinges on the correlation between reality and ideality, between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Husserl neither negates empirical reality nor advocates that all 
naturally existent objects are immanent in consciousness. Transcendental idealism, thus, 
becomes the doctrine that encapsulates correlations between subjectivity and objectivity, 
between ideality and reality, between the transcendental and the empirical.  
5.3 Essence after Ideas I  
Husserl’s break-through in Ideas I marks the birth of his transcendental phenomenology. He 
keeps enriching the notion of intentionality, transcendental idealism, and eventually, essence. 
In the last two phases of Husserl’s philosophical thinking, essence is not only crucial to pure 
                                                        
‚primordiale‘, konstituiert, wie es von da aus in motivierter Weise einen konstitutive Leistung vollzieht, durch 
die eine intentionale Modifikation seiner selbst und seiner Primordialität zu Seinsgeltung kommt unter dem 
Titel ‚Fremdwahrnehmung‘, Wahrnehmung eines Anderen, eines anderen Ich, für sich selbst Ich wie ich 
selbst… So kommt in mir ein ,anderes‘ Ich zur Seinsgeltung, als kompräsent, und mit seinen Weisen evidenter 
Bewährung, offenbar ganz anderen als denen einer ‚sinnlichen‘ Wahrnehmung.“  
 148 
 
 
logic and pure theory of knowledge but also pivotal for remedying existential crisis in 
Europe. While naturalism precipitates the paradox of subjectivity and provokes the crisis of 
meaning, phenomenology guides each ego in renouncing the naïve mode of existence and 
being a subject in its true essence. As such, different from groundless naturalistic essence, the 
true and pure essence of each ego implies the mutual constitution of the self and other, 
consequently amounting to a twofold a priori of being in the world and being with others. 
That being said, what defines each ego as such is grounded in its interrelation and interaction 
with other things in the world and with other egos in the community. Such a refined 
conception of essence facilitates Husserl’s endeavor to formulate phenomenology as a 
remedy for the existential crisis in modern Europe.   
In Crisis, Husserl replaces the noesis-noema structure with the ego-cogito-cogitatum 
schema (Hua 1/87), which is further expanded into the collective we, the collective intending 
act, and the collectively intended phenomena tripartite (Hua 6/189). In our previous study of 
the ego-cogito-cogitatum schema, we explained how the underlying ego does not transform 
into a closed system nor an outstanding pole, but rather mutually constitutes itself with the 
subjective act of cogito and the objective phenomenon qua cogitatum. This is the case, in 
virtue of two types of genesis: the passive and the active. The study of the genesis of 
intentional acts heralds Husserl’s expression of genetic phenomenology (Hua 14/40). In 
virtue of passive genesis, each ego interacts with other objects in the world and with other 
egos in a community to mutually produce the primordial constitution of the temporal horizon 
in one’s entire life and the life-world for the community, even before this ego actively uses 
the faculty of reason to conduct intentional mental acts. The primordial constitution entails 
the “inward being-for-one-another and mutual interpenetration (innerlichen ineinander- und 
füreinanderseins)” as the fundamental interdependence between each ego and its 
surroundings (Hua 6/346). The eidetic essence of an ego becomes a twofold a priori, that is, 
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“consciousness of oneself as being in the world” (Hua 6/255), and “self-consciousness and 
consciousness of others are inseparable” (Hua 6/256). In Husserl’s terms (Hua 6/259),  
 Within the universal epoché which actually understands itself, it becomes evident that there is no 
separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature. What is a mutual externality 
for the natural-mundane attitude of world-life prior to the epoché, because of the localization of souls in 
living bodies, is transformed in the epoché into a pure, intentional, mutual internality. With this the world – 
the straightforwardly existing world and, within it, existing nature—is transformed into the all communal 
phenomenon “world”, “world for all actual and possible subjects”, none of whom can escape the 
intentional implication according to which he belongs in advance within the horizon of every other 
subject.96  
 
The eidetic essence of the transcendental ego arises from the horizon of life experience for 
this individual person, as well as from the collective horizon in which the person shares with 
others. In this manner, the essence of each person becomes the twofold a priori of being in 
the world and being with others.  
Naturalism, however, does not acknowledge and appreciate the twofold essence of egos. 
Empowered by the inauthentic way of thinking, naturalism reduces the essence of humans to 
factual materiality, which is coherent with the naturalistic view of essence and existence all 
along (Hua 1/115; Hua 6/12). Now that Husserl expands his philosophical project to genetic 
phenomenology, he extends his critique of naturalism by tracing the forces that give rise to 
the predominance of inauthentic thinking. The first force surfaces throughout the 
development of modern physics, the discipline that is characterized by an abstract 
mathematical view of the world, which can be dated back to the time of Galileo Galilei 
(1564-1642) (Hua 6/36). This worldview empowers scientists to treat the world as sheer 
material realities and, then, to summon up objective rules through experiments (Hua 6/36). 
When scientists glorify their testable hypothesis as the objective truth, they equally reduce 
                                                        
96 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 255-256). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„In der wirklich sich selbst verstehenden universalen Epoché zeigt es sich, dass es für die Seelen in ihrer 
Eigenwesentlichkeit überhaupt keine Trennung des Außereinander gibt. Was in der natürlich-mundanen 
Einstellung des Weltlebens vor der Epoché ein Außereinander ist, durch Lokalisation der Seelen an den Leibern, 
das verwandelt sich in der Epoché in ein reines intentionales Ineinander. Damit verwandelt sich die Welt, die 
schlicht seiende, und in ihr die seiende Natur, in das allegemeinschaftliche Phänomen ‚Welt‘, ‚Welt für alle 
wirklichen und möglichen Subjekte‘, von denen keines sich der intentionalen Implikation entziehen kann, der 
gemäß es in den Horizont eines jeden Subjekts vorweg hineingehört.“  
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objectivity to a pre-given actuality as that which is irrelevant to and independent from 
individual consciousness (Hua6/54). Husserl labels this approach to objectivity, 
“objectivism” (Hua 6/70).  
 What characterizes objectivism is that it moves upon the ground of the world which is pre-given, taken for 
granted through experience, seeks the “objective truth” of this world, seeks what, in this world, is 
unconditionally valid for every rational being, what it is in itself. It is the task of episteme, ratio, or 
philosophy to carry this out universally. Through these one arrives at what ultimately is; beyond this, no 
further questions have a rational sense.97  
 
The physicalistic perception of the world as mind-independent and mind-irrelevant soon rifts 
the mind and the world apart, a rift intrinsic to the modern European worldview. From such a 
rift, there arises the second force for the prevalence of inauthentic thinking, that is, Cartesian 
dualism (Hua 6/74). This dualism nurtured the flourishing of modern psychologism, which a 
fortiori reduces the mind to the sum-total of contingent, factual psychical realities. Not very 
different from physicists, psychologists induce empirical rules from psychological 
experiments and employ these rules to verify the objective validity of subjective knowledge 
(Hua 6/71). Their notion of objectivity, thus, entails “transcendentalism”. As per Husserl 
(Hua 6/71),  
 Transcendentalism, on the other hand, says: the ontic meaning of the pre-given life-world is a subjective 
structure, it is the achievement of experiencing pre-scientific life. In this life the meaning and the ontic 
validity of the world are built up – of that particular world, that is, which is actually valid for the individual 
experiencer. As for the “objectively true” world, the world of science, it is a structure at a higher level, 
built on prescientific experiencing and thinking, or rather on its accomplishments of validity. Only a 
radical inquiry back into subjectivity – and specifically the subjectivity which ultimately brings about all 
world-validity, with its content and in all its pre-scientific and scientific modes, and into the “what” and 
the “how” of the rational accomplishments – can make objective truth comprehensible and arrive at the 
ultimate ontic meaning of the world. Thus, it is not being of the world as unquestioned, taken for granted, 
which is primary in itself; and one has not merely asked what belongs to it objectively; rather what is 
primary in itself is subjectivity, understood as that which naïvely pre-gives the being of the world and then 
rationalizes or (what is the same thing) objectifies it.98 
                                                        
97 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 68-69). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Das Charakteristische des Objectivismus ist, dass er sich auf dem Boden der durch Erfahrung 
selbstverständlich vorgegebenen Welt bewegt und nach ihrer ‚objektiven Wahrheit‘ fragt, nach dem für sie 
unbedingt, für jeden Vernünftigen Gültigen, nach dem, was sie an sich ist. Das universal zu leisten, ist Sache der 
Episteme, der Ratio, bzw. der Philosophie. Damit werde das letztlich Seiende erreicht, hinter das 
zurückzufragen keinen vernünftigen Sinn mehr hätte.“ 
98 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 69). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Der Transzendentalismus dagegen sagt: der Seinssinn der vorgegebenen Lebenswelt ist subjektives Gebilde, ist 
Leistung des erfahrenden, des vorwissenschaftlichen Lebens. In ihm baut sich der Sinn und die Seinsgeltung der 
Welt auf, und jeweils der Welt, welche dem jeweilig Erfahrenden wirklich gilt. Was die ‚objektiv wahre‘ Welt 
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As such, psychologism construes subjectivity as the absolute reality at a higher level, through 
which objectivity can be determined by the capacity of reasoning, namely, inducing and 
deducing.  
The joint forces of physical objectivism and psychological transcendentalism conspire to 
bring about the prevalence of modern naturalism in Europe (Hua 6/61).99 While physical 
objectivism reduces each ego to nothing but factually existent matters of fact, psychological 
transcendentalism elevates ego to the highest place as the absolute reality for the world. 
Then, how could an ego exist both as extremely passive matter in the world and as absolutely 
active mind for the world at the exact same moment? The flourishing of naturalism soon 
brings about a “paradox of human subjectivity” (Hua 6/184): 
For the philosopher, however, this, and also the juxtaposition “subjectivity in the world as object” and at 
the same time “conscious subject for the world”, contains a necessary theoretical question, that of 
understanding how this is possible.100 
 
Upon distorting objectivity, naturalism also menaces subjectivity. In Husserl’s terms, 
naturalism turns the mind and the world into an inaccessible “enigma”; they cannot be 
                                                        
anlangt, die der Wissenschaft, so ist sie Gebilde höherer Stufe, aufgrund des vorwissenschaftlichen Erfahrens 
und Denkens bzw. seiner Geltungsleistungen. Nur ein radikales Zurückfragen auf die Subjektivität, und zwar 
auf die letztlich alle Weltgeltung mit ihrem Inhalt, und in allen vorwissenschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen 
Weisen, zustandebringende Subjektivität, sowie auf das Was und Wie der Verunftleistungen kann die objektive 
Wahrheit verständlich machen und den letzten Seinssinn der Welt erreichen. Also nicht das Sein der Welt in 
seiner fraglosen Selbstverständlichkeit ist das an sich Erste, und nicht die bloße Frage ist zu stellen, was ihr 
objektiv zugehört; sondern das an sich Erste ist die Subjektivität, und zwar als die das Sein der Welt naiv 
vorgebende und dann rationalisierende oder, was gleich gilt: objektivierende.“ 
99 In a recent paper, Hilary Putnam intends to differentiate two types of metaphysical realism: hardcore 
metaphysical realism (“as a term for a specific position whose main feature was the insistence that the world can 
be divided into mind-independent objects and properties in exactly one way”) and liberal metaphysical realism 
(for which “representation is a relation between organisms and real things, properties and events) (Putnam 2015, 
318; 325). Under these two types of metaphysical realism, Putnam identifies two kinds of naturalism: the former 
is connected to scientific naturalism for which truth is justified by natural, physical laws, whereas the latter is 
refered to as liberal naturalism for which truth cannot be reduced to causality but is grounded in the possible 
references (Putnam 2015, 312; 322). Nevertheless, Putnam’s differentiation is very new. For Husserl, naturalism 
is not Putnam’s liberal naturalism but the scientific, hardcore naturalism. Mutatis mutandis, when contemporary 
Husserlian scholars use the term “metaphysical realism”, they mainly refer to Putnam’s hardcore metaphysical 
realism, not the liberal one.  
100 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 180-181). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Für den Philosophen aber liegt darin und liegt in dem Miteinander: ‚Subjektivität’ in der Welt als Object und 
zugleich ‚für die Welt Bewusstseinssubjekt‘ eine notwendige theoretische Frage, nämlich zu verstehen, wie das 
möglich ist.“ 
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connected to each other (Hua 6/4). Through homogenizing individual differences, naturalism 
facilitates the disconnection of humans from the world, posing the paradox of subjectivity 
and provoking an existential crisis (Hua 6/5): 
 But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences recognize as true 
only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all 
the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and 
dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason 
must turn to nonsense, and well-being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in 
this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and 
bitter disappointment?101 
 
Naturalism overlooks the fact that symbolic, inauthentic thinking always finds its ground in 
authentic, categorial intuition (Hua 19/ 707).102 Reducing the eidetic essence to an abstract 
factuality, naturalists propose a version of essence that is never truly self-sufficient as it 
proclaims to be, but is rather groundless and baseless, insofar as it ignores the genesis of 
experience in which the mind and the world mutually constitute the shared life-world (Hua 
17/356).103 For Husserl, the essence of the world is not an abstract, pre-given reality invariant 
across time and space. Objective reality is equally not devoid of subjectivity. Rather, the 
world is where we live with other concrete individuals, with whom we constitute the shared 
                                                        
101 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 6-7). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Kann aber die Welt und menschliches Dasein in ihr in Wahrheit einen Sinn haben, wenn die Wissenschaften 
nur in dieser Art objektiv Feststellbares als wahr gelten lassen, wenn die Geschichte nichts weiteres zu lehren 
hat, als daß alle Gestalten der geistigen Welt, alle den Menschen jeweils haltgebenden Lebensbindungen, Ideale, 
Normen wie flüchtige Wellen sich bilden und wieder auflösen, daß es so immer war und sein wird, daß immer 
wieder Vernunft zum Unsinn, Wohltat zur Plage werden muß? Können wir uns damit beruhigen, können wir in 
dieser Welt leben, deren geschichtliches Geschehen nichts anderes ist als eine unaufhörliche Verkettung von 
illusionären Aufschwüngen und bitteren Enttäuschungen?“ 
102 As individuals, we make incessant effort to constitute with one another the collective life-world so as to 
share an intersubjective horizon (Hua 6/112). It is on this horizon that we can narrate our distinct life stories. 
When using inauthentic thinking to grasp the diversity of such life-world, naturalistic science soon exposes its 
limits. Indeed, Husserl envisages the restoration of authentic, intuitive thinking as that which ushers in the return 
of objective knowledge and meaningful life (Hua 6/314). As the conception of authenticity unfolds through 
different phases in Husserl’s philosophical thinking, many layers of this concept’s connotations start to 
transpire, from that of knowledge to that of collective life, and finally to human history. Likewise, as Aron 
Gurwitsch remarks, Husserl’s account of objectivity becomes multi-dimensional (Gurwitsch 1966, 168): from 
objectivity of individual perception to that of socio-historical groups, and finally to that of the trans-socio-
historical Lebenswelt that is universally accessible to humans. 
103 Articulated in this manner, objectivity entails a threefold sense: it is the impossibility of reshaping the 
coherent content of the phenomena appeared in consciousness; it is the quality of being determined and, 
therefore, retained by constitutive subjectivity in post-epoché  consciousness; and it ensures the correlation of 
the life-world and other I-subjects, further contributing to a meaningful life.  
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horizon of a community. In Husserl’s terms, the life-world is the “world of original common 
experiences” given before science, “furnishing us in advance … with all possible scientific 
topics” (Hua 6/112, 230). Such a life-world cannot be reduced to material realities. Likewise, 
individual egos in this world cannot be homogenized through physical and psychological 
rules into factually existent reality. In Husserl’s terms, each ego is not an empty pole of self-
identity, but rather is that which constitutes identity through the abiding habitus or state (Hua 
1/101).  
With the help of phenomenology, each ego returns from the naïve attitude to itself, 
embracing its true essence as both an object in the world and a subject for the world. In 
Husserl’s terms (Hua 6/187), 
 It is I who practice the epoché, I who interrogate, as phenomenon, the world which is now valid for me 
according to its being and being-such, with all its human beings, of whom I am so fully conscious; it is I 
who stand above all natural existence that has meaning for me, who am the ego-pole of this transcendental 
life, in which, at first, the world has meaning for me purely as world; it is I who, taken in full concreteness, 
encompass all that.104 
 
This is how we come to terms with the existential status of our subjectivity. Being a subject 
does not indicate any transcendence of worldly life but entails a unique mode of navigating 
this life. As such, subjectivity becomes the transcendental condition for the possibility of how 
everyday life will appear, further inseparable from empirical reality. We, therefore, no longer 
find ourselves trapped in the paradox of subjectivity. 
As the paradox dissolves itself, we likewise see the way in which Husserl divorces 
himself from dualism in the Cartesian sense. As Dermot Moran portrays, each ego lives a 
“double life” (Moran 2012, 239).105 This being said, we can enjoy two distinct modes of 
                                                        
104 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 184). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„Ich bin es, ich der Epoché-Übende, ich, der die Welt, die mir jetzt nach Sein und Sosein geltende Welt, mit 
allen ihren Menschen, deren ich so völlig gewiss bin, als Phänomen befrage; also ich, der ich über allem 
natürlichen Dasein, das für mich Sinn hat, stehe und der Ichpol bin des jeweils transzendentalen Lebens, worin 
zunächst Welt rein als Welt für mich Sinn hat: Ich, der ich, in voller Konkretion genommen, all das umfasse.“ 
105 Moran writes, “human beings are physical, corporeal objects in a physical, corporeal world”, but “the world 
has ‘being and sense’ not because of this physicality, but precisely because of the achievements of the 
transcendental ego and indeed the open-ended plurality of transcendental egos acting in consort” (Moran 2012, 
239).  
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living our worldly life: We live in the real psycho-physical world that is intersubjectively 
accessible, yet we also live in a world where subjectivity or intersubjectivity determines how 
worldly reality appears to us in a meaningful way and guarantees the objectivity of such 
appearance. In Husserl’s terms (Hua 6/346):  
The development of an actual method for grasping the fundamental essence of the spirit in its 
intentionalities, and for constructing from there an analysis of the spirit that is consistent in infinitum, led 
to transcendental phenomenology. It overcomes naturalistic objectivism and every sort of objectivism in 
the only possible way, namely, through the fact that he who philosophizes proceeds from his own ego, and 
this purely as the performer of all his validities, of which he becomes the purely theoretical spectator. In 
this attitude it is possible to construct an absolutely self-sufficient science of the spirit in the form of 
consistently coming to terms with oneself and with the world as spiritual accomplishment. Here the spirit 
is not in or alongside nature; rather, nature is itself drawn into the spiritual sphere. Also, the ego is then no 
longer an isolated thing alongside other such things in a pre-given world; in general, the serious mutual 
exteriority of ego-persons, their being alongside one another, ceases in favor of an inward being-for-one-
another and mutual interpenetration.106  
 
That being said, transcendental, genetic phenomenology is absolutely self-sufficient insofar 
as it secures its ground in the mutual constitution of all three components in intentionality 
(ego, cogito, cogitatum). The essence of each ego consists in the way in which it mutually 
constitutes its own identity and the shared life-world with other objects and other egos. In 
Husserl’s terms, each ego by its fundamental essence (grundwesen) is “no longer an isolated 
thing”. While naturalism nourishes the paradox of subjectivity, phenomenology guides the 
ego in returning from the natural attitude to embrace its twofold essence of being in the world 
and being with others.  
From the elaboration above, I derive four features of Husserl’s conception of pure, 
eidetic essence, or to be more precise, eidos: first, essence is universal but not mind-
                                                        
106 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 298). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Die Ausbildung einer wirklichen Methode, das Grundwesen des Geistes in seinen Intentionalitäten zu erfassen 
und von da aus eine ins Unendliche konsequente Geistesanalytik aufzubauen, führte zur transzendentalen 
Phänomenologie. Den naturalistischen Objektivismus und jeden Objektivismus überhaupt überwindet sie in der 
einzig möglichen Weise, nämlich dadurch, daß der Philosophierende von seinem Ich ausgeht, und zwar rein als 
dem Vollzieher aller seiner Geltungen, zu deren rein theoretischem Zuschauer er wird. In dieser Einstellung 
gelingt es, eine absolut eigenständige Geisteswissenschaft aufzubauen, in Form einer konsequenten 
Selbstverständigung und Verständigung der Welt als geistiger Leistung. Der Geist ist darin nicht Geist in oder 
neben der Natur, sondern dieser rückt selbst in die Geistessphäre. Das Ich ist dann auch nicht mehr ein isoliertes 
Ding neben anderen solchen Dingen in einer vorgegebenen Welt, es hört überhaupt das ernstliche Außer- und 
Nebeneinander der Ichpersonen auf zugunsten eines innerlichen Ineinander- und Füreinanderseins.“ 
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independent, self-determining or sui generis; second, it is transcendentally constituted by 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity at different levels; third, essence is the ideal sense of the 
intentional structure of consciousness for mental acts at different levels; fourth, essence 
implies objectivity of knowledge and the meaning of existence. As such, an essence defines 
how and what things actually are in pure consciousness. Unlike essence in the natural attitude 
which is separate from living experience, the pure, phenomenological, eidetic essence is that 
which one lives through and perceives to be true. Considering these features, we can also say 
that eidetic essence is the product of and the hallmark of transcendental idealism. 
Phenomenology as the science of essence is, therefore, inseparable from transcendental 
idealism. Now that we have clarified the Husserlian concept of essence, we can move on to 
explore what Yogācārins mean by essence (svabhāva) and emptiness (śūnyatā).  
 
Chapter 6: Essence in Later Chinese Yogācāra  
 
Having established how Husserl defines the concept of essence in the preceding chapter, let 
us now examine the notion of essence articulated by Xuanzang and his disciples. The English 
term “essence” has been frequently employed by Buddhist scholars to translate the Sanskrit 
word svabhāva. Etymologically, svabhāva derives from sva-, which means “self” or “own”, 
and -bhāva, the literal meaning of which is “coming into existence”. As such, svabhāva 
indicates an existence that comes into being on its own, independent of other factors and 
invariant across time and space. Xuanzang pinpoints three defining features of svabhāva: (1) 
it is immutable (chang 常), (2) it is sui generis and self-deteriming (zhuzhai 主宰),107 and (3) 
it persists throughout time and space (bian 遍) (T43N1830, P239c3; P244c22).  
                                                        
107 The Chinese notion zhuzhai 主宰 is often translated as “self-determining”. I am grateful for Jiang Tao’s 
translation advice. In this paper, I use sui generis more often, for one specific reason. When describing the 
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According to Xuanzang and his disciples, the later Yogācāra understanding of svabhāva 
differs from that of early Yogācāra and Madhyamaka. Moreover, it reflects the Mahāyāna 
critique of Theravāda Buddhism. For Theravāda clerics, while they negate the svabhāvic 
existence of sentient beings, they affirm the svabhāvic existence of non-sentient dharmas 
(T45N1861, P249a19). Following the epistemological argument provided by Theravādins, 
external objects are directly given to the mind through affection, which means that the stimuli 
qua external objects must have an existence on their own, independent of sentient beings (Lin 
2009, 121). Followers of the Mahāyāna tradition refute the Theravāda view of reality, 
explaining how everything in the cosmos is empty of such svabhāvic existence (T31N1585, 
P1b9). To express the idea that everything is empty of svabhāva, Mahāyāna clerics evoke the 
concept of emptiness (śūnyatā). Within the Mahāyāna tradition, the Yogācāra school emerges 
as a further development of the Madhyamaka school, both of which propose their own 
understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā) and essence (svabhāva).108   
To outline the changing stances toward svabhāva from Theravāda to Madhyamaka and to 
Yogācāra, I borrow the “sūtra classification system (panjiao 判教)” articulated by Xuanzang 
and his disciples. Following this system, section 1 examines how, although Mādhyamikas 
prioritize emptiness as the central notion in Buddhist teaching through their critique of the 
Theravāda tradition, the Madhyamaka refutation of svabhāva raises new issues. 
Subsequently, it is not early Yogācārins but later Yogācārins who address these issues and 
advance our understanding of emptiness. Section 2 explores the divide between early and 
                                                        
Yogācāra critique of svabhāvic self, it can raise confusion if I write “for Yogācārins, there is no such self-
determining self”. To avoid such a confusion, I turn to the notion “sui generis”. 
108  Xuanzang maintains that Consciousness-only reveals the true meaning of emptiness through the critique of 
svabhāva (T31N1585, P1a9-10). Kuiji further distinguishes later Yogācāra’s view of emptiness and svabhāva 
from that of Theravādins, Mādhyamikas, and early Yogācāra clerics: Theravādins, especially Sarvāstivādins, 
contend that the external world has existence as real as consciousness (T43N1830, P236b27); Mādhyamikas 
championed by Bhāviveka (清辨) argue that consciousness has no real existence just as the external world 
(T43N1830, P236c4); early Yogācārins, among others, the Saṃgrahas (shelunshi 攝論師), hold that there is an 
original consciousness, which is exhaustive of all other consciousnesses and their transformations (T43N1830, 
P236c11).  
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later schools of Chinese Yogācāra by clarifying their interpretations of emptiness (śūnyatā) 
and essence (svabhāva). This clarification supports my claim, which I articulate in section 3, 
that the worldview of later Chinese Yogācārins can be understood as a form of transcendental 
idealism.  
Through examining the Yogācāra critique of svabhāva, I put forward a twofold 
argument: first, the development of Yogācāra Buddhism in China was not a passive reception 
of ideas from India but rather a creative interpretation of the doctrine of consciousness in the 
Chinese language and cultural context; and second, Chinese Yogācārins represented by 
Xuanzang and Kuiji do not endorse nihilism in their refutation of essence but rather propose a 
worldview that can be interpreted as transcendental idealism in the Husserlian sense.  
6.1 The Madhyamaka Refutation of Essence (svabhāva)  
The current section examines Mādhyamikas’ challenge to the Theravāda notion of svabhāva 
and the issues that accompany this challenge. Mādhyamikas initiate a paradigm shift in their 
exploration of the ultimate nature of reality. They shift their focus from examining the way in 
which things really exist to questioning how these things appear in consciousness. 
Subsequently, in one’s experience, if the perceiver has no permanent existence, neither does 
the perceived, insofar as an object relies on a subject to appear as a phenomenon. If 
everything, be it sentient beings or non-sentient dharmas, dependently arises in experience, 
nothing has an essential core (svabhāva) (T30N1564, P2b18-19). Although Mādhyamikas 
elevate the notion of emptiness to the center of the Buddhist doctrinal philosophy, 
Yogācārins identify several inconsistencies in the Madhyamaka refutation of svabhāva, 
through which Yogācārins provide their distinct understanding of emptiness on the basis of 
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their study of consciousness. In understanding this paradigm shift, it will be of help to turn to 
the Sūtra Classification System, also known as panjiao (判教), proposed by Kuiji.109  
In Chinese Buddhist history, panjiao was initiated by Chinese clerics to account for the 
discrepancy, or even disparateness, in a wide range of Indian Buddhist texts translated and 
transmitted to China (Chen 1973, 10). As clarified by Kuiji, these discrepancies allude to the 
pedagogy of the Buddha, known as the skillful means (fangbian ⽅便), to preach in 
accordance with the audience (T45N1861, P249a1). Consequently, the Buddha turned the 
dharma wheel three times for those with different interests, further giving rise to the gradual 
development from Theravāda, to Madhyamaka, and finally to Yogācāra (T45N1861, P248c7-
19):110 
 世尊初於⼀時，在婆羅泥斯仙⼈墮處施⿅林中，唯為發趣聲聞乘者，以四諦相，轉正法輪。雖是甚
奇、甚為希有，⼀切世間諸天⼈等，先無有能如法轉者。⽽於彼時，所轉法輪，有上有容，是未了
義。是諸諍論，安⾜處所。世尊在昔第⼆時中，唯為發趣修⼤乘者，依⼀切法皆無⾃性、無⽣無
滅、本來寂靜、⾃性涅槃，以隱密相，轉正法輪。雖更甚奇、甚為希有，⽽於彼時，所轉法輪，亦
是有上有所容受，猶未了義。是諸諍論安⾜處所。世尊於今第三時中，普為發趣⼀切乘者，依⼀切
法，皆無⾃性、無⽣無滅、本來寂靜、⾃性涅槃、無⾃性性。以顯了相轉正法輪。 
 The world honored one, for the first time [of turning the dharma wheel], in the Mṛgadāva deer garden of 
Varanasi, only for those who were interested in the vehicle of Śrāvaka [i.e. who were interested in attaining 
arhatship,] preached the four noble truths and turned the wheel of dharma. Although it was so wondrous 
and so rare, all sentient beings in the cosmos, no one could turn the wheel like that. When the honored one 
turned the dharma wheel at that time, some of the teachings remained obscure. As such, there arose all the 
debates.  
 The world honored one, in the second time [of turning the dharma wheel,] preached for those who were 
interested in the Greater vehicle [namely, Mahāyāna,] that all dharmas are not svabhāva, neither arising 
nor perishing, but quiescent and tranquil by nature as nirvāṇa. Marked by its secretiveness and 
implicitness, the honored one turned the wheel of dharma. Although it was even more wondrous and rare, 
at that time when the dharma wheel was turned, again, only few accepted and understood. The explicit 
meaning was still not clear. As such, there arose all the debates.  
 Now, the world honored one was in the third time, generally for anyone interested in any vehicle, preached 
that all the dharmas are not svabhāva, neither arising nor perishing, but quiescent and tranquil by nature as 
nirvāṇa; as such, the dharmas have it as their nature to be empty of svabhāva. Marked by its directness and 
explicitness, the honored one turned the wheel of dharma. 
                                                        
109 Zhiyi (538-579 CE), the real founder of the Tiantai School of Buddhism, was a proponent of this 
classification. As Kenneth Chen remarks, “The T'ien-t'ai School with its classification represented the Chinese 
attempt to establish an all-embracing school of Buddhism that could include all the manifold and diverse 
teachings of the master. The Chinese genius for organization and classification and the emphasis on history may 
be said to be the forces behind this comprehensive and encyclopedic venture” (Chen 1973, 10).  
110 Considering how these three traditions represent three stages in the Buddha’s teaching, what looks like a 
discrepancy at the surface level in fact reveals the underlying complementarity. The system of classifying the 
sūtras constitutes a two-pronged project for Kuiji: to discover harmony in various Buddhist theories; and to 
demonstrate the doctrinal development of philosophical ideas, especially that of svabhāva and emptiness. 
Eventually, Kuiji was able to claim the supremacy of the Yogācāra doctrine of Consciousness-only, further 
justifying the superiority of Yogācāra over other traditions. As such, defending the authority of Yogācāra 
becomes an indispensable part of Kuiji’s thesis.  
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The first stage of the classification captures the stance toward svabhāva in the Theravāda 
tradition, especially how these followers of the Buddha’s first sermon affirm the svabhāvic 
existence of non-sentient beings. According to Kuiji, the first sermon is preserved in the four 
Āgamas (ajimo 阿笈摩), which present the teaching of the four noble truths (T45N1861, 
P249a11). The four noble truths – the depiction of life as suffering, the explication of the 
cause of suffering, the solution to suffering, and the path to such a solution – accentuate that 
there is no permanent self for each sentient being. This is because the so-called self is 
constituted by five aggregates and will dissolve throughout time (T45N1861, P249a16). 
Nevertheless, Theravādins do not negate the svabhāvic nature of non-sentient dharmas. One 
argument for the Theravāda stance towards essence (svabhāva) is put forward by the 
Sarvāstivāda School. As per Sarvāstivādins, knowledge in one’s mind is acquired through 
direct representation of external objects; furthermore, as the cause of knowledge, these 
external objects must have an existence on their own, independent of consciousness 
(T31N1585, P10b204). The distinct understanding of svabhāva likewise shapes the goal of 
Theravāda religious practice. Theravādins follow the Four Noble Truths in the hope of 
negating the existence of the human self, liberating oneself from suffering, and attaining 
arhatship (T45N1861, P249a4). According to Kuiji, Theravādins fail to grasp the gist of the 
Buddha’s teaching due to their limited capacity — the Buddha scrutinizes the idea of 
permanent self, not because non-sentient beings qua dharmas have permanent existence, but 
rather because the permanent self proves to be the most challenging viewpoint for humans to 
negate (T45N1861, P249a19).  
The second stage characterizes how Mādhyamikas refute the svabhāvic existence of non-
sentient dharma in their formulation of emptiness. For Mādhyamikas, various things in the 
world, be it sentient beings or non-sentient dharmas, have no permanent, sui generis self-
identity and therefore are not svabhāvic.  
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The Madhyamaka refutation of svabhāva is best expounded by a treatise written by the 
Madhyamaka master, Nāgārjuna (c. 150? -250? CE), known as Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(zhonglun 中論, henceforth MMK). This treatise made explicit the paradigm shift from how 
things really exist to how things appear in consciousness. Subsequently, in one’s experience, 
if the perceiver has no permanent existence, neither does the perceived object, for an object 
relies on a subject to appear as a phenomenon. Considering how things, be it sentient beings 
or non-sentient dharmas, dependently arise in experience, nothing is permanent and sui 
generis (T30N1564, P2b18-19). To expand the idea of no-self, Nāgārjuna utilizes the term 
śūnyatā, also translated as either kong (空 emptiness) or wu (無 nothingness) in the Chinese 
language (T30N1564, P2b19). Likewise, the term svabhāva is utilized to capture the sui 
generis, self-determining, immutable nature which shall “not be affected by conditionality or 
causality (不在眾緣中)” (T30N1564, P2b20). Through criticizing the Theravāda notion of 
svabhāva, Nāgārjuna elaborated the Buddha’s teaching, further elevating the concept of 
emptiness to the center of Buddhist doctrinal debates (Nagao 1991, 213-214). As per 
Nāgārjuna, non-sentient beings are empty of svabhāva, just as sentient beings. Eventually, 
everything becomes empty and illusory.  
To elucidate the nature of illusory dharmas,111 Nāgārjuna states (T30N1564, P1b14-15), 
 不⽣亦不滅，不常亦不斷，不⼀亦不異，不來亦不出。 (MMK 1:1-2) 
 Neither arising nor perishing; neither permanent nor terminate; neither identical nor different; neither 
coming nor going.112  
 
                                                        
111 By illusions, I do not mean wrong perceptions. Nor do I use illusion to translate a specific Buddhist term. 
Rather, let us agree to consider illusions as dharmas that seem to be permanently real. Given this definition of 
illusion, I interchangeably use “illusion”, “illusory dharma”, and “illusory image”. 
112 For the translation of the MMK, I mainly consult the Chinese translation from Kumārajīva and the English 
translation from Siderits and Katsura. Siderits and Katsura translate directly from Sanskrit that “neither 
cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor the eternal, neither singularity nor plurality, neither the 
coming nor the going” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 13). However, I conjecture that regarding the characteristics 
of dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), it is more suitable to translate them as adjectives, not nouns. Plus, I 
revise Siderits and Katsura’s translation of the third pair of neither-nor into “neither identical nor different” 
insofar as it alludes to the identity of dharmas – as per Piṅgala, “if they are all identical, it is impossible to have 
cause and effect in the same way that if they are all different, they cannot succeed one after another (若⼀則無
緣。若異則無相續 )” (T30N1564, P2a4-5).  
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This description alludes to Nāgārjuna’s notion of the middle way – emptiness is neither 
identical with nor different from the arising-and-perishing illusions. Rather, emptiness 
overcomes dualistic views of being/arising and non-being/perishing. This portrait might 
strike us as obscure. Nonetheless, Mādhyamikas will find this obscurity quite unexceptional – 
one’s common sense can only access the conventional truth (shisudi 世俗諦, saṃvṛtisatya) 
about illusory dharmas; eventually, one needs to go beyond common sense to uncover the 
ultimate truth (shengyidi 勝義諦, paramārthasatya) of emptiness that is neither being nor 
non-being.  
Since the conception of emptiness is out of the reach of conventional knowledge, 
contemporary scholars constantly fall into a debate when using their common sense to define 
emptiness.113 Indeed, any attempt to articulate emptiness in an affirmative manner seems to 
expose the limit of language and reason.114 As Nāgārjuna summarizes (T30N1564, P33b11-
12),  
 眾因緣⽣法，我說即是無。亦為是假名，亦是中道義 (MMK 24：18) 
All the dependent arising dharmas, we declare them to be nothingness [i.e. emptiness]. They are also 
fictitious names; just that is the meaning of the middle way.115   
                                                        
113 In existing scholarship, we can enumerate at least four explications of Nāgārjuna’s emptiness that which is 
provided by the absolutists, the nihilists, the skeptics, and the anti-realists, respectively (Li 2016): the absolutists 
construe emptiness as the ultimate reality or the absolute noumena. All arising dharmas derive from the absolute 
noumena so that dharmas are relative phenomena (Murti 1960, 251). Some scholars challenge the first reading 
by arguing that emptiness is not an absolute noumena. For these scholars, emptiness is a pure void (Narain 
1964, 316- 318). Since the second group of scholars read emptiness as a negation of any possible existence, 
their reading is branded Nihilism (Yao 2010, 85). For the nihilists, although we can speak of emptiness at the 
conventional level, it is ineffable at the ultimate level (Narain 1964, 336). Now that the ultimate truth of 
emptiness falls out of the reach of languages and thinking, Nāgārjuna also embraces epistemic skepticism. This 
becomes the third or the skeptic reading—emptiness nullifies all conceptual thinking (Ganeri 2001, 43-47). The 
anti-realists conceive of emptiness as a critique of the viewpoint known as metaphysical realism (Siderits 1988, 
321-324). 
114 As Nāgārjuna says in MMK 25:1-3, “if all dharmas were empty, there would be neither arising nor perishing. 
[If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is nirvāṇa that is called (若⼀切法空，無⽣無滅者，何斷
何所滅,⽽稱為涅槃)? (T30N1564, P34c15-16) If all dharmas were not empty, there would be neither arising 
nor perishing. [If so,] Due to the terminating and perishing, what is nirvāṇa that is called (若諸法不空，則無⽣
無滅，何斷何所滅，⽽稱為涅槃) ? (T30N1564, P34c21-22) Neither acquired nor abandoned, neither 
terminate nor permanent, neither arising nor perishing; thus is nirvāṇa to be called (無得亦無⾄，不斷亦不
常，不⽣亦不滅，是說名涅槃)( T30N1564, P34c26-27)”.  
115 The verse has been translated by Siderits and Katsura, based on the original Sanskrit language, as follows, 
“the dependent co-arising, we declare [it] to be emptiness. It is also a dependent concept; just that is the middle 
way” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, 277). Immediately, we can discern how Kumārajīva creatively translated the 
MMK.  
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Emptiness stands in the middle between an absolute nothingness and a svabhāvic reality. 
Since Nāgārjuna uses emptiness to refute dualistic views of being and non-being, he ipso 
facto expresses a viewpoint commonly known as metaphysical anti-realism in his critique of 
the Theravāda view of reality as mind-independent and svabhāvic (Nagao 1991, 213-214; 
Siderits 1988, 321-324).  
Nevertheless, from the Yogācāra point of view, the Madhyamaka refutation of svabhāva 
is exposed to several issues.116 As identified by Kuiji, the major problem is twofold: the 
ambivalent nature of illusory dharma, and the impossibility of Buddhist practice (T45N1861, 
P249a22). The first issue can be elaborated in the following manner: if illusory dharmas are 
empty, are these dharmas empty the moment they arise? If they are empty, then they cannot 
arise. Yet, if they are not empty, then they are not illusory.117 The second issue can be 
unpacked as such: if everything is empty, can sentient beings engage in Buddhist training? If 
they can, these sentient beings would have non-illusory existence and, therefore, would not 
be empty. Yet, if they cannot, Buddhism as a religious tradition should have no practitioners, 
as nothing would exist and there would be nothing to be trained.  
Considering how the Madhyamaka refutation of essence brings about several issues, 
Kuiji ranks Madhyamaka as the one higher than Theravāda but lower than Yogācāra. In 
Kuiji’s narrative, the Buddha preached for the second time, secretively implying how all 
                                                        
116 In contemporary studies, scholars have discerned more issues (Li 2016): In the first place, the nature of 
arising dharmas at the conventional level becomes ambivalent. If emptiness is identical to illusory dharmas, are 
these dharmas empty the moment they arise? If they are empty, how is such arising possible? (Yao 2014, 320-
321). If they are not, how are they illusory? In the second place, it seems that Nāgārjuna makes the ultimate 
truth inaccessible to intellectual understanding. Since we cannot even confirm whether emptiness has existence, 
it equally becomes impossible for us to find out whether our knowledge of such an object qua emptiness is true 
(Burton 1999, 4-5). In the third place, a problem of logical infinite regress gradually transpires. If the ultimate 
truth is the truth of a higher order than the conventional truth, then we can continue to negate this ultimate truth 
by another higher truth, and so on ad infinitum. Given these problems, we are unsure if Nāgārjuna really fails to 
give a consistent definition of emptiness or if he is simply playing with these inconsistencies to reveal the 
limitation of human reason (Hayes 1989, 159; 166).  
117 As to be seen later in Chapter 9, the Yogācāra critique of Madhyamika’s viewpoint of twofold truth is in line 
with its critique of Madhyamika’s articulation of Buddha nature in the Chinese context.  
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dharmas are empty by nature for the purpose of clearing up the misunderstandings of 
svabhāva  (T45N1861, P249a20). Since Mādhyamikas articulate emptiness by indicating 
what it is not, Kuiji categorizes this approach to emptiness as that of “secretive saying 
(miyishuo 密意說)” (T43N1830, P229c22-25). From Kuiji’s vantage point, Buddha 
employed the secretive saying of emptiness as a skillful means for the purpose of 
encouraging devotees to go beyond arhatship and turn to the Greater Vehicle of Mahāyāna. 
Thereby, Madhyamaka does not represent the supreme truth but rather paves the way for the 
third stage of the Buddha’s teaching, a view that equally demonstrates Kuiji’s defense of the 
status of Yogācāra (T45N1861, P249a21). For the last time, the Buddha directly explicated 
that empty dharmas are not voids, but still have their distinct existence.  
Followers of this affirmative approach to emptiness are Yogācārins. The term “direct 
explicating (liaoyishuo 了意說)” is employed by Kuiji to characterize the Yogācāra approach 
to emptiness. Nagao Gadjin depicts this positive approach to emptiness as the Yogācāra 
insight of “absolute emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214). Kuiji, who 
explicates the Buddha’s teaching as that of three stages, indicates the way in which Buddhist 
doctrinal philosophy gradually matures with the rise of Yogācāra, further implying the 
superiority of Yogācāra Buddhism over other Buddhist schools.  
The three-stage doctrinal development envisaged by Kuiji is an idealized depiction of 
history. Though Kuiji believed that the transmission of Yogācāra in China would bring an 
end to doctrinal debates, history suggests otherwise. When Kuiji’s master, Xuanzang, 
accomplished his study in India and brought more Buddhist texts back to China, his effort did 
not usher in the end of doctrinal debates over svabhāva; rather, it resulted in the split between 
early and later Yogācāra.  
6.2 The Yogācāra Objections to Essence (Svabhāva)  
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In Chapter 3, we briefly presented how later Yogācārins held a conception of consciousness 
distinct from that of early Yogācārins. In this section, I examine how their respective 
conceptions of consciousness produce differences in their refutations of svabhāva.118 For 
                                                        
118 In India, Buddhists portray the divide inside Yogācāra as follows: early Yogācārins negate the existence of 
illusory images/dharmas, in contrast to later Yogācārins who affirm it. They, thus, coin nirākāravijñānavāda 
(wuxiangweishi 無相唯識, Consciousness-only without illusory images) for early Yogācāra; sākāravijñānavāda 
(youxiangweishi 有相唯識, Consciousness-only with illusory images) for later Yogācāra (Yao 2005, 122). In 
China, the situation was more complicated. This early-later divide first appeared as two different ways of 
translating Yogācāra texts. After decades of debating, Yogācārins gradually realized that these two types of 
translations in fact expressed two distinct understandings of Consciousness-only and emptiness. Therefore, the 
early and the later are used to depict more than two consecutive time-periods. Footnote 47 has described Lü 
Cheng’s elaboration on the distinction between early and later Yogācāra. Most of Lü’s contemporaries also 
detailed the difference between the old translations and the new translations. Mei Guangxi (1880-1947), for 
instance, has listed six dissimilarities between Paramārtha’s old translations and Xuanzang’s new translations 
(Mei 2014, 341-342): 
(1) 在真谛则谓定姓⼆乘亦必由佛道⽽般涅槃，⽽⽞奘译中则谓定姓⼆乘永不回⼊⼤乘，即⾮由于
佛道⽽般涅槃，只由彼⼆乘道⽽般涅槃⽽已。此不同之处⼀也。 
(For Paramārtha, those in the hearer family and the solitary family can follow the path of the Buddha to 
attain nirvāṇa. Contrariwise, in Xuanzang’s translations, these two families can never turn to the 
Greater Vehicle, namely, cannot follow the path of the Buddha to attain nirvāṇa but rather follow their 
own paths to attain nirvāṇa. This is their first difference.) 
(2) 在真谛则谓分别性与依他性悉皆是空，真如实性是有；⽽⽞奘则谓但遍计所执性空⽽依、圆⼆
性则皆有。此不同之处⼆也。 
(For Paramārtha, among the three natures, both the imagined nature and the dependent natures are 
empty while only the last absolute nature has real existence. Contrariwise, Xuanzang contends that 
only the first imagined nature is empty, whereas the dependent nature and the absolute natures both 
have existence. This is their second difference.) 
(3) 在真谛则谓依他不由⾃成，即是分别体⽆；⽽⽞奘则但谓依他⾮⾃然⽣，不谓其⽆。此不同之
处三也。 
(For Paramārtha, dependent nature is empty insofar as it arises from dichotomization. Contrariwise, 
Xuanzang only interprets the dependent nature as secondary, not as empty. This is their third 
difference.) 
(4) 在真谛则名真如为阿摩罗识；⽽⽞奘则不名真如为识，谓真如只是清净识所缘之境⽽已。此不
同之处四也。 
(For Paramārtha, suchness is named the [ninth] consciousness, Amoluo. Contrariwise, Xuanzang does 
not equate suchness with consciousness, in that suchness characterizes how unpolluted consciousnesses 
perceive their objects. This is their fourth difference.) 
(5) 在真谛则⽈本识；在⽞奘则但⽈识，⽽不⽈本识。此不同之处五也。 
(For Paramārtha, there is the underlying original consciousness, whereas Xuanzang never pinpoints one 
original consciousness among others. This is their fifth difference.) 
(6) 真谛译之《显识论》⽈：⼀切三界，但唯有识。何者是耶？三界有两种识，⼀者显识，⼆者分
别识。此盖以第⼋识为能变，前七识为能缘也。⽽⽞奘译之《成唯识论》则⽈：诸⼼、⼼所皆
有所缘之相分，及能缘之见分等也。此不同之处六也。 
(In his translation of the Treatise on Manifesting Consciousness, Paramārtha writes, among all the 
realms, there exists only the consciousness. Why is it so? Among the three realms, there are two types 
of consciousness, that which manifests itself and that which dichotomizes. That being said, only the 
eighth consciousness can manifest and transform itself whereas all the other seven consciousnesses can 
only perceive. Contrariwise, in Chengweishilun, Xuanzang states, all consciousnesses and their mental 
factors can transform to give rise to the image parts and the seeing parts. This is their sixth difference.) 
(7) 真谛译之《转识论》，以阿陀那为第七识…⾄于新译之说，则以阿陀那为第⼋识之异名，⽽第
七识则名为末那。此不同之处七也。 
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early Yogācārins in China, everything is empty of the svabhāvic existence because 
everything is an illusion arising from the movement of consciousness. As such, nothing truly 
exists but the original consciousness. Once the original consciousness stops its movement and 
returns to its non-dual state, this consciousness becomes emptiness itself. Later Yogācārins 
formulate their objection to svabhāva differently. From their viewpoint, various things have 
no svabhāvic existence, not because they are non-existent but rather due to the fact that they 
rely on the movement of consciousnesses to appear as phenomena in one’s experience and, 
therefore, become interdependent with consciousnesses. Perceiving objects in this manner, 
later Yogācārins do not conceive of emptiness as consciousness in its non-dual state, but 
rather as the defining feature of consciousnesses devoid of illusions. To understand how early 
Yogācārins again fail to remedy the issues in the Madhyamaka account of emptiness, the 
current section will first examine early Yogācārins’ refutation of svabhāva and their 
conception of emptiness, which is to be contrasted with that in later Yogācāra. Due to the 
lack of literature produced by early Yogācārins, we mainly draw on writings composed by 
Paramārtha in what follows.  
                                                        
(In his translation of On Transforming Consciousness, Paramārtha refers to the seventh consciousness 
as Atuona … In the new translations, Atuona is used as one of the many names for the eighth 
consciousness, while the seventh consciousness is referred to as mona. This is their seventh difference.) 
(8) 地论宗以第⼋识为净识，摄论宗则更于⼋识之外⽴第九识。⽽新译所谈者，既不⽴九识，亦不
谓第⼋识是净识。此不同之处⼋也。 
(The Dilun Group refers to the eighth consciousness as the one devoid of pollutions. The Shelun Group 
postulates the existence of the ninth consciousness aside from the eight ones. For the new translations, 
there is no need to presuppose such a ninth consciousness. The eighth consciousness is also not the 
unpolluted one. This is their eighth difference.) 
 
Eventually, Mei concludes that the early translations, though departing from the Madhyamaka, still rely on most 
of Madhyamaka teaching, therefore demonstrating the transition from Madhyamaka to Yogācāra (Mei 2014, 
345).  
Drawing on and developing their findings, I intend to delve deeper into these differences. In the following 
analysis, I attempt to clarify how the different interpretations of the intentional structure of consciousness at the 
descriptive/epistemic level eventually lead to their respective understandings of three natures and emptiness in 
early and later Yogācāra. This analysis further allows me to argue for perceiving Chinese Yogācāra as a creative 
development of the doctrine from India.  
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Paramārtha expresses his objection to svabhāva through highlighting how various things 
derived from consciousnesses, as well as the consciousnesses themselves, all have no sui 
generis, immutable existence (T31N1616, P861b4-5): 
唯識無境，故名外空。以無境故，亦無有識。即是內空。 
 Nothing exists but consciousness. This indicates the emptiness of objects on the outside. Since there is no 
object, there is no consciousness either. This indicates emptiness of consciousness on the inside.119 
 
That being said, things external to consciousness have no svabhāvic existence because they 
are transformed from consciousness. Even the transforming consciousness also has no 
svabhāvic existence. As such, emptiness results from the negation of the existence of objects 
on the outside and from nullification of the existence of consciousness on the inside.  
To understand Paramārtha’s formulation of essence (svabhāva) and emptiness, it will be 
of help to revisit the notion of consciousness preserved and presented in early Yogācāra 
literature. As analyzed previously in Chapter 3, it is a consensus among early Yogācārins that 
as long as consciousness transforms, there will be subject-object dualities which further 
enable the rise of illusory dharmas.120 Considering how all illusions emerge out from the 
transformation of consciousness, early Yogācārins, therefore, contend that nothing external to 
consciousness has svabhāvic existence. Regarding all eight types of consciousness, the first 
seven surface out of the original consciousness – when the original consciousness transforms, 
it gives rise to the subject-object duality in which the subjective side becomes the seventh 
                                                        
119 This articulation might remind us of the secretive saying of Madhyamaka that always defines emptiness by 
saying what it is not. 
120 Xuanzang writes, “some say that the image parts (nimittabhāga), etc. are transformed by consciousness but 
these transformations are not as real as consciousness in the dependent nature. Otherwise, the doctrine of 
Consciousness-only could not be justified because in this case, consciousness and external objects would have 
real existence (然相分等依識變現。⾮如識性依他中實。不爾唯識理應不成。許識內境俱實有故)” 
(T31N1585, P59a6-7). As la Vallée Poussin comments, for Xuanzang, the first view comes from Nanda (la 
Vallée Poussin 1928, 714). The last view is from Sthiramati: “some say that the image parts (nimittabhāga), etc. 
have consciousness as their nature because consciousness transforms itself by force of perfuming, as if 
consciousness encompassed these (seeing and seen) parts. Suchness is also the real nature of consciousness. 
Thus, nothing exists outside the nature of consciousness. The term consciousness (here) also covers the 
accompanied mental factors because these factors always associate with consciousness (或相分等皆識為性。
由熏習⼒似多分⽣ 。真如亦是識之實性。故除識性無別有法。此中識⾔亦說⼼所。⼼與⼼所定相應
故。)” (T31N1585, P59a15-17).  
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consciousness while the objective side turns into the first six consciousnesses. In 
Paramārtha’s terms (T31N1587, P62c12-14; P62b16-17), 
⼀⼀識中，皆具能所。能分別，即是識。所分別，即是境。能，即依他性。所，即分別性。故云，
起種種分別及所分別，也由如此義。離識之外，無別境。但唯有識義成。 
 Every consciousness contains two parts, namely, that which can differentiate and that which can be 
differentiated. That which can differentiate is consciousness. That which can be differentiated is the object. 
Being able to differentiate indicates the nature of dependent arising. Being able to be differentiated entails 
the nature of differentiating. This is how various types of differentiations and their objects arise. Without 
consciousness, there will be no object. As such, we establish the doctrine of Consciousness-only.  
 
如是七識，於阿梨耶識中，盡相應起，如眾像影，俱現鏡中，亦如眾浪，同集⼀⽔。 
 These seven consciousnesses, all arise from the eighth consciousness, aliye, moment by moment, like all 
the reflecting images appear in the mirror, or, like all the waves gather in one water.  
 
From the viewpoint that the original consciousness gives rise to other consciousnesses, which 
further generate dualities and therefore illusions, early Yogācārins interpret awakening as a 
return to the non-dual state of mind. As such, in their pronouncement that nothing exists but 
consciousness, early Yogācārins actually mean that nothing exists but the original 
consciousness devoid of duality. Equally, to attain awakening means to purify any duality 
and impede the transformation of consciousness. Paramārtha delineates this non-dual state of 
mind as the ninth consciousness, amoluo-shi (阿摩羅識, amalavijñāna) (T31N1587, 
P62c19): 
此境識俱泯，即是實性。實性，即是阿摩羅識。 
 This [original] consciousness, once both its act of differentiating and the object to be differentiated are 
removed, its real nature will be revealed. This true nature is therefore amoluo-shi. 
 
For early Yogācārins, emptiness entails the real nature of things in the cosmos, which is 
further equated with the ninth consciousness (amoluo).  
To further elaborate on their conception of emptiness and their refutation of svabhāva, 
early Yogācārins turn to the three-nature theory, the three natures known as the imagined 
nature (bianjisuozhixing 遍計所執性, parikalpitasvabhāva) of illusory beings, the other 
dependent nature (yitaqixing 依他起性, paratantrasvabhāva) of consciousness’s 
transformation, and the absolute nature (yuanchengshixing 圓成實性, pariniṣpannasvabhāva) 
of things in the cosmos. Since illusions have no svabhāvic existence but are only falsely 
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imagined to be svabhāvic, the imagined nature of illusions is not real but empty (T31N1585, 
P45c18). What generates illusions are subject-object dualities which result from the 
transformation of consciousness (T31N1585, P46a18-19). As such, duality characterizes the 
dependent nature, which equally becomes illusory and non-existent (T31N1585, P46a20). 
Removed and purified from all the illusions, only the underlying original consciousness has 
real existence. The original consciousness, devoid of all the illusions and dualities, turns into 
the luminous mind of suchness, manifesting the last absolute nature (T31N1587, P62c19).  
Later Yogācārins represented by Xuanzang and Kuiji become very concerned about early 
Yogācāra’s stance on emptiness (śūnyatā) and essence (svabhāva). They argue that, because 
early Yogācārins assimilate all eight types of consciousness into one original consciousness, 
early Yogācārins fail to acknowledge the unique epistemic function (yong用) of each 
consciousness (T31N1587, P1a16). Moreover, Xuanzang and Kuiji maintain that early 
Yogācārins could not provide a satisfactory explanation for the possibility of transformation 
from being illusory to being pure. If illusions have no real existence, how can this 
transformation from consciousness to illusions happen in the first place? Since early 
Yogācārins do not acknowledge the existence of illusions, they could not address this 
question of arising, and further fail to distance themselves from the Mādhyamikas (Mei 2014, 
345). Xuanzang and Kuiji also recognize another problem with the early Yogācāra refutation 
of svabhāva, which has to do with their notion of the non-dual state of mind,121 a notion that 
is depicted by early Yogācārins almost as another svabhāva.  
                                                        
121 Early Yogācārins in China gradually split into two groups. According to the dilunshi (地論師, 
Daśabhūmikas), followers of Bodhiruci (arriving in China in 508), everything has no existence, except for the 
original consciousness. Existing as the pure side of the eighth consciousness laiye, the original consciousness is 
the luminous mind (T26N1522, P187a22). The shelunshi (摄論師, Saṃgrahas) represented by Paramārtha (499-
569CE) argue otherwise. They postulate the existence of a ninth consciousness amoluo, as the purified original 
consciousness. Therefore, the shelunshi deem all eight consciousnesses to be non-existent while affirming the 
real existence of amoluo. Aside from their debate over doctrinal philosophy, early Yogācārins could not agree 
upon how to translate the name of each consciousness. The eighth consciousness, for instance, was transliterated 
sometimes as alaiye (阿賴耶), and sometimes as aliye (阿黎耶) (T31N1587, P62b16).  
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To remedy these issues, later Chinese Yogācārins develop the conception of 
consciousness and emptiness. In their refutation of svabhāva, later Yogācārins go beyond the 
polarity of existence and non-existence by introducing three types of existence. I identify 
these three types as: seemingly real existence, fictitious existence, and real existence.  
By seemingly real (xushi 虛實 or siyou 似有),122 Xuanzang means that the 
transformation of consciousness, though being empty of any svabhāvic quality, still has a 
special way of existing (you 有), without which we could not explicate the nature of illusions 
at the exact moment they arise (T31N1585, P39a3). This becomes how later Yogācārins 
affirm the existence of illusory images that are as “seemingly real as consciousness” 
(T31N1585, P46c8-9; P59a8-9): 
 謂⼼⼼所及所變現，眾緣⽣故。如幻事等，⾮有似有，誑惑愚夫。 
 What are transformed from consciousnesses and their mental factors depend on various conditions to arise. 
[Those transformed ones,] like illusory events etc., they do not really exist but are only seemingly real, in 
such a way that the ignorant ones can be tricked or fooled.  
 
 或識相⾒等，從緣⽣。俱依他起，虛實如識。唯⾔遣外，不遮內境。不爾，真如亦應⾮實。 
                                                        
122 To end CWSL, Xuanzang expounds whether the seeing and the image parts are real. He enumerates three 
accounts, of which, according to Kuiji, the second one represents the correct view. This second account goes as 
follows, “or, the darśanabhāga and nimittanabhāga of the consciousness, etc, arise, due to various conditions, 
both of which are characterized by the second dependent nature. Thus, these two parts are seemingly real as 
consciousness (或，識相⾒等，從緣⽣。俱依他起，虛實如識。)” (T31N1585, P59a8). The key concept 
here is 虛實, which I translate as “seemingly real”. In classical Chinese, the character 虛 has mainly three 
meanings: 1) empty; 2) false; 3) weak. In his translation, Louis de la Vallée Poussin opted for the second 
meaning and rendered 虛實 as “false or real”. However, as we will clarify later, the second dependent nature is 
real. If so, those that are characterized by the nature as such cannot be either false or real. Thus, given the 
nuance of this term 虛, I contend that the concept of 虛實 should be translated as a compound, as “emptily real” 
or “seemingly real”, namely, a reality that seems to be as real as the transforming consciousness, yet is 
ultimately empty. Later in Chapter 9, we will encounter Kuiji’s formation of “five steps of contemplating 
Consciousness-only (wuchongweihsi 五重唯識觀)”, the first step of which is known as “dispelling the 
seemingly real from the really existing consciousness so that the latter could remain (qianxucunshishi 遣虛存
實)” (T45N1861, P258b21). Upon translating 虛 as the seeming, we preserve the neutrality of this term, further 
sustaining the open possibility for both false views and correct insights. Earlier when explicating the three 
natures, Xuanzang uses another concept, siyou 似有, to capture the metaphysical quality of those that are 
transformed from consciousness. As Xuanzang unpacks, these seeing and image parts, although they exist, are 
not genuinely real (有⽽⾮真) (T31N1585, P46c06). He, thus, depicts such existing of illusory seeing and 
image parts as “not ultimately real but seemingly real (⾮有似有)” (T31N1585, P46c09). Both notions here, 
either xushi 虛實, or, siyou 似有, as I suggest, are harnessed by Xuanzang to facilitate his depicting of the 
neutral reality of the seeing and the image parts transformed from consciousness. As we will soon encounter, the 
expression with a more negative denotation, viz. falsely, factitious real, which we can locate in CWSL is either 
xuwang 虛妄 (in contrast to xushi 虛實), or, jiayou 假有 (contrasted with siyou 似有). Nevertheless, such 
seemingly reality of that which is transformed from consciousness, for sure, does not allude to any mind-
independent existence. For a close examination of such an issue in CWSL, please consult Schmithausen (2005). 
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 Or, the image part and the seeing part of a consciousness arise when various conditions are fulfilled. Both 
parts depend on consciousness to arise, therefore as seemingly real as consciousness. We only contend that 
there is no consciousness-independent external world. This does not mean phenomena in experience have 
no existence. If that were not the case, even suchness would not be real. 
 
The seemingly real existence soon raises an open possibility. As previously expounded in 
Chapter 3, when consciousness transforms, it generates the seeing part (darśanabhāga) and 
the image part (nimittabhāga). Now, according to Xuanzang, both parts have a seemingly 
real existence. An existence, as such, can further be cognized in two manners: sometimes we 
come to see these two parts as they really are and, thus, realize emptiness and 
interdependence; other times, we misperceive these two parts as svabhāvic, which further 
gives rise to a wide range of attachments.   
What is produced by misconception has only a fictitious existence (jiayou 假有, 
prajñāptisat). As Xuanzang quotes from the Madhyāntavibhāga, “the imagined (parikalpita) 
does not really exist. In order to indicate its non-existence, we describe it as a fictitious 
name” (T31N1585, P47a10).123 Indeed, in our embodied attachments, we misconceive our 
self and other beings in the cosmos as sui generis, self-determining, and svabhāvic. To fortify 
the self-other polarization in our discriminative attachments, we further produce names to 
differentiate the self from other. These names are fictitious insofar as our self-identity is not 
immutable but constituted through our constant interactions with the rest of the world. As 
such, Xuanzang implicitly associates fictitious existence with svabhāva, in that svabhāva is 
nothing but a fictitious name.  
Contrariwise, the real existence (shiyou 實有, dravyasat) that underlies all our false 
conceptualization starts to reveal itself after we see things as they actually are. As is stated in 
CWSL, “if the real dharmas do not exist, the fictitious ones do not exist either. It is so 
because the fictitious is established on the real” (T31N1585, P47c12).124 To capture how 
                                                        
123 Xuanzang writes, “遍計所執都無，體故為顯⾮有，假說為名。” 
124 Xuanzang writes, “若無實法，假法亦無，假依實因，⽽施設故。” 
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false conceptualization obstructs us from seeing this real existence, Yogācārins pinpoint two 
types of obstructions: obstructions of defilement (fannaozhang 煩惱障, kleśāvaraṇa) that 
arise from self-attachments, and obstructions of knowledge (suozhizhang 所知障, 
jñeyāvaraṇa) that emerge from dharma-attachments. These obstructions and attachments can 
be overcome by conducting various Buddhist practices at the prescriptive level, which we 
will revisit in the last part of this dissertation.  
This explanation of the existence of illusory dharmas is fully elaborated in the account of 
the three natures in CWSL. Xuanzang first unpacks the imagined nature in the following 
manner (T31N1585, P45c26-27; P46-a11): 
 第六第七⼼品，執我法者，是能遍計。唯說意、識，能遍計故。意及意識，名意識故。計度分別，
能遍計故。 
 The sixth and seventh consciousnesses, when misperceiving the self and the dharma, are the ones that can 
falsely imagine. Only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses can falsely imagine. The seventh 
consciousness yi and the sixth consciousness yishi, in short, we refer to them as yishi. The two can 
conceptualize and differentiate, further being able to falsely imagine.   
 
That being said, when consciousness transforms itself, the seemingly real seeing and image 
parts arise. Among all eight types of consciousness, only the sixth and seventh ones can 
falsely imagine these parts as svabhāvic. False imaginations further pollute the transforming 
consciousnesses. As such, the imagined nature is fictitious and not real (T31N1585, P47c09).  
The transformation of consciousness, since it generates the seemingly real seeing and 
image parts, opens up the possibility of either polluting consciousness with misperceptions or 
purifying consciousness by seeing things as they are. This transformation has a real existence 
(T31N1585, P47c11). To put it differently, the second, other dependent nature is real. As 
detailed by Xuanzang (T31N1585, P46b7-8), 
 頌⾔分別緣所⽣者，應知且說，染分依他。淨分依他，亦圓成故。 
 Those referred to as being generated from differentiation in Triṃśikā, are tantamount to the part of the 
dependent nature which is polluted by misperceptions. The part of the dependent nature that is pure of 
misperceptions, therefore turns out to be the last absolute nature.  
 
Therefore, when any false imagination is removed, the absolute nature of consciousnesses 
reveals itself. “This nature, devoid of any false imagination, is empty of self-attachments and 
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dharma-attachments, therefore unveiling its nature as suchness” (T31N1585, P46b14).125  
The absolute nature, which describes consciousness pure of misperceptions, also has real 
existence (T31N1585, P47c13). Kuiji further clarifies that the absolute nature is synonymous 
to the true nature of being empty, also known as suchness and emptiness (T43N1830, 
P546b3-5). Characterizing the polluted, neutral, pure states of consciousnesses, the three 
natures are likewise interdependent with consciousness (T31N1585, P46c13).  
In facilitating our understanding of the three natures, it is helpful to turn to the well-
known Chan analogy of “mountains as mountains”. When our perception is predominated by 
the first imagined nature, we see mountains as mountains and waters as waters that are 
svabhāvic, invariant across time and space, and independent of us. The second dependent 
nature enables us to recognize our false imaginations and understand that the mountain and 
water in our perceptions are phenomena transformed from consciousness. Thus, we no longer 
see mountains as mountains, waters as waters. Eventually, when we realize the absolute 
nature of things as they actually are, we again see mountains as mountains, waters as waters, 
though not in a svabhāvic sense but as interdependent with ourselves. 
Given the explication of the three-nature account in later Yogācāra, one can further 
comprehend the early-later divide among Chinese Yogācārins. As previously examined, early 
Yogācārins believe that all consciousnesses can falsely imagine and further negate the real 
existence of the second dependent nature. In their interpretation of the last nature, early 
Yogācārins equate it with the consciousness of suchness, further making emptiness 
tantamount to the non-dual state of mind. To the contrary, upon acknowledging the existence 
of illusory dharmas, later Yogācārins contend that only the seventh and sixth consciousnesses 
can misperceive or falsely imagine. They continue to acknowledge the real existence of the 
second dependent nature. Regarding the last nature, later Yogācārins demarcate emptiness 
                                                        
125 Xuanzang writes, “遠離前遍計所執。⼆空所顯，真如為性。” 
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from consciousness, insofar as emptiness is not the original consciousness per se, but the 
defining feature of consciousnesses when being pure of misperceptions (T45N1861, 
P259a14).  
To elaborate on this conception of emptiness, Kuiji further details the distinction 
between “empty” (kong 空, śūnya) and “emptiness” (kongxing 空性, śūnyatā) (T44N1835, 
P2b25-29; T43N1830, P546a3-5, a28): 
 即妄分別中，離於⼆取，唯有真如。真如是妄分別體故，無⼆取也。但⾔空者，即⼆取無。⾔空性
者，以空為⾨。顯空性，即真如也。梵云瞬若，但名為空。⾔瞬若多故，說真如，名空性也。以多
此翻是性義故。 
 That being said, once the act of grasping and the phenomenon to be grasped can be removed from 
differentiation, there remains suchness. [Therefore,] suchness is the body of differentiation, devoid of 
grasping. By empty, we mean the absence of the two types of grasping. By emptiness, we mean that which 
takes the empty as the door. [When the door is open, one comes to see] the revealed nature of being empty 
as suchness. The Sanskrit term śūnya, we refer to it only as the “empty”. The Sanskrit term śūnyatā, we 
refer to it only as “emptiness”. We say suchness is the name of emptiness. Translated in this manner, 
emptiness becomes the nature of being empty.  
  
 此圓成實，依他起上，無計所執。⼆我既空，依此空⾨，所顯真如，為其⾃性。梵云瞬若，此說為
空。云瞬若多，此名空性。如名空性，不名為空，故依空⾨，⽽顯此性。即圓成實，是空所顯。 
 This absolute nature will arise, once the false imagination has been removed from the dependent nature. If 
the self-attachments and dharma-attachments are empty, this being-empty opens the door and reveals 
suchness as the nature of itself. The Sanskrit term śūnya refers to the empty. The Sanskrit term śūnyatā 
amounts to emptiness. We call it emptiness, not empty, because emptiness is the nature unveiled by the 
empty. That being said, the absolute nature [qua emptiness] is unveiled by the empty.  
 
 真如，是空之性，⾮即是空。空為所由，如⽅顯故。 
 Suchness is the nature of being empty, therefore, not the same as the empty, but rather revealed by the 
empty.  
 
In the Sanskrit language, one can add the affix -tā to an adjective, from which there derives a 
noun of a more abstract meaning. Having said that, śūnyatā entails a more abstract form of 
śūnya. Although relating the notion of emptiness to its Sanskrit origin, Kuiji does not 
perceive emptiness as the more abstract meaning of the empty. Rather, playing with the 
nuance of words in the Chinese language, Kuiji puts forward his innovative interpretation. 
This is how Kuiji inserts his creative understanding of the Sanskrit concepts in his 
commentary. He defines the empty as that which is absent of both of the two types of 
grasping (qu 取, grāha) and the two types of attachments. Grasping is another way of 
describing false imagination and misperception. Therefore, grasping appears when someone 
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misperceives the seeing parts of consciousness as the svabhāvic acts of grasping, the image 
parts as the svabhāvic images to be grasped. Accordingly, grasping will be removed once this 
person comes to see things as they really are. Along with the absence of grasping, there 
comes the removal of attachments. Subsequently, the true nature of things in the cosmos will 
unveil. Such a nature of being empty of svabhāvic qualities is known as emptiness or 
suchness. Therefore, through these three passages, Kuiji intends to stress that the notion of 
empty indicates a negation of misperception, grasping, and false imagination, whereas the 
concept of emptiness demonstrates a positive articulation of the true nature of things in the 
cosmos. Having said that, emptiness is not an abstract void. Quite to the contrary, emptiness 
(kongxing 空性) entails the nature (xing 性) of being empty (kong 空) of svabhāva 
(T44N1835, P2b29).  
Kuiji’s interpretation of emptiness is deeply indebted to his master Xuanzang, who is 
particularly critical of the nihilist view that equates emptiness with nothingness. As 
Xuanzang expounds (T31N1585, P39b14-19). 
 謂依識變妄執，實法理不可得，說為法空。⾮無離⾔正智所證唯識性，故說為法空。此識若無，便
無俗諦。俗諦無故，真諦亦無，真俗相依⽽建⽴故。撥無⼆諦，是惡取空。諸佛說為不可治者。應
知諸法有空不空。 
 By emptiness of dharma, we mean that dharmas, which are transformed by consciousness, cannot be 
falsely grasped as svabhāvic, in principle. It does not entail that the nature of consciousness, which is 
ineffable but can be realized by correct wisdom, does not exist. If consciousness had no existence, the 
conventional truth would not exist either. If the conventional truth had no existence, the ultimate truth 
would not exist either, insofar as the conventional and the ultimate are interdependent. Those who negate 
the twofold truth misunderstand emptiness. They are deemed incurable by the awakened ones. As such, 
one shall know that all are empty and are also not empty. 
 
Regarding the nature of consciousness, Xuanzang further elucidates that (T31N1585, P39a3), 
 唯，既不遮不離識法。故真空等，亦是有性。 
 The term “only” [in Consciousness-only] does not deny the existence of those dharmas that are dependent 
on consciousness. That is why those that are truly empty etc., also have their nature. 
 
Consequently, for Xuanzang and Kuiji, Consciousness-only cannot be equated to the 
statement that nothing exists but the non-dual state of mind. Rather, it shows that everything 
is not independent of consciousness (不離識). Since all the images in one’s experience arise 
from the movement of consciousness, these images are only as seemingly real as 
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consciousness. Once this person removes any falsely imagined, factious existence from these 
images, the true nature of consciousness as well as its transformation discloses; and this is the 
nature of being truly empty, otherwise known as emptiness. Articulated in this manner, 
emptiness is not the same as the non-dual state of mind but rather defines what things 
actually are in the constant process of arising and perishing. Equally, emptiness is not a void 
but the defining quality of things in the cosmos and the underlying principle of change. This 
viewpoint presented in later Yogācāra differs from that in early Yogācāra, which is illustrated 
by the following table:  
Viewpoints  Early Yogācāra Later Yogācāra 
Descriptive 
level 
Intentional 
structure 
The onefold or twofold structure 
 
The threefold or fourfold structure 
 
 
Origin of 
illusion 
 
As long as each consciousness 
transforms, there will be subject-
object dualities from which 
illusions arise.  
All consciousness can produce 
illusions. 
Illusions derive from 
misperceptions of the seventh and 
sixth consciousnesses. 
Not all consciousness, but only 
the seventh and the sixth can 
produce illusions. 
 
Relation of the 
consciousnesses 
The first seven consciousnesses 
surface out of the original 
consciousness qua the eighth 
consciousness. 
 
“All consciousnesses have 
different functions but share the 
same underlying body (諸識⽤別
體同)” (T31N1587, P1a16). 
 
All the first seven 
consciousnesses depend on the 
eighth consciousness to arise, but 
they cannot be assimilated into 
the eighth consciousness. 
 
“All consciousnesses have 
different functions and therefore 
their bodies are distinct from one 
another.” 
Explicative 
level 
 
Definition of 
Consciousness-
only 
Consciousness-only means that 
nothing exists but the original 
consciousness. 
(metaphysical idealism) 
Consciousness-only means that 
everything depends on 
consciousness to appear as 
phenomena for someone. 
(transcendental idealism) 
 
 
Elaboration of 
the three natures 
The imagined nature and the 
dependent nature both allude to 
duality, therefore, being illusory 
and having no existence. 
 
The imagined nature indicates 
misperception and, therefore, has 
no real but only fictitious 
existence. 
 
The dependent nature has 
seemingly real existence. 
 
 
 
Interpretation of 
emptiness 
To awaken means to sweep the 
dust and uncover the non-dual 
state of mind. 
 
The non-dual state of mind is 
emptiness; it is also the ninth 
consciousness. 
To awaken means to purify 
misperception to acquire the pure 
state of mind. 
 
Emptiness is the defining feature 
of pure consciousness, not the 
same as consciousness. 
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The next question we will address is whether later Yogācāra does resolve problems in 
Madhyamaka’s account of emptiness in a more satisfactory way than early Yogācāra. Recall 
the two problems Kuiji identified in Madhyamaka’s conception of emptiness: the ambivalent 
nature of illusory dharma and the impossibility of Buddhist practice (T45N1861, P249a22). If 
illusory dharmas do have their distinct form of existence, they can rise and perish at any 
moment. Sentient beings, likewise, can engage in various practices to become one with 
emptiness through removing misperceptions and purifying consciousness. In the following 
chapters, when I use phrases like “becoming one with emptiness”, I do not mean to assimilate 
consciousness to emptiness. This phrase will rather indicate the way in which our 
consciousness embraces the nature of being empty and embodies the underlying principle of 
arising and perishing. As to be seen in Chapter 9, the Yogācāra stress on the wondrous 
existence of transformable dharmas likewise becomes fundamental to their interpretation of 
Buddha nature and to their promotion of the gotra system.  
6.3 Essence, Emptiness, and Existence  
In the previous section, we have examined the accounts of essence and emptiness preserved 
in early and later Yogācāra. Different from early Yogācāra, which negates the existence of 
illusory dharmas, later Yogācāra introduces a more positive way of understanding the 
existence of illusions and consciousnesses. Clerics in later Yogācāra propose three types of 
existence (fictitious, seemingly real, real) to capture three modes of being for a phenomenon 
in experience when it is perceived as svabhāvic, as transformed by consciousness, and as it 
actually is, respectively. Nagao Gadjin describes this positive view of existence as later 
Yogācāra’s insight of “absolute emptiness and wondrous being” (Nagao 1991, 214). Now, 
what does this wondrous being (miaoyou 妙有) entail? Does this existence (you 有) allude to 
another svabhāva that endures throughout perennial time? This question directs us back to the 
notion we encountered earlier, namely, that of ālambanapratyaya (所缘缘).   
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Yogācārins utilize the concept of ālambanapratyaya (所緣緣) to differentiate the role of 
external objects from that of images transformed from consciousness, which further allows 
Yogācārins to distance themselves from the Sarvāstivāda style of epistemological realism. As 
Xuanzang clarifies in CWSL (T31N1585, P40c15), 
三所緣緣。謂若有法，是帶⼰相，⼼或相應，所慮、所託。 
 The third [out of the four conditions] is the condition of that which can be perceived. Its definition is as 
such: an existing dharma/object appears as its own image [in the mind] which can be perceived, further 
becoming dependent on consciousnesses and the mental factors. 
 
In other words, to be qualified as suoyuanyuan, a dharma needs first to meet the criteria of 
being a suoyuan (所緣, ālambana), namely, an object intended by our consciousnesses. Thus, 
atoms do not meet this condition, insofar as they are too small to be noted (T31N1624, 
P888b12). Second, this dharma should have real existence (有), be eligible to be a yuan (緣, 
pratyaya). For instance, when we claim to have seen two moons in the sky, the second moon 
has no real existence, so it is a delusion (T31N1624, P888b19).126 Consequently, the so-
called second moon does not fulfil the condition of that which can be perceived. Kuiji further 
clarifies the meaning of “existing (有)” as such (T43N1830, P500b21): 
謂若有法者，謂⾮遍計所執。 
By existing dharmas, we mean those that are not produced by false imagination.  
 
                                                        
126 Both examples are taken from Xuanzang’s translation of Dharmapāla’s Treatise on the Contemplation of the 
Condition of the Perceived Phenomena (觀所緣緣論, Ālambanaparīkşā) (T31N1624). For a more in-depth 
discussion of Xuanzang’s creative translation of Dharmapāla’s Ālambanaparīkşā, see Lü Cheng’s 1928 paper 
“On the Distinctness of Xuanzang’s Translation of Ālambanaparīkşā” (論奘譯觀所緣釋論之特徵) (Lü 1986, 
5-62) and Dan Lusthaus’s discussion of Lü Cheng and the Alambanaparikṣa (Lusthaus 2014, 317-341). Aside 
from Xuanzang’s translation, there are three other ones available. As Lü listed in his paper, Paramārtha, Yijing 
(635-713), and Lü himself have also translated this text penned by Dharmapāla. In his paper “Object of 
cognition in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti: On the controversial passages in Paramārtha's and Xuanzang's 
translations”, Lin Chen-Kuo highlighted how the discrepancy among these four translations reveals Xuanzang’s 
distinct understanding of the ontological status of the object of cognition, namely, of ālambana (Lin 2009, 118). 
As Lin insightfully pinpoints, “If the object of mental consciousness is regarded as externally real, it should be 
subject to the same criticism that Dignāga had launched against re- alists. On the other hand, if it is not 
externally real, there is no need to include it as the target of investigation” (Lin 2009, 118). And Lin continues, 
“To sum up Dharmapāla’s commentary, the central argument of Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti is said to be a 
refutation of the realist thesis that all sensory objects of cognition are external objects” (Lin 2009, 130). 
Drawing on Lin’s analysis, I develop his argument by exploring what this anti-realism entails and how one 
could give a positive definition of this metaphysical position embraced by Xuanzang and his disciples.  
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Therefore, anything that is not contaminated by the false imagination, not being grasped as 
svabhāva, can be considered to have a real existence, either as seemingly real dharmas or as 
the real consciousnesses. From the conception of existence, there derives the conception of 
reality presented in the doctrine of later Yogācāra. On the one hand, consciousness is not 
exhaustive of reality. As we have seen in the example of two moons, if reality is merely a 
production of consciousness, we will not be able to differentiate the real moon from the 
delusion. This view that nothing exists but consciousness is espoused by early Yogācārins, 
not by later Yogācārins. On the other hand, reality is not svabhāvic. As indicated above, the 
existence of svabhāvic objects is fictitious and cannot serve as a condition. While Theravāda 
followers, like Sarvāstivādins, acknowledge the existence of svabhāvic reality through their 
articulation of knowledge, Yogācārins divorce themselves from such realism.  
For later Yogācārins, any svabhāva is characterized by three defining qualities: being 
immutable (chang 常), sui generis or self-determining (zhuzhai 主宰), and persistent 
throughout time and space (bian 遍) (T43N1830, P239c3; P244c22). In this regard, the 
existence of dharma is too momentary to become svabhāvic, because dharmas arise and 
perish constantly. Whenever these dharmas appear in our consciousness, their existence 
becomes seemingly real. Likewise, the existence of consciousness is far from immutable, 
insofar as consciousness incessantly transforms itself moment by moment. Through the 
transformation of consciousnesses, these real dharmas appear as image/manifestation. 
Subsequently, we either see these seemingly real dharmas as they actually are and realize 
emptiness, or misconceive this seemingly real existence as something svabhāvic to which we 
form attachments.  
Our discussion of the Yogācāra view of reality permits us to inquire into the 
metaphysical position endorsed by later Yogācārins through their articulation of emptiness 
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and essence (svabhāva).127 To demarcate later Yogācāra from early Yogācāra, let us recall 
the latter’s view of reality. As previously mentioned, early Yogācārins perceive the original 
consciousness as the ground for everything in the cosmos; and it becomes tantamount to 
emptiness once it is purified of dualities. Considering how the original consciousness is 
exhaustive of all realities, we interpret the viewpoint of early Yogācāra as metaphysical 
idealism. Early Yogācārins, who lived in the time when terms such as metaphysics or realism 
were not incorporated into the popular discourse of Buddhism, had employed a different 
terminology to express their viewpoint – “all consciousnesses have different functions but 
share the same underlying body (諸識⽤別體同)” (T31N1587, P1a16). With the help of the 
body-function pair, early Yogācārins ipso facto envisage the original consciousness as the 
origin of all consciousness and transformed illusions. Articulated as the underlying Ti or 
body, the original consciousness entails an absolute idea qua the ninth consciousness, 
amoluo. As such, nothing exists but this absolute idea.  
Different from early Yogācārins, Xuanzang and his disciples do not support the idea of 
the original consciousness as the cosmic origin. By acknowledging the existence of 
                                                        
127 Scholars have proposed the following ways of demarcating Yogācāra’s idealistic position (Li 2016): Lambert 
Schmithausen interprets it as metaphysical idealism – “there are no entities, especially no material entities, apart 
from consciousness, or more precisely, apart from the various kinds of mind (citta) and the mental factors or 
mind-associates (caitta)” (Schmithausen 2005, 1). Ashok Kumar Chatterjee reads it as absolute idealism that 
surpasses Madhyamaka’s dialectical idealism (Chatterjee 1962, 27-28). Alex Wayman casts doubt on 
Chatterjee’s reading of “consciousness as the sole reality”, because, in Yogācāra, “in respect to content, this 
system is realistic; in respect to form, it is idealistic” (Wayman 1965, 67). Thomas Kochumuttom prefers to dub 
it “realistic pluralism”, not “monistic idealism” (Kochumuttom 1982, 21). Upon interpreting the Yogācāra study 
of consciousness as an epistemological investigation rather than a metaphysical inquiry, Dan Lusthaus contends 
that, “having suspended the ontological query that leads either to idealism or materialism, they instead are 
interested in uncovering why we generate and attach to such positions in the first place” (Lusthaus 2003, 6). 
While Lusthaus defines Yogācāra’s position in a negative manner as neither idealism nor materialism, I propose 
to follow the “direct explicating” approach adopted by Xuanzang and Kuiji themselves to give a positive or 
affirmative explication of Yogācāra’s position. This positive definition will further facilitate our understanding 
of ways in which Yogācārins conceive of this transcendental idealism not only as a worldview (ways of 
understanding the world) but also as a guide to actions. These readings of Yogācāra Buddhism, however, 
overlook the early-later divide inside the Yogācāra school. Yogācārins, at least those in China, have offered not 
one but two different versions of idealism. Due to this contrast, I am hesitatant to bring Yogācāra’s idealism 
under one brand. Nonetheless, I would likewise venture to build a positive reading of the metaphysical position 
endorsed by Xuanzang and Kuiji, through drawing on Lusthaus’s critical reading. Therefore, as mentioned 
above, early Yogācārins have endorsed what is currently known as metaphysical idealism, whereas latter 
Yogācārins advocate correlative dualism.  
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seemingly real dharmas, later Yogācārins espouse realism in an empirical sense. Meanwhile, 
even though they affirm the momentary existence of seemingly real phenomena in our 
experience, they do not go further to depict such existence as svabhāvic, therefore distancing 
themselves from schools in the Theravāda tradition in which most clerics hold a similar 
position as metaphysical realists. Implying their support for what can be interpreted as 
empirical realism, later Yogācārins affirm the existence of an intersubjectively accessible 
world through their analysis of other minds. They further proclaim that the external world, 
the body of all beings, as well as consciousnesses are neither similar nor dissimilar such that 
these three factors are mutually interdependent (T31N1624, P889a9).  
In the wake of their conception of seemingly real existence, Yogācārins also expressed 
their view of ideality, which can be inferred from the notion of the body (ti 體) of 
consciousness. As previously mentioned, early Yogācārins perceive of the original 
consciousness as the origin and ground, namely, as the body (ti 體) of all other types of 
consciousness. Later Yogācārins, however, argue otherwise. As elaborated by Kuiji 
(T43N1830, P487a13-14),  
 謂⼀識體，改轉為⼆相起，異於⾃體。即⾒有能取之⽤；相有質礙⽤等。由識⾃體，轉起能取，及
有礙故。 
 We therefore say that the body of consciousness changes and transforms into two images that are different 
from the body itself. That being said, the seeing part has the function of being able to grasp. The image 
part has the function of being a distinct archetype and phenomenon. Therefore, from the body of 
consciousness, there stem the one which is able to grasp and the phenomenon which is distinct.  
 
Indeed, later Yogācārins in China followed Dharmapāla to perceive consciousness through 
the fourfold structure, in which the seeing part and the image part represent the function 
(yong ⽤) qua vijñapti, whereas the underlying self-awareness and the reflective awareness of 
this self-awareness epitomize the underlying body qua vijñāna. The body (ti 體) of 
consciousness entails a self-aware ego, which has been coined by Western philosophers, such 
as Husserl, as subjectivity.  
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As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, subjectivity exists in two forms, either passively 
and subconsciously in the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, or actively and consciously in 
the first six consciousnesses. Although this subjectivity is not tantamount to a svabhāvic ego 
or exhaustive of all real objects, it serves as the condition for the possibility of phenomena to 
appear in the mind, further able to determine how such possibility is realized. Unlike early 
Yogācārins who envisage the pure state of the original consciousness qua amoluo-shi as an 
absolute idea, later Yogācārins perceive subjectivity as an ideality in the transcendental 
sense. Given their implicit view of subjectivity, later Yogācārins endorse a worldview which 
can be interpreted as transcendental idealism in the Husserlian sense. The metaphysical 
position of later Yogācāra, likewise, can be demarcated from that of early Yogācāra (namely, 
metaphysical idealism) and that of Theravāda (namely, metaphysical realism).  
Indeed, subjectivity in a transcendentally ideal sense gives rises to an open possibility 
between falsely imagining things as svabhāvic and seeing things as they are, between 
attachment and detachment, and eventually between becoming an ignorant one (yufu 愚夫) 
and becoming a wise one (zhizhe 智者). As demonstrated by CWSL (T31N1585, P48a4-9; 
b3-4), 
 即依此前所說三性，⽴彼後說三種無性，謂即相、⽣、勝義無性。故佛密意說，⼀切法皆無⾃性，
⾮性全無。說密意，⾔顯⾮了義。謂後⼆性，雖體⾮無，⽽有愚夫，於彼增益，妄執實有我法⾃
性。此即名為遍計所執。為除此執故，佛世尊於有及無，總說無性。 
 Drawing on our previous discussion of the three natures, we can derive the three non-natures, namely, the 
non-svabhāvic nature of images, the non-svabhāvic nature of arising, and the ultimate non-svabhāvic 
nature. Therefore, the Buddha secretively implied that all dharmas have no svabhāva. It does not mean 
their nature is non-existent. We use the term “secretive implying” for the purpose of demonstrating its non-
explicitness. The last two natures, though not non-existent, have been misperceived by the ignorant ones as 
svabhāvic self and dharmas, therefore giving rise to the first imagined nature. To awaken the ignorant ones 
from their mistake, the honored one spoke of dharmas as non-existent by nature.  
  
 三頌總顯諸契經中說無性，⾔⾮極了義。諸有智者，不應依之，總撥諸法都無⾃性。 
 The three verses reveal that the way in which many sūtras speak of the nature of non-existence is not 
explicit. All the wise ones will not follow the literal meaning of these texts in order to negate the existent 
nature of dharmas. 
 
The ignorant ones can exercise their nature of being a subject, namely their subjectivity, in a 
wrong way, further falsely imagining various phenomena as svabhāvic entities in virtue of 
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the function of the seventh and sixth consciousnesses. As examined in Chapter 3, false 
imagination propels one to embrace an egocentric lifestyle, conduct non-altruistic actions, 
and cultivate an egocentric worldview. Evil, subsequently, arises from egoism. Yogācārins 
refer to this cultivation as “perfuming (熏習)” the seeds in the storehouse consciousness 
(T31N1585, P8b8), that is, cultivating more possibilities of future egoistic views or actions.  
Contrarily, subjectivity of those with wisdom allows them to open their eyes to the real 
existence of things in the cosmos that arise and perish moment by moment. Prior to becoming 
one with emptiness, those with wisdom shall make a constant effort to conduct rituals and 
actions for purifying previous misperceptions. They will also realize their interdependence 
with the ignorant ones, further awakening their compassion. Indeed, cultivation for those with 
wisdom becomes a long process of de-habitualizing from egoism and re-habitualizing in a 
collective setting. We will continue to detail how such self-transformation, namely, the 
process of de-habitualizing and re-habitualizing, is possible through self-power and other-
power in Chapter 9.   
Perceived as such, transcendental idealism for later Yogācārins is not only a worldview, 
but also a norm for practice, not only an explication of how we can perceive phenomena in 
experience, but also a prescription of what we should do in everyday life. In Kuiji’s terms, 
the Buddha preached for the third time about the ultimate meaning of existence and 
emptiness for the purpose of encouraging one’s religious practice (T45N1861, P249a23). 
Now, we have clarified the meaning of essence in Husserl in Chapter 5, as well as the 
meaning of svabhāva and emptiness in Yogācāra in the present chapter. We can, thus, 
proceed to solve the problem of essence in the upcoming Chapter 7. 
 
Chapter 7: The Problem of Essence in a Multicultural and Multilingual Context 
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Now that we have examined the concept of essence in Husserl’s phenomenology, and the 
notion of svabhāva described by later Yogācārins, we can proceed to address the problem of 
essence. Before tackling this problem, I would like to invite readers to take a step back and 
think about how the term essence is used in a multicultural and multilingual context. 
In contemporary studies of philosophy, scholars speak of essences as necessary attributes 
or properties that cannot be lacked by an object (Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Cowling 2013; 
Correia 2007; Denby 2014; Wildman 2013; Zalta 2006).128 For instance, one might say that a 
cat person has many characteristics, such as loving cats, able to afford cat food, knowing how 
to contact a vet, etc. Among these, the essence of a cat person is the attribute of loving cats, 
not that of knowing how to contact a vet.129 In common vernacular, essences are usually used 
in contrast with accidental, unnecessary, or contingent properties of an object.  
In the context of this dissertation, the difficulty in understanding the notion of essence 
stems from the fact that neither Husserl nor Yogācārins have directly utilized the English 
word “essence” in their investigations of consciousness. Husserl employed the German term 
“wesen”, further borrowing “eidos” from Greek and “essentia” from Latin. When we shift 
our attention to the Chinese context, the situation becomes equally complicated. In our 
previous analysis, we encountered three Chinese terms that are often paraphrased as the 
                                                        
128 This way of defining essence as necessary attributes or properties, in contrast with accidental properties, 
namely, unnecessary and contingent ones of an object, yields the modality account of essence. To challenge this 
modal characterization of essence, contemporary philosophers propose two alternatives: the definitional 
characterization and the explanatory characterization. Championed by Kit Fine, some philosophers put forward 
the definitional characterization, according to which, essences are properties that define an object as such and 
allow us to know what an object is (Fine 1994). Fine pinpoints several counterexamples to the modal 
characterization of essential properties that eventually propel modalists to modify and refine their 
characterization (Cowling 2013). Besides, other philosophers propose a third characterization that considers 
essential properties as those that can explain fundamentally the object’s possession of its other properties (Copi 
1954; Gorman 2005). For a preliminary review of this discussion on essence and essential properties, see Philip 
Atkins and Teresa Robertson (2016). 
129 A similar use of essence can be found in D.T. Suzuki’s writings on satori, sudden awakening. Suzuki speaks 
of satori as the essence, the “sine qua non” of Zen – “Zen may lose all its literature, all its monasteries and all its 
paraphernalia; but as long as there is satori in it, it will survive to eternity”, and thus, “when there is no satori, 
there is no Zen” (Suzuki 1927, 216; 1933, xxxi). In the cross-cultural context, scholars start to examine Suzuki’s 
expression of Zen, especially whether his depiction of satori as an essence alludes to some contradiction vis-à-
vis the Buddhist critique of svabhāva (Sharf 1993; Faure 1996).  
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English term essence. These three notions are svabhāva (zixing ⾃性), ti (體, body),130 and 
xing (性, nature).131 Additionally, the concepts of jing (精, spirit), qing (情, disposition), and 
qi (氣, vital energy) are also rendered as “essence” in the English language scholarship of 
Chinese philosophy (Graham 1967; Shun 1997; Wang 2005; Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2005).  
When scholars of Chinese philosophy evoke the word “essence” to translate these many 
terms, they are likely noticing that these terms denote a sense of being the necessary, must-
have, attribute of objects. Furthermore, these terms, such as ti (體) and xing (性), are often 
paired with yong (⽤) and xiang (相), a correlation which might likewise strike translators as 
parallel to that of essential and accidental. Although some scholars, such as A.C. Graham, 
welcome this translation (Graham 1967), others tend to be more critical (Ames 2002; Bloom 
2002). As remarked by Shun Kwong-loi, “I hesitate to ascribe an Aristotelian framework to 
early Chinese thinkers and … it is unclear that early Chinese thinkers drew a distinction 
between essential and accidental properties” (1997, 185). Accordingly, a closer examination 
is required in exploring whether the widely-adopted definition of essence, used in common 
English vernacular, can be imposed on Husserl and Chinese Yogācāra; this will occur in 
sections 1 and 2, respectively. Through this examination, I maintain that, on the one hand, 
Husserl’s understanding of essence contributes to the Western intellectual history of the 
concept and, on the other hand, the distinct interpretation of emptiness (śūnyatā) and essence 
(svabhāva) in Chinese Yogācāra is an integral part of Chinese intellectual history. Towards 
the end of this chapter in section 3, we come to resolve the problem of essence at the 
                                                        
130 In his study of Korean Buddhism, Charles Muller translates Ti as essence, which is paired with Yong, 
function (1999; 2005). In the English language scholarship of Confucianism and Daoism, Ti is also frequently 
paraphrased as essence; see Allen Wittenborn’s study of Neo-Confucianism (1991). 
131 For the translation of Xing (性) as essence in Buddhist studies, please see Klaus Mathes’s German translation 
of Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von Ihern Wesen (辨法法性論, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga) (1996). In 
Confucianism, Xing, or nature, is also paraphrased as the essence of being human, commonly in the studies on 
Mencius (孟⼦ 372-289BCE) (Ames 2002), Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130-1200) (Allen 2016), and on Wang Fuzhi (王夫
之 1619-1692) (Liu 2017). For a critical reflection of this translation, see Irene Bloom (1995), Roger Ames 
(2002), David Wong (2005).  
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explicative level of our comparative project, expounding the difference yet compatibility in 
their conceptions of essence.   
7.1 Essence in Husserl’s Phenomenology, A Reappraisal  
Essence is one of only a few concepts that have become fundamental to Western philosophy, 
especially in the branch of metaphysics. Modern scholars often trace the distinction between 
the essential, as that which is in a subject, and the accidental, as that which is said of a 
subject, to the philosophical writings of Aristotle (Robertson and Atkins 2016; Cohen 2016). 
In truth, the intellectual history of the concept of essence predates Aristotle and can be found 
already in Plato. The following section will introduce articulations of essence provided by 
Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas, which constitute the basic meaning of this term in 
modern times and set the stage for Husserl’s elaboration of essence. The purpose of this 
exposition is thereby not to defend Husserl against others, nor to demonstrate how Husserl’s 
theory is distinct from others, but rather to position Husserl in dialogue with previous 
thinkers as a way of highlighting the richness and plurality of the tradition. As such, this 
section is also dialogical and comparative by nature.  
Writing in Greek, neither Plato nor Aristotle employed the English term essence. In the 
translation of Platonic concepts, essence has been utilized to paraphrase either the Greek term 
ousia (Silverman 2008), or that of eidos (Ricoeur 2013). As indicated in Parmenides, the 
concept of ousia is an integral part of Plato’s account of eidos.132 Upon distinguishing eidos 
from the particulars, Plato formulates eidos as the universal, independent, sui generis ideas 
that are devoid of change (129a). Indeed, eidos exists in itself, transcending the sensible 
world of particulars (129a, c). As sensible, the particulars can relate to eidos through 
partaking of it (129b). Considering how the particulars are constantly in change, they cannot 
                                                        
132 The Parmenides turns out to be both a summary and a problematization of the theory of Forms, presented by 
Plato. While the summary reinforces the distinction between forms and particulars, the problematization 
accentuates the dialectical relationship between the two. For more discussion on this issue, please see Samuel 
Rickless (2015).  
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be used to define a thing as such (130a). What defines an entity, in other words, what defines 
ousia, is the eidos rather than the particulars of a thing. As such, eidos encompasses ousia, 
both of which allude to essence in the Platonic sense as a nonsensible, transcendent quality.  
In the English language scholarship of Aristotle, ousia is often translated as substance 
and eidos as form, whereas the phrase of “to ti ên einai”, literally meaning “what being is 
for” or “what-being-is” (Bostock 1994), is paraphrased as essence (Cohen 2016). This 
translation per se bespeaks the distinction between the Aristotelian system and the Platonic 
one. While, for Plato, eidos entails that which is universal, transcendent, and separate from 
particulars, Aristotle expresses his critique of this separation in the Metaphysics (1032b19-
20).133 For Aristotle, eidos is always instantiated in, therefore indivisible from, things of its 
sort, namely, from matters (1033b11-16). That being said, the universal eidos does not exist 
separately from the particular matters (1040b25), but rather always appears in a compound 
with them (1033b26). Considering how eidos informs and enables matters to actualize its 
final formation, eidos takes priority over the matter in the compound (1041a6-9; 105016-17). 
For instance, a chunk of wood is the material from which a table can be made and indeed has 
the potential of becoming a dining table, yet the potential is not actualized until the form of a 
table has been offered. As such, eidos becomes the essence of the compound, further 
becoming the primary substance (1032b1). A substance is the first category; it does not refer 
to anything, but others will refer to it (1028a31-36). In contrast to other accidental attributes, 
a substance becomes the essential one (1029a12-16). The primary substance, namely, an 
essence, is therefore sui generis, eternal, immutable, though not transcending the particulars.  
The translation of “what being is” as essence can be traced back to Medieval times when 
the scholastics evoked the term essentia to paraphrase “to ti ên einai” in Aristotle’s writings 
                                                        
133 For more in-depth studies of the conception of essence in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see Lucas Angioni (2014), 
David Charles (2002), Alan Code (1986), Norman Dahl (1997, 2007), Frank Lewis (1984), Charlotte Witt 
(1989). 
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(Cohen 2016). Considering how the term essence has been incorporated into the Latin 
lexicon, one will not be surprised at the way in which discussion of essence was closely 
associated with that of existence and being in scholastic philosophy. Take St. Thomas 
Aquinas,134 for instance, who defines essence as that which is demarcated and signified by 
existence, in his essay On Being and Essence (De Ente Et Essentia) (30):135 
 The term “an essence” is not derived from this second meaning of “a being”, for in this sense some things 
are called beings that do not have an essence, as is clear in the case of privations. Rather, “an essence” is 
derived from “a being” in the first meaning of the term. As the Commentator says, a being in the first sense 
of the term is that which signifies the essence of a thing. And because, as we have said, “a being” in this 
sense is divided by the ten categories, essence must mean something common to all the natures through 
which different beings are placed in different genera and species, as for example humanity is the essence of 
man, and so with regard to other things.136 
 
Given the distinction between substance and accidents, essence (essentia) can be further 
classified in two ways, either as truly and properly, as in substances; or as restrictedly, as in 
accidents (32). There are three types of substances: composites of matter and form, 
immaterial forms, and one with the purest, simplest form (60). In the first case, the essence of 
a composite embraces both its matter and form, insofar as its matter serves as the principle of 
individualization (36), whereas its form informs and actualizes the matter (35). As such, the 
essence of a composite unfolds as that which “abstracts from every being, but in such a way 
that prescinds from no one of them” (47). In the second case, the essence of immaterial 
forms, otherwise known as separate substances (inter alia soul and intelligence), is 
demarcated by its existence as a potentiality (55). What determines such potentiality is the 
first cause qua God, whose essence is the same as existence (60),  
                                                        
134 For more in-depth studies of the conception of existence or being in Aquinas’s metaphysics, see Leo Elders 
(1993), Joseph Bobik (1988), Anthony Kenny (2002), John Wippel (1995, 2000), Lawrence Dewan (2006).  
135 For Aquinas, essence can also be understood by previous thinkers, as form due to its function of 
determination, or as nature since it can be grasped by intellect (31). 
136 The English translation is based on that of A. A. Maurer’s edition (1968, 30). The original Latin version is as 
follows:  
“Nomen igitur essentiae non sumitur ab ente secundo modo dicto, aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia, quae 
essentiam non habent, ut patet in privationibus; sed sumitur essentia ab ente primo modo dicto. Unde 
Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens primo modo dictum est quod significat essentiam rei. Et quia, ut 
dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune 
omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est 
essentia hominis, et sic de aliis.”   
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 There is a reality, God, whose essence is his very being. This explains why we find some philosophers who 
claim that God does not have a quiddity or essence, because his essence is not other than his being. From 
this it follows that he is not in a genus, for everything in a genus must have a quiddity in addition to its 
being… If we say that God is pure being, we need not fall into the mistake of those who held that God is 
that universal being by which everything formally exists. That being that is God is such that no addition 
can be made to it. Because of its purity, therefore, it is being distinct from all other beings. That is why the 
Commentary on the Book of Causes says that the first cause, which is pure being, is individuated through 
its pure goodness. But even though the notion of universal being does not include any addition, it implies 
no prescinding from an addition. If it did, we could not conceive anything existing in which there would be 
an addition to being. Furthermore, although God is pure being, it is not necessary that he lacks other 
perfections or excellences. On the contrary, he possesses all the perfections of every kind of things, so that 
he is called absolutely perfect, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say.137  
 
Articulated in an Aristotelian manner, the essence of God is the sui generis, self-determining, 
immutable, eternal, absolutely perfect existence (60-61). Only for God, the essence is 
complete (66). Caused and shaped by God, immaterial substances, such as intelligence or 
soul, take it as their essence to be the existence of the received and partial (62-63). 
Considering how intelligence arises because of God, Aquinas remarks that anyone can know 
what “a phoenix is and still be ignorant whether it has being in reality” (55). Actualized by 
form, the composite substance of both matter and form has its essence as the existence of the 
received, limited, divided and designated (65). Further, caused by substances, accidents are 
not composed of form and matter, but rather result from them (67, 70). The essence of 
accidents, accordingly, unravels itself as the existence of being secondary, qualified, and 
restricted (68). Throughout his exposition of essence and existence, Aquinas ipso facto 
highlights how the essence of God is the purest, as the essence of essence. Therefore, only in 
                                                        
137 The English translation is based on that of A. A. Maurer’s edition (1968, 60). The original Latin version is as 
follows :  
“Aliquid enim est, sicut Deus, cuius essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi 
dicentes quod Deus non habet quiditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse eius. Et ex 
hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quiditatem praeter 
esse suum, cum quiditas vel natura generis aut speciei non distinguatur secundum rationem naturae in illis, 
quorum est genus vel species, sed esse est diversum in diversis. Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse 
tantum, ut in illorum errorem incidamus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale, quo quaelibet res 
formaliter est. Hoc enim esse, quod Deus est, huius condicionis est, ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per 
ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse. Propter quod in commento IX propositionis libri de 
causis dicitur quod individuatio primae causae, quae est esse tantum, est per puram bonitatem eius. Esse autem 
commune sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita non includit in intellectu suo praecisionem 
additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse, in quo super esse aliquid adderetur. Similiter etiam, 
quamvis sit esse tantum, non oportet quod deficiant ei reliquae perfectiones et nobilitates, immo habet omnes 
perfectiones, quae sunt in omnibus generibus. Propter quod perfectum simpliciter dicitur, ut philosophus et 
Commentator in V metaphysicae dicunt.”  
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the third case of the purest form, namely, only in God, essence (essentia) and existence (ente) 
become one.   
The brief exposition above demonstrates the way in which the term essence has been 
incorporated into the discourse of Western philosophy. Against the background of the 
centuries-long discussion of essence and existence, Husserl foregrounds how an essence 
explicitly defines appearance in pure consciousness with its implicit allusion to an existence. 
As such, essence is not demarcated and signified by existence but rather defines the existence 
of phenomena in one’s experience.  
In Chapter 5, we delineated three stages in Husserl’s writings where he formulates 
essence differently. In the first stage, Husserl articulates phenomenology as the critique of 
psychologism. Unlike psychology, which fixes its focus on contingent psychological facts, 
Husserl maintains that phenomenology is a science of essence (wesenwissenschaft) (Hua 
19/2),  
 This phenomenology, like the most inclusive pure phenomenology of experiences in general, has, as its 
exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analysable in the pure generality of their essence, 
not experiences empirically perceived and treated as real facts, as experiences of humans or animals in the 
phenomenal world that we posit as an empirical fact. This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, 
must describe in terms of their essential concepts and their governing formulae of essence, the essences 
which directly make themselves known in intuition, and the connections which have their roots purely in 
such essences. Each such statement of essence is an a priori statement in the highest sense of the word. 138 
 
As such, essence (wesen) becomes the ideal union of matter and form of intentional acts at all 
levels, further contributing to the law-governed conditions for knowledge of contingent, 
accidental, empirical realities (Hua 18/236). As explained previously in Chapter 5, essence 
(wesen) can be further differentiated between intentional, semantic, and epistemic essences 
                                                        
138 The English translation is based on J.N. Findlay’s edition (1970, 166). The original German version is as 
follows 
„Diese, wie die sie umspannende reinen Phänomenologie der Erlebnisse überhaupt, hat es ausschließlich mit 
den in der Intuition erfassbaren und analysierbaren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber 
mit empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnissen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in 
der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfassten Wesen 
und rein in den Wesen gründenden Zusammenhänge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 
Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist ein apriorische im vorzüglichsten Sinne des 
Wortes.“  
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(Hua 19/417). Essence (wesen) is distinct from essentia (essenz): while essentia is ascribed to 
the matter of intuitive acts, essence is articulated to capture the unity of both the matter and 
form of all intending acts. In the first phase of his philosophical thinking, Husserl does not 
prioritize forms over matters; nor does he perceive conceptuality as the cause of human 
knowledge. Quite to the contrary, form and matter mutually define one another. Without 
matter, form would be empty, unfulfilled. That is why meaning-intentions, otherwise known 
as concepts, are in need of intuitions to fulfill their content and to generate their intentional 
essence. Considering how essence represents the ideal, Husserl also perceives an essence as 
an Idea (Hua 18/237).  
After his transcendental turn, Husserl renews his terminology, through which he evokes 
the Greek term eidos to capture the pure essence devoid of factuality that appears in pure 
consciousness after epoché (Hua 3/6). As such, eidos in the Husserlian context is not 
synonymous with the Platonic idea nor the Aristotelian substance (Hua 3/11, 12), 
The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an 
individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence.  
 
To the essential difference between the intuitions there corresponds the essential relationship between 
“existence” (here obviously in the sense of individual factual existent) and “essence”, between matters of 
fact and Eidos. Following up such interconnections, with insight we seize upon the conceptual essences 
which correspond to these terms and will be firmly attached to them from now on; and thus all the semi-
mystical thoughts clinging particularly to the concepts Eidos (idea) and essence will remain cleanly 
separated from them.139  
 
Juxtaposing existence and essence, Husserl tries to demarcate factual reality from 
phenomenological ideality. However, as Ideas I unfolds, Husserl does not stick with this 
juxtaposition in that he implies both essence and existence can be perceived differently by 
                                                        
139 The English translation is based on F. Kersten’s edition (1983, 9-11). The original German version is as 
follows: 
„Das Wesen (Eidos) ist ein neuartiger Gegenstand. So wie das Gegebene der individuellen oder erfahrenden 
Anschauung ein individueller Gegenstand ist, so das Gegebene der Wesensanschauung ein reines Wesen. 
Den Wesen-unterschieden der Anschauungen korrespondieren die Wesensbeziehungen zwischen 
‚Existenz‘ (hier offenbar im Sinne von individuell Da-seiendem) und ‚Essenz‘ zwischen Tatsche und Eidos. 
Solchen Zusammenhängen nachgehend, erfassen wir einsichtig die diesen Terminis zugehörigen und von num 
an fest zugeordneten begrifflichen Wesen, und damit bleiben alle, sich zumal an die Begriffe Eidos (Idee), 
Wesen anheftenden, z. T. mystischen Gedanken reinlich ausgeschieden“. 
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naturalists and phenomenologists. Another layer of complexity, therefore, is added to these 
two terms. An essence can be either naturalistic or eidetic, and so can the existence.  
When one embraces naturalism, the existence of material reality in the actual spatial-
temporal order, either as the physical reality or the psychological one, becomes perceived as 
natural, pre-given, and mind-independent. Subsequently, the essence becomes a mental 
construct, as an abstract entity that one generalizes and extracts from empirically real matters 
of fact (Hua 3/42). As a mental construct, the naturalistic essence becomes sui generis and 
immutable. Later detailed in Crisis, Husserl maintains that naturalists, be they physicists or 
psychologists, strive to discover what “it is in itself” that is pre-given unconditionally in the 
material world or in oneself (Hua 6/70). Perceived through the scope of naturalism, both 
existence and essence are reduced to factuality.  
Husserl proposes that, by enacting epoché, one comes to suspend any assumption of 
existence and essence in the natural attitude, thereafter entering the realm of pure 
consciousness. Hereby, phenomenological existence is characterized by ideality, as the 
salient feature of “a multitude of possible worlds” (Hua 3/88). What undergirds these 
phenomenologically existent worlds is pure essence, which embraces both noesis and noema 
(Hua 3/177. 270, 274). As such, pure essence or eidos is not an abstract mental construct, but 
a perceivable new object that serves as the ground for naturalistic essence. Unlike Aquinas, 
who conceives of essence as being demarcated and signified by existence, Husserl articulates 
pure essence (eidos) as that which defines the appearance of phenomena in pure 
consciousness.  
In the last two phases of his philosophical thinking, Husserl expands his philosophical 
enquiries from the foundation of knowledge to the fulfilment of a meaningful life. His 
critique of naturalism also expands from the epistemological realm to the existential one. 
Husserl contends that a naturalistic essence is never truly self-sufficient, as it proclaims to be, 
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but is rather groundless, insofar as it must turn to our experience in the shared life-world to 
fulfill its content and acquire its meaning (Hua 17/356). Considering how natural sciences 
build their theories in the belief of the absolute self-sufficiency of the naturalistic essence of 
various objects, natural sciences likewise are not self-sufficient but, rather, find their ground 
in phenomenology (Hua 6/65). The eidetic essence revealed by pure phenomenology 
becomes self-sufficient not because it is the sui generis absolute, but rather because it 
emerges out of the mutual constitution of all three components of intentionality (ego, cogito, 
cogitatum) (Hua 6/346). More specifically, the self-sufficient eidos of each ego consists in its 
“being-for-one-another and mutual interpenetration” (Hua 6/346), rather than a system closed 
and isolated to the nature and other egos.  
Due to this distinct understanding of the self-sufficient eidos, Husserl does not move 
towards a theological discussion of the existence of God, but rather shifts his focus towards 
collective consciousness for the purpose of stressing the life-world of communities. In the 
last stage of his thought, Husserl develops his genetic phenomenology in which 
intentionality, as well as essence, stem from the moment-by-moment mutual constitution of 
collective subjects, intentional acts, and the intended phenomena (Hua 1/106). As such, pure 
essence is not sui generis, not immutable, and therefore not an absolute. The essence of each 
ego is the twofold a priori, that is, “consciousness of oneself as being in the world” (Hua 
6/255), and “self-consciousness and consciousness of others are inseparable” (Hua 6/256). 
This means that the pure essence of an ego is its being in the world with others.  
Our reappraisal of Husserl’s notion of essence in the context of the history of this 
concept motivates us to reflect on the generalized distinction between the essential and the 
accidental. Upon treating essences merely as properties different from accidents, one might 
confuse the distinction between transcendental and empirical, further overlooking Husserl’s 
effort to demarcate eidos from non-eidetic, namely, naturalistic essence.  
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7.2 Essence in Later Chinese Yogācāra, A Reappraisal 
As previously discussed, the meaning of the concept of essence in Husserl’s phenomenology 
cannot be exhausted by the essential-accidental binary. Shifting to the Chinese context, the 
current section explores how scholars are prone to summon this binary to translate Chinese 
ideas. Subsequently, this section attempts to depict how the development of Buddhism 
unfolded as an innovative process in China. Hereby, two philosophical binaries, ti-yong 
(body-function) and xing-xiang (nature-image), serve as exemplars in the following 
investigation of the development of Buddhist thinking from a time when the Doctrine of Dark 
Learning (xuanxue ⽞學) was prevalent.  
Let us first turn to the notion of ti (體). This term, which is usually paired with yong (⽤), 
has frequently been translated as essence or substance in English. Chapter 3 described to 
readers how Kuiji utilized the ti-yong pair to expound the notion of consciousness in his 
writings. Throughout the intellectual history of China, this body-function binary was 
officially incorporated into philosophical discourse during the 200s CE through the effort of 
Wang Bi (王弼 226-249), one of the founders of the “Doctrine of Dark Learning (xuanxue ⽞
学)”.140 Wang creatively employed this body-function pair to account for the conception of 
Dao presented in Dao De Jing (道德經).  
                                                        
140 Later in the Easter Jin Dynasty (317-420 CE), Yuan Hong (袁弘 328-376) summarized three phases in the 
development of the Doctrine of Dark Learning (Tang 2001, 37). As concluded by most modern scholars, 
debates constantly occurred among members of the gentry class as to the relationship between existence (you
有) and nothingness (wu 無), as well as how one should understand the interplay between the Dao, existence, 
and nothingness (Tang 2001; Ge 2008; Feng 2009). The representative of the first phase (c.200-250 CE), was 
Wang Bi, who revered the notion of nothingness and equated nothingness with the Dao (Tang 2001, 38). In the 
second phase (c.250-260 CE), most literati began to reflect on how existence could arise from nothingness, 
gradually shifting their focus to naturalness (ziran ⾃然), namely, the ultimately harmonious unity of both 
existence and nothingness (Feng 2009, 374). Thinkers of the last phase (c.260- 290 CE) further accentuated the 
dialectical relationship between existence and nothingness in their elaboration of reciprocal efficacy (xiangyin
相因) and individual transformation (duhua 独化) (Feng 2009, 404-405). For scholarship on Dark Learning in 
the Six Dynasties (220-589CE), please see Livia Knaul (1985), Brook Ziporyn (2003), Fung Yu-Lan (2016). 
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As early as the Spring-Autumn Period (770-476 BCE), Laozi (⽼⼦ 604-531 BCE) 
introduced the notion of the Dao, the literal meaning of which is “the way”, to expound the 
origin of the cosmos and the ultimate principle of change. In the opening chapter of the Dao 
De Jing, Laozi presents the following image of the Dao in a negative manner by demarcating 
it from what it is not (DDJ 1.1-1.2):  
道可道，⾮常道 。名可名，⾮常名。無名，天地之始。有名，萬物之母。 
A way that can be followed is not a constant way. A name that can be named is not a constant name. 
Nameless, it is the beginning of the Heaven and the Earth. Named, it is the mother of the myriad 
creatures.141  
 
Drawing on and developing the concept of Dao articulated by Laozi, Wang equates the Dao 
with nothingness (wu 無). In his elaboration of the second half of the previously mentioned 
passage from the Dao De Jing, Wang Bi foregrounds the idea of nothingness (ZJZ 1.2): 
  凡有，皆始於無，故未形無名之時，則為萬物之始。及其有形有名之時，則⾧之育之，亭之毒之，
為其母也。⾔道以無形無名，始成萬物。 
 All existent things, all originate from nothingness. That is why the time of the shapeless and nameless 
[Dao] is the beginning of the myriad creatures. When it comes to a time when there are shapes and names, 
that is when [the myriad creatures start to] grow, nurture, reproduce, and complete. [That is how the Dao] 
becomes the mother of all existent things. Therefore, we say that the Dao becomes the origin of the myriad 
creatures in virtue of its shapelessness and namelessness.142   
 
Upon construing the Dao as nothingness, Wang introduces the body-function pair to explain 
how shapeless nothingness gradually informs and animates existence (ZJZ 38.2):  
 夫⼤之极也，其唯道乎，⾃此已往，岂⾜尊哉。故虽德盛业⼤，富⽽有万物，犹各得其德，虽贵以
⽆为⽤，不能舍⽆以为体也，不能舍⽆以为体，则失其为⼤矣，所谓失道⽽后德也。以⽆为⽤，德
其母，故能⼰不劳焉，⽽物⽆不理。下此已往，则失⽤之母。 
 The so-called ultimate of greatness, it can only be the Dao. What is there from this [Dao] onward that can 
be more revered? That is why, although the virtue can be blossoming, and the achievement can be great, 
although the wealth can encompass the myriad creatures, each [great person] can still obtain a particular 
virtue. [That is because they] revere the function of nothingness, yet unable to retain the body of 
nothingness. Since they are unable to retain the body of nothingness, they lose out on being the great. This 
is what is known as “once the Dao is lost, one resorts to the virtue”. Acknowledging how nothingness 
exercises its function, one retains the mother [of the Dao], therefore able to regulate things without self-
fatiguing. From here onward, the mother of the function is lost. 143 
 
                                                        
141 The English translation is based on that of Philip Ivanhoe & Bryan Van Norden (2005, 163). 
142 The English translation is based on that of Rudolf Wagner (2003, 119). Wagner translates 有 as entity, 無 as 
negativity, probably because he intends to highlight the fluidity and dynamic nature of the Dao. However, this 
translation does not demonstrate the correlative nature of 有 and 無. Therefore, I paraphrase them as that of 
existence and nothingness. Here, “the myriad creatures” is a figurative way in the Chinese language to describe 
everything in the cosmos.    
143 The English translation is based on that of Rudolf Wagner (2003, 245). Wagner translates Ti as substance. 
For the reason mentioned in chapter 2, I continue to paraphrase Ti as body.  
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By means of the body-function pair, Wang is able to detail the fluidity between nothingness 
and existence, further indicating the dialectical relationship of the two. To unpack this 
interplay, Wang Bi turns to the motherliness analogy.144 In the Daoist framework, 
motherliness symbolizes the origin of life (ZJZ 1.2). It is an analogy to describe how sentient 
beings are children of a cosmic motherly-body that animates them, breeds them, cultivates 
them and cares for them (ZJZ 35.1). Although each sentient being will eventually outgrow 
the motherly-body, its influence remains in the way in which this sentient being behaves and 
becomes (ZJZ 38.2). In everyday life, when one encounters children, the underlying 
motherliness is usually not present and, therefore, is invisible. Nevertheless, one can still 
infer the invisible motherliness from visible children. Having said that, the invisible 
motherly-body manifests itself through how children have become. Hereby, the dialectical 
relationship surfaces through the interplay between the invisible body of motherliness and its 
visible function qua the cultivation and preservation of children.  
Just like how we comprehend the invisible motherly-body through its role in nurturing 
and cultivating its children, so too do we understand the body qua shapeless nothingness 
through its function of creating lives. Articulated as such, Dao or nothingness becomes the 
invisible motherly-body that can enact the function of creating and caring for various forms 
of life. For Wang Bi, this parallel between nothingness and motherliness encapsulates what 
Laozi describes as “Nameless, it is the beginning of the Heaven and the Earth. Named, it is 
                                                        
144 In the original text, Wang directly used the Chinese term “mother (mu 母)”. The mother analogy proves to be 
crucial in Daoism, especially for various rituals and Daoist cosmology. However, considering that this 
dissertation is taking shape in a modern context, I anticipate rejection from readers when they see the following 
articulation: the role of a mother manifests itself in her function of giving birth to a son. One can misread this 
articulation as an indication that the role of women is solely defined by her fertility, especially, the ability to 
conceive offspring. In a paper, Robin Wang expounds how gender is a social construct and cannot be equated 
with biological sex; for instance, being feminine does not automatically entail being a woman biologically 
(Wang 2016). Since Daoists revere the transformative power of the Dao, there is a possibility that one could 
self-identify as a mother even though this person is not the biological mother of a child, as seen in many Daoist 
mystic stories and hagiography. Indeed, one can understand the concept of mother as a figurative way of 
depicting the living energy flowing in the cosmos. This is why I paraphrase 母 (mother) as motherliness, to 
highlight the fluidity of concepts of gender and sex in Daoism. For scholarship on the Daoist perception of 
women and gender, please see Despeaux & Kohn 2003; Lee 2014; Wang 2016; and Nelson & Yang 2016.  
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the mother of the myriad creatures” (DDJ 1.2). Nothingness, since it is shapeless and 
nameless, cannot be observed in everyday life. We can only infer nothingness from seeing 
how various things in the cosmos arise from the state of non-existing, continue to grow and 
flourish, and eventually perish into the state of non-existing, ad infinitum. Every phase in 
growth entails a negation of the previous state, therefore indicating how nothingness 
nourishes the progress of life. That is the principle of how things change. Once we 
understand this principle, we likewise comprehend the correlative nature between invisible, 
shapeless nothingness and its visible, shapeshifting function. The body breeds its function; in 
return, the function manifests the body. This interplay between the body and the function is 
commonly expressed as the complementarity of body and function (tiyongbuer體用不二). 
To be more precise, the shapeless body preserves the ground for and nourishes the function, 
whereas the function of creating various forms of life derives from and manifests the body. If 
one can follow the correlative nature of body and function, one can easily master the 
principle of cosmos and rule the world effortlessly; or, in Wang Bi’s terms, “acknowledging 
how nothingness exercises its function, one retains the mother [of the Dao], therefore able to 
regulate things without self-fatiguing” (ZJZ 38.2). Otherwise, if one overlooks the underlying 
origin of nothingness, one misreads the principle and abandons the root, further not able to 
maintain achievements (ZJZ 38.2).  
The articulation of nothingness proposed by Wang Bi marked the beginning of the 
golden era for Dark Learning, further setting the intellectual stage for the transmission of 
Buddhism (Ge 2008, 361). In their interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching, many clerics 
borrowed ideas from the Doctrine of Dark Learning to translate Buddhist concepts. What 
epitomizes this translation is the way in which emptiness (śūnyatā) becomes paraphrased as 
nothingness (無) (Ge 2008, 359). This method of paraphrasing is commonly known as Geyi 
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(格義).145 However, towards the second half of the 300s CE, when more Buddhist texts 
became available in the Chinese language, especially through the effort of Kumārajīva (鳩摩
羅什 344-413 CE), Buddhist clergy started to reflect on this method of paraphrasing. They 
discerned one major issue: If one equates emptiness with nothingness, then one places more 
weight upon non-existence than existence, further deviating from the Buddha’s teaching of 
the Middle Way.146 In this process of revising the interpretation of emptiness, another pair 
became popularized, that is, the nature-image (性相) binary.  
During the Warring States period (453-221 BCE), Mengzi (孟⼦, Mencius, c.372-289 
BCE) elaborated on “nature (xing 性)” as the defining quality which demarcates humans from 
other animals (MZ 6A3). For Mengzi, “human nature’s being good (shan 善) is like water’s 
trending downward” (MZ 6A2).147 In the wake of Dark Learning, Chinese thinkers, Guo 
                                                        
145 Considering the adoption of Geyi in this period, many scholars remark that Buddhism has been dark-
learning-ized (xuanxuehua ⽞學化) (Feng 2009, 425). This remark, however, seems to overlook the agency of 
Chinese Buddhist clerics. Indeed, the development of Chinese Buddhism cannot be reduced to a passive 
reception of Indian thinking nor to an active sinicization in China. Rather, there is a mutual constitution and 
reciprocal engagement of ideas between these two cultures. For the literature on how to understand the concept 
of Chinese Buddhism, please see Hu Shih (2013), Kenneth Chen (1973), Eric Zürcher (2007), and Robert Sharf 
(2002). For a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between Buddhism and Daoism, please see Stephen 
Bokenkamp (2007), Christine Mollier (2008), and James Robson (2010).  
146 In his “Treatise on the Non-Genuine and the Empty (不真空論)”, Sengzhao (僧肇 384-414) for instance 
scrutinized three readings on emptiness in his era. The first one is named by Sengzhao as the reading of “no-
mind (xinwu ⼼無)”: emptiness is tantamount to the non-existence of mind, although things in the world are not 
non-existent (T45N1858, P152a16). For Sengzhao, the reading acknowledges the quiescence of the spirit (shen
神) but fails to appreciate the illusory existence of worldly objects (T45N1858, P152a16).  
The second reading is branded “just form (jise 即⾊)”, which clarifies how “form is not its own form” 
(T45N1858, P152a17). Examining this viewpoint, Sengzhao explains how it acknowledges that various forms 
qua objects have no sui generis, self-determining existence, but it still fails to elucidate why they are empty 
(T45N1858, P152a19). 
The last reading is known as “original nothingness (benwu 本無)”, for which all existent things are originally 
from nothingness (T45N1858, P152a20).  
For Sengzhao, all three readings do not follow the Buddha’s teaching of the Middle Way and, therefore, are 
unable to expound how various objects are illusorily existent images at the conventional level but ultimately 
become empty at the ultimate level (T45N1858, P152a29-b3). Articulated as such, Sengzhao puts forward his 
view of emptiness, that is, the non-real is the empty (不真空). Through his analysis, Sengzhao implicitly 
criticizes the trend of equating emptiness with nothingness, insofar as this equation, especially as seen in the last 
reading of original nothingness, prioritizes nothingness over existence, thereby lacking in conformity with the 
Buddha’s teaching of the Middle Way.  
147 Mengzi wrote, “⼈性之善也，犹⽔之就下也。” The translation is based on that of Philip Ivanhoe & Bryan 
Van Norden (2005, 145). 
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Xiang (郭象 252-312 CE) for instance, extended the use of nature from that of humans to that 
of all beings in the cosmos (Feng 2009, 407). Through constant dialogues and debates with 
intellectuals in the Dark Learning tradition, Buddhists started to employ the nature-image (性
相) binary to refine their understanding of emptiness; the key representative was Sengzhao 
(僧肇 384-414). At that time, Sengzhao rose to prominence as the “best cleric in interpreting 
emptiness (解空第⼀)” (T45N1858, P150c05). The opening verses of his commentary state 
the following (T45N1858, P152c15-24): 
本無、實相、法性、性空、緣會，⼀義⽿。何則？⼀切諸法，緣會⽽⽣。緣會⽽⽣，則未⽣無
有。緣離則滅，如其真有。有則無滅，以此⽽推。故知雖今現有，有⽽性常⾃空。性常⾃空，故
謂之性空。性空故，故⽈法性。法性如是，故⽈實相。實相⾃無，⾮推之使無，故名本無。⾔不
有不無者，不如有⾒常⾒之有，邪⾒斷⾒之無⽿。若以有為有，則以無為無，夫不存無以觀法
者，可謂識法實相矣。雖觀有⽽無所取相。然則法相為無相之相。 
Original nothingness, real image, dharma nature, the nature of being empty, the dependent assembling, all 
these concepts mean only one thing. Why is it so? All dharmas, they arise because of dependent 
assembling. As such, if they do not assemble and do not arise, they have no existence. If the assembling 
disappears, so do dharmas. If their existence is truly real, then they cannot vanish. Accordingly, that is why 
we know that although these dharmas exist for now, their nature is ultimately empty. That is what we mean 
by the nature of being empty. This nature is also called dharma nature. Since the nature of dharmas is as 
such, it is also referred to as the real image. These real images are non-existent in origin, not by inference. 
That is why real image entails original nothingness. Accordingly, we say it is neither existing nor non-
existing. By existing, we do not mean the [svabhāvic] way of existing in a regular sense. By non-existing, 
we do not mean nothingness [as a void] in misperceptions. If existence is existence [in a svabhāvic sense] 
and non-existence is nothingness [as a void], we cannot contemplate nothingness. That is why we can say 
that consciousness and dharmas have the real image. Although we can contemplate existence, there is 
nothing to be grasped as [svabhāvic] images. Hence, the image of dharmas is the image of non-existence.  
 
Following the Madhyamaka approach of secretive saying, Sengzhao utilizes the image-nature 
binary to unpack the twofold truth and then emptiness. On the conventional level, images 
illusorily arise in virtue of dependent assembling, yet they are ultimately non-existent. As 
such, images of dharmas manifest the nature of dharmas qua original nothingness, also 
known as the nature of being empty, while the nature of being empty serves as the ground for 
dependent assembling and constitutes the ultimate reality. From the complementarity of the 
image and the nature of dharmas, there arises Sengzhao’s pronouncement that “original 
nothingness, real image, dharma nature, the nature of being empty, the dependent assembling, 
all these concepts mean only one thing”, all alluding to the Middle Way.  
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Though still describing emptiness as what it is not, Sengzhao was able to enrich the 
meaning of emptiness with the help of the image-nature binary.148 Dichotomous language, 
especially the underlying complementarity of opposites, provided Chinese clerics with a 
means to elaborating on the Buddha’s teaching in the local context. Further considering how 
the invisible origin (body in the body-function binary and nature in the nature-image pair) 
does not entail a sui generis, immutable, self-determining static entity, clergy in China were 
able to discuss the complementarity of the underlying origin (body and nature) and their 
manifestations (functions and images) without worrying about violating the Mahāyāna 
refutation of svabhāva. As such, the body-function and nature-image binaries have been 
incorporated into the standard lexicon of Chinese Buddhism.  
Continuing to use existing terminology in Chinese thinking, Xuanzang inserted his own 
interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine in his translated texts, further advancing the 
understanding of emptiness in the Buddhist community. By means of the body-function and 
nature-image binaries, Kuiji refined and enriched the doctrinal philosophy, demarcating later 
Yogācāra from early Yogācāra. As previously mentioned, early Yogācārins equated the 
unpolluted original consciousness with emptiness and suchness. To the contrary, later 
Yogācārins differentiated consciousness from emptiness, insofar as emptiness is the nature of 
being empty, which can be attributed to all the illusory images, including the underlying body 
of consciousness and its function of transformation.  
In his elucidation of the gist (ti 體)149 of Consciousness-only, Kuiji expounds four 
aspects of this teaching (T45N1861, P252c10; 19; 21; 26): 
⼀攝相歸性體，即⼀切法，皆性真如。 
                                                        
148 Gradually, this binary sets up a paradigm for Buddhist doctrinal philosophy. Even towards the modern day, 
scholars would divide various Buddhist schools into two camps. Those that focus more on clarifying the nature 
of emptiness are known as the schools of dharma-nature (faxingzong 法性宗); these include, the Sunlun School, 
the Tiantai School, the Huayan School, and the Chan School. Others that investigate how illusory images reveal 
the underlying nature of emptiness are members of the schools of dharma-image (faxiangzong 法相宗).  
149 In many places in his commentaries, Kuiji also used ti, merely to refer to the gist of the Yogācāra teaching. 
In those cases, ti is therefore not paired with yong. The nuance of the term ti shall also draw our attention.   
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First, all illusory images share the nature [of being empty], insofar as the nature of all the dharmas is 
suchness. 
 
⼆攝境從識體，即⼀切法，皆是唯識。 
 Second, all objects, [as long as they can be perceived,] depend on consciousness to arise [as phenomena in 
one’s experience]; that is, all the dharmas, all entail the [conception of] Consciousness-only. 
 
三攝假隨實體，即諸假法，隨何所依實法為體。 
 Third, all fictitious existence presumes the real existence, since the fictitiously existent dharmas arise from 
the real dharmas [i.e. consciousness and its transformation]. 
 
四性⽤別論體，⾊⼼、假實，各別處故。 
 Fourth, the nature [of being empty] and the function [of transformation] shall be differentiated, because 
objects [to be perceived], consciousnesses, fictitious existence, and real existence, they are all different.  
 
Among these four aspects, the first three encapsulate the three-nature theory – the absolute 
nature of emptiness for all dharmas; the dependent nature for the transformation of 
consciousness; and the imagined nature of the falsely, fictitiously existent images. The last 
aspect enquires into the way in which emptiness and consciousness cannot be fused into one. 
Borrowing the wave analogy articulated by Kuiji (T45N1861, P252c16), I propose to 
understand the distinction in the following manner: the nature of emptiness can be compared 
to the fluidity of water, the images to the waves that constantly arise and perish; in contrast, 
the body of consciousness resembles the body of water, and the function resembles the ability 
to generate waves given certain causes and conditions. Just as the fluidity of water is different 
from the water-body, so is the nature of emptiness dissimilar to the body of consciousness. 
As such, consciousness that constantly transforms shall be demarcated from the perceived 
object, from the fictitious svabhāvic existence, and further from the real existence of 
emptiness (T45N1861, P252c26). In virtue of the ti-yong (body-function) and the xing-xiang 
(nature-image) binaries, Kuiji designates dissimilar roles to the body and nature. 
Consequently, he expands the explicit articulation of emptiness and develops the teaching of 
Consciousness-only, further laying the foundation for later Yogācāra in China.  
When introducing Buddhism to Europe and North America, scholars often paraphrase 
the concepts of body and nature as essence in the English language, insofar as these concepts 
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allude to an underlying origin of all changes. The complementarity of body and function, as 
well as of nature and image, further strikes these translators as rather close to that between 
the essential (that which is in a subject) and the accidental (that which is said of a subject). 
Upon observing such resemblances, scholars, such as A. C. Graham, speculate that this 
correlative thinking or dialectical logic is fundamental to all reasoning (Wang 2012, 5). As 
such, Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy are construed as different manifestations 
of one same core qua correlative thinking (Wang 2012, 5). Graham’s account epitomizes the 
synthetic approach detailed in the introductory chapter. As Robin Wang remarks, “Such 
generalizations are too broad, and they miss the complexity and diversity of both Chinese and 
Western philosophy” (Wang 2012, 5). In obscuring the complexity for both sides, the 
synthetic approach tends to hold scholars back from delving deeper into the foundational 
frameworks that undergird these articulations of correlative thinking in intellectual traditions 
across time and space, which further costs scholars of comparative studies the chance of 
appreciating the distinctiveness of each tradition or discerning the potential conflicts between 
these traditions.  
Indeed, on the one hand, our discussion in the previous sections has sketched how 
philosophers in Western traditions continue to redefine the concept of essence in such a way 
that this concept has never maintained a fixed definition. And on the other hand, in 
translating several Chinese concepts, ti (體 body) and xing (性 nature) for instance, as 
essence, the subtle distinctions between these Chinese concepts have been lost. As elucidated 
by Kuiji, the nature of being empty is demarcated from the body of consciousness, the same 
way that the fluid nature of water is dissimilar to the body of water. More often than not, we 
encounter the limit of language in cross-cultural communications. Our investigation in the 
previous two sections demonstrates how the nuance of the term “essence” keeps being 
reshaped throughout the long history of transliteration and translation in multilingual 
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contexts. Keeping this in mind, we can arrive at the last section of this chapter to resolve the 
problem of essence.  
7.3 The Problem of Essence, A Reappraisal  
In the Prologue, I coined the term problem of essence to capture the perceived incompatibility 
of Husserl’s phenomenology and Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism, insofar as they seem to 
demonstrate two different or even disparate attitudes towards essence: for Yogācārins, 
everything in the cosmos, including consciousness, is empty of svabhāva; Husserl, however, 
affirms the existence of essence and articulates phenomenology as the science of essence. 
With the help of the analysis in the previous sections, it is now possible to resolve the 
problem of essence. As this solution unfolds, the incompatibility of their attitudes towards 
essence on the surface level reveals, in fact, a similar stress on the mind-world 
interconnectedness and self-other interdependence.  
Upon his transcendental turn, Husserl starts to differentiate essence in the 
phenomenological sense from that in the naturalistic sense. Indulging in the natural attitude, 
one comes to perceive things as pre-given, mind-independent, actually existent matters of 
fact (Hua 3/88). As such, an essence perceived through the naturalistic scope becomes a 
“mental construct”, a “product of abstraction”; that is, an abstract entity that one generalizes 
and extracts from empirically/factually real psycho-physical facts (Hua 3/42).  As a mental 
construct, naturalistic essence entails a quality that is sui generis, immutable, and irrelevant 
to individual differences.  
Naturalistic essence is not self-sufficient, in that it always turns to eidetic experience to 
fulfill its meaning. Different from naturalistic essence, eidetic essence or eidos is self-
sufficient. In the wake of epoché, one suspends assumptions about essence and existence. As 
a result, eidetic essence unveils itself in pure consciousness. Eidos is not a mental construct, 
but a perceivable new object. It defines what it is like to appear as a phenomenon after 
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epoché and is characterized by ideality (Hua 3/88). As such, eidos is self-sufficient, not 
because it is the sui generis, immutable absolute, but rather because it arises through the 
moment-by-moment constitution of consciousness as the ideal union of the ego(s), the 
intending act, and the intended object (Hua 1/106). For each ego, its self-sufficient eidetic 
essence becomes its being in the world and being with others (Hua 6/255-256).   
The clarification of Husserl’s notion of essence sets the stage for us to explore a solution 
to the problem of essence. First of all, the depiction of the naturalistic essence shares many 
similarities with the svabhāva criticized by Mahāyāna Buddhists, especially the quality of 
being sui generis and invariant across time and space. Indeed, naturalism arises through the 
joint force of physicalism and psychologism, the former of which assumes the immutable 
nature of materiality whereas the latter perceives the mind as the absolute reality. As detailed 
in Crisis, naturalists, be it physicists or psychologists, strive to discover what “it is in itself” 
that is pre-given unconditionally in the material world or in oneself (Hua 6/70). Perceived as 
a mental construct, naturalistic essence becomes a universal, sui generis, unconditional entity 
in itself (Hua 6/70). Husserl remarks on the absurdity of upholding such a view of the life-
world and of the human self. In Husserl’s terms, natural sciences cannot be self-sufficient 
(Hua 6/65). In this way, naturalism shares many traits in common with the heretical 
approaches criticized by Mahāyāna Buddhists. What characterizes the heretical approaches is 
their perception of the world and the human self as svabhāvic, namely, as immutable (chang
常), sui generis or self-determining (zhuzhai 主宰), and persistent throughout time and space 
(bian 遍) (T43N1830, P239c3; P244c22).  
Second, eidos – which is an allusion to the mutual constitution of subjectivity and 
objectivity, of ideality and reality – is compatible with the Yogācāra refutation of svabhāva, 
insofar as both Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins come to acknowledge the underlying 
 204 
 
 
interdependence of opposites. If Husserl’s notion of pure essence differs from the Yogācāra 
notion of svabhāva, the problem of essence is no longer a problem for our comparative study.  
More importantly, both Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins refute svabhāvic essence. Their 
accentuation on the complementarity and interdependence of opposites, especially the self-
other mutual constitution, reveals a common ground for Husserl and Yogācārins to engage in 
dialogues. That said, although Husserl and Yogācārins inquire into similar questions and, in 
figurative terms, travel the same road, they have their own interlocutors. As previously 
analyzed, Husserl develops his critique of naturalistic essence in dialogue with scientists in 
his era, as a reflection on the flourishing naturalism that triggered the existential crisis in 
modern Europe. In contrast, Chinese Yogācārins keep elaborating on their refutation of 
svabhāva through debates with Buddhists from other schools as well as Daoists and 
Confucians. Given this fact, the current section eschews the synthetic approach, rejecting the 
proposal of viewing Husserlian phenomenology and Yogācāra philosophy as manifestations 
of a higher, a-cultural theory for consciousness.  
While Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins share similar views on the interdependence of the 
mind and world, and of the self and others, Yogācāra Buddhism is more than a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology. On his journey, Husserl is confident that epoché can serve as a 
method for persons to change their attitude in life and, therefore, overcome the existential 
crisis. As such, epoché per se entails a self-transformation in Husserl’s phenomenological 
project. Nevertheless, epoché remains a philosophical speculation. It does not, at least not 
explicitly, point to a mechanics for realizing self-transformation nor a set of ritualized 
techniques that can inform a person about how to regulate individual life or how to interact 
with others in the community. That is why this dissertation perceives the prescriptive level as 
nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology. Later phenomenologists represented by Martin 
Heidegger, Edith Stein, and Michel Henry expand Husserl’s phenomenological project, from 
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which they develop their articulations of philosophy of religion and theological philosophy. 
While the prescriptive level remains nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology, a more elaborate 
and systematic form of “being prescriptive” has been presented by Chinese Yogācārins for 
whom the investigation of consciousness and the refutation of svabhāva are all subservient to 
the religious practice of realizing emptiness and compassion, a practice that is known as the 
Bodhisattva’s path. It is this prescriptive level in Yogācāra Buddhism that eventually makes 
it more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology.  
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Part Three: The Destination – The Path to Liberation at the Prescriptive Level of 
Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology and Chinese Yogācāra Philosophy 
       
云何漸次悟⼊唯識？ 
謂諸菩薩於識相性資糧位中能深信解； 
在加⾏位能漸伏除所取能取引發真⾒； 
在通達位如實通： 
修習位中如所⾒理數數修習伏斷餘障： 
⾄究竟位出障圓明， 
能盡未來化有情類復令悟⼊唯識相性。 
[What does it mean to gradually realize Consciousness-only? 
It means that the Bodhisattvas can,  
at the [first] stage of accumulation, cultivate profound confidence 
in the image and nature of consciousness; 
at the [second] stage of preparation, gradually impede the twofold grasping, 
for acquiring true insight; 
at the [third] stage of seeing, realize the wisdom of emptiness; 
at the [fourth] stage of refinement, practice frequently  
according to the altruistic principle,  
further removing the remaining obstructions; 
until the final ultimate stage, remove all obstructions,  
become perfect in merit and knowledge,  
and spend infinite time ahead to teach others, 
 so they could also realize the image and nature of Consciousness-only.]   
(T31N1585, P48b15-20) 
 
Having examined the descriptive and explicative levels of Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Yogācāra philosophy in Parts 1 and 2, we can now begin exploring the third level introduced 
in the prologue: the prescriptive level where philosophical insights transform and translate 
into actions. As discussed in the introductory chapter, I use the term “prescriptive level” to 
capture the instructional dimension in which normative values are articulated in connection 
with ritualized actions. The prescriptive level entails: 
1. Accounts that establish a series of moral values regarding what is good and what is 
evil;  
 
2. Accounts that enforce normative actions, especially why one should adhere to moral 
values; 
 
3. Accounts that regulate one’s actions – either general, everyday behaviours, or specific 
rituals – for the purpose of achieving a higher good; 
 
4. Accounts that entail a soteriology of liberation, the path towards such a soteriology, 
and the mechanics for realizing liberation and transformation.  
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I argue that the systematic account of the prescriptive level in Yogācāra Buddhism is what 
makes it much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology. Moreover, I maintain that 
the prescriptive level remains nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology.  
According to Husserl, naturalists and phenomenologists have different perspectives on 
how their philosophical insights translate into actions. While naturalism nourishes the 
paradox of subjectivity, which results in the disconnection of mind and world; 
phenomenology brings people to see things as they actually are, which motivates them to 
change their lifestyle or what I refer to as rehabitualization, in order to regain a meaningful 
life. Husserl uses the notion of attitude to convey this translation of insights into actions (Hua 
6/326):  
 Attitude, generally speaking, means a habitually fixed style of willing life comprising directions of the will 
or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, the cultural accomplishments 
whose total style is thereby determined. The individual life determined by it runs its course with this 
persisting style as its norm. The concrete contents of culture change according to a relatively closed 
historical process. Humanity (or a closed community such as a nation, tribe, etc.), in its historical situation, 
always lives under some attitude or other. Its life always has its norm-style and, in reference to this, a 
constant historicity or development.150 
 
Attitude per se is normative. It prescribes how people should live their lives. Husserl 
envisages the phenomenological attitude as one that remedies the crisis of meaning caused by 
the natural attitude. Switching from the natural to the phenomenological attitude after epoché 
yields a change in perception which brings the existential crisis to an end (Hua 6/259). In 
accordance with this new perception, people undergo rehabitualization, which entails 
refashioning their lifestyle and reconstructing their ethical norms.  
                                                        
150 The English translation is based on that of David Carr’s edition (1970, 280). The original German version is 
as follows:  
„Einstellung, allgemein gesprochen, besagt einen habituell festen Stil des Willenslebens in damit 
vorgezeichneten Willensrichtungen oder Interessen, in den Endzwecken, den Kulturleistungen, deren gesamter 
Stil als damit bestimmt ist. In diesem bleibenden Stil als Normalform verläuft das jeweilig bestimmte Leben. Es 
wechselt die konkreten Kulturgehalte in einer relativ geschlossenen Geschichtlichkeit. In irgendeiner 
Einstellung lebt die Menschheit (bzw. Eine geschlossene Gemeinschaft wie Nation, Stamm usw.) in ihrer 
historischen Lage immer. Ihr Leben hat immer einen Normalstil und eine beständige Historizität oder 
Entwicklung in diesem.“ 
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Husserl seems to be confident that the phenomenological attitude per se can 
spontaneously redirect the will and prescribe new interests for those who embody this attitude 
(Hua 6/326). Indeed, as remarked by Nicholas de Warren, “many statements can be found in 
Husserl’s writings expressing this ethical motivation for the phenomenological renewal of 
philosophy” (De Warren 2006, 267). Husserl, however, does not elaborate on how epoché 
can be enacted nor how one may demonstrate that such a change has taken place. Likewise, 
his investigation of empathy “does not explicitly link this normative moment to the 
constitutive role of second-person phenomenology” (Crowell 2016). It remains unclear 
whether Husserl perceives epoché as a kind of ritualized technique that informs individuals 
on how to regulate their lives or interact with others in their community. As such, Husserl 
advocates for the possibilities of rehabitualization and self-liberation that are inherent in 
epoché, yet he does not reveal the mechanics that would enable individuals to follow the 
phenomenological path. Consequently, I consider the prescriptive level as nascent in 
Husserl’s phenomenology.  
While Husserl does not specify whether the change of “attitude” is a sudden acquisition, 
Chinese Yogācārins understand liberation differently. To realize the unity of knowing and 
doing, they maintain that sentient beings must undergo a long process of training – also 
known as following the Bodhisattvas’ path (T31N1585, P48b11-20). Chinese Yogācārins, 
thus, established an elaborate system of normative values and techniques consisting of 
ritualized actions, which constitutes the prescriptive level of their philosophy. As I will argue 
in the last part of this dissertation, it is the prescriptive level that makes Yogācāra Buddhism 
much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology. 
This part of the dissertation will explore the following questions: If every action is 
determined by its precedent, how is agency possible? If agency exists universally in all 
sentient beings, what is the point of sorting them into five groups, as the five gotra? For 
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sentient beings in these groups, how should they exercise agency to pursue the Bodhisattvas’ 
path of awakening their Buddha nature, liberating themselves from ignorance, and attaining 
wisdom and compassion? 
Chapter 8 explores the possibility of agency. I contend that Yogācārins articulate 
dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda) in a distinctive way to enable their affirmation of 
agency without negating causality. Chapter 9 examines the controversial theory of gotra. I 
suggest that later Chinese Yogācārins do not promote the gotra theory to derogate and 
demean sentient beings with lower-level of agency; rather, their intention is to highlight the 
compassion of Bodhisattvas. Chapter 10 addresses the last question regarding how sentient 
beings can attain awakening, which further explains why the prescriptive level is nascent in 
Husserl’s phenomenology and why Yogācāra Buddhism is much more than a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology.  
 
Chapter 8: Entering the Gate of Practice  
 
The current chapter examines the possibility of agency for the purpose of clarifying how 
knowledge translates into action. In contemporary philosophy, agency is defined as the 
capacity of an individual to conduct a purposeful action (Goldman 1970, 81; Audi 1986, 511; 
Schlosser 2015).151 The descriptor “purposeful” implies a causal component of agency. For 
sure, causality occupies a crucial place in Buddhist doctrine, as indicated in the concept of 
karma. In the Theravāda tradition, various karmas arise in a causal chain, conspiring to trap 
                                                        
151 The standard term here should not be “purpose/purposeful” but “intention/intentional”. However, since, in 
most parts of this dissertation, the term intention takes on a distinct nuance in Husserl’s phenomenology, readers 
may find it confusing to see the term intentional again in the discussion of agency, where intention involves not 
a subject-object correlation in the epistemic sense but that of agent with action in the performative sense. Thus, I 
eschew the standard terminology and opt for the synonym “purpose/purposeful”. Elisabeth Anscombe, for 
instance, has explored the possibilities of connecting “intentionality” as the purpose of action with 
“intentionality” as the directedness of mental acts (Anscombe 1957). 
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sentient beings in “endless rounds of birth and death (⽣死相續)”, namely, in saṃsāra 
(T43N1830, P518b13). The Mādhyamika clerics complicate this account. Nāgārjuna, for 
instance, does not perceive nirvāṇa as the break-through from saṃsāra. Instead, he highlights 
the non-duality of the two states (T30N1564, P35b09-10). However, this non-duality soon 
poses a problem for agency. If nirvāṇa is saṃsāra, and the net of causality extends its arm to 
all stages of existence in the cosmos, it follows that everything, everyone, and, of course, 
every action is determined by their precedents. If all our actions are predetermined, how can 
we have the freedom to exercise agency? Does this mean that all sentient beings are nothing 
but puppets in the hands of destiny? 
These are the main questions to be addressed in the current chapter. While the theme of 
agency remains implicit and nascent in Husserl’s articulation of “attitude” (Hua 6/326),152 
Yogācārins explicitly and elaborately structure a systematic articulation of causality and 
agency. To answer the questions, I direct our attention to the concept of the mental factors 
provided by Yogācārins. I contend that, for Yogācārins, individuals do have agency, although 
such agency does not distort the prevailing causality in the cosmos. To unpack my viewpoint, 
the chapter begins with an investigation of Buddhist articulations of causality provided by 
Theravāda, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra, followed by a re-examination of the Yogācāra 
theory of mental factors, and a clarification of the meaning of liberation and self-
transformation in the Yogācāra framework. As such, we resolve the dilemma of agency and 
enter the gate of the Bodhisattvas’ path.  
8.1 Causes and Conditions  
                                                        
152 Recently scholars have discovered some of Husserl’s discussions of action and agency in his unpublished 
manuscripts which have been collected to be published under the title “Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins” 
(Hua 43). These discussions have laid the foundation for a more in-depth phenomenological investigation of 
action and agency (Melle 2015; Uemura 2015; Micali 2015; Ávila 2015).  
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Since the concept of agency is closely related to the idea of causality, the current section 
centers on the Buddhist articulation of causality, which is an integral part of the theory of 
dependent arising (yuanqi 緣起, pratītyasamutpāda). Buddhists put forward this theory to 
account for the following question: since rebirth and reincarnation presuppose an 
indestructible soul, why is every sentient being lacking a svabhāvic self? Or, in short, why is 
there saṃsāra, when there is no-self? (T31N1585, P43a09) This conception of dependent 
arising usually implies a net of causality that influences every phase of cosmic existence. For 
Yogācārins, the clarification of dependent arising is a two-pronged project: on the one hand, 
they continue to explain why there is saṃsāra when there is no-self; and on the other, they 
explore the possibility of awakening when there is non-duality between nirvāṇa and 
saṃsāra.153 To familiarize ourselves with the twofold purpose, we follow Kuiji’s sūtra 
classification system to examine how Chinese Yogācārins refashion the theory of dependent 
arising in the framework of their doctrine of Consciousness-only (T31N1585, 43b1).  
Let us begin with the Theravāda theory of dependent arising. As per Theravādins, 
various karmas arise in a causal chain, conspiring to trap sentient beings in “endless rounds 
of birth and death (⽣死相續)”, namely, in saṃsāra (T43N1830, P518b13). “To break 
through death and rebirth and to leave saṃsāra (⽣死已斷，不復轉於五道)”, one must 
attain nirvāṇa (T2N109, P503b10).154 Their view of dependent arising is encapsulated in the 
                                                        
153 There has been a wealth of scholarship on the Yogācāra notion of dependent arising in English language 
studies of Yogācāra: see Paul Griffiths (1986); Gadjin Nagao (1991); William Waldron (2003); Dan Lusthaus 
(2003); Jay Garfield (2002); and Jonathan Gold (2015b). These studies, on the one hand, focus more on Indo-
Tibetan recourses, and on the other, prioritize the espitemic and ontological function of this notion. Drawing on 
and developing their research, I will explore how Chinese Yogācārins articulate the idea of dependent 
origination and how this idea sets the stage for them to argue for the possibility of what is currently known as 
agency in contemporary philosophy.    
154 The Buddha’s first sermon is documented in the Sūtra of the Buddha Turning the Dharma-Wheel (佛說轉法
輪經), and the Chinese version was translated by An Shigao (安世⾼ c. 148-180 CE). As previously mentioned 
in Chapter 5, this text details the four noble truths. First, life is endless suffering (T2N109, P503b20). Second, 
the five aggregates (wuyin 五陰) conspire to generate suffering (T2N109, P503b25). That being said, sentient 
beings do not know they are comprised of five aggregates but rather misperceive these five elements as a 
permanent self. From such misperception, attachments arise, further causing endless suffering (T2N109, 
P503b26-27). Third, to end suffering, one must change its current state, detaching from all attachments 
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doctrine of twelve links. Through this doctrine, those in the Theravāda tradition proclaim 
that, although there is no-self, saṃsāra is perpetuated in virtue of karma. In his commentary, 
Kuiji elaborates the twelve links of the causal chain (which are italicized in the table) in the 
following manner:  
 
According to Theravādins, ignorance propelled us, sentient beings, to undertake various 
actions in our previous life, which continue to shape the course of our current life and 
condition our future lives. In this manner, causality extends its arms to three time periods: to 
the life of our past, to our present life, and to the life of our future. Considering the two layers 
of causality, namely, that which is between past and present and that which is between 
                                                        
(T2N109, P503b27-28). Fourth, to do so, one needs to pursue the eightfold path (T2N109, P503b29). As a 
result, one will be able to attain nirvāṇa, “never being reborn after this round of life, further leaving saṃsāra for 
good, and no longer being burdened by suffering (是⽣後不復有, ⾧離世間，無復憂患。)” (T2N109, 
P503c12-13).  
Name of the link Its cause and effects  
ignorance (wuming 無 明 , 
avidyā) 
Ignorance of the wisdom of emptiness heralds the beginning of this 
causal chain (T43N1830, P518b27-c19). 
actions (xing ⾏, karma) Caused by ignorance, sentient beings will conduct various egocentric 
actions (karma) (T43N1830, P518c24-25). 
consciousness (shi 識, vijñāna) Actions in the previous life shape the consciousness of the zygote in 
the current life (T43N1830, P518c27). 
names and forms (mingse 名⾊, 
nāmārūpa ) 
Once the zygote grows into an embryo, names and forms gradually 
appear (T43N1830, P519a25). 
six sense sources (liuchu 六處, 
ṣaḍāyatana) 
By the time the embryo is fully-grown, the six sense sources of this 
life form become mature (T43N1830, P519b26). 
contact (chu 觸, sparśa) Newborns use these senses to get in contact with other sentient 
beings (T43N1830, P519c8). 
feeling (shou 受, vedanā) As they grow up, they gradually acquire clear feelings (T43N1830, 
P519c10). 
craving (ai 愛, tṛṣṇā) These feelings evoke great craving for various objects in the cosmos 
(T43N1830, P519c14). 
grasp (qu 取, upādāna) Craving propels sentient beings to grasp these objects and to perform 
egocentric actions, further generating various types of mental defilements 
(T43N1830, P519c17).  
existence (you 有, bhava) When these actions/karmas come into existence, they continue to 
condition and determine these sentient beings’ future cravings 
(T43N1830, P520a5).  
birth (sheng ⽣, jāti)  These existing karmas determine the birth of these sentient beings in 
their next life (T43N1830, P520a8). 
death (si 死, jarāmarana) Upon death, these sentient beings, who have accumulated various 
karmas in the wake of ignorance, enter another round of life that is shaped 
by the twelve links, ad infinitum (T43N1830, P520a9). 
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present and future, Kuiji characterizes this notion of causality as that of “three times and two 
layers” (三世⼆重因果) (T43N1830, P528c20). According to the twelve links doctrine, if 
sentient beings want to be awake, they must break through the causal chain by acquiring the 
wisdom of no-self and eradicating ignorance (T43N1830, P528c21-22). Such an awakening 
is known as nirvāṇa, which promises all devotees an escape from saṃsāra and an ascent to 
the realm devoid of causality. 
Mādhyamikas negate the polarity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, further contesting the 
Theravāda view of causality (T30N1564, P21b15-19). From the Madhyamaka point of view, 
all things in the cosmos are interdependent; so are saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. That is why 
“nirvāṇa is saṃsāra; saṃsāra is nirvāṇa – this is how things actually are (涅槃即⽣死、⽣
死即涅槃，如是諸法實相。)” (T30N1564, P21b19). The conclusion that nirvāṇa is 
saṃsāra is in line with the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness. As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 6, Mādhyamikas shift their focus from examining the way in which things really 
exist to questioning how these things appear in the consciousness. Subsequently, in one’s 
experience, if the perceiver has no permanent existence, neither does the perceived, insofar as 
an object relies on a subject to appear as a phenomenon. If everything, be it a sentient being 
or a non-sentient dharma, dependently arises in experience, then nothing has an essence 
(svabhāva) (T30N1564, P2b18-19). This is how they developed the theory of emptiness 
through expanding the idea of no-self. For Mādhyamikas, the goal of individual awakening as 
the break-through of saṃsāra is equally deemed to be selfish and egoistic. As per 
Mādhyamikas, those who become awakened will comprehend the interdependence of various 
things in the cosmos, which will motivate them to return to the realm of saṃsāra to help 
other sentient beings. Stemming from this altruism, there arises the ideal of the Bodhisattva – 
the salient feature of the Mahāyāna tradition – who embodies both the wisdom of emptiness 
and compassion.  
 214 
 
 
Although the Madhyamaka refutation of the polarity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa leads to the 
rise of the Bodhisattva ideal, their refutation is vulnerable to one issue: if nirvāṇa is saṃsāra, 
and the net of causality extends its arms to all stages of existence in the cosmos, it follows 
that everything, everyone, and, of course, every action is determined by their precedents. If 
all our actions are predetermined, how can we have the freedom to exercise agency?  
To resolve this issue, Yogācārins reinterpret the doctrine of twelve links in their 
framework of Consciousness-only. Instead of unpacking the twelve links as a system of 
“causality of three times and two layers”, they argue for understanding them as a “causality 
within one layer (⼀重因果)” (T43N1830, P528c27). Xuanzang regroups the twelve links to 
account for dependent arising (T31N1585, P43b27-c26): 
Category  The links   
The links that can 
influence (能引⽀) 
(T31N1585, P43b27-c2) 
Ignorance, 
karma  
Ignorance triggers karma, which can exert influence 
on the seeds inside the storehouse consciousness. 
The links that can 
be influenced (所引⽀) 
(T31N1585, P43c3-c15) 
Consciousness, 
names and forms,  
six sense 
sources, contact, 
feeling  
Due to the influence of ignorance and karma, 
consciousnesses give rise to the seeing and image parts, 
on the basis of which names and forms, six sense 
sources, and the mental factors of contact and feeling 
will arise, consecutively.   
The links that can 
generate (能⽣⽀) 
(T31N1585, P43c16-
c23) 
Craving, grasp, 
existence  
When someone misperceives things as svabhāvic, 
misconception becomes the ground for the mental factors 
of craving and grasping, which brings more egocentric, 
morally wrong actions into existence. 
Those that can be 
generated (所⽣⽀) 
(T31N1585, P43c24-26) 
Birth and death  Such egocentric actions cultivate the life of this 
sentient being until death.  
 
In his reformulation of the twelve links, Xuanzang foregrounds the function of consciousness 
against the background of causality. As clarified in Chapter 3, consciousness (vijñāna) 
becomes the ground for and manifests itself through its function (vijñapti) of intending. In 
virtue of this interplay between vijñāna and vijñapti, Yogācārins rearticulate dependent 
arising in the following manner. The eighth consciousness stores both pure seeds and impure 
ones. The seeds, as clarified in Chapter 3, are figurative ways for Yogācārins to express the 
idea of possibility. Some seeds are pure and give rise to true perceptions and morally good 
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action. Others are impure and grow into misperceptions and evil deeds. Whenever the eighth 
consciousness functions, it gives rise to its seeing part and the image part, further facilitating 
the function of the other seven consciousnesses. When the seeing part, or the subjective act of 
perceiving, aims at its image part qua the perceived phenomena, both the act and the 
phenomena obtain their names and forms along with the six sense sources of our experience. 
This perceptual process is accompanied by mental factors, such as contact and feeling. Often, 
the knower could misperceive the function of consciousness, envisaging the knower and the 
known as two opposite svabhāvic beings. Stemming from this misconception, there arises in 
this knower the mental factors of craving and grasping, which cultivate ignorance and 
prompt the knower to conduct egocentric actions. These actions, in turn, cultivate a deep 
egoism in this knower, further planting more impure seeds in the eighth consciousness. While 
these impure seeds come into existence, the eighth consciousness of this knower becomes 
further contaminated and will breed the birth of another misperception in this life, and so on 
until death.  
The Yogācāra account of causality demonstrates the way in which our actions are shaped 
and conditioned by a series of events,155 such as perceiving, feeling, and craving, not by our 
existence as sentient beings per se (T43N1830, P528c28).156 Now that all the causes and 
effects can be traced back to consciousness, Xuanzang contends that there is no need to 
                                                        
155 In this articulation of dependent arising, consciousness, mental factors, and objects external to 
consciousnesses play different roles in the event of perceiving. The seeds in laiye and the actions (karma) 
become the direct cause (yinyuan 因緣, hetupratyaya) of the entire chain (T31N1585, P40a22). The constantly 
acting laiye preserves all previous events of perception and, thus, serves as the immediate condition 
(dengwujianyuan 等無間緣, samanantarapratyaya) to sustain the entirety of our experience (T31N1585, 
P40b7). Real objects external to consciousness, as long as they are not falsely imagined by us, become the 
previously mentioned ālambanapratyaya (suoyuanyuan 所緣緣). Other mental factors, such as craving and 
graspings or faith and perseverance, can be either advantageous or disadvantageous to our authentic knowing. 
These factors are, therefore, categorized as the assisting condition (zengshangyuan 增上緣, adhipatpratyaya) 
(T31N1585, P41a6). 
156 As remarked by Kuiji, “now that we have reinterpreted the twelve links as the causality of one-life, we have 
demonstrated how there are endless rounds of death and rebirth. As such, it is not that the negation of self and 
dharmas would result in liberation (今破之，如我⼗⼆⼀重因果。⾜顯⽣死輪轉。⾮我⾃然等⽣，體⾃解
脫。)” (T43N1830, P528c27-28). 
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differentiate three times and two layers of causality (T31N1585, P44b4). Rather, “the endless 
round of birth and death is sustained by inner causes and conditions, not relying on external 
causes, in such a way that it is Consciousness-only” (T31N1585, P45a12).157 Later clerics 
refer to this account of dependent arising from the vantage point of the eighth consciousness 
(賴耶緣起) (Lü 1979; Sheng-yen 1999; Xia 2003). The way in which Yogācārins foreground 
the role of consciousness against the backdrop of reformulating the theory of dependent 
arising is, in fact, in line with their view of “Consciousness-only”; that is, everything depends 
on consciousness to arise as a phenomenon in one’s experience.   
To facilitate our understanding of how the Theravāda account of dependent arising 
should be demarcated from that in Yogācāra, I borrow the terms “agent-oriented” and “event-
oriented” from Western philosophy. These two terms have been used to explain the cause of 
actions. According to those who endorse an agent-oriented type of causality, the cause of 
one’s actions is attributed to the agent per se (Ginet 1990; O’Connor 2000; Lowe 2008; 
Schlosser 2015). In contrast, those who support the event-oriented type of causality ascribe 
the cause of actions to a purpose constituted in the event of “want-and-belief” (Goldman 
1970; Davidson 1980; Dretske 1988). Philosophers who adhere to the agent-oriented 
characterization of causality understand the cause of actions, such as drinking a glass of 
water, differently from those who adhere to an event-oriented characterization of causality. 
Understanding actions as caused by agents, the former would conclude that Cindy wants to 
drink a cup of water, because she is a human who has the capacity of doing so. As such, the 
cause of the action resides in the fact that Cindy is born as a human being. If she wants to 
reduce the desire of drinking, she then has to negate her status of being human. In contrast, 
those in favor of event-oriented causality would maintain that Cindy drinks a cup of water, 
                                                        
157 Xuanzang wrote, “復次⽣死相續，由內因緣不待外緣，故唯有識。” 
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not because she is a human, but because of her current state of being thirsty for water. Once 
the event dissolves and her state of being thirsty vanishes, Cindy stops craving water.  
In Xuanzang’s reinterpretation of the Theravāda account of dependent arising, we 
observe a shift from an agent-oriented type of causality (in Theravāda) to an event-oriented 
one (in Yogācāra). This shift can be unpacked in the following way. As we saw earlier, in the 
Theravāda tradition, actions are considered to be caused by individual sentient beings 
embedded in the causal chain. Drawing on this notion of action, sentient beings have various 
kinds of craving, because and only because they are born as such (T43N1830, P528c24). 
Hence, it is their existence that shapes their actions, further trapping them in the net of 
causality and incarcerating them in saṃsāra. To disable the trap, sentient beings must negate 
their existence by means of nirvāṇa (T43N1830, P528c25). Articulated as such, nirvāṇa 
becomes the antidote to and the negation of saṃsāra. Theravādins, thus, attribute actions to 
the doer and ascribe liberation to a negation of one’s existential status. 
Against this view, Yogācārins perceive causality as that which is oriented towards 
events. As detailed in their account of dependent arising, actions stem from various mental 
events, such as perception, which further cultivate sentient beings’ state of craving and 
grasping. Described in this manner, actions are determined not by existence per se but by 
how this existence is perceived by sentient beings in each mental event (T43N1830, 
P528c28). The previous example of drinking water could be evoked to illustrate this type of 
causality – sentient beings like Cindy conduct the action of drinking water, not because they 
are humans, but because of their perception of the current state of being thirsty. Likewise, 
sentient beings are trapped in the net of causality, not because they are born as such, but due 
to their misperception of their existence. Following this Yogācāra articulation of causality as 
the event-oriented type, if sentient beings want to free themselves from the trap of saṃsāra, 
they do not have to negate their existence; instead, they need to change the composition of 
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their mental events through revising their way of perceiving. If Yogācārins attribute actions 
to mental events and ascribe liberation to the revision of perception, they are able to secure 
the active role of consciousness from the descriptive level (as in the acquisition of 
knowledge) to the prescriptive level (as in the motivation of actions).  
This is how Xuanzang and Kuiji fulfil the twofold purpose: first, they refashion the 
theory of dependent arising in the framework of Consciousness-only – there is no permanent 
self but there is still saṃsāra, because of the activity of consciousness; second, this 
articulation of dependent arising suggests how sentient beings have agency even when 
nirvāṇa is saṃsāra. It is true that the karmic law of causality extends through every stage of 
saṃsāra in the entire cosmic history. This fact, nonetheless, does not negate the existence of 
agency. A sentient being has agency insofar as causality does not stem from its existence as a 
sentient being per se (the agent-oriented type of causality in Theravāda), but from the way in 
which this sentient being perceives the state of affairs and, therefore, constitutes wants-and-
beliefs (the event-oriented type of causality in Yogācāra).  
The different ways of perceiving further shape and condition the way in which agency is 
exercised. As previously mentioned, the misperception of things as svabhāva will result in 
craving and suffering. Contrariwise, upon seeing things as they really are, it is possible to 
become one with dependent arising and realize nirvāṇa in every moment of this-worldly life. 
And thus, nirvāṇa becomes saṃsāra. Awakening from ignorance does not indicate an 
existence that transcends saṃsāra by breaking through the cosmic net of causality. Instead, 
upon becoming one with saṃsāra, sentient beings navigate their worldly life in virtue of 
causality without being trapped. The Yogācāra conception of nirvāṇa will be further 
elaborated on the last section of this chapter.  
8.2 The Rise of Agency  
 219 
 
 
Now that we have affirmed the existence of agency, we can continue to detail ways in which 
agency stems from knowledge. To understand how agency arises from knowledge, it will be 
helpful to revisit the concept of mental factors. This concept was introduced towards the end 
of Chapter 3 in which we unpacked the role of these mental factors (xinsuo ⼼所, caitasika) 
through the king-servant analogy: consciousnesses are like kings, always being accompanied 
by their servants qua the mental factors (T43N1830, P320c16). Borrowing Husserl’s 
conception of founding (for instance, the act of feeling affectionate about the cat is founded 
upon and, therefore, arises on the basis of the act of perceiving the cat), we inquired into the 
way in which the mental factors function on the basis of the activity of consciousnesses. As 
such, the mental factors equally have the fourfold intentional structure. Xuanzang utilized the 
painter metaphor to unpack the cooperation between consciousness and its mental factors: 
each sentient being is the composer of its worldview, in the process of which consciousness 
outlines the mental image, and mental factors furnish this image with colours (T31N1585, 
P26c15-18).  
The current section explores how the subject of knowing becomes one with the agent of 
acting in virtue of these mental factors. Our following analysis focuses on the five 
omnipresent mental factors (wubinxingxinsuo 五遍⾏⼼所, pañca sarvatraga caitasika). As 
suggested by this name, these mental factors have accompanied all eight types of 
consciousness throughout beginningless time (T43N1830, P328b02). These five caitasika are 
contacting (chu 觸, sparśa), attending (zuoyi 作意, manaskāra), feeling (shou 受, vedanā), 
thinking (xiang 想, saṃjñā), and purposing (si 思, cetanā). Surfacing one after another, these 
caitasika will help us understand the emergence of agency. In CWSL, Xuanzang details the 
function of the five mental factors in the following manner: 
 觸謂三和，分別變異。令⼼、⼼所觸境為性。受想思等，所依為業。謂根境識更相隨順，故名三
和。觸依彼⽣，令彼和合 (T31N1585, P11b19-20) 
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 Contacting is defined as the encounter of three elements, which can differentiate and transform. By nature, 
it allows consciousnesses and their mental factors to get contact with objects. It serves as the dependence 
for feeling, thinking, and purposing. By the encounter of three elements, we mean the harmonious 
cooperation of the sense organ, object, and consciousness. Contacting arises on the basis of these three 
elements, further making them cooperate harmoniously.  
 
 作意謂能警⼼為性。於所緣境，引⼼為業。謂此警覺，應起⼼種，引令趣境，故名作意。雖此亦能
引起⼼所，⼼是主故，但說引⼼。(T31N1585, P11c6-8) 
 By nature, attending alerts consciousness. It acts as the guidance for consciousnesses to find their 
perceived objects. The literal meaning of its name is “guiding the mind”, insofar as it alerts the mind and 
the seeds, further guiding the mind in targeting its objects. Although attending can give rise to other mental 
factors, it is secondary to consciousness. Therefore, we only say that attending can guide consciousness 
[rather than give rise to consciousnesses].  
  
 受謂領納順違俱⾮，境相為性，起愛為業。能起合離⾮⼆欲故。有作是說。(T31N1585, P11c11-12) 
 By nature, feelings can discern objects that are favorable, pernicious, or neither favorable nor pernicious. It 
acts as the origin of craving, insofar as it can give rise to the desire of reunion, of separation, and of 
neither.  
 
 想謂於境取像為性。施設種種名⾔為業。謂要安⽴境分⿑相，⽅能隨起種種名⾔。(T31N1585, 
P11c23-24) 
 By nature, thinking perceives the image of the object. It acts to produce various names and words. Once 
the image of the object is established, various names and words can be produced to articulate this image.  
 
 思謂令⼼造作為性。於善品等，役⼼為業。謂能取境正因等相，驅役⾃⼼令造善等。(T31N1585, 
P11c25-26) 
 By nature, purposing conditions consciousness and its mental factors. It acts to maneuver consciousnesses 
into the state of morally good, evil, or neutral. That being said, it can aim at the image of the object, further 
driving consciousness and its mental factors to conduct good, evil, or neutral actions.  
 
That being said, whenever consciousness gives rise to the seeing part and the image part, the 
mental factor of contacting arises and sustains the harmonious co-existence of various parts 
derived from consciousness (T43N1830, P328b15). Let us take the example of Cindy’s 
perception of her cat. In recollection, Cindy remembers how, this morning, her cat was sitting 
by the window observing the pigeons on the balcony. The cat that appears as the 
phenomenon of her recollection pertains to her previous experience, whereas her eye-
consciousness exists with her at the current moment. In virtue of the mental factor contacting, 
Cindy’s eye-consciousness is able to perceive phenomenon of her preceding experience. 
Even when she starts hallucinating and sees two cats by the window, contacting manages to 
connect her act of perceiving with the fictitious second-cat. While contacting ensures 
harmony among various parts of her perception, the mental factor of attention allows for the 
shift of focus (T43N1830, P330b26). Upon recollecting, Cindy focusses on her cat with the 
help of attention, while leaving the fuzzy backdrop of the pigeons aside. Then, Cindy 
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becomes curious about the reaction of these pigeons to her cat. By force of attention, she can 
redirect her focus to these pigeons and bring that which once was immersed in the 
background of her perceptual field to the forefront. Subsequently, based on Cindy’s 
perception of her cat, feelings arise, which indicate how Cindy finds this mental episode 
amusing. This mental factor of feeling (founded on perceptions) can bring both delight and 
disgust, which further nourish the mental factor of craving (T43N1830, P331a22). Cravings 
serve as the ground for thinking. Cindy, thus, can evoke names and words to articulate the 
funny behaviors of her cat, with the help of the mental factor of thinking (T43N1830, 
P332a26). Thinking gives rise to the mental factor of purposing that drives consciousness to 
conduct a wide range of morally good or evil actions.  
Our examination of these five mental factors outlines the process by which the 
perception of consciousness nourishes other mental states and eventually motivates actions. 
And so, we have clarified the way in which the subject of knowing becomes the agent of 
doing. Given the analysis of twelve links in the previous section, we continue to pose the 
question about how these actions, in return, influence the function of consciousness. This is 
the question we will try to answer in the next section. The answer reveals to us not only how 
actions and perceptions reciprocate each other, but also how this reciprocity can lead to two 
types of moral life.  
8.3 Life between Good and Evil  
At the end of Chapter 3, we have introduced how Yogācārins ascribe four types of moral 
qualities to consciousnesses and their mental factors. These moral qualities are good (shan
善, kuśala), evil (e 惡, akuśala), neutral with pollution (youfuwuji 有覆無記, nivṛtaavyākṛta), 
and neutral without pollution (wufuwuji 無覆無記, anivṛtaavyākṛta) (T31N1585, P12a20). 
The eighth consciousness, laiye, for instance, is morally neutral and so are its mental factors, 
namely, the five omnipresent ones. Nevertheless, for the other seven consciousnesses, the 
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case becomes more complicated. As we will see in the following discussion, due to their 
distinct ways of knowing, these consciousnesses are accompanied by respective types of 
mental factors that continue to prompt the subject of knowing to conduct various actions, and 
these actions, in turn, cultivate the way in which a subject perceives.  
As detailed previously, the seventh consciousness is always inclined to misperceive the 
seeing part of the eighth storehouse consciousness as the manifestation of a sui generis, 
immutable self-identify. Upon the rise of this misperception, sentient beings become 
conditioned to the egocentric view of life – I am the author of my life and my “self”, thus, 
must remain the immutable center of my life story. As such, ego-centric views nurture 
embodied attachments (T31N1585, P2a10; P6c27). 
To further clarify the rise of these embodied attachments, it would be of help to examine 
the mental factors that accompany the seventh consciousness, mona. As expounded by 
Xuanzang (T31N1585, P22a24-b6),  
 此意相應，有幾⼼所？且與四種煩惱常俱。此中俱，⾔顯相應義。謂從無始⾄未轉依，此意任運恒
緣藏識，與四根本煩惱相應。其四者何？謂我癡、我⾒，并我慢、我愛。是名四種。 
 我癡者謂無明。愚於我相，迷無我理，故名我癡。 
 我⾒者謂我執。於⾮我法，妄計為我。故名我⾒。 
 我慢者謂倨傲。恃所執我，令⼼⾼舉。故名我慢。 
 我愛者謂我貪。於所執我，深⽣耽著。故名我愛。 
 “并”，表慢愛有⾒慢俱。遮餘部，執無相應義。此四常起，擾濁內⼼，令外轉識恒成雜染。有情由
此，⽣死輪迴，不能出離。 
 For this mona, how many mental factors are associated with it? Mona is always accompanied by all four 
types of defilements (kleśa). The term “all” here highlights the sense of being associated. To put it 
differently, throughout beginningless time until the seventh consciousness evolves into wisdom [i.e. the 
unpolluted state of consciousness], mona incessantly misperceives the eighth storehouse consciousness and 
is always associated with all four types of fundamental defilements. What are they? They are self-
ignorance and self-misunderstanding, together with self-conceit and self-love. These are the four types.  
 Self-ignorance entails delusion. When someone is fooled by the fictitious image of the self, therefore 
unable to understand the idea of no-self, this sentient being is in the state of self-ignorance.  
 Self-misunderstanding is tantamount to attachments, in virtue of which a sentient being gradually becomes 
attached to fictitious images of the self. Thus, it is called self-misunderstanding.  
 Self-conceit means arrogance, since it propels a sentient being to elevate oneself to the center [of one’s 
worldview]. Therefore, it is called self-conceit.  
 Self-love amounts to  self-obsession, through which one becomes deeply obsessed with the self. Therefore, 
it is called self-love.  
 The term “together with” in the treatises means that all these four types of defilements co-exist, therefore 
different from the viewpoint held by the Hīnayāna clerics [who object to such co-existence]. These four 
types of defilements incessantly arise, disturbing the seventh consciousness and the first six 
consciousnesses and sustaining their misperceptions. In virtue of their function, sentient beings are trapped 
in the endless rounds of death and rebirth.   
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The misperception of the seventh consciousness serves as the ground for self-ignorance of the 
truth of no-self. Caused by such ignorance, each sentient being tends to misperceive the self 
as an immutable, sui generis entity. This misunderstanding continues to propel this sentient 
being to place the self in the center of its life story, further animating ego-centrism. Such self-
conceit nourishes self-love, further empowering various types of embodied attachments to the 
self. Accordingly, other dharmas are pushed to the outskirts of this self-centered life story, 
further nurturing embodied dharma-attachments. As Xuanzang remarks towards the end of 
the selected passage, these defilements condition and influence the first six consciousnesses 
that motivate sentient beings to conduct morally good or evil actions (T31N1585, P22b6). On 
the basis of these four fundamental defilements, there stem five other secondary afflictions of 
lethargy, relentlessness, loss of faith, lack of persistence, and laziness (T31N1585, P22c25). 
Further due to the fact that the seventh consciousness results in self-misunderstanding, this 
consciousness is accompanied by the mental factor of reasoning (T31N1585, P22c26).  
The first six consciousnesses can have all four types of moral qualities (T31N1585, 
P26b11). When the sixth consciousness misperceives other consciousnesses as svabhāvic 
entities, it energizes embodied attachments on the one hand and empowers discriminative 
attachments on the other (T31N1585, P2a21; P7a06). This process can explain how the ten 
basic mental defilements arise (T31N1585, P31b18).158 Driven by these afflictions, the 
subject produces theories and conducts various egoistic actions to uphold egocentric views. 
These verbal and non-verbal actions continue to perfume the seeds in the eighth storehouse 
consciousness and nourish more misperceptions. In this process, twenty kinds of secondary 
defilements will arise. These secondary afflictions bring to an individual sentient being the 
mental factors of belligerence, resentment, hypocrisy, spite, jealousy, miserliness, deceit, 
                                                        
158 These ten basic mental defilements or afflictions are desire/raga, anger/pratigha, pride/māna, 
ignorance/avidyā, doubt/vicikitsā, view of the “I” as existing/satkāyadṛṣṭi, view of the “I” as 
permanent/antagrāhadṛṣṭi, wrong convictions/mithyādṛṣṭi, conviction of wrong views as the 
supreme/dṛṣṭiparāmarśa, and wrong ethics/śīlavrataparāmarśa. 
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dissimulation, arrogance, and ruthlessness, subsequently rendering this sentient being 
apathetic towards shame and embarrassment of its own deeds (T31N1585, P33b1-2). 
Eventually, this sentient being indulges in the state of lethargy, relentlessness, lack of faith 
and persistence, and laziness (T31N1585, P33b3). That is how an ego-centric sentient being 
finds it impossible to change its mode of being oblivious, of being easily distracted, and of 
constant misunderstanding (T31N1585, P33b3). Stemming from misperception of the sixth 
consciousness, all kinds of morally egocentric actions emerge, which widen the perceived rift 
between the self and others. Such sentient beings are, thus, trapped in their egocentric 
worldview whereby all sorts of cravings and sufferings start to haunt them from this round of 
life to the next, ad infinitum.  
However, once a sentient being is exposed to the wisdom of emptiness and altruistic 
compassion, despite it still being submerged in the misconception of the self and the world, 
the seeds of goodness will start to grow in its storehouse consciousness (T31N1585, P8c8). 
Most importantly, this allows for the reappearance of the mental factor of faith. On the basis 
of the perception of the sixth consciousness, faith arises and encourages the sentient being to 
uphold its trust in the wisdom of emptiness (T31N1585, P29b25), then in the karmic merit of 
altruistic deeds (T31N1585, P29b26), and finally in the possibility of awakening (T31N1585, 
P29b27). This conviction becomes so deep so that this sentient being would not be misled by 
wrong opinions. Due to this faith, the sentient being regains the sense of shame and of 
embarrassment of evil actions (T31N1585, P29c17). These emotions continue to evoke a 
rejection of attachments, anger, and desire (T31N1585, P30a03). Gradually, this sentient 
being will demonstrate perseverance in religious training, despite all obstacles and hardship 
(T31N1585, P30a24). As a devotee, the sentient being always remains at ease without being 
relentless (T31N1585, P30b5-7). Eventually, it will achieve equanimity, never willing to 
conduct actions to harm others (T31N1585P30b23, 29; P31).  
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From the exposition of the mental factors of the six consciousnesses, it can be inferred 
that misperceptions give rise to an egocentric worldview, which further empowers evil 
actions. In contrast, correct perceptions encourage sentient beings to purify their 
consciousness of egoism and to conduct altruistic actions. Both egoistic and altruistic actions 
cultivate seeds in the storehouse consciousness, conditioning the way in which sentient 
beings perceive and act in the future. Borrowing the analogy from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, 
Xuanzang compares such interplay between actions and seeds as that between flame and 
wick – the flame burns the wick while the wick produces the flame; such is the reciprocity 
between the two, just as that between actions and seeds (T31N1585, P8c09).  
Having said that, not only do sentient beings have agency, but they can also exercise 
agency in completely different or even opposite manners. Either they can follow 
misperceptions and conduct egocentric actions. Or, they will eventually see things as they 
really are and be motivated to perform altruistic deeds to awaken compassion. Now, 
considering the mutual advancement of knowing and doing, the line between subjectivity (in 
the epistemic sense) and agency (in the practical sense) gradually disappears so much that 
agency becomes the embodied and habitualized subjectivity in every moment of daily life. As 
habitual as such, the agent no longer entertains any purpose when carrying out an action. 
Instead, the agent appears to resonate with the natural flow of things in the cosmos. This 
articulation of agency leads us to the upcoming question regarding the idea of awakening or 
nirvāṇa in the Yogācāra framework. Since saṃsāra is not a break-through from nirvāṇa, 
awakening is, therefore, not tantamount to transcending worldly life. That being the case, 
how do Xuanzang and Kuiji elucidate the notion of nirvāṇa?  
8.4 Awakening between Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa  
Upon refashioning the account of dependent arising to confirm the place of agency in their 
doctrine of Consciousness-only, Xuanzang likewise redefines the idea of saṃsāra. As will be 
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seen soon, saṃsāra is no longer envisioned as a break-through from nirvāṇa. In unpacking 
the Yogācāra notion of liberation or nirvāṇa, it will be of help to revisit two concepts 
described in Chapter 3, that is, embodied and discriminative attachments. These attachments 
demonstrate how various types of defilements arise to trap sentient beings in saṃsāra.  
Attachments stem from misperceptions of the seventh and sixth consciousnesses. In 
virtue of such misconceptions, each sentient being is prone to embrace svabhāvic views of 
the self and of other dharmas. While the former animates embodied self-attachments, the 
latter empowers embodied dharma-attachments. As embodied as such, these attachments 
penetrate sentient beings’ habitual way of living and encourage egocentrism. Based on these 
embodied attachments, the sixth consciousness continues to create various criteria to 
differentiate others from oneself, further fortifying discriminative self-attachments on the one 
hand and discriminative dharma-attachments on the other. These self-other polarizations 
conspire to push others to the fringes of the egocentric worldview. From the self-attachments, 
obstructions of defilement arise (T31N1585, P48c7); from the dharma-attachments stem 
obstructions of knowledge (T31N1585, P48c9). As detailed by Xuanzang (T31N1585, 
P48c6-c11),  
 煩惱障者。謂執遍計所執實我、薩迦耶⾒、⽽為上⾸百⼆⼗⼋根本煩惱，及彼等流諸隨煩惱。此皆
擾惱有情⾝⼼，能障涅槃，名煩惱障。 
 所知障者。謂執遍計所執實法、薩迦耶⾒、⽽為上⾸⾒疑無明愛恚慢等。覆所知境無顛倒性，能障
菩提，名所知障。 
 By obstructions of defilement, we mean the one hundred and twenty-eight fundamental defilements as well 
as the secondary defilements that arise from the wrong views which falsely imagine [the eighth 
consciousness as] the svabhāvic self. They can inflict pain and suffering upon sentient beings, further 
obstructing the arrival of nirvāṇa. As such, they are called obstructions of defilement.  
 By obstructions of knowledge, we mean the defilements of doubt, ignorance, desire, harming, pride, etc, 
that arise from the wrong views that falsely imagine [various things as] the svabhāvic dharma. They can 
cover the true nature of perceived objects, further obstructing the arrival of bodhi. As such, they are called 
obstructions of knowledge.  
 
  
Originating from misperceptions, attachments and obstructions drive sentient beings further 
away from awakening, incessantly propelling them to initiate various egoistic actions, which 
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in turn reinforce their egocentric worldview. This begins a causal chain which traps sentient 
beings in saṃsāra, and so on ad infinitum.  
Drawing on the theorization of Yogācārins, if sentient beings want to remove 
attachments and obstructions for the dawn of awakening, they need to make an effort in two 
ways: first, they must reshape their scope of perceiving things, so as to liberate themselves 
from discriminative attachments (T31N1585, P48c27). This is the first step towards 
awakening (T31N1585, P48c28). Upon removing discriminative attachments, they must then 
proceed to purify all types of embodied attachments. This process can be compared to that of 
rehabitualizing. That is, the sentient being must reshape their habitual ways of living and 
reform their lifestyle through a wide range of religious training and cultivation.  
Borrowing the framework proposed by Victor Hori, these two steps correspond to the 
realization of insight first at the horizontal level and then at the vertical level. As such, the 
former demonstrates an insight within language and conceptual thinking that concerns our 
discriminative thinking and linguistic expression, whereas the latter alludes to an insight that 
“takes one outside of language to experience itself” (Hori 2006, 206). Upon realizing these 
two insights, sentient beings not only understand emptiness and compassion as conceptual 
knowledge but act to become one with them. Subsequently, sentient beings eradicate the 
obstructions of defilement for the self and the obstructions of knowledge for other dharmas.  
The realization of the vertical and horizontal insights results in awakening, which has 
been encapsulated in the Yogācāra notion of dependent-evolution (zhuanyi 轉依, āśraya-
parivṛtti/āśraya-parāvṛtti) (T31N1585, P51a3-18):159 
                                                        
159 For an in-depth study on the notion of āśraya-parivrtti/āśraya-parāvṛtti in the Indo-Tibetan literature of 
Yogācāra, please see Yokoyama Kōitsu (1978), and Ronald Davidsion (2003); for studies on the notion of 
Zhuanyi articulated by Chinese Yogācārins, please see Takemura Makio (1976), Alan Sponberg (1979), Lü 
Cheng (1991), and Zhao Dongming (2011). Lusthaus also examined this notion in his Buddhist Phenomenology 
(2006). All these scholars acknowledge that the Yogācāra theory of knowledge is subservient to the goal of 
realizing wisdom of emptiness and compassion, although in current English language scholarship of Yogācāra, 
the notion of āśraya-parivrtti has again been overlooked in the wake of the epistemic reading of Yogācāra. I 
will not give another thorough analysis of the notion of āśraya-parivrtti. Instead, drawing on previous research, 
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 此能捨彼⼆麤重故，便能證得廣⼤轉依。依謂所依，即依他起，與染淨法為所依故。染謂虛妄遍計
所執。淨謂真實圓成實性。轉謂⼆分，轉捨轉得。由數修習無分別智，斷本識中⼆障麤重，故能轉
捨依他起上遍計所執，及能轉得依他起中圓成實性。由轉煩惱，得⼤涅槃。轉所知障，證無上覺。
成⽴唯識意，為有情證得如斯⼆轉依果。 
 或依即是唯識真如，⽣死涅槃之所依故。愚夫顛倒，迷此真如。故無始來，受⽣死苦。聖者離倒，
悟此真如。便得涅槃，畢究安樂。由數修習無分別智，斷本識中⼆障麤重，故能轉滅依如⽣死，及
能轉證依如涅槃。此即真如離雜染性。如雖性淨，⽽相雜染，故離染時假說新淨。即此新淨說為轉
依，修習位中斷障證得。雖於此位，亦得菩提，⽽⾮此中頌意所顯，頌意但顯轉唯識性。 
 If sentient beings could remove the seeds of the two types of obstructions, they could realize the grand 
dependent-evolution. By dependent, we mean the dependent nature upon which rely both the polluted and 
immaculate dharmas. The polluted are those imbued with the false imagined nature. The immaculate are 
those characterized by the absolute nature. By evolving, we mean that the polluted can evolve to be 
removed, the immaculate to be attained. Through repeatedly cultivating the non-dualistic wisdom, sentient 
beings will be able to eradicate the seeds of these two obstructions, so as to evolve to remove the polluted 
from the imagined nature and retain the immaculate from the absolute nature. In the evolution of the 
obstructions of defilement, sentient beings realize the great nirvāṇa [for themselves]. In the evolution of 
the obstructions of knowledge, sentient beings realize the great bodhi [for others]. As such, the treatise 
establishes the doctrine of Consciousness-only for the purpose of preaching to sentient beings the 
realization of the result of the two dependent-evolutions.  
 Or, we could say that the dependent entails the suchness of Consciousness-only, insofar as saṃsāra and 
nirvāṇa are both dependent on this suchness. The ignorant ones do not understand this suchness. 
Therefore, they suffer from the endless rounds of death and rebirth from the beginningless time. The sages 
distance themselves from misunderstanding and therefore realize this suchness. Subsequently, they realize 
nirvāṇa, further residing in ultimate peace and happiness. These sages constantly cultivate non-dualistic 
wisdom to remove the seeds of the two obstructions from the storehouse consciousness. As such, their 
consciousnesses can evolve and these sages can realize nirvāṇa without abiding in dependence on 
suchness. This is the suchness devoid of all types of polluted nature. Although suchness is immaculate by 
nature, its images can be polluted and defiled. Therefore, once divorcing itself from pollutions, suchness 
can be considered to be reborn as immaculate. This reborn immaculateness is what we mean by dependent-
evolution, which is realized by eradicating two defilements at the stage of practice. Although sentient 
beings can realize bodhi at the stage of practice, it is not what the verse tries to convey here. Here, the 
verse intends to express that through evolution, sentient beings can realize the true nature of 
Consciousness-only.  
 
Upon removing the embodied and discriminative attachments, a sentient being likewise 
eradicates obstructions of defilement and of knowledge. This sentient being can then realize 
nirvāṇa (liberation) for itself and attain the great bodhi (enlightenment) for helping others. 
Subsequently, compassion arises, further encouraging this sentient being to help others. The 
English terms “awakening” is, thus, used to accentuate both the liberation for oneself and the 
enlightenment for others. The following table demonstrates the aforementioned notion of 
dependent-evolution articulated by later Yogācārins: 
 
 
                                                        
I will focus on the soteriological aspect of this evolution and detail how āśraya-parivrtti is an integral part of the 
Bodhisattvas’ practices of benefiting others. 
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Misperception/Ignorance Embodied 
attachments  
Discriminative 
attachments  
 
Obstructions Awakening  
Svabhāvic views of the 
self  
Embodied self-
attachments   
(Originating from 
intuition) 
 
Discriminative self-
attachments  
(Originating from 
conceptualization) 
 
Obstructions 
of defilement  
Great nirvāṇa 
(liberation for 
oneself) 
Svabhāvic views of 
other dharmas  
Embodied dharma-
attachments   
(Originating from 
intuition) 
 
Discriminative 
dharma-attachments  
(Originating from 
conceptualization) 
 
Obstructions 
of knowledge  
Great bodhi 
(enlightenment 
for others) 
Purification  Vertical insight Horizontal insight  Dependent-evolution 
 
As such, the concept of dependent-evolution becomes used by Chinese Yogācārins to express 
the way in which the self and others transform from the state of ignorance to the state of 
awakening. Articulated in this manner, nirvāṇa is not liberation just for oneself, not a 
gateway for sentient beings to ascend to a realm devoid of causality. Quite to the contrary, 
Xuanzang perceives nirvāṇa as a liberation within saṃsāra from egocentric views and 
lifestyle, further leading to enlightenment for others. Liberation and enlightenment constitute 
two correlated sides of awakening. Upon awakening, sentient beings come to embody 
emptiness in every movement of life in walking, talking, sitting, and sleeping. Eventually, 
sentient beings become one with saṃsāra, imbued themselves with the nature of being 
empty, and liberate themselves from suffering. By embracing emptiness, sentient beings 
realize the interdependence of the self and others, further attaining enlightenment qua seeing 
things as they actually are. Compassion arises accordingly. As such, sentient beings reshape 
the scope of perceiving and rehabitualize themselves in everyday actions to attain awakening. 
In this sense, sentient beings transcend saṃsāra by becoming one with it. Borrowing the river 
analogy that Xuanzang articulates in his description of consciousness, after attaining nirvāṇa, 
each sentient being neither leaves the river for good, nor continues to struggle to float; rather, 
they resonate with the flow and become one with the river. Saṃsāra is the flowing water; so 
is nirvāṇa.  
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For Yogācārins, to eventually realize awakening, sentient beings need to go through five 
stages of the Bodhisattvas’ path. Nevertheless, they maintain that not all sentient beings can 
realize nirvāṇa and bodhi to the same extent (T31N 1585, P55b20). Indeed, later Yogācārins, 
like Xuanzang and Kuiji, sort sentient beings into five groups, known as the five families 
(gotra), in accordance with their different levels of agency. During the lifetimes of Xuanzang 
and Kuiji, the gotra system undoubtedly provoked fierce controversies. This system will be 
examined in Chapter 9.  
 
Chapter 9: Pursuing the Path of Liberation  
 
In the preceding chapter, I explained the place of agency in the Yogācāra framework. Not 
only did Xuanzang and Kuiji refashion the interpretation of dependent arising to affirm the 
existence of agency, but they also detailed how each sentient being can enact their agency in 
different manners to conduct either morally good or evil actions. These actions, in turn, 
condition and cultivate ways in which sentient beings can perceive the world. Understanding 
agency in this manner, Xuanzang and Kuiji conceive of nirvāṇa not as a break-through from 
saṃsāra, but rather as an integral part of awakening from misperceptions and egocentrism, 
such that the devotee becomes one with saṃsāra. Towards the end of the previous chapter, it 
was mentioned that later Yogācārins, like Xuanzang and Kuiji, seem to reject the status quo 
that all sentient beings have equal potential for realizing emptiness and compassion. They 
sort sentient beings into five groups, known as the five families (gotra), in accordance with 
their different levels of agency. The current chapter, thus, analyzes the controversial theory of 
gotra.  
In comprehending the gotra system, this chapter addresses three questions consecutively: 
Does the gotra system predetermine a sentient being’s life? If it does not, what makes it 
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possible for a sentient being to change its current membership in the gotra system? When a 
sentient being can change its membership, what is the path that it should follow? The answers 
to these questions allow me to argue that Chinese Yogācārins like Xuanzang and his disciples 
promote the gotra system not to demean sentient beings of lower-level of agency but rather to 
highlight the power of the Bodhisattvas’ compassion in changing one’s family membership in 
the gotra system. I contend that the gotra system preserves the empirical differences of 
sentient beings (some able to realize Buddha nature on their own and others incapable of 
doing so), and reserves the possibility of transformation (sentient beings can change family 
membership through the collaborative effort of self-power and other-power) at the same time.  
Section 1 examines whether the gotra system is predeterminate. To understand this 
system, it is necessary to introduce the doctrinal debate over Buddha nature in early Tang 
dynasty (618-712). Drawing on Huizhao’s articulation of Buddha nature, I contend that the 
gotra system does not define the future of one’s life but rather accommodates the possibility 
of changing one’s membership. Section 2 clarifies how this change can happen. I use 
icchantikas as an exemplar to demonstrate that even the most ignorant sentient beings have 
the chance of regaining awakening through temporarily relying on the compassion of the 
Bodhisattvas. Therefore, in virtue of self-power and in reliance on other-power, sentient 
beings can transform one’s membership in the gotra system to pursue the Bodhisattvas’ path 
towards awakening. Section 3 elaborates on the Bodhisattvas’ path envisaged by Yogācārins, 
known as the five stages of Consciousness-only.  
9.1 Gotra and Buddhahood  
The current section explores whether the gotra system predetermines a sentient being’s future 
or whether it still allows for the possibility of change. The gotra system is an integral part of 
the Yogācāra theory of Buddha nature (or Buddhahood). Before examining the debate over 
Buddha nature between later Yogācārins and their antagonists, I want to clarify the meaning 
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of this concept. It is articulated by Buddhist clerics to describe the nature of the Buddha, the 
one who awakens the wisdom of emptiness and compassion (Chen 1964, 117; King 1991, 2; 
Gethin 1998, 252). For Buddhists in China, since the Buddha embodies wisdom and 
compassion, the nature of the Buddha (foxing 佛性) likewise entails emptiness (kongxing 空
性) or suchness (zhenru 真如).160 In general, the realization of Buddhahood is the ultimate 
goal that devotees must pursue through religious training. Now that we have clarified the 
basic meaning of Buddha nature, let us turn to the debate over it in seventh century China.161  
Towards the end of the South-North Dynasty period (420-589 CE), Buddhists in China 
reached the consensus that all sentient beings have Buddha nature and can become awakened 
(Chen 1964, 125). This consensus is epitomized by the maxim presented by the Lotus Sūtra 
and the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, “all sentient beings, all have Buddha nature (⼀切眾⽣，悉
有佛性)” (T43N1831, P610a25). One of the eminent proponents of this Mahāyāna universal 
salvation was Zhiyi 智𫖮 (538-597), the actual founder of the Tiantai school of Buddhism. 
Drawing on and developing the Madhyamaka conception of the twofold truth, Zhiyi 
describes the non-duality of conventional (quan 权) and ultimate (shi 实), which constitutes 
one of the many ways for Zhiyi to expound emptiness: various phenomena that arise and 
perish are only conventionally real and ultimately, they do not exist but only manifest the 
underlying emptiness. Such a non-duality between the arising phenomena and the underlying 
emptiness reveals the middle way between being and non-being (T33N1716, P693a20-23; 
                                                        
160  For instance, Zhiyi 智𫖮 (538-597) explains how the negation of ignorance reveals the insight of Buddha 
nature which resembles the way in which the jewels are disclosed and the suchness is unveiled (T46N1911, 
P10c12). Similarly, the master of Huayan Buddhism, Fazang 法藏 (c.643-712) equates Buddha nature with 
emptiness and suchness with the reference to Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (T45N1866, P487c17-19).  
161 In her book, Buddha Nature, Sallie King investigated the Treatise on Buddha Nature, and she sketched the 
debates between Xuanzang and followers of Paramārtha (King 1991). Drawing on her findings, I will position 
this debate in the early-later divide in Chinese Yogācāra, with reference to more Yogācāra texts in the Chinese 
language. 
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T46N1911, P34a19-21).162 Further applying the conventional-ultimate binary to the 
interpretation of Buddha nature, Zhiyi categorizes individual difference as part of 
conventional reality, and Buddha nature as ultimate emptiness (T33N1716, P693c19-2). 
Since the individual mind derives from and discloses the ultimate reality of Buddha nature, 
every sentient being, regardless of their dissimilar capacity, can make an effort to realize their 
inherent Buddha nature.163 Subsequently, Zhiyi designates contemplative practice as the 
means to the wisdom of seeing things as they are and to the realization of their innate Buddha 
nature.164 Through reformulating the non-duality of the conventional and ultimate, Zhiyi 
followed the middle path to reinforce the widely-accepted view of Buddha nature 
(T33N1716, P741b17-21).165 This viewpoint was likewise espoused by early Yogācārins 
(T43N1830, P307a16).  
                                                        
162  Zhiyi widely utilizes Chinese philosophical terminologies, such as Quan-Shi 權實 (conventional-ultimate) 
or Ti-Yong 體⽤ (essence-function), in his elaboration of emptiness, subsequently expanding the twofold truth 
into the threefold truth, and consequently putting forward his creative interpretation of the Buddha’s teaching 
(T33N1716, P693a20-23; T46N1911, P34a19-21). For studies on Zhiyi’s threefold truth, please see Swanson 
(1989, 115-156); and Wu (1993, 1-11). 
163  For Chinese Buddhists at that time, the terminologies they employed to capture the conventional differences 
and ultimate identity are three vehicles 三乘 and one vehicle ⼀乘 (T33N1716, P694c23-695a17, 700b17-21). 
The notion of ‘three vehicles’, literally meaning the vehicles of śrāvaka, pratyeka, and buddha, was formulated 
to capture different results of sentient beings’ religious training, in contrast to the idea of ‘one vehicle’, which 
entails that sentient beings ultimately have innate Buddha nature. As analysed by Fujita Kōtatsu, the idea of 
‘one vehicle’ bespeaks the stance toward Buddhahood preserved in the Locus Sūtra, the one revered by the 
Tiantai School of Buddhism (Fujita 1975, 82). While Tiantai clergy follow the Lotus Sūtra to deem the three 
vehicles to be conventional, Yogācārins perceive these three vehicles as the ultimate (Lü 1991, 433). There are 
also many other ways of referring to this debate in doctrinal philosophy, such as “all having Buddha nature 悉有
佛性” vs. “sentient beings without nature” 有情無性, or “all natures to be realized” ⼀性皆成 vs. “five natures 
being distinctly different” 五姓各别 (Xia 2003, 88; Yoshimura, 2002, 35). To help readers access the core of 
the idea of all having Buddha nature, I express the teachings articulated by Chinese Buddhists without 
introducing too many doctrinal terminologies. In the greater East Asian context, clerics in Japan and Korea 
continued to develop their creative articulations of Buddha nature. For instance, Dōgen, the prominent Sōtō 
cleric, creatively interprets the verse “⼀切眾⽣，悉有佛性” by equating the three parts, ⼀切眾⽣=悉有=佛
性, further suggesting that all sentient beings are Buddha nature (T82N2582, P91c). By rejecting the polarity 
between the nature of sentient beings and that of the Buddha, Dōgen advocates that all sentient beings are 
Buddha nature.   
164  Swanson refers to the real nature of things, the wisdom of seeing things as they are, and the wide range of 
religious practices, which are synergistic, as the three aspects of Zhiyi’s articulation of Buddha nature (Swanson 
1989, 173).   
165  Regarding Zhiyi’s stress on the middle way between the ultimate and the conventional, Paul Swanson also 
argues for interpreting it as the expression of Buddha nature and the nature of reality in virtue of the threefold 
pattern (Swanson 1989, 174).  
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As previously mentioned in Chapter 6, early Yogācārins affirm the existence of a meta-
consciousness called the original consciousness (benshi 本識), a notion that is further equated 
with the luminous mind, with Buddha nature, and with emptiness itself. As maintained by 
early Yogācārins, the luminous mind is contaminated by various types of defilements that 
arise from dualistic views in virtue of the activity of the original consciousness. If that is the 
case, sentient beings should engage in religious training to stop the movement of the original 
consciousness, remove mental defilements, and reveal the immaculate luminous mind 
(T31N1585, P8c20).166  
Growing up in this monastic culture, Xuanzang was very sympathetic to early 
Yogācārins’ account of Buddha nature. It is said that his teacher in the Nālandā temple, 
Sīlabhadra, however, did not uphold the viewpoint documented by the Lotus Sūtra; instead, 
this Indian master defended the five gotra (wuzhongxing 五種性, pañca gotrāḥ) account, 
which sorts sentient beings into five dissimilar families (gotra) (T43N1831, P610b29). 
Contrary to the view that “all have Buddha nature” (xiyoufoxing 悉有佛性), Xuanzang and 
his disciples contend that there are some “sentient beings without Buddha nature” 
(youqingwuxing 有情無性) (Xia 2003). In his interpretation of the gotra, Kuiji traces the 
origin of this account to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which can be found in the following chart. 
Preserved in this text, members of the hearer family and the solitary family have Buddha 
nature but lack the ability to realize it and, therefore, cannot become a Buddha. Members of 
                                                        
166 In his study of the debate over Buddha nature, Lü Cheng mainly explores the divide inside the School of 
Consciousness-only (Lü 1991, 425). While Lü mainly focuses on the writings of Kuiji and Huizhao, recent 
studies in Japanese scholarship detail the arguments from both sides of the debate over Buddha nature 
(Fukuhara 1973; Rhodes 1994; Yoshimura 2009). Outside the Yogācāra school, clerics, such as the third 
patriarch of Huayan Buddhism Fazang 法藏 (c. 643-712) and the ninth patriarch of Tiantai Buddhism Jinxi 
Zhanran 荊溪湛然 (711-782), have composed commentaries to challenge the gotra system endorsed by 
Xuanzang’s followers (Wang 2005, 194). In Japan, Yogācārins debated over the same issue of Buddha nature 
during the Nara Period, and later on in the Kamakura period. At that time, their rivals were clerics not only from 
the long-established schools that were in favour of the “one-vehicle” but also from the newly-founded schools 
of Zen and Pure Land (Yamasaki 1985). 
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the last family of no-nature, also known as the icchantikas, amount to sentient beings without 
Buddha nature: 
Gotra (T16N672, P597a29-b2) Description 
       The tathāgata family 
(rulaichengzhongxing 如來乘種性, 
tathāgatayānābhisamayagotraḥ) 
Its members are those who can realize the wisdom of emptiness 
and compassion (T16N672, P597b20), become the Buddha, and attain 
the great nirvāṇa and great bodhi. 
The indefinite family 
(budingzhongxing 不定種性, 
aniyatagotraḥ) 
Its members are those who have the possibility of becoming arhat, 
pratyekabuddha, or the Buddha. The outcome of their training is 
undetermined (T16N672, P597b24-28). 
The hearer family 
(shengwenchengzhongxing 聲聞乘種
性, śrāvakayānābhisamayagotraḥ) 
Its members are those who hear about the Buddha’s teaching of 
no-self and engage in Buddhist practices. Although they realize that 
there is no svabhāvic self and then become arhats, they are still ignorant 
of the empty nature of all dharmas (T16N672, P597b8-12). 
The solitary family 
(pizhifochengzhongxing 辟⽀佛乘種
性, 
pratyekabuddhayānābhisamayagotraḥ) 
Its members are those who realize the wisdom of emptiness and 
become pratyekabuddha (T16N672, P597b15). Yet, they prefer to 
practice in solitude, not willing to help others or to be helped, thus 
remaining ignorant of the Bodhisattvas’ compassion. 
The family without gotra 
(wuzhongxing 無種性, agotrakaḥ) 
Its members are those who have no Buddha nature and cannot 
become a Buddha (T16N672, P597c9-11). 
 
The gotra system appears to imply that the future of a sentient being has been predetermined 
by its membership in these families. If this is the case, how is it possible for this sentient 
being to exercise agency? The gotra system seems to overthrow the conclusion made in the 
previous chapter that all sentient beings can exercise agency to realize nirvāṇa.  
To explore whether Xuanzang and Kuiji endorse such determinism, it is helpful to revisit 
the notion of gotra. Although this Sanskrit term originally meant the lineage of family and 
clan, Xuanzang plays with the term “gotra” again in his translations. He paraphrases gotra as 
zhongxing 種姓, the literal meaning of which is “family-name 姓 of one’s origin 種”, which 
is further used interchangeably with zhongxing 種性, namely, the “nature 性 of one’s seeds
種”.167 Connecting gotra with the theory of seeds in the storehouse consciousness, Chinese 
                                                        
167 In the writings of Chinese Yogācārins, the CWSL for instance, gotra has been translated as 種姓 and 種性. In 
the Chinese context, these two terms have been used interchangeably. In his insightful dissertation, “Yogācāra 
Buddhism Transmitted or Transformed”, Keng Ching examines how and why the two concepts, namely 佛性
Buddha-nature and 佛姓 Buddha-gotra have been treated as synonyms in Chinese Buddhism (Keng 2009). As 
argued by Keng in the conclusion, such a confusion of these two concepts represents another creative 
understanding of Buddhism in the local Chinese intellectual context. Thereby, I follow Lü Cheng’s 
interpretation of this term and contend that these two Chinese terms are used, indeed, interchangeably. Lü 
provides the following etymological analysis of the Sanskrit term gotra: gotra is comprised of two parts, go- and 
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Yogācārins implicitly insert their own understanding of Buddha nature to support their view 
of dependent-evolution (zhuanyi 轉依, āśraya-parivṛtti). 
CWSL introduces the seeds in the following manner (T31N1585, P8a5-8; a12-16): 
 此中何法，名為種⼦？謂本識中，親⽣⾃果，功能差別。此與本識及所⽣果，不⼀不異。體⽤因
果，理應爾故。雖⾮⼀異，⽽是實有。 假法如無，⾮因緣故。種⼦雖依第⼋識體，⽽是此識相分
⾮餘。⾒分恒取此為境故。諸有漏種，與異熟識，體無別故，無記性攝。因果俱有善等性故，亦名
善等。諸無漏種，⾮異熟識性所攝故，因果俱是善性攝故，唯名為善。 
 What are the dharmas that are called seeds? They are those inside the original consciousness, namely, the 
eighth storehouse consciousness, which exist as virtuality and can immediately function to produce a wide 
range of fruits. Seeds and the storehouse consciousness, seeds and fruits, they are neither identical nor 
different. This is because the consciousness is the body whereas the seeds are the function; and the seeds 
are the causes while the produced dharmas are the fruits. Body and function, or cause and fruit, they are 
neither identical nor different. Nevertheless, the seeds have the real existence. Otherwise, they would not 
be able to serve as causes.  
 Seeds, although they depend on the body of the eighth consciousness, are only the image part of this 
storehouse consciousness. The seeing parts of the eighth consciousness constantly perceive these seeds as 
the image parts. For all the polluted seeds and the contaminated storehouse consciousness, their body is the 
same and they are both morally neutral. Yet, since the seeds are cultivated by and can further produce 
morally good, evil, or neutral actions, we can also say that the seeds have all three moral qualities. The 
immaculate seeds: their body is not the contaminated storehouse consciousness, insofar as they are 
cultivated by and can further produce morally good deeds. Therefore, the moral quality of immaculate 
seeds is good.  
 
As elaborated previously in Chapter 3, seeds symbolize the possibilities for consciousnesses 
to form svabhāvic or non-svabhāvic views, thus giving rise to a wide range of actions. Just 
like a seed, a possibility needs proper conditions to realize itself (T31N1585, P9b23). 
Without such conditions, a seed/possibility might very well remain nascent, never being able 
to come into actual existence in our experience. Under the right conditions, the seed will 
grow up, and the possibility will be realized as a viewpoint. Since each consciousness has its 
distinct way of perceiving, the realized viewpoint varies from one consciousness to another 
(T31N1585, P9b26). Every viewpoint flashes through one’s experience, enduring as short as 
one instant, prior to giving rise to an action (T31N1585, P9b8-11). It is the function of the 
seeds to serve as the direct cause of a wide range of actions. Some of the seeds are polluted 
by ignorance and are capable of bringing about misconceptions and misdeeds; others are pure 
and lay the ground for awakening. As such, actions are always associated with moral 
                                                        
-tara, the literal meaning being “virtue” and “carrying beyond”. As such, gotra yields the sense of being saved 
by virtue, which alludes to the cause of goodness (Lü 1991, 426). 
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qualities, either good, evil, or neutral (T31N1585, P9b21). In turn, actions cultivate the seeds 
in the storehouse consciousness, planting possibilities for a viewpoint and then an action to 
arise, and so on ad infinitum (T31N1585, P9b18).  
Thereafter, Xuanzang explains how these seeds come into existence. He maintains that 
some seeds innately exist (benyou 本有) throughout beginningless time, whereas others can 
be newly perfumed (xinxun 新熏) by recent actions (T31N1585, P8b23-c3). Due to the fact 
that seeds can be newly cultivated, sentient beings who have no pure seeds still have the 
chance of acquiring such seeds in the future. Xuanzang also reserves the possibility that the 
seeds in one’s consciousness may be perfumed indirectly by the mind and actions of 
others,168 a viewpoint that alludes to the importance of community and collectivity in the 
Yogācāra architectonic of consciousness.  
Having recapitulated the depiction of the seeds, let us return to the question concerning 
gotra. We learn from CWSL that a sentient being’s family membership is determined by the 
nature of seeds in the storehouse consciousness (T31N1585, P9a22): those who have pure 
seeds like the Buddha belong to either the Tathāgata family or the indefinite one; yet, those 
who have the pure seeds as arhats and pratyekabuddha are classified as members of the 
hearer family and the solitary one; for those who have only impure seeds, they are considered 
the icchantikas that have no Buddha nature. Clarifying how the pure or impure quality of 
seeds shapes a sentient being’s membership in the gotra system, Chinese Yogācārins justify 
the interchangeability of the “family-name 姓 of one’s origin 種” (zhongxing 種姓) and the 
“nature 性 of one’s seeds 種”  (zhongxing 種性). 
Positioning the discussion of Buddha nature in this framework of seeds, Kuiji’s disciple, 
Huizhao, scrutinizes the account of “all have Buddha nature” (T45N1863, P409c16-18). 
                                                        
168 This point is implied by Xuanzang in the Cheng weishi lun regarding perfume of seeds in one’s 
consciousness and of those outside (T31N1585, P9c2-5). 
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Provided that all sentient beings are destined to realize Buddhahood, Huizhao questions 
whether they have Buddha nature in the current, specific moment. If they do have Buddha 
nature, all the seeds in their consciousness should be pure; moreover, because these seeds can 
only result in more good actions and perfume more pure seeds, there should not be any 
ignorance at the conventional level, which contradicts the fact that some sentient beings are 
ignorant and unawakened. However, if sentient beings do not have Buddha nature, there 
should be no pure seeds in their minds, which would make it impossible for them to conduct 
good actions and achieve awakening, a result that conflicts with the premise that all 
ultimately have Buddha nature. Now that Huizhao deems the Madhyamaka distinction of the 
conventional and the ultimate insufficient to make a case for awakening, he implicitly turns 
to the Yogācāra notion of the three natures in building his account of Buddha nature.169  
In parallel to the three natures, Huizhao elaborates on three senses of the concept of 
Buddha nature (T45N1863, P439a16-b25):  
所明佛性，不過三種：⼀理性；⼆⾏性；三隱密性。⾔理性者，佛性論云，為除此執故。佛說佛
性，佛性者，即是⼈法⼆空所顯真如…⾏性者，通有漏無漏⼀切萬⾏… 隱密性者，如維摩經云，塵
勞之儔，為如來種等…即由斷無明，故得理清淨。清淨不⼆故。說無明，名為菩提。 
The Sūtras have clarified three senses of Buddha nature: first, the nature in principle; second, the nature in 
practice; third, the nature in secretiveness. What we mean by the nature in principle, as related in the 
Commentary on Buddha Nature, is that which [helps sentient beings] remove attachments. The Buddha 
preaches Buddha nature. By Buddha nature, we mean the suchness revealed after one empties attachments to 
the self and to dharmas… What we mean by the nature in practice penetrates all the ten thousand practices 
that are polluted and unpolluted… What we mean by the nature in secretiveness, as related in the Vimalakīrti 
Sūtra, shows that mental defilement is the partner of the seed of Tathāgata… [F]rom the cessation of 
ignorance, there arises the principle of immaculateness. Such is the non-duality of immaculateness [and 
ignorance]. That is why we say ignorance is awakening.  
 
Following this line of reasoning, Buddha nature in principle describes the absolute nature of 
how things are in the cosmos, which further amounts to suchness devoid of any ignorance, 
misperceptions, and misdeeds. Buddha nature in secretiveness entails how the mind is 
secreted and concealed through ignorance, a state that reflects the imagined nature. 
                                                        
169 In his study of Huizhao’s Nengxianzhongbian Huirilun 能顯中邊慧⽇論,  Fukihara Shōshin expounds the 
three senses of Buddha nature penned by Huizhao, and he also remarks how these three senses are related to the 
three natures in the Yogācāra framework (Fukihara 1966, 17-18). Drawing upon and developing Fukihara’s 
insight, I expand the account and elaborate the parallel.  
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Nevertheless, as concluded by Huizhao, “from the cessation of ignorance, there arises the 
principle of immaculateness. Such is the non-duality of immaculateness [and ignorance]. 
That is why we say ignorance is awakening” (即由斷無明故得理清淨。清淨不⼆故。說無
明名為菩提). Just as the dependent nature encapsulates the open possibility between the 
imagined nature and the absolute nature, so does Buddha nature in practice that encloses the 
fluidity between awakening (as in Buddha nature in principle) and ignorance (as in Buddha 
nature in secretiveness). Indeed, the nature in practice penetrates all that is pure or impure, 
further allowing for the fluid change from one state to the other.  
As detailed in Chapter 6, through expanding the Madhyamika view of the twofold truth 
into the theory of three natures, Yogācārins shift the focus from the absolute emptiness (as 
the ultimate truth) to the wondrous existence of phenomena that constantly arise and perish in 
virtue of consciousnesses (as the dependent nature). This shift is likewise expressed by 
Huizhao in his reformulation of Buddha nature. Instead of highlighting how Buddha nature is 
the ultimate truth that penetrates all sentient beings, Huizhao stresses Buddha nature in 
practice, which reserves the fluid change between becoming awake as a Buddha and 
remaining ignorant without Buddha nature.  
It is through this fluid change that the gotra system is not pre-determinate but rather 
reserves the possibility of changing one’s family membership. Due to the fluid change 
between Buddha nature in principle and Buddha nature in secretiveness, even the most 
ignorant ones can regain the chance of growing pure seeds and transforming their family 
membership. Such a transformation amounts to the Yogācāra concept of dependent-
evolution. Reversely, even the most intelligent ones can lose the possibility of awakening if 
not making a proper effort. Now, since membership in the gotra system results from the pure 
or impure quality of seeds, change of family membership is realized through the appearance 
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of new seeds. The next section will explore how new seeds can be cultivated through 
different powers in the Yogācāra framework.  
During the Tang Dynasty, when Xuanzang released the five-gotra account, the majority 
of the Buddhist community attacked his proposal of “sentient beings without Buddha nature” 
(Chen 1964; Lü 1991). Upon Xuanzang’s death, the debate between early Yogācāra and later 
Yogācāra became more intense, eventually leading to the split between Kuiji in the Ci’en 
Temple and Woncheuk (圓測 613-696) in the Ximing Temple (Xia 2003, 113). When 
Xuanzang’s patron, Emperor Taizong, passed away, his son, Emperor Gaozong (628-683) 
succeeded to the throne. Gaozong later entrusted the empire to his wife, Empress Wu Zetian 
(武則天 624-705), who paid great respect to Woncheuk and invited him back to the capital 
city to preach (Xia 2003, 113). In this political climate, Kuiji left the capital city to stay on 
the outskirts of the power center. Later Yogācāra likewise was pushed to the fringes of the 
Buddhist community. Eventually, the debate over Buddha nature subsided due to the political 
patronage of the ruling class.  
9.2 Self-Power and Other-Power 
Thus far, we have clarified that the gotra system does not predetermine the life of sentient 
beings. To explore what makes it possible for a change of family membership in the gotra 
system, the current section takes the icchantikas as an exemplar. As to be seen shortly, 
through the collaborative effort of self-power and other-power, even the most ignorant 
icchantikas can leave the family of no-nature and regain the chance of attaining awakening.   
For a long time, Buddhist scholars have lamented that the concept of icchantika caused 
the downfall of Yogācāra Buddhism in China (Lü 1979, 191; Xia 2003, 87; Chen 1964, 325). 
From their vantage point, the existence of icchantikas contradicts the consensus that all 
sentient beings can realize Buddha nature or Buddhahood, further rendering the doctrine of 
Consciousness-only unattractive to the Chinese laity. As such, the School of Consciousness-
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only gradually declined. They further conjecture that Xuanzang knew very well the 
incompatibility of Indian Yogācāra with indigenous Chinese culture, but out of his deep 
respect for Sīlabhadra, Xuanzang continued to preach that some sentient beings like the 
ignorant icchantikas, had no Buddha nature (Lü 1998, 190; Xia 2003, 88). 
From my point of view, this popular assessment not only overlooks how the relationship 
between religion and the state contributed to the decline of Yogācāra in China,170 but also 
obscures the philosophical justification of the icchantika theory provided by Chinese 
Yogācārins in the seventh century. Through analyzing how Kuiji (632-682) expounds this 
notion of icchantika, this section argues that what looks like a negation of icchantikas’ 
capacity of attaining awakening is, in fact, an affirmation of the compassion of the 
Bodhisattvas. The power of this compassion is able to cultivate pure seeds in the storehouse 
consciousness of the incurable icchantikas, further allowing for the possibility of these 
icchantikas to change their membership in the gotra system. The way in which icchantikas 
can regain the chance of awakening epitomizes how all sentient beings can transform their 
family membership in virtue of self-power and in reliance on other-power.  
To begin with, let us introduce Kuiji’s definition of icchantika. According to Kuiji, there 
is not merely one type of icchantika, but two: the real ignorant ones and the compassionate 
Bodhisattvas (T45N1831, P610c2-8),  
 五者無性，謂⼀闡提。此有⼆種：⼀者焚燒⼀切善根，則謗菩薩藏。⼆者憐愍⼀切眾⽣，作盡⼀切
眾⽣界願。是菩薩也。若眾⽣不⼊涅槃，我亦不⼊。⼤惠⽩佛，此⼆何者常不⼊涅槃？佛⾔，菩薩
常不⼊涅槃，⾮焚燒⼀切善根者。以知諸法本來涅槃，不捨⼀切諸眾⽣故。 
 The fifth family consists of those without nature, namely, the icchantikas. There are further two types. The 
first are those who have burnt all the roots of goodness and defamed the Bodhisattvas. The second are 
those who are compassionate about all sentient beings and vow to save them. They are the Bodhisattvas 
who make the vow that “if all sentient beings do not attain nirvāṇa, neither do I”. Mahaprajñā asks the 
Buddha, “why do the two never enter nirvāṇa?” The Buddha answers by saying, “only the Bodhisattvas do 
not enter nirvāṇa, not those whose root of goodness has been burnt. The Bodhisattvas have already known 
that saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, yet they are not willing to leave other sentient beings behind”.  
 
                                                        
170 For recent studies of the relationship between later Chinese Yogācāra and the state, please see Yoshimura 
Makoto “『⼤唐⼤慈恩寺三藏法師傳』の成⽴について (On the Composition of the Biography of the 
Tripitaka Master of the Ci’en Temple of the Great Tang)” (1995); and Liu Shufeng “⽞奘的最後⼗年 (The Last 
Ten Years of Xuanzang’s Life)” (2009). 
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The Sanskrit term icchantika is used to describe those who maintain their desires. As clarified 
by Kuiji, there are two kinds of these desire-maintainers: those who are truly incapable of 
purifying their seeds due to their indulgence in pleasures, and those who have made the great 
vow and, hence, desire to save all sentient beings. That being said, the first type of 
icchantikas are those who are genuinely incapable of awakening the wisdom of emptiness 
and, thus, are unable to conduct any compassionate deeds. In Yogācāra terms, they are 
sentient beings whose root of goodness has even been burnt off (T43N1831, P610c2). 
Nevertheless, the Bodhisattvas are the second type of sentient beings without Buddha nature 
insofar as they make the great vow of saving all sentient beings prior to becoming the 
Buddha (T43N1831, P610c4). Because of this Bodhisattvas’ vow, if ignorant sentient beings 
do not realize their Buddha nature, neither will the Bodhisattvas. To fulfil their vows, the 
Bodhisattvas will come to the most incurable ones to help them. Kuiji exalts this vow for it is 
the expression of the great compassion of Bodhisattvas (T43N1831, P6111a28).  
By incorporating the Bodhisattvas into the family of the icchantikas, Kuiji accentuates 
how the power of Bodhisattvas’ great compassion (dabei ⼤悲) assists the ignorant ones in 
cultivating pure seeds in their storehouse consciousness. For the most ignorant ones, their 
storehouse consciousnesses are filled only with impure seeds, so much so that, in their 
current life, they have no Buddha nature and, thus, cannot become a Buddha. Since it is 
impossible for the most ignorant to realize their Buddha nature through their own power, they 
must temporarily rely on the power of Bodhisattvas’ compassion. Through familiarizing 
themselves with the “good knowledge” (善知識) of the Bodhisattvas and taking these 
Bodhisattvas as their “good friends” (善友), these ignorant icchantikas will regain the 
possibility of cultivating pure seeds and growing the root of goodness (T45N1863, P442a5-9; 
T45N1862, P375c5-11). This is how icchantikas start to have the possibility of changing their 
family membership in the gotra system. The way in which Bodhisattvas assist ignorant ones 
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in regaining pure seeds is described by Huizhao’s disciple, Zhizhou (智周, 668-723), as the 
transfer of merit (T45N1864, P450b21-23): 
七者，菩薩⽽能增⾧⼀切善根。修習究竟安住忍⼒。閉惡趣⾨。永離顛倒。不著諸⾏。⼀切善根
由皆悉迴向。為⼀切眾⽣作功德藏。 
Seventh, the Bodhisattvas can grow all the roots of goodness. At the stage of refinement and the ultimate 
stage, they reside in the power of forbearance. They close the door to evilness, permanently separate from 
misperceptions, and never obsess with practices. All the roots of goodness grow due to the transfer of the 
Bodhisattvas’ merit. For all sentient beings, the Bodhisattvas store their merits.   
 
The power of Bodhisattvas’ compassion has been categorized as one of the upheaving 
conditions (adhipat-pratyaya 增上緣) for the ignorant icchantikas’ awakening (T45N1863, 
P447c8). Positioning the discussion in the context of the seeds, Huizhao elaborates on how 
others’ preaching of emptiness and compassion, as the upheaving condition, can indirectly 
cultivate newly perfumed pure seeds in the minds of ignorant ones and facilitate their 
awakening of correct insight (T45N1863, P447c9-10). Assistance from others, Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas for instance, does not amount to the direct cause (hetu-pratyaya 因緣) of newly 
perfumed pure seeds, insofar as the ignorant icchantikas have only impure seeds in their 
current minds, thereby unable to grow any pure seeds themselves (T45N 1863, P447c23-
448a16).  
The distinction between upheaving condition qua help from others and direct cause qua 
actions of oneself suggests how Yogācārins strive to locate a middle way between making an 
effort on oneself and relying on the help of others. It is true that others could assist one in 
awakening when this sentient being is temporarily incompetent to do so. Yet, this assistance 
is not enough to be the direct cause of the appearance of pure seeds and of Buddha nature. 
Eventually, this sentient being shall make an effort on its own and engage in religious 
training to regrow the root of goodness and realize awakening. That being said, the ignorant 
icchantikas can rely on the compassion of the Bodhisattvas’ as a provisional means, but the 
power of compassion can never replace the effort of oneself in the gradual process of 
changing one’s membership in the gotra system.  
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Following Kuiji and Huizhao, Jōkei (貞慶 1155-1213)171 – a later Yogācārin in late 
Heian and early Kamakura Japan – in order to highlight the “power of Bodhisattvas’ vow” 
(菩薩願⼒), describes them as the “icchantikas of great compassion” (⼤悲闡提) in contrast 
to the “icchantikas without the root of goodness” (斷善闡提) (T66N2263, P28a1-30b16). At 
that time, Japanese Buddhist clerics debated over the idea of other-power, more directly due 
to the ideological competition between Hōsso and the newly-arisen Pure Land schools.172 
Other-power is synonymous with the power of Bodhisattvas’ compassionate vow, and in 
contrast to self-power that characterizes the effort sentient beings can make on their own. 
Thus far, it becomes clear that the change of a sentient being’s membership in the gotra 
system can happen through the collaborative effort of self-power and other-power: when the 
sentient being is incurably ignorant, it has to temporarily rely on the Bodhisattvas’ 
compassion until it can exercise self-power to attain awakening.   
To understand why others can perform such an assistive role for an individual but still 
can not replace self-effort and self-power, it is necessary to revisit the Yogācāra view of other 
minds. In Chapter 3, I clarified the Yogācāra account – although our own minds cannot 
transform into that of others or vice versa, we nevertheless experience other minds through 
the second-person perspective, as our partners and friends with whom we co-exist in cosmic 
history. This experience further demonstrates the self-other interdependence at the explicative 
level. When the Bodhisattvas attain initial awakening and comprehend their self-other 
interdependence, they voluntarily return to the realm of saṃsāra to help others, especially the 
most ignorant icchantikas. They do not perceive the icchantikas as their rivals but as their 
                                                        
171 As many scholars have noted, Jōkei associates the theory of Buddha nature quite explicitly with the three-
nature and three-non-nature theory, insofar as he promotes the differentiation of five families with the help of 
the three-nature account, while reaffirming the account of all having Buddha nature through the conception of 
three-non-nature. See Kamata Shigeo (1971, 534); and Yamasaki Keiki (1985, 254).   
172  See Jōkei, “Kōfukuji sōjō”, 312-316. For a critical translation of this text in English, see Morrell, “Jōkei and 
the Kōfukuji petition” (1983, 6-38). 
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friends. Through interacting with the Bodhisattvas, the most ignorant ones are able to 
experience the minds of others qua the Bodhisattvas, which reveals the pure wisdom of 
emptiness and compassion. This is how the icchantikas have access to wisdom and 
compassion, not through self-power, but rather through the compassion of the Bodhisattvas. 
Or, borrowing the mirror analogy, the ignorant ones have no awakened mind or Buddha 
nature, but still, they experience the awakened minds of the Bodhisattvas through the second-
person perspective, as seeing the world through the mirror. From the vantage point of the 
Bodhisattvas, it is through their compassion that the awakened, pure mind can be manifested 
to the ignorant ones. Yogācārins refer to this manifestation as the other-enjoyment body 
(shouyongshen 受⽤⾝, sambhogakāya) of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, which will be detailed 
in Chapter 10. Kuiji continues that once sentient beings are exposed to this other-enjoyment 
body, their current membership in the gotra family will no longer obstruct their realization of 
Buddha nature (T45N1861, P373b15). Through their experience of the wisdom of emptiness 
and compassion, newly cultivated pure seeds start to grow in the storehouse of the most 
ignorant ones. From then on, the seeds of Buddha nature will appear in the minds of the 
ignorant ones. After several rounds of rebirth, even the most incurable icchantikas can 
change their gotra membership and realize their Buddha nature through self-power. This 
transition, in turn, explains why the gotra system is not predeterminate but rather 
accommodates the possibility of change. 
Following this line of reasoning, it can be explained why Xuanzang and his disciples 
spared no effort to promote the gotra theory. Their purpose was not to demean the ignorant 
ones against others, but rather to highlight the compassion of the Bodhisattvas, through the 
power of whom even the most ignorant ones can have the chance of being awakened in the 
future. As such, what looks like a negation of icchantikas to attain awakening is in fact an 
affirmation of the compassion of the Bodhisattvas. As remarked by Lü Cheng, the existence 
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of the sentient beings without Buddha nature reveals the great virtue of Buddhas and 
Bodhisattvas (Lü 1986, 433).  
This deep care for the icchantikas prompted later Yogācārins to criticize early 
Yogācāra’s notion of “all sentient beings having Buddha nature”. As previously mentioned, 
the underlying conviction of this early view is as such: Buddha nature is the luminous mind 
innate to all sentient beings, although such luminosity can be cloaked by guest dust, a 
metaphorical way of describing various kinds of mental defilements in everyday life. Thus, 
there arises the maxim, “the nature of the [luminous] mind is originally pure, only being 
polluted by guest dust qua mental defilements (⼼性本淨, 客塵煩惱所染)” (T31N1585, 
P8c20). Such a maxim, as scrutinized in CWSL, raises a paradox: if the original mind is 
temporarily covered by the dust, namely, by misperceptions and mental defilements, is the 
mind in this covered state pure or impure? If it is pure, then the dust should also be pure; 
misperception should also be an insight; defilement should also be awakening (T31N1585, 
P8c24). If it is not, no pure seeds would remain in consciousness, which equally makes 
awakening impossible (T31N1585, P8c26). Due to this paradox, intrinsic to the view of the 
“originally pure mind”(xinxingbenjing ⼼性本淨), these later Yogācārins in China argue that 
(T31N1585, P9a5-7),  
 然契經說，⼼性淨者，說⼼空理所顯真如。真如是⼼真實性故。或說⼼體⾮煩惱，故名性本淨。⾮
有漏⼼性是無漏，故名本淨。 
 Yet, when the sūtra says the nature of the luminous mind is originally pure, it means that the emptiness of 
the mind as a principle reveals suchness. Thereby, suchness is the true nature of the mind. To put it 
differently, the dependent nature of the mind is not the defilement so that the nature is originally 
immaculate. By originally pure, it does not mean that the nature of the polluted mind is immaculate. 
 
That being said, Buddha nature is not an innate quality but the ideal state to be realized to 
various degrees by sentient beings. Such a realization yields the appearance of pure 
consciousness; the defining nature of such pure consciousness is emptiness (T31N1585, 
P9a6). Scholars have characterized the later Yogācāra view of Buddha nature as that of the 
“originally quiescent mind” (xinxingbenji ⼼性本寂) (Lü 1991, 1415). 
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In their critique of “all sentient beings having Buddha nature”, Yogācārins raise a more 
practical concern. As documented in CWSL, this view blurs the line between the awakened 
ones and the unawakened commoners (T31N1585, P9a1). Early Yogācārins remove this line 
but are unable to adequately explain why, if human nature (unawakened) is already Buddha 
nature (awakened), sentient beings must engage in monastic training and Buddhist practice. 
The gotra system provides an ideal answer to this question, in that it preserves the empirical 
differences of sentient beings (some able to realize Buddha nature on their own and others 
incapable of doing so) and simultaneously reserves the possibility of transformation (sentient 
beings can change their family membership through the collaborative effort of self-power and 
other-power). To realize these possibilities, sentient beings must undergo monastic training to 
improve themselves. This training unravels through the “five stages of Consciousness-only” 
(wushiwuwei 唯識五位).  
9.3 Five Stages of Realizing Consciousness-only      
To realize Buddha nature, namely, to transform from the state of ignorance to the state of 
awakening, sentient beings need to engage in religious practice so that their consciousnesses 
can go through dependent-evolution to become wisdom. This religious training at the 
prescriptive level has been articulated by Chinese Yogācārins as the five stages (wei 位, 
vasthā) of entering and realizing Consciousness-only (T31N1585, P48b11). As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 8, dependent-evolution of consciousnesses into wisdom can happen 
when sentient beings acquire two types of insight – first, the horizontal insight that removes 
all discriminative attachments to the self and to other dharmas; and second, the vertical 
insight that dissolves all embodied attachments and enables sentient beings to become one 
with emptiness. Positioning the investigation of the five stages of Consciousness-only in the 
framework of these two insights, I propose to understand the realization of awakening as a 
process that takes place both horizontally and vertically. The introduction in the current 
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section sets the stage for an in-depth analysis of why Husserl provides a rather nascent 
account of the prescriptive level and why Yogācāra Buddhism is much more than a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology in the next chapter.  
To begin with, let us introduce the five stages depicted by Xuanzang in CWSL 
(T31N1585, P48b15-20).  
 云何漸次悟⼊唯識？謂諸菩薩於識相性，資糧位中能深信解。在加⾏位，能漸伏除所取能取，引發
真⾒。在通達位，如實通達。修習位中，如所⾒理，數數修習，伏斷餘障。⾄究竟位，出障圓明，
能盡未來，化有情類，復令悟⼊唯識相性。 
 What does it mean to gradually realize Consciousness-only? It means that the Bodhisattvas can, at the 
[first] stage of accumulation, cultivate profound confidence in the image and nature of consciousness; at 
the [second] stage of preparation, gradually impede the twofold grasping for acquiring true insight; at the 
[third] stage of seeing, realize the wisdom of emptiness; at the [fourth] stage of refinement, practice 
frequently according to the altruistic principle, further removing the remaining obstructions; until the final 
ultimate stage, remove all obstructions, become perfect in merit and knowledge, and spend infinite time 
ahead to teach others, so they could also realize the image and nature of Consciousness-only.  
 
Outlined in this manner, Xuanzang stresses how the realization of awakening is a gradual 
process from the first stage to the last one. This gradual process starts with the stage of 
accumulation (ziliangwei 資糧位, saṃbhāravasthā). As the name suggests, it is when 
practitioners make the determination to follow the Bodhisattvas’ path (T31N1585, P48c1). At 
this stage, practitioners have not yet removed any attachment, not yet purified any 
misperception, and thus not yet acquired any insight. As portrayed by Xuanzang (T31N1585, 
P48c2-3; P49a1-2), 
 此位菩薩，依因、善友、作意、資糧四勝⼒故，於唯識義，雖深信解，⽽未能了能所取空。多住外
⾨，修菩薩⾏。故於⼆取所引隨眠，猶未有能伏滅功⼒，令彼不起⼆取現⾏。 
 In this stage, the Bodhisattvas draw upon the four excellent forces, namely, the force of cause, the force of 
condition of friends, the force of attention to pursue the supreme awakening, and the force of accumulating 
merit and wisdom. Although they have developed comprehension and faith upon the doctrine of 
Consciousness-only, they still have not realized the emptiness of the twofold grasping. Thereby, they 
reside outside the gate to pursue the Bodhisattvas’ path, further not being able to put down the seeds 
cultivated by the twofold grasping or to stop future grasping from arising. 
 
 菩薩住此資糧位中，⼆麤現⾏，雖有伏者，⽽於細者及⼆隨眠，⽌觀⼒微，未能伏滅。 
 Bodhisattvas residing in this stage of accumulating, though able to impede actualized actions produced by 
the two obstructions from conceptual discrimination, are still incapable of putting down the subtle actions 
produced by the two obstructions or purifying the seeds of these obstructions, insofar as the power of their 
calming and contemplating remains weak.  
  
The main training practitioners participate in includes a wide range of moral actions that can 
accumulate karmic merit (T31N1585, P49a5-13). Through these good acts, they accumulate 
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more pure seeds, which leads to the development of faith and perseverance (T31N1585, 
P49a3). Aside from moral actions, practitioners also embark on meditation, especially 
calming and contemplating (zhiguan ⽌觀, śamathavipaśyanā), although at the first stage, the 
power of meditation remains weak, thus not enough to guide practitioners in purifying false 
imagination from consciousness and unable to clear obstructions or to completely remove 
attachments (T31N1585, P49a2). Nevertheless, the accumulated karmic merit serves as the 
direct cause of perfuming pure seeds in the storehouse consciousness for these practitioners, 
further enriching the possibilities for them to attain awakening later on 
 (T31N1585, P49a14-21). 
Practitioners start to correct misperception and remove attachments when they enter the 
second stage of preparation (jiaxingwei 加⾏位, prayogāvasthā). In this stage, practitioners 
are able to acquire true conceptual knowledge of how things actually are. Thereafter, they can 
correct discriminative attachments of the self and of other dharmas. This is how they attain 
the horizontal insight (T31N1585, P49a26-b1; c4-7): 
 菩薩先於初無數劫，善備福德智慧，資糧順解脫分既圓滿已。為⼊⾒道住唯識性，復修加⾏，伏除
⼆取。謂煖、頂、忍、世第⼀法。此四總名順決擇分，順趣真實，決擇分故。近⾒道，故⽴加⾏
名。⾮前資糧，無加⾏義。 
 The Bodhisattvas, in the first countless eons, have accumulated enough merit, knowledge, and wisdom. 
Their dharmas of deliverance have been accomplished. To enter the stage of seeing and to reside in the 
nature of Consciousness-only, they still need to prepare for impeding and removing the twofold grasping. 
Thereby, they need to practice heat, peak, forbearance, and the supreme mundane quality. These four are 
known as the part relating to intelligence (nirvedhabhāgīya), insofar as these four practices produce and 
follow the true and pure intelligence. This stage is close to that of seeing, therefore being referred to as that 
of preparation. It is not to say that one does not get oneself prepared in the first stage of accumulation.  
  
 此加⾏位，未遣相縛，於麤重縛，亦未能斷。唯能伏除分別⼆取，違⾒道故。於俱⽣者、及⼆隨
眠，有漏觀⼼有所得故有分別，故未全伏除全未能滅。 
 At the stage of preparation, the Bodhisattvas have not yet removed the restraint imposed by the polluted 
dharmas upon the contemplating mind, not able to cut off the constraint on the seeds of the two 
obstructions. Thereby, they are only able to put down the actions of twofold grasping which arise from 
conceptual discrimination, insofar as this type of twofold grasping is incompatible with the stage of seeing. 
However, regarding the actions of twofold grasping that stem from embodied habit and their seeds, the 
polluted mind of contemplating is incapable of removing them.    
 
Through engaging in meditation, practitioners learn to scrutinize their svabhāvic views of the 
self and of others at the conceptual level (T31N1585, P49b11). This is the stage where 
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practitioners familiarize themselves with the true knowledge of how things actually are. 
Although sentient beings can comprehend the truth of emptiness and change their svabhāvic 
way of perceiving, they have not yet become one with emptiness, habitually. To realize 
rehabitualization, it is not enough to acquire the horizontal insight. Practitioners need to 
continue their training to embody the vertical insight at the third stage of seeing (tongdawei
通達位, prativedhāvasthā) (T31N1585, P49c5).  
At the third stage of seeing, emptiness is no longer a subject matter for conceptual 
speculation but an underlying principle of life (T31N1585, P50a5). Once practitioners no 
longer entertain emptiness but rather embody it, they acquire both the vertical and the 
horizontal insight. As described by Xuanzang (T31N1585, P49c19-22; P50a5),  
 若時，菩薩於所緣境，無分別智都無所得，不取種種戲論相故。爾時乃名實住唯識真勝義性。即證
真如智，與真如平等，平等俱離能取所取相故。能所取相俱是分別，有所得⼼戲論現故。 
 At a time when the Bodhisattvas come to perceive objects, their non-dualistic wisdom has nothing to 
obtain, insofar as it does not entertain any false images. By then, the Bodhisattvas can really be said to 
reside actually in the true ultimate nature of Consciousness-only. To put it differently, they realize the 
wisdom of suchness. This non-dualistic wisdom is equated with suchness, because both have divorced 
themselves from the false images of twofold grasping. The twofold grasping, namely, the act of grasping 
and the image to be grasped, stems from false dichotomization and appears due to the misperceptions of 
the mind.  
 
 加⾏無間。此智⽣時，體會真如，名通達位。初照理故，亦名⾒道。 
 At the stage of preparation, the non-dualistic wisdom could arise incessantly. When this wisdom arises, it 
[allows the Bodhisattvas to] become one with suchness. Thereby, this stage is known as that of clearing. 
Since it is the first time for the Bodhisattvas to realize the principle [of emptiness], it is also called the 
stage of seeing. 
 
By engaging in an even more profound type of meditation, practitioners come to see things as 
they really are: different yet interdependent (T31N1585, P50b11). Even though 
consciousness still transforms itself, practitioners no longer perceive things as svabhāvic, but 
become one with emptiness at each moment of life (T31N1585, P49c28, P50b20). After the 
first three stages, practitioners have acquired the two insights, purified their sixth and seventh 
consciousnesses, liberated themselves from both the embodied and discriminative 
attachments, and removed the obstructions of defilement and knowledge. These changes 
allow for the transformation of consciousness into wisdom (轉識成智), as encapsulated in 
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the concept of dependent-evolution (轉依, āśraya-parivrtti). The sixth consciousness evolves 
itself into the “wisdom of wondrous observation” (miaoguanchazhi 妙觀察智, 
pratyavekṣanājñāna), through which sentient beings perceive things as they actually are 
(T31N1585, P56b16). The seventh consciousness turns into the wisdom of equality 
(pingdengxingzhi 平等性智, samatajñāna), inspiring sentient beings to treat others as equals 
who are inherently interdependent on them (T31N1585, P56b20).  
As previously mentioned in our examination of other minds, Chinese Yogācārins imply 
the existence of a collective consciousness of all sentient beings. Due to the 
interconnectedness of consciousness at the collective level, if there is one sentient being that 
remains ignorant in this community, then the collective consciousness continues to be 
polluted by ignorance, which further obstructs the awakening of other members. As such, 
those who have attained the horizontal and vertical insights for themselves will voluntarily 
turn to help those who remain ignorant. By doing so, practitioners enter the fourth stage of 
refinement (xiuxiwei 修習位, bhāvanāvasthā). 
At the fourth stage, the practitioners, now becoming Bodhisattvas, are motivated to 
continue performing the ten perfect actions (shengxing 勝⾏, pāramitā) to benefit and help 
others (T31N1585, P51b8-b18). Continuing to refine their own realization of emptiness by 
completing practices through ten grounds (shidi ⼗地 daśa bhūmayaḥ), their practices 
become increasingly more altruistic, and they are able to purify the consciousnesses of others, 
which, in turn, facilitates the progress of the Bodhisattvas’ training (T31N1585, P50c21-23). 
Eventually, the Bodhisattvas will be able to realize dependent-evolution and awakening, 
attaining liberation (nirvāṇa) for themselves and enlightenment (bodhi) for others 
(T31N1585, P54c21).  
When all sentient beings attain the two insights and transform their consciousnesses into 
wisdom, they have purified the collective consciousness in the entire cosmos. By then, the 
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cosmos transforms into a pure dharma realm. This is when sentient beings enter the ultimate 
stage (jiujingwei 究竟位, niṣṭhāvasthā) (T31N1585, P57a14-19):  
 前修習位所得轉依，應知即是究竟位相。此謂此前⼆轉依果，即是究竟無漏界攝。諸漏永盡，⾮漏
隨增，性淨圓明，故名無漏。界是藏義，此中含容無邊，希有⼤功德故。或是因義，能⽣五乘世，
出世間利樂事故。清淨法界，可唯無漏攝。四智⼼品，如何唯無漏？道諦攝，故唯無漏攝。 
 The realization of dependent-evolution at the stage of practice indicates the appearance of the last ultimate 
stage. The term “this” in the verse refers to the fruits of the two types of dependent-evolutions, namely, the 
great liberation (nirvāṇa) and the great enlightenment (bodhi). These two fruits pertain to the immaculate 
ultimate stage. By immaculate, we mean that all the phenomena of defilements are impeded, and all the 
non-afflicting phenomena continue to grow. These non-afflicting phenomena are pure by nature, perfect, 
luminous, thereby immaculate. The term realm (dhātu) entails containing, insofar as this realm contains the 
limitless, infinite, sublime merit. Or, realm means the cause, insofar as it can give rise to beneficial and 
pleasant things for all five families in the mundane and super-mundane world. The pure dharma realm of 
nirvāṇa can be interpreted as immaculate, yet, how come the four types of wisdom are also immaculate? 
These types of wisdom pertain to the truth of path [in the four noble truths] and therefore are immaculate.  
 
If the entire collective consciousness is purified, there is no longer anything in the cosmos 
that could cultivate impure seeds. Eventually, the eighth storehouse consciousness evolves 
into mirroring wisdom of great perfection (dayuanjingzhi ⼤圓鏡智, ādarśajñāna), which 
enables the practitioner to become aware of all beings that have existed throughout the entire 
cosmic history without grasping them as svabhāva (T31N1585, P56a16-b13). The first five 
consciousnesses transform into the wisdom of accomplishment (chengsuozuozhi 成所作智, 
kṛtyānusthānajñāna), which facilitates the Bodhisattvas’ effort to help others (T31N1585, 
P56b26).  
These four kinds of wisdom fulfil their functions, respectively, despite their common 
capacity of perceiving all things in the cosmos (T31N158, P57a1). The wisdom of perfection 
lays the ground for practitioners to acquire holistic perception of the self and dharmas 
(including other minds), purifying the image of the body and of the entire realm for oneself 
(T31N1585, P57a2). The wisdom of equality, then, enables practitioners to purify the image 
of others’ bodies and of the realm where others reside (T31N1585, P57a3). The wisdom of 
wondrous observation inspires practitioners to observe their actions, to reflect on their 
mistakes, as well as the benefits of their religious training for both themselves and others 
(T31N1585, P57a5). Eventually, the wisdom of accomplishment allows practitioners to use 
 253 
 
 
their corporeal bodies in their specific spatiotemporal locale to preach to and help others 
(T31N1585, P57a4). It is through the collaborative effort of all sentient beings at the five 
stages that all consciousnesses transform into wisdom, and the cosmos becomes a pure 
dharma realm. According to Xuanzang and his disciples, travelling through each stage may 
take a practitioner of Yogācāra Buddhism many eons (jie 劫, kalpa), each lasting four billion 
years. Different from Husserl, who does not specify whether liberation from natural attitude 
is a sudden acquisition, Chinese Yogācārins depict liberation as a rather long process.  
 
Chapter 10: Soteriology at the Prescriptive Level 
 
Thus far, we have examined how agency is possible and how sentient beings can exercise 
their agency to attain liberation for oneself and enlightenment for others. In our analysis of 
agency, we have clarified that Husserl implies his view of agency in the notion of attitude, 
whereas Chinese Yogācārins detail the existence of agency in their theories of dependent 
arising and mental factors. Furthermore, Chinese Yogācārins highlight the role of 
Bodhisattvas in their soteriology, which does not explicitly appear in Husserl’s writings. 
Now, to elaborate why and how Husserl provides a nascent account of the prescriptive level 
of consciousness, the current chapter explores three aspects of awakening: meditation for 
oneself, moral actions in a community, and social construction. As I will argue, it is the 
elaborate system of soteriology that makes Yogācāra Buddhism much more than a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology.  
10.1 Epoché and Yogācāra Contemplation    
Contemplative practice, also known as meditative practice, is fundamental for Buddhism 
(Hopkins 1983; Williams 2008). It is a practice of acquiring the insight of seeing things as 
they actually are. The function of contemplation might strike us as rather close to the 
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Husserlian notion of epoché – a two-step practice through which we suspend all our 
presumptions of factual reality and, thereafter, return to pure consciousness to have an insight 
of essence. Indeed, several scholars propose to interpret contemplative practice in the 
Yogācāra system as a Buddhist version of epoché (Lau 2007; Xiao 2009; Mei 2014). 
Nevertheless, this interpretation has its own limits. The current section explains why 
Yogācāra contemplation is much more than a Buddhist version of epoché. I contend that, 
although the function of epoché is compatible with Yogācāra contemplative practice, the 
content of the two is not completely identical. This is the case for two reasons: first, epoché is 
a two-step process (suspending assumptions and observing essence) of one practice, whereas 
Chinese Yogācārins like Xuanzang and Kuiji perceive these two steps as two separate 
practices; second, the contemplative practice outlined by Kuiji consists of five steps, which is 
broader than a philosophical speculation.  
To begin with, let us recapitulate Husserl’s articulation of epoché. Husserl evokes the 
concept of epoché to describe a two-step process of suspending previous assumptions in the 
natural attitude and observing mental acts in pure consciousness. The former is known as 
phenomenological reduction qua bracketing, whereas the latter becomes referred to as 
transcendental reduction qua seeing the essence (Hua 3/60). Once enacting epoché, a person 
first suspends all assumptions about the factually existent actuality (Hua 3/57), subsequently 
returning to the domain of pure consciousness to grasp the essential conditions for the 
possibility of phenomena that manifest themselves through intentionality (Hua 3/60). Those 
that can appear as phenomena in pure consciousness are not limited to factually real objects 
but are inclusive of the ideal ones. “Seeing” the essence does not entail seeing in its literal 
sense as “seeing with the eyes”, but rather implies figuratively how a person grasps in one 
stroke any state of affairs, universal idealized object, or a priori self-evident laws of 
knowledge. As expected by Husserl, through embracing the phenomenological attitude in 
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virtue of epoché, people can liberate themselves from the natural attitude and return to 
authentic thinking. In Husserl’s terms (Hua 6/259):  
Within the universal epoché which actually understands itself, it becomes evident that there is no 
separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature. What is a mutual externality 
for the natural-mundane attitude of world-life prior to epoché, because of the localization of souls in living 
bodies, is transformed in epoché into a pure, intentional, mutual internality. With this, the world – the 
straightforwardly existing world and, within it, existing nature – is transformed into the all communal 
phenomenon “world”, “world for all actual and possible subjects”, none of whom can escape the 
intentional implication according to which he belongs in advance within the horizon of every other 
subject.173 
 
Husserl refers to such a liberation as a transformation in virtue of epoché. In the wake of such 
transformation, each individual will be able to remedy the crisis of meaning and regain a 
meaningful life.  
The way in which epoché entails an insight of seeing things as they are and a potential 
for self-liberation, might strike us as rather close to the function of the meditative practice of 
“calming and contemplating (zhiguan ⽌觀, śamathavipaśyanā)” depicted by Buddhists. In 
Sanskrit, the term śamathavipaśyanā means “calming-contemplating”. Its Chinese 
translation, zhiguan, literally means “calm insight”. Scholars have used different English 
terms, including “Concentration and Insight”, “Calming and Contemplation”, or “Quite 
Insight”, to translate the notion of zhiguan (Chen 1964; Donner & Stevenson 1993; Kantor 
2009; Swanson 2018).174 Zhiguan was widely practiced by Buddhists in China, including 
                                                        
173 The English translation is based on David Carr’s edition (1970, 255-256). The original German version is as 
follows:  
„In der wirklich sich selbst verstehenden universalen Epoché zeigt es sich, dass es für die Seelen in ihrer 
Eigenwesentlichkeit überhaupt keine Trennung des Außereinander gibt. Was in der natürlich-mundanen 
Einstellung des Weltlebens vor der Epoché ein Außereinander ist, durch Lokalisation der Seelen an den Leibern, 
das verwandelt sich in der Epoché in ein reines intentionales Ineinander. Damit verwandelt sich die Welt, die 
schlicht seiende, und in ihr die seiende Natur, in das allegemeinschaftliche Phänomen ‚Welt‘, ‚Welt für alle 
wirklichen und möglichen Subjekte‘, von denen keines sich der intentionalen Implikation entziehen kann, der 
gemäß es in den Horizont eines jeden Subjekts vorweg hineingehört.“  
174 There has been a wealth of scholarship on the contemplation practice promoted and popularized by the 
Tiantai School of Buddhism (Chen 1964; Donner & Stevenson 1993; Kantor 2009; Swanson 2018). Regarding 
Yogācāra Buddhism, most studies are dedicated to resources in the Indo-Tibetan tradition. Paul Griffith, for 
instance, examines one particular meditative practice called nirodhasamapatti, literally translated as “attainment 
of cessation” in the Indian Buddhist traditions of Therāvada, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra (Griffiths 1986). In 
another paper, Nagao Gadjin enquires into the relationship between emptiness and meditation in early Yogācāra 
(Nagao 1978). Stephen Anacker investigates the notion of mindfulness in Vasubandhu’s 
Mahyāntavibhāgabhāṣya (Anacher 1978). Regarding abhisamaya, “the immediate insight”, Hayajima Kyosei 
and Mano Ryūkai have examined the etymology of this term in Sanskrit and Chinese, as well as the 
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early Yogācārins. As two consecutive steps of realizing the calm insight of emptiness, 
calming (zhi ⽌, śamatha) and contemplating (guan 觀, vipaśyanā) allow the practitioner to 
sweep misperceptions and obstructions from the luminous mind (T45N1861, P259b2). 
Different from early Yogācārins, Kuiji does not perceive calming and contemplating as 
two steps of one meditative practice. Rather, Kuiji envisions calming and contemplating as 
two separate practices, different by nature. Moreover, he maintains that insight is 
immediately acquired through one clear contemplation (T45N1861, P259a28). Different from 
the early Yogācāra practice of zhiguan (⽌觀, śamathavipaśyanā), contemplative practice in 
the later Yogācāra framework is known as xianguan (現觀, abhisamaya), the literal meaning 
of which is “immediate insight” in Chinese and “clear contemplation” in Sanskrit 
(T45N1861, P259b04).  
In understanding why Kuiji insists on demarcating the Yogācāra contemplative practice 
of xianguan (immediate insight) from the popular zhiguan (calming and concentrating), it 
would be helpful to turn to his articulation of “immediate insight” (T45N1861, 259a28-b7):   
 能觀唯識，以別境慧，⽽為⾃體。攝⼤乘第六說：為何義，故⼊唯識性？由緣總法出世⽌觀智故。 
無性解云，由三摩呬多，無顛倒智故。 或有解⾔，能觀唯識，通以⽌觀⽽為⾃性。此亦不然。若
取相應四蘊為體，若兼眷屬即通五蘊。今且依名，觀體唯慧。無性又云，唯識現觀智故；又云，由
三摩呬多，無顛倒智。但舉定中所起之智，以為觀體。作尋思等，勝唯識觀必居定故。不⾔即以⽌
為觀體。 
 That which can contemplate [for the realization of insight] is the mental factor of regulated reasoning. As 
preached in the sixth chapter of Mahāyānasaṃgraha, “What can lead one to enter the nature of 
Consciousness-only? The super-mundane wisdom of calming and contemplating all the conditions”. 
Asaṅga interprets it as the true wisdom in intense contemplation (samādhi). [In the Commentary on early 
Yogācāra,] [t]hat which can contemplate entails by nature the practice of calming and contemplating. This 
is not correct. If one can contemplate, one must correspondingly have four aggregates (i.e. feeling, 
thinking, actions, consciousness) as its support. If one shall take into account the relative supports, it can 
                                                        
development of this practice in India and Tibet (Hayajima 1956; Mano 1969). In his dissertation on Kuiji’s 
interpretation of Yogācāra, Alan Sponberg sketched the notion of five-levels of contemplation (Sponberg 1979). 
Though not detailing the early-later divide on the theory of meditative practice, Sponberg made a case for his 
argument that the notion of contemplation “represents K’uei-chi’s most original contribution both to Yogacara 
Buddhism in general and to Chinese Buddhism as well. It provides a model for the progressive realization of the 
fundamental principle of Mere Conceptualization (Vijñaptimātratā), a model outlining the successive levels by 
which one gains an understanding of delusion and experiences the enlightenment that constitutes nirvana” 
(1979, 78). Drawing on the aforementioned research, I position Kuiji’s elaboration on contemplation in the 
Yogācāra framework of consciousness, further examining the place of contemplation in Yogācāra practice. I 
will argue for perceiving this account of contemplation not as “a model for the progressive realization of the 
fundamental principle of Consciousness-only”, but rather as the first step towards gradual realization, which is 
followed by moral actions and social constructions.  
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also be said that one must have all five aggregates. For this reason, that which can contemplate shall only 
be the mental factor of reasoning. Asaṅga continues that the correct wisdom is that of the immediate 
insight of Consciousness-only. The correct wisdom arises in intense concentration, further being able to 
support contemplation. At the time [of contemplating], one has already followed the four inquiries 
(paryeṣaṇā) of contemplating Consciousness-only and therefore resided in concentration. Thereby, that 
which can calm can not serve as the body for contemplating.  
 
In a contemplative practice, Kuiji identifies the contemplated phenomenon and the 
contemplator; that is, that which can be contemplated and that which can contemplate for the 
purpose of realizing insights (T45N1861, P258b19-20). For Kuiji, all dharmas serve as the 
objects for contemplation, insofar as emptiness is the salient feature of how things actually 
are (T45N1861, P258b20). Those that can serve as the contemplator are mental factors. Each 
mental factor has its distinct epistemic function, among which the mental factor of 
concentration (ding 定, samādhi) guides the mind to calm down, whereas the mental factor of 
reasoning (hui 慧, prajñā) permits consciousnesses to contemplate (T45N1861, P259a28). As 
such, calming and contemplating become two separate practices in that they are enacted by 
different mental factors.  
Furthermore, the mental factor of concentration does not enact contemplation to acquire 
insights, but rather prepares the mental factor of reasoning for contemplation (T45N1861, 
P259b3). The insight of seeing things as they actually are enables sentient beings to correct 
misperceptions. As previously mentioned, misperceptions are produced by the seventh and 
sixth consciousnesses. Accordingly, to purify misperceptions and obtain insights, the mental 
factor in charge of contemplating needs to be able to accompany both the seventh and sixth 
consciousnesses. With respect to the mental factor of concentration (whose function is 
calming) and that of reasoning (in charge of contemplating), reasoning as a mental factor 
arises and accompanies both consciousnesses, while concentration as a mental factor is not 
affiliated with the seventh consciousness. Therefore, the mental factor of concentration can 
calm the mind down, but it cannot contemplate; the mental factor of reasoning can 
contemplate, but it cannot calm the mind down. That is why concentration and contemplation 
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are considered two separate practices, rather than two steps of one practice, in the later 
Yogācāra framework.  
Epoché, however, is distinct from the meditative practice elaborated by later Yogācārins. 
While Xuanzang and Kuiji envisage calming and contemplating as two separate practices, 
Husserl depicts epoché in such a way that suspending assumptions and observing mental acts 
in the domain of pure consciousness become two steps of one practice. Moreover, Xuanzang 
and Kuiji depict contemplation as a mental act which arises upon the sixth and seventh 
consciousnesses. In phenomenology, epoché is not articulated, at least not explicitly, by 
Husserl as an intentional mental act in the phenomenological attitude. That becomes the first 
reason why Yogācāra contemplation cannot be represented as a Buddhist version of epoché 
in the Husserlian sense.  
Besides, Husserl formulates epoché mainly as a philosophical speculation, which can be 
contrasted with Kuiji’s articulation of contemplation as a five-step religious practice known 
as the “five ranks of contemplating Consciousness-only (wuchongweishiguan 五重唯識
觀)”175 (T45N1861, P258b21-23; c15-18; c26-28; P259a4-6; a12-14):  
 ⼀遣虛存實識。觀遍計所執，唯虛妄起，都無體⽤。應正遣空，情有理無，故觀依他圓成諸法體
實。 
 First, one dispels the falsely perceived ones for preserving the real consciousness. In contemplation, one 
realizes that the falsely imagined ones have no body and function, properly negating the [two grasping for 
the] empty. These false images have fictitious existence in certain circumstances but have no real existence 
in principle. Thereby, one contemplates the dependent nature and the absolute nature, realizing that they 
are the true nature of various dharmas. 
 
 ⼆捨濫留純識。雖觀事理，皆不離識。然此內識，有境有⼼，⼼起必託內境⽣故。但識⾔唯，不⾔
唯境。成唯識⾔：識唯內有，境亦通外。恐濫外故，但⾔唯識。 
 Second, one renounces the superfluous ones for retaining the pure consciousness. Although one 
contemplates the events and principles, [one shall realize that] both of them are inseparable from 
consciousness. The inner consciousnesses have both the object [i.e. the image part] and the mind [i.e. the 
seeing part]. The mind arises, in reliance on the object. Yet, we say Consciousness-only, not object-only. 
[This is because,] as explained in the Chengweishilun, consciousness has only internal existence, while the 
object alludes to that which exists on the outside. To avoid the overusing of the external, we only say 
Consciousness-only.  
 
 三攝末歸本識。⼼內所取，境界顯然。內能取⼼，作⽤亦爾。此⾒相分，俱依識有。離識⾃體本，
末法必無故。 
                                                        
175 For an alternative translation, please consult Alan Sponberg (1979).  
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 Third, one is in charge of branches for returning to the origin. What is to be grasped in the mind manifests 
the object. That which can grasp inside alludes to the function of the mind. The image part and the seeing 
part exist interdependently of consciousness. Once these two parts divorce themselves from the underlying 
origin qua consciousness, they would become the non-existent dharmas of ending branches. 
 
 四隱劣顯勝識。⼼及⼼所，俱能變現。但說唯⼼，⾮唯⼼所，⼼王體殊勝，⼼所劣依勝⽣。隱劣不
彰唯顯勝法。 
 Fourth, one suppresses the inferior to foreground the superior. Both the consciousnesses and their mental 
factors could transform to manifest. Yet, we say Consciousness-only, not mental-factor-only, insofar as the 
consciousnesses are the superior kings on the ground of which there emerge the inferior mental factors. 
The inferior shall be suppressed to highlight the supreme ones.  
 
 五遣相證性識。識⾔所表，具有理事。事為相⽤，遣⽽不取。理為性體，應求作證。 
 Fifth, one dispels the image for realizing the nature. Consciousness (vijñāpti) amounts to that which can 
cause to know distinctly, which consists of both the principle and the event. The event refers to the image 
and the function, which one shall dispel. The principle alludes to the nature and the body, which one shall 
make an effort to realize.  
 
Engaged in contemplative practice, sentient beings first come to realize that everything in our 
experience arises from the activity of consciousness and, therefore, is not svabhāvic 
(T45N1861, P258b21). Second, sentient beings come to understand how consciousness has 
an intentional structure – every consciousness and its mental factors give rise to the seeing 
part, the image part, the underlying self-awareness, and the awareness of the self-awareness. 
Subsequently, they realize that various objects in one’s experience depend on consciousness 
to appear as image parts, namely, as perceivable phenomena (T45N1861, P258c15). Third, 
sentient beings comprehend that, just like dharmas, the self is also not svabhāvic but rather 
depends on consciousness to appear as the seeing parts (T45N1861, P258c29). Fourth, 
sentient beings realize that the mental factors transform themselves, the same way as 
consciousnesses (T45N1861, P259a5). Fifth, sentient beings eventually acquire the insight of 
emptiness (T45N1861, P259a12), becoming one with the impermanent nature of things in the 
cosmos and embodying the principle of arising and perishing. Upon accomplishing the five 
steps of contemplation, sentient beings acquire the horizontal and vertical insights. While 
their consciousnesses continue to function, sentient beings no longer misperceive the seeing 
parts and the seen parts as svabhāva but realize the interdependence of things in the cosmos 
(T45N1861, P259a13). Kuiji refers to the entirety of consciousnesses in this state as the 
immaculate mind of suchness (T45N1861, P259a14). In the five stages of realizing 
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Consciousness-only, sentient beings arrive at the third stage of seeing upon completing the 
five-step contemplation.  
Compared with Kuiji’s articulation of contemplation, Husserl does not yet detail how 
such a change of attitude can happen through epoché nor how one can testify to it. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether Husserl perceives epoché as the beginning of a set of 
ritualized techniques that can inform one about how to regulate individual life or how to 
interact with others in a community. Nor is epoché an integral part of the mechanics of 
religious training. Apparently, this is not the case for Xuanzang and Kuiji.176 If we interpret 
Kuiji’s articulation of “Five Ranks of Contemplating the Consciousness-only” as epoché in 
the phenomenological sense, then we overlook how Yogācāra contemplation is not 
completely identical to and, thus, cannot be equated with epoché in respect of its content.  
10.2 Empathy and Moral Actions177 
                                                        
176 Prior to Xuanzang’s return to China from India, the meditative practice of calming and contemplating had 
already become prevalent. This meditative practice, as detailed by Zhiyi in his manual of Great Calming and 
Contemplating (mohezhiguan 摩訶⽌觀), entails a system from how to monitor one’s breath to how to regulate 
one’s dietary routine, and how to conduct various rituals of bathing and chanting (T46N1911). As presented and 
preserved in the chronicles of Xuanzang and Kuiji, these rituals were still commonly enacted by Yogācāra 
clerics as their daily routine (T50N2053). For instance, even before Xuanzang entered nirvāṇa, namely, before 
passing away, he started an intense contemplation while the clergy in the Ci’en Temple were chanting sūtras for 
him (T50N2053, P277b1-11). 
177 When it comes to Buddhist ethics, existing scholarship tends to categorize the Buddhist teaching of moral 
actions in four fields, normative ethics (thoughts on the bases and justifications of moral guidelines); meta-
ethics (concerning the principles of moral truth), applied ethics (moral guidelines for specific cases), and 
descriptive ethics (how people actually behave) (Harvey 2000, 2).  
There is a wealth of scholarship on normative ethics (Gowans 2015; Goodman 2017). In this regard, the 
articulation of moral rules and precepts has been interpreted in four different ways (Gowans 2015; Goodman 
2017). 
First, Hedonism. This is mainly because Buddhist followers undertake religious training to overcome suffering 
through liberation and enlightenment. In the hedonist framework, some scholars continue to understand 
Buddhist ethics as one form of utilitarianism (Barnhart 2012; Harris 2015), others as consequentialism (Siderits 
2003).  
Second, Virtue Ethics. This is because Buddhist training serves as the method for cultivating various virtues in 
practitioners, so they could help all sentient beings realize a flourishing life (Keown 1992). 
Third, Character Consequentialism, which intends to incorporate virtue ethics into classical consequentialism 
and, thereby, reject hedonism (which prioritizes happiness over others for one’s well-being) (Goodman 2009, 
2017). 
Fourth, Aretaic Consequentialism, another attempt to combine hedonism and virtue ethics, which perceives 
Buddhist training as the development of virtuous characters for oneself through which one could attain 
happiness (Siderits 2007). 
Nevertheless, several scholars refuse to impose the framework of normative ethics upon Buddhist theories, 
insofar as Buddhism encompasses a plurality of traditions and therefore does not present a universal viewpoint 
on ethics (Hallisey 1996). This is probably the case for later Yogācāra Buddhism. As previously mentioned, the 
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In the Yogācāra system, when sentient beings acquire the vertical and horizontal insights of 
seeing things as they actually are, they come to realize the interconnectedness of the self and 
others. Such interconnectedness alludes to the larger collective consciousness and motivates 
sentient beings to conduct altruistic actions. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, Chinese 
Yogācārins, like Xuanzang and Kuiji, capture the collectivity of consciousness in their 
investigation of the knowledge of other minds. They contend that each sentient being does 
have direct knowledge of the minds of others through the second-person perspective. 
Considering how the second-person perspective reveals the interconnectedness of the self and 
others at the descriptive level, it can serve as the starting point for people to think about their 
moral responsibility for other “fellow humans” (Hua 27/24). As remarked by Steven Crowell, 
“ethics is a technical term for an essential feature of second-person phenomenology, namely, 
the experience of being addressed by a normative claim” (Crowell 2017, 70). While Husserl 
also describes how the second-person perspective is indispensable to people’s experience at 
the descriptive level, he does not move one step further to explain how such a perspective 
                                                        
goal of religious training and moral actions is to realize dependent-evolution, which entails a twofold awakening 
as liberation for oneself and enlightenment for others. Articulated in this manner, Buddhist moral actions not 
only fulfil the goals of self-cultivation and happiness for oneself but also go beyond them.  
Meta-ethics, according to Michael Huemer, addresses the ultimate question of whether objective moral values 
exist (Huemer 2005, 4). Those who acknowledge this existence are known as moral realists in contrast to moral 
anti-realists who negate the existence of such objective moral values (Huemer 2005, 4). By objectivity, Huemer 
means a non-subjective quality, in contrast to a subjective quality that always depends on our psychological 
attitude or response towards things, an attitude that has the tendency to elicit our actions (Huemer 2005, 2). 
Regarding the degree to which moral anti-realists deny the existence of objective moral values, their standpoints 
can be further categorized into three types: subjectivism (for which moral values are inherently subjective), non-
cognitivism (moral evaluation does not yield any propositions about objective existence), and nihilism (there is 
no such thing as an objective value) (Huemer 2005, 4). Contrariwise, there are two varieties of moral realism: 
ethical naturalism (objective moral properties exist but such properties can be reduced to non-evaluative ones) 
and ethical intuitionism (objective moral properties exist and are irreducible, which we can know intuitively) 
(Huemer 2005, 6). From Huemer’s outline, we can infer that the concern for meta-ethics in contemporary 
philosophy is the existence of objective moral value. This concern, however, differs enormously from that of 
Chinese Buddhists who lived in the 600s CE. Further, the latter do not deliberately demarcate meta-ethics from 
applied ethics or normative ethics. Nevertheless, if we agree to follow Huemer’s line of thinking, we might be 
able to classify ethics in the Yogācāra sense as a type of ethical intuitionism in terms of meta-ethics, namely, we 
have an intuitive and irreducible knowledge of right and wrong (in virtue of the function of consciousnesses and 
their mental factors), which urges us to conduct moral deeds.  
Applied ethics center on discussions of moral actions in instantiated cases, such as animals, environment, 
violence, etc. We have not seen many discussions on these subject matters in Xuanzang and Kuiji’s writings. 
Nevertheless, in the liturgical texts composed by Kuiji’s disciples, there are traces of such accounts which can 
be interpreted in terms of applied ethics.  
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justifies moral actions for others. As I will argue in this section, although Yogācārins express 
a view of the experience of other minds that shares a similar function with what Husserl 
refers to as empathy at the descriptive level, Chinese Yogācārins, like Xuanzang and Kuiji, 
explicitly link the second-person experience with moral actions and prescribe instructions for 
such actions. As such, Yogācāra Buddhism is more than a Buddhist version of 
phenomenology, regarding the mechanics of conducting moral actions.  
In his later writings, such as Cartesian Meditations, Husserl started to tackle the issue of 
solipsism. To explore how the ego of one person is not a closed system but interdependent 
with others, Husserl expands intentionality from that of the “I” to that of the “We”, further 
bringing to light the second-person perspective of experience. In this exploration, he depicts 
the way in which the consciousness of each ego is contextualized in and presupposes the 
collective consciousness of the we – all the individuals in a community mutually constitute 
the primordial life-world that serves as the context for the communal experience. As Husserl 
describes, “the constitution of the world essentially involves a harmony of the monads 
(egos)” (Hua 1/138), and “each of us has his life-world, meant as the world for all” (Hua 
6/257).  Now, since alterity is an indispensable part of each ego’s experience, the self and 
others are interconnected. In other words, self-identity is correlated with, though not 
assimilated into, the identities of others. As clarified later by Husserl, the essence of each ego 
consists in its being in the world and being with others.  
Egos in a community primordially constitute the life-world. Usually, they are not 
actively aware of such primordial constitution, unless they are deprived of it. Solitary 
confinement epitomizes such deprival. After observing how the experiential structure of 
prisoners has been impaired by prolonged solitary confinement, Lisa Guenther remarks that 
punishment like solitary confinement distorts the life-world of prisoners (Guenther 2011, 
259):  
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Deprived of everyday encounters with other people, and confined to a space with radically diminished 
sensory stimulus, many inmates come unhinged from reality. Their senses seem to betray them; objects 
begin to move, melt or shrink of their own accord. Even the effort to reflect on their experience becomes a 
form of pathology, leading one prisoner to ‘‘dwell on it for hours,’’ while another goes into ‘‘a complete 
standstill’’. They can’t think straight, can’t remember things, can’t focus properly, and can’t even see 
clearly. What is the prisoner in solitary confinement at risk of losing, to the point of ‘‘not get[ing it] 
back’’?  
 
Drawing on Husserl’s writings of collective consciousness and life-world, Guenther explains 
how solitary confinement cuts inmates off from concrete social engagement and forces them 
to leave the mutual constitution of life-world with others, eventually becoming violence 
against the transcendental structure of human experience (Guenther 2011, 270). She 
continues to pose a political question about whether there is a legitimate justification for 
prolonged solitary confinement if it is known to all how such punishment can damage the 
essence of a person (Guenther 2011, 275). Although Husserl prepares a wealth of resources 
for justifying moral responsibility for others, his view of ethics remains nascent.  
Also acknowledging the interconnectedness of the self and others, Chinese Yogācārins 
put forward a systematic theory of moral actions. In the wake of the immediate insight of 
seeing things as they actually are, Buddhist practitioners realize the self-other 
interdependence and willingly return to the saṃsāra to conduct altruistic actions for other 
unawakened ones. In return, these moral actions sustain and refine the realization of acquired 
insights. This interplay between seeing/knowing and living/doing is encapsulated in the 
Yogācāra maxim that the seeds in the storehouse consciousness preserve the source of 
present actions, whereas these actions perfume the seeds (種⼦⽣現⾏，現⾏熏種⼦). 
Keeping in mind the interplay between doing and knowing, Yogācāra Buddhists in their daily 
practices incessantly cultivate themselves so that altruism can become as habitual as a second 
nature. Such a long process of rehabitualization consists in engagement in the “ten perfect 
actions” (⼗勝⾏, ten pāramitā) (T31N1585, P51b8):  
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The perfect actions Elaboration   
 Giving (bushi 布 施 , 
dāna) (T31N1585, P51b8) 
There are three types of giving: material treasure, support for those to 
overcome fear, preaching dharma for others. (T31N1585, P51b9) 
Precept (jie 戒, śīla) 
(T31N1585, P51b9) 
There are three types of precepts: adhering to the commandments, to the 
good actions, to the altruistic values. (T31N1585, P51b10) 
Forbearance (ren 忍 , 
kṣānti)  
(T31N1585, P51b10) 
There are three types of forbearance: tolerating hatred from others, 
sufferings in practice, and difficulty in understanding dharma. (T31N1585, 
P51b11) 
Perseverance (jingjin
精進, vīrya) 
(T31N1585, P51b11) 
 
There are three types of perseverance: mustering up the courage to 
overcome hardship, making an effort to conduct good deeds, and persisting in 
benefiting others.  
(T31N1585, P51b12) 
Quiet rumination 
(jinglü 静虑, dhyāna) 
(T31N1585, P51b12) 
There are three types of quiet ruminations: residing in rumination, 
ruminating on merit actions, and ruminatng on benefiting others.  
(T31N1585, P51b13) 
Reasoning (banruo 般
若, prajña) 
(T31N1585, P51b13) 
 
There are three types of reasoning: non-discriminative reasoning of the 
empty life, non-discriminative reasoning of the empty dharma, and non-
discriminative reasoning of all that is empty. 
(T31N1585, P51b15) 
Skillful means 
(fangbian ⽅便, upaya) 
(T31N1585, P51b15) 
There are two types of skillful means: the skillful means of not residing in 
saṃsāra and of not residing in nirvāṇa. 
(T31N1585, P51b16) 
Vows (yuan 願 , 
praṇidhāna) 
(T31N1585, P51b16) 
There are two types of vows: vowing to attain the Bodhi and vowing to 
benefit others. 
(T31N1585, P51b17) 
Resolve (li ⼒, bala) 
(T31N1585, P51b17) 
There are two types of resolve: that in contemplating and that in practicing. 
(T31N1585, P51b17) 
Wisdom (zhi 智, jñāna) 
(T31N1585, P51b17) 
 
There are two types of wisdom: the wisdom of seeing things as they really 
are and of solving suffering for sentient beings.  
(T31N1585, P51b18) 
 
As previously mentioned towards the end of Chapter 9, the perfect actions are enacted by 
practitioners in all five stages of the Bodhisattvas’ path. Yet, it is only at the fourth stage of 
refinement that they play a crucial role (T31N1585, P52b3-4). Xuanzang explains why this is 
so as follows: in the first two stages, practitioners have just attained an initial understanding 
of emptiness; therefore, some of the seeds for these perfect actions in the storehouse 
consciousness remain polluted by previous actions (T31N1585, P52b5). Even until the third 
stage of seeing, when devotees finally manage to acquire insights and remove attachments, 
some impure seeds continue to exist inside the storehouse consciousness of these 
practitioners (T31N1585, P52b5). It is only by performing the ten perfect actions during the 
fourth stage of refinement that the Bodhisattvas are able to purify all the seeds prior to 
entering the last ultimate stage (T31N1585, P52b6-8). Thereby, at the stage of refinement, the 
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Bodhisattvas spare no effort to conduct the ten perfect actions, further purifying the 
actualized actions and the unactualized seeds. Towards the end of this stage, they will be able 
to eradicate every single possibility of misperception, attachment, and obstruction, be it in the 
embodied sense or the discriminative one. By then, they are able to realize dependent 
evolution, attaining liberation for oneself and enlightenment for others (T31N1585, P51a21). 
While the ethical aspect remains nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology, Yogācārins have 
provided a more elaborate and explicit account of moral actions, which further indicates why 
Yogācāra Buddhism is more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology.  
10.3 Communal Renewal and Social Construction 
As previously mentioned, Yogācārins contend that it is not enough to purify the mind of one 
sentient being. Considering the interdependence and interconnectedness of all sentient beings 
in the collective consciousness, true awakening will be realized when all consciousnesses are 
purified from misperceptions and attachments. It is through the collaborative effort of all 
sentient beings that all consciousnesses can transform into wisdom and the cosmos can 
become a pure dharma realm. The idea of constituting an ideal realm through collaborative 
effort is sketched by Husserl in his proposal of liberating Europe from the existential crisis. 
As I will argue in this section, although the function of such constitution is compatible with 
that in Yogācāra Buddhism (function as liberating sentient beings from suffering and 
ensuring the flourishing of life), the content of social construction is closely related to the 
concept of Pure Land in Yogācāra Buddhism, which remains distinct from and richer than 
Husserl’s view of renewing community (Hua 27/31).  
Husserl expresses his view of social construction in the Kaizo articles. Witnessing how 
naturalism results in a crisis of meaning in Europe, Husserl not only appeals to a 
rehabitualization of individual life but also advocates for a renewal of communal life (Hua 
27/30). In this sense, the call for renewal alludes to a soteriology envisioned by Husserl 
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(Buckley 2017, 4). Just as for each individual, a remedy to the existential crisis consists in 
awakening from the natural attitude and accepting the phenomenological attitude; the renewal 
of communal life takes place through a collaborative effort of community members to 
liberate themselves from the current culture and to re-establish an authentic life. As per 
Husserl, when an individual liberates oneself through conducting epoché, this ego acquires 
the insight of its true essence as being in the world and being with others, so this ego will 
naturally have the desire to make the community a better place for itself and for other 
community members (Hua 27/46). Awakened from the natural attitude, this ego undertakes 
the responsibility of convincing others, through preaching and ethical instructions, to inspire 
and enlighten more members in the community (Hua 28/52-54). Here, Husserl offers the 
insight of how the well-being of each individual is interdependent with others in a 
community and how a better community will appear through collaborative effort. He lays out 
the principles for community-building. However, he does not detail the mechanics of such 
renewal of the communal life (Buckley 2017, 29).  
Yogācārins in China have expressed a compatible view of “renewal” in the idea of 
dependent-evolution (轉依 āśraya-parivṛtti), which brings about liberation (nirvāṇa) for 
oneself and enlightenment (bodhi) for others. As clarified in Chapter 8, once consciousnesses 
evolve into wisdom, all misperceptions, attachments, and obstructions will be removed from 
both the actualized actions and the unactualized seeds of sentient beings. The eighth 
consciousness will turn into the wisdom of perfection (T31N1585, P56a12-16): those who 
realize this wisdom will be able to access the subtle transformation of the storehouse 
consciousness, becoming further aware of the minds of sentient beings throughout every 
phase of the cosmic history without grasping them as svabhāva. The seventh consciousness 
evolves into the wisdom of equality, through which sentient beings embrace otherness as an 
indispensable part of themselves, further arousing the innate compassion of seeing other 
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beings throughout cosmic history as one’s equals (T31N1585, P56a17-21). The sixth 
consciousness purifies itself into the wisdom of wondrous observation with the help of which 
sentient beings perceive various dharmas in the cosmos without misconceiving them as 
svabhāvas (T31N1585, P56a21-25). The first five consciousnesses evolve into the wisdom of 
accomplishment, which allows the sentient beings to perceive objects throughout the cosmic 
history (T31N1585, P56a26-28).  
The evolution of consciousness into wisdom soon brings about a transformation of the 
entire cosmos. While Husserl does not depict the mechanics of this transformation, Chinese 
Yogācārins like Xuanzang and Kuiji outline such mechanics in the theory of three bodies 
(sanshen 三⾝, trikāya). Throughout history, the concept of three-body has been utilized by 
Buddhist clergy to explain why the Buddha “extends beyond the physical human being” and 
manifests in such different ways in the scriptures, especially in the sūtras (Williams 2008, 
173-174). As such, it is fair to understand the idea of body in this context as that which is 
currently known as the idea of embodied space – the space in which one’s experience could 
take on material and spatial forms (Low 2003). These three bodies are the dharma body, the 
enjoyment body, and the emanation body.  
The purified eighth consciousness as the mirroring wisdom manifests as the self-
enjoyment body (zishouyongshen ⾃受⽤⾝, svasambhogakāya) (T31N1585, P58a25). The 
mirroring wisdom enables the awakened ones to perceive the holistic image of all things in 
the cosmos (T45N1861, P360a3). In a figurative sense, it seems that the body of Buddhas is 
able to purely reflect and manifest the entire cosmic history as it actually is (T31N1585, 
P58a26-27). Pure as such, this reflection is devoid of any svabhāvic views, thus providing the 
Bodhisattvas with the endless enjoyment of attaining liberation (T31N1585, P58c1-3). 
Given that each sentient being is interdependent on one another throughout beginningless 
time, the purified seventh consciousness, now known as the wisdom of equality, gives rise to 
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the other-enjoyment body (tashouyongshen 他受⽤⾝, parsambhogakāya) (T31N1585, 
P58a24). Through the power of this other-enjoyment body, the Bodhisattvas are able to 
manifest various Pure Lands for the purpose of benefiting other sentient beings, including 
even the most ignorant icchantikas (T45N1861, P369a22). These Lands of Bliss – inter alia, 
those of Amitābha, Bhaiṣajyaguru, or Maitreya – attest to the great compassion of Buddhas 
and Bodhisattvas. From time to time, they metamorphose into the image of others, in virtue 
of the wisdom of accomplishment, so as to preach to sentient beings (T31N1585, P58c14), 
which manifests their emanation body (bianhuashen 變化⾝, nirmāṇakāya) (T31N1585, 
P58c14).  
To foreground how emptiness serves as the nature of things in the cosmos and how the 
pure dharma realm serves as the principle of change, Xuanzang and Kuiji compare emptiness 
to the dharma-body (fashen 法⾝, dharmakāya), which penetrates the arising and perishing of 
illusory dharmas (T31N1585, P57a12). Such dharma-body is also the body of the Buddha as 
well as the pure dharma realm (T31N1585, P57a18). The entire cosmos is, thus, the 
embodied space for the awakened ones. 
The soteriological goal for Yogācārins is to purify the cosmos polluted with 
misperceptions and mental defilements so as to reveal the pure dharma realm. As such, the 
pure dharma realm becomes the ideal society for all sentient beings to dwell. As expounded 
by Kuiji, only the dharma body has real existence. In contrast, various types of Pure Land are 
not ultimately real but rather serve as the provisional means. These lands, manifested by the 
Buddhas, are often depicted as the heavenly realms of bliss where pious devotes, even the 
most ignorant icchantikas, can ascend if they have collected enough karmic merit during the 
current life. From his interpretation of the Pure Lands, namely these other-enjoyment bodies, 
Kuiji develops his view that these wondrous heavenly realms have no ultimately real 
existence (T45N1861, P369b16).  
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The reason why Kuiji contends that Pure Lands have no ultimately real existence 
bespeaks his view of how to realize an ideal society. In understanding his stance towards 
social construction, it will be helpful to recall our previous discussion on self-power and 
other-power in the preceding Chapter 9. Although Kuiji highlights the wondrous power of 
Bodhisattvas’ compassion, he still conceives of relying on other-power as an expedient way 
of training. The Pure Land manifested in virtue of compassion for sentient beings, therefore, 
serves as a skillful, provisional means of no ultimately real existence (T45N1861, P369b16). 
Stemming from the great compassion and resolve of the Bodhisattvas, a land of bliss 
manifests itself to the ignorant ones, like an image in a mirror (T45N1861, P371a20; 
P373a9). Having become familiar with the wisdom and compassion in the Pure Land, these 
ignorant ones regain pure seeds in their minds and are then motivated to pursue goodness. 
After several rounds of death and rebirth, the ignorant can gradually purify their own 
consciousness through self-power and realize their self-enjoyment body by following the five 
stages of realizing Consciousness-only on the Bodhisattvas’ path (T45N1861, P371c5).   
This discussion of Kuiji’s approach to the Pure Land gives practical meaning to the 
interpretation of the Yogācāra worldview presented in this dissertation, which I interpret as 
transcendental idealism. As sentient beings, we cannot determine the existence of the dharma 
body nor that of the pure dharma realm. However, we can shape how this dharma body 
appears for us and how we live in it. For those who misperceive things in the cosmos as 
svabhāva, the dharma body manifests to them as the polluted realm, the realm of suffering, or 
in Buddhist terms, the Sahālokadhātu (suoposhijie 娑婆世界). Yet, upon purifying and 
removing these misperceptions and subsequent attachments, we embrace and immerse 
ourselves with the dharma body, which is disclosed to us as the enjoyment body. The ideal 
society, as Kuiji indicates, is not a heavenly realm of material existence to which we ascend 
upon death (T45N1861, P372b24-25). Rather, when we purify our mind through a 
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collaborative effort, we find ourselves living in the Pure Dharma Realm with other sentient 
beings (T45N1861, P372b29). The Bodhisattvas who return to saṃsāra, thus, help and await 
as ignorant sentient beings awaken, so that they can collaborate to constitute a Pure Land as 
such in saṃsāra.  
Hereby, just as Buddha nature amounts to an ideal state for an individual sentient being, 
so does Pure Land suggest the ideal society, which is realized in the future through the effort 
of all sentient beings. At the societal level, the surface of such Pure Land likewise benefits 
the practitioner per se, as well as all other beings in the cosmos. Such an idea of a perfect 
society is suggested by Kuiji in the Yogācāra faith of Maitreya’s Pure Land. Following 
Xuanzang, Kuiji contends that, in the future, Maitreya Buddha will descend to the human 
realm to realize the Pure Land in this realm (T38N1772, P295b3). By then, all sentient beings 
will be reborn to the home of Maitreya and then live in the land of bliss. 178 Standing between 
the self and others, there arises the gist of Yogācāra Buddhism, its epistemology at the 
descriptive level, its metaphysics at the explicative level, and its soteriology at the 
prescriptive level. Although Husserl provides a nascent account of this soteriology through 
outlining basic principles for contemplation, moral action, and social construction, he does 
                                                        
178 As demonstrated by many murals in the Mogao Grottoes, the faith in Maitreya was prevalent in the 600s 
around the early Tang dynasty. In these visual representations, Maitreya Buddha descends to the human realm 
from the Tuśita heaven to preach to sentient beings in this world. Although such a notion of “realizing the Pure 
Land in the human realm” might strike readers as modern, we should keep in mind that such a realization 
requires practice and ritualized training that stretches over billions of years throughout countless rounds of death 
and rebirth. When it comes to proselytization, this premodern version of “Pure Land on Earth” was far less 
attractive than a heavenly happy realm where sentient beings could go upon death. Indeed, the faith in 
Maitreya’s Pure Land gradually subsided in the history of Chinese Buddhism, in place of which Amitābha’s 
Pure Land (a heavenly realm) thrived and flourished in China. Nevertheless, along with the revival of Yogācāra 
Buddhism in early Republican China, this conception of “constituting a Pure Land on Earth” likewise was 
rediscovered by Buddhist reformers and scholars, among others, Ven. Taixu (太虛 1890-1947) who has been 
recognized as the founder of modern humanistic Buddhism. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
investigate how the pre-modern conception of Maitreya’s Pure Land on Earth inspired Taixu’s humanistic 
Buddhism. What I wish to point out here is that Taixu’s modern expression of Buddhist doctrine, commonly 
known as humanistic Buddhism in English language scholarship, is not his personal creation but a 
reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrinal philosophy with the help of the long-forgotten Yogācāra doctrine of 
Consciousness-only at that time.   
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not detail the mechanics of such soteriology. Soteriology at the prescriptive level eventually 
makes Yogācāra much more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology.  
 
Epilogue: Doing Comparative Philosophy in a Multicultural Society 
 
In previous chapters, we examined a perceived incompatibility that arises when scholars try 
to compare Husserl’s phenomenology with Yogācāra philosophy in the multicultural and 
multilingual context. When intellectuals try to read Yogācāra Buddhism as a Buddhist 
version of phenomenology, they are soon confronted with this perceived incompatibility 
about essence: Husserl affirms the existence of essence and defines phenomenology as the 
science of essence, whereas Yogācārins negate the existence of svabhāva, also translated as 
essence in English. Through our analysis, it becomes clear that what Husserl means by 
essence is different from what Yogācārins mean by svabhāva. As such, the problem of 
essence is no longer a problem for the current project, which opens a way for doing a 
comparative study of the two.  
The comparative study unfolds in three parts. Part One examines the descriptive level of 
both intellectual traditions. Upon demonstrating how Husserl’s notion of intentionality can be 
related to the Yogācāra view of the intentional structure of consciousness, I have argued how 
Husserl’s view of consciousness is not completely identical to that in Chinese Yogācāra. To 
do so, we have first outlined four phases in Husserl’s philosophical thinking through which 
he continued to enrich the notion of intentionality. Afterwards, we have explored how 
Husserl’s formulation of intentionality can be related to the Yogācāra articulation of 
consciousness, especially to their translation of vijñāna and vijñapti as consciousness and to 
their definition of the fourfold structure of consciousness. Then, turning back to Husserl, we 
have investigated how the Yogācāra depiction of the intentional feature of mental acts 
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complicates and complements the Husserlian notion of intentionality. Travelling on the same 
road, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins utilize their conceptions of intentionality to depict the 
origin of knowledge and highlight the contribution of intuition, both having provided 
resources to support non-conceptualism.  
The tracks of the two soon diverge at the explicative level where Husserl and Chinese 
Yogācārins explain the ultimate nature of reality based on their studies of intentionality. In 
his critique of naturalism that reduces everything to factuality, Husserl utilizes essence to 
capture that which defines things as they actually are, a notion that is in contrast with 
factuality. He, therefore, envisages phenomenology as a science of essence. Yogācārins, in 
their investigation of what defines things as they are, stress that everything in the cosmos has 
no essential core and is not svabhāva. As such, a perceived incompatibility transpires. We 
have coined the term problem of essence to capture this divergence, which indicates how 
Husserl and Yogācārins seem to have different attitudes towards essence. After clarifying 
what Husserl means by essence is not the same as what Chinese Yogācārins mean by 
svabhāva, we have solved the problem. The solution further allows us to interpret the 
worldview expressed by Husserl and Yogācārins as transcendental idealism, which 
accentuates the interdependence and mutual constitution of the mind and the world, of the 
organism and its surroundings, and of the self and others. Although the problem of essence 
does not undermine our comparative study, it is also not irrelevant. Investigating the problem 
of essence brings to the forefront a number of important implications for a comparative study 
of philosophical traditions in a multicultural, multilingual context.  
After travelling through the first two levels, Husserl and Chinese Yogācārins reach the 
destination of their investigation of consciousness where their philosophical insights inform 
their respective articulations of soteriology at the prescriptive level. I have argued that 
Husserl’s view of soteriology is rather nascent, in that he outlines basic principles for agency, 
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liberation, contemplation, moral action, and social construction, but he does not detail the 
mechanics of such soteriology. In contrast, Chinese Yogācārins put forward a more elaborate 
system of moral actions and religious practice known as the Bodhisattvas’ path. We have 
examined this system by addressing three questions consecutively: Do sentient beings have 
the agency to pursue the path of liberation? If all sentient beings have agency, then what is 
the point of sorting them into different families? How should one pursue the path of 
liberation? In answering these questions, we have elucidated that Chinese Yogācārins 
articulate causality in a distinct way, so as to affirm the existence of agency without negating 
the pervasive function of karma. Regarding the fact that sentient beings have different levels 
of agency, Chinese Yogācārins continue to support the controversial gotra theory, not to 
depreciate the ignorant ones but rather to compliment the great compassion of the 
Bodhisattvas. In their attempt to locate a middle way between self-power and other-power, 
Chinese Yogācārins present the Bodhisattvas’ path as a process of self-cultivation through 
meditation, moral actions, and the construction of an ideal society. While the idea of self-
cultivation in these three different aspects remains to be further developed in Husserl’s 
phenomenology, Yogācārins in East Asia, through generations of effort, have put forward 
more elaborate forms of self-cultivation, which eventually makes Yogācāra Buddhism much 
more than a Buddhist version of phenomenology.  
Our analysis serves as an experiment of tackling perceived incompatibilities in cross-
cultural communication. In our experiment, we have explored what is involved when a 
comparison is made across a cultural and linguistic divide. The goal of this study, thereby, is 
not to demonstrate how phenomenology and Yogācāra Buddhism can be fused into a meta-
theory of consciousness. Nor does it intend to depict them as unable to have dialogues. 
Rather, it clarifies how the resolution to these perceived incompatibilities can advance our 
understanding of both traditions in a crosscultural and multilingual context. On the one hand, 
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we come to see how the prescriptive level of Yogācāra Buddhism makes it much more than a 
Buddhist version of phenomenology; and on the other, we discern the nascent version of 
soteriology in Husserl’s phenomenology, which has been developed into a phenomenological 
theology by later philosophers like Edith Stein and Michel Henry. Compared as such, one 
tradition becomes the mirror of the other.  
Almost twenty years ago, when Iso Kern, the well-respected Husserlian scholar, shifted 
his interest to Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism, he remarked that (Kern 1992, 268),  
 I have a feeling that phenomenological thinkers, conditioned by Western languages and culture, will find 
this philosophy something alien, different and unfamiliar. But they will also, I feel, find in it, in spite of 
different cultural presuppositions, insights with intercultural appeal – for the problems it deals with are 
universal problems of philosophy… My making a link here between phenomenology and the thinking of 
Vijñānavāda merely intended to let occidental phenomenologists guess that Vijñānavāda may be for them a 
treasure house to be explored and tapped. Indian phenomenologists and philosophers may clarify and 
correct many of the points I have referred here. 
 
Kern has expressed his wish for phenomenologists to expand their horizon from European 
philosophy to the non-European intellectual traditions. In this case, Yogācāra philosophy 
serves as a treasure house, not because it should be fused with phenomenology, but rather 
because it reveals the possibility of intercultural communication. Recognizing and respecting 
diversity, comparative philosophy has the possibility of securing a middle ground as a shared 
space of understanding between the two philosophical traditions so that people from two 
cultures can discover and deal with perceived incompatibilities. This middle ground allows 
one to explore how Husserl and Yogācārins, through their respective manners, describe the 
perceptions of the self and others, explain the ultimate nature of reality, and prepare 
guidelines for actions (either nascent in Husserl’s phenomenology or more elaborate in 
Yogācāra Buddhism).  
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